REBUKE AND ANGER IN PLATO’S APOLOGE

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RESUMO: Leitores da Apologia de Sócrates de Platão, de Xenofonte em diante, espantaram-se com o fato de que Sócrates, em contraste com outros defensores em julgamentos legais, parece provocar deliberadamente cólera em seu júri. Eu proponho que o uso que Sócrates faz de metáforas militares e sua alusão a Aquiles em particular, provê importantes mas negligenciadas pistas para seus motivos. Na Ilíada, como bem sabe o júri de Sócrates, um herói frequentemente admoesta o outro, provocando vergonha e cólera na intenção de incitar um guerreiro a lutar corajosamente. As admoestações de Sócrates aos atenienses seguem o padrão específico da admoestação homérica, e têm o mesmo objetivo: provocar cólera e vergonha na intenção de incitar sua audiência a buscar a virtude.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: cólera, admoestação, Sócrates, Platão, Apologia.

ABSTRACT: Readers of Plato’s Apology, from Xenophon on, have wondered why Socrates, in contrast to other defendants in legal trials, seems deliberately to arouse anger in his jury. I argue that Socrates’ use of military metaphors and his allusions to Achilles in particular provide important but neglected clues to his motives. In the Iliad, as Socrates’ jury well knew, one hero frequently rebukes another, arousing shame and anger in order to stir a warrior to fight courageously. Socrates’ rebukes to the Athenians follow the specific pattern of the Homeric rebuke, and they have the same goal: to arouse anger and shame in order to stir his audience to pursue virtue.

KEYWORDS: anger, rebuke, Socrates, Plato, Apology.

I. "Perhaps you would be annoyed"

The ordinary defendant in a legal trial attempts to arouse pity in the jurors. There is good reason for this because, as David Konstan argues, pity presupposes the innocence of the accused. In contrast, Socrates in Plato’s Apology explicitly condemns appeals to pity (for example, 34b4, 35b7), while he seems intent on arousing anger in the jury. He asks them, for example, not to make a disturbance (θορυβε/υν) if he speaks to them in his accustomed manner (17c6-d1, 27b1-2), or seems to be boasting (20e4-5, 21a5), or says other things that they dislike (30c3-7). He acknowledges that what he says may annoy them (ἄχθος: 31a4, 31e1-2)

1 Konstan 2001, 27-48, and 43, noting Aristotle’s view that pity is for undeserved suffering (Po. 13.1453a5). See also de Strycker and Slings 1994, 179-180.
or irritate them (ἀγακτήσειεν: 34c1), thus causing them to harden themselves against him and to vote in anger (34c7-d1). Socrates also often calls attention to the fact that he angered or aroused enmity in many Athenians before his trial.²

Various explanations have been offered for this apparently perverse and self-destructive behavior. Xenophon writes of Socrates' arrogance (megalègoria) and claims that he wanted the jury to condemn him to death because the god thought it was best for him to escape the troubles of old age (Ap. 5-9). Thomas West holds that Socrates "seems to go out of his way to boast about himself and to antagonize the jury," and that in so doing he is guilty of doing injustice.³ According to Erwin Wolff, however, Socrates is a pure example of Aristotle's great-souled man, who speaks freely because he despises others (NE 1124b27).⁴ Gabriel Danzig holds that "Socrates frequently displays a strange combination of arrogance and humility. This arises from the predicament Plato finds himself in: Socrates really did speak arrogantly." Plato, according to Danzig, "acknowledges the arrogance while toning it down."⁵ Many explain Socrates' apparent arrogance as the result of his commitment to telling the truth, whatever the cost. C. D. C. Reeve, for example, takes issue with the view that Socrates "purposely antagonizes and alienates the jury," arguing that instead, he "subordinate[s] persuasion to telling the truth."⁶ A similar interpretation is offered by E. de Strycker and S. R. Slings, who hold that Socrates is portrayed as a "man who speaks the truth and cares only for justice (18a3-6), regardless of the consequences."⁷ According to John Burnet, Plato's "Socrates would have been glad to secure an acquittal (19a2sqq.), if that could be done without stooping to unworthy compromises which would give the lie to his whole life (38d3sqq)."⁸ And Thomas Brickhouse and Nicholas Smith argue that "Socrates must offer a sincere and effective defense, intended to convince his jurors of his innocence," and that "as he speaks to the jurors he cannot act in such a way as to violate his principles, even if acting in that way would be likely to arouse the sympathy of the jurors."⁹

I agree with those scholars who argue that Socrates is more concerned with telling the truth about himself than with being acquitted. However, I hold that he has another goal, that of arousing his audience to pursue virtue, and that this goal leads him deliberately to arouse

² See, for example, 21d1-2, 21e3-4, 23a1-2, 23e8-9, 23e5, 24a6-7, 28a6-9, 37c8-d2. On the difference between anger and enmity see Konstan 2006, 185-6.
³ West 1979, 79, 149-50.
⁴ Wolff 1929, 6; cf. 27, 49-51, 67.
⁵ Danzig 2003, 292.
⁶ Reeve 1989, 6-7
⁷ de Strycker and Slings 1994, 11-12.
⁸ Burnet 1924, 145.
⁹ Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 40-41 and 46, and 1984, with bibliography n. 3, 42-43.
anger in the jurors and in other Athenians--anger not against Socrates, but against themselves. His use of military metaphors, and, in particular, his allusions to Achilles provide an important, but neglected, clue to this goal.

Socrates frequently alludes to military activities in the *Apology*. The word he uses to refer to his examination of others, *exetasis*, originally had the military sense of "muster, review, scrutiny." He also calls attention to his own military service (28e1-4) and compares his life of examination to keeping his station in battle (28d5-29a2, 33e3-39b8). Socrates not only reminds the jurors of contemporary military combat, he also compares his own willingness to risk his life to that of one particular warrior: Homer's Achilles. This "demigod," he says, thought so little of death and danger, when set besides doing anything shameful, that he accepted his own death as the price of punishing Hektor for killing Patroklos (28b9-d4). Socrates' use of Achilles as a model is problematic and controversial in some respects. Achilles certainly provides a model of courageous behavior. On the other hand, the angry and vengeful Achilles is very different from the Socrates who says that he is not distressed at the verdict (35e1), who states that during his lifetime he has restrained those who will punish the Athenians after his execution (39c3-d8), and who asks the jurors to give his sons the same "punishment" (τιµωρήσασθε) he himself gave the Athenians if his sons seem to care more for anything else than for virtue (41e1-42a1).

I also argue that Socrates uses the figure of Achilles not only because this hero acts courageously (even though his cause is dubious by Socratic standards), but also because Achilles evokes another important feature of Homeric military combat. In the *Iliad*, as the jury, and Plato's contemporary readers, would have been well aware, one hero frequently rebukes another, arousing shame and anger in order to stir him to fight courageously. This anger can be directed against oneself, as is the case, for example, in *Iliad* 98-104, (mis)quoted in *Apology* 28d2-3, where Achilles blames himself for the death of Patroklos. The example of Achilles, then, suggests that Socrates has the same goal as the rebukers in Homer: arousing anger and shame in order to stir people to pursue virtue. Further evidence that this is so is provided by the fact that Socrates' rebukes in the *Apology* follow the specific pattern of

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10 Burnet 1924, on 22e6; Goldman 2004, 3, who also discusses Socrates' use of other military terms. Socrates uses *exetasis* and cognates at 22e6, 23c5-6, 24c3, 28e6, 33c3, 38a5-6. As Young 2002, 84-86 notes, the sharp distinction between *exetasis* and *elenchus* made by Tarrant 2002 does not take into account adequately the wide range of meanings of "elenchos" and cognates that are noted by Lesher 2002.

Homeric rebukes. In this way, as in many others, the Socrates of the Apology uses and adapts literary conventions.\(^{12}\)

**II. Rebukes in Homer**

In his study of battle scenes in the *Iliad*, Bernard Fenik lists three elements of a typical rebuke: (1) criticism; (2) description of bad situation, and (3) call to action.\(^ {13}\) One example given by Fenik is the rebuke of Glaukos to Hektor in *Iliad* 16.537-47.\(^ {14}\) In this passage:

(1) Glaukos criticizes Hektor, saying:

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\ldots \text{Hektor,} \\
\text{now you have utterly forgotten your armed companions} \\
\text{who for your sake, far from their friends and the land of their fathers,} \\
\text{are wearing their lives away, and you will do nothing to help them. (537-40)} \]

(2) Glaukos then describes the situation:

\[
\text{Sarpedon has fallen, the lord of the shield-armoured Lykians,} \\
\text{who defended Lykia in his strength and the right of his justice.} \\
\text{Now brazen Ares has struck him down by the spear of Patroklos. (541-43)} \]

(3) Finally, Glaukos gives a call to action:

\[
\text{Then, friends, stand beside me, let the thought be nemesis [indignation] in your spirit} \\
\text{that they may strip away his arms, and dishonour his body,} \\
\text{these Myrmidons, in anger for all the Danaans perished,} \\
\text{those whom we Lykians have killed with the spear by the swift ships. (544-47)} \]

Elizabeth Minchin finds four elements in the Homeric rebuke instead of the three Fenik lists: (1) address, or emotional reaction, or words of reproach; (2) account of problem; (3) generalization from broader perspective, and (4) proposal for action.\(^ {17}\) One example she discusses is Achilles' rebuke to Idomeneus and Aias, when Idomeneus and Aias dispute about who is in the lead in the chariot race at Funeral Games in *Iliad* 23.492-98:

(1) address: "Aias and Idomeneus" (493)

(2) problem: "No longer now . . . continue to exchange this bitter and evil talk. It is not becoming" (492-3)

\(^{12}\) de Strycker and Slings 1994 provide an excellent survey of Plato's use of rhetorical conventions in the *Apology*.


\(^{14}\) Fenik 1968, 205-206.

\(^{15}\) Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Homer are those of Lattimore 1951, and other translations are my own.

\(^{16}\) Lattimore, 1951, adapted.

\(^{17}\) Minchin 2002, 75-76.
Belfiore, Elizabeth
Rebuke and anger in Plato's Apology

(3) action viewed from broader perspective: "If another acted so, you yourselves would be angry [nemesaton]" (494)

(4) proposal: "Rather sit down again among those assembled and watch for the horses . . . Then you each can see for himself. . . ." (495-8).

In addition to these three or four elements, Homeric rebukes often have two other characteristics. First, as Richard Martin notes, in rebukes a praiseworthy foil is frequently juxtaposed to a blameworthy addressee. For example, in rebuking Hektor in 17.140-165, Glaukos praises three different heroic alternatives: Sarpedon (152), Achilles (165), and Ajax (166-68). In some passages, this praiseworthy foil is the father of the addressee. Fenik cites 5.628-667, where Tlepolemos calls Sarpedon unworthy of his father. "The Homeric hero," comments Fenik, "assumes that excellence passes from one generation to the next, and that a father's prowess will reappear in his son. A corollary is that the greater the father, the greater the son." In addition to these three or four elements, Homeric rebukes often have two other characteristics. First, as Richard Martin notes, in rebukes a praiseworthy foil is frequently juxtaposed to a blameworthy addressee. For example, in rebuking Hektor in 17.140-165, Glaukos praises three different heroic alternatives: Sarpedon (152), Achilles (165), and Ajax (166-68). In some passages, this praiseworthy foil is the father of the addressee. Fenik cites 5.628-667, where Tlepolemos calls Sarpedon unworthy of his father. "The Homeric hero," comments Fenik, "assumes that excellence passes from one generation to the next, and that a father's prowess will reappear in his son. A corollary is that the greater the father, the greater the son."

Second, rebukes usually lead to action. According to Fenik, they cause the rebuked person either to charge or to stir his men to fight. As Richard Janko notes, rebukes are usually obeyed without delay. Fenik does not list this result as an element in the "rebuke pattern," but he calls it "one of the most important patterns," and Janko incorporates it into his own account of Fenik's rebuke pattern: "X chides Y for not fighting, Y explains and X persuades him to enter battle; such exchanges often provoke aristea. After the rebuke in 16.537-54, for example, the Trojans "went straight for the Danaans, raging, and Hektor/ led them, in anger for Sarpedon" (16.552-3). In other passages also, the rebuker stirs the spirit in those he rebukes, thus leading them to act. For example, Poseidon stirs up (ἐποτρύων) the Argives in Iliad 13.95-98, and after he does so, they form ranks around the two Aiantes (125-26). And in the Odyssey, Odysseus is stirred to compete in athletic contests by the insults of Euryalos, who calls him a "business man" (8.185, 205). In the case of Achilles' rebuke to Idomeneus and Aias in Iliad 23, the result of the rebuke is stated by the narrator, before

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18 Minchin 2002, 79-80, her translations.
19 Martin 1989, 74.
20 Fenik 1968, 66-67, also citing 4.370, and 5.800-835.
21 Fenik 1968, 67
22 Fenik 1968, 49.
24 Fenik 1968, 49; Janko 1992, 73, on 13.206-45, where he also cites examples.
25 Among the other passages in which a rebuke has this effect, Fenik 1968, 49, lists 5.471-498, 17.70-83, 17.140-233, 17.322-333, 17.582-591.
26 On this passage see Janko 1992, 54-5. Cf. 15.501-514, 17.179-186, where Hektor responds to another reproach by Glaukos by becoming aroused and going on to arouse others.
recounting the rebuke itself: "And now the quarrel between the two of them would have gone still further, had not Achilleus himself risen up and spoken between them" (490-91). In this case, the two Argive men do not fight a common enemy, but instead act properly by ceasing to fight between themselves.

The proper use of, and response to, rebukes is modeled in Agamemnon's rebuke of Diomedes in Iliad 4. Agamemnon accuses Diomedes of remaining behind in battle and being inferior to his father (4.370-400). Diomedes makes no reply, "feeling aidôs [shame or reverence] at the rebuke of the revered (aidoio) king" (402). Sthenelos, in contrast, tells Agamemnon that he is lying (404). Diomedes then rebukes Sthenelos for his reply to Agamemnon:

Friend, stay quiet rather and do as I tell you; I will find no fault [nemesô] with Agamemnon, shepherd of the people, for stirring thus into battle the strong-greaved Achaians; this will be his glory to come, if ever the Achaians cut down the men of Troy and capture sacred Ilion. If the Achaians are slain, then his will be the great sorrow. Come, let you and me remember our fighting courage (ll. 4.412-18).

After this speech, Diomedes attacks the Trojans (419-21).

Diomedes' response to Agamemnon's rebuke, then, is not nemesis (anger or indignation) against Agamemnon, but aidôs for the king. His aidôs leads Diomedes to accept the rebuke as an appropriate way to stir up the men. Diomedes then responds by acting to show the king that he is courageous and better than his own father.

As the passage in shows, rebukes are successful in large part because they have powerful emotional effects. In the first place, they arouse anger. After Glaukos rebukes Hektor in ll. 16.537-47, the Trojans feel sorrow at the death of Sarpedon (548), and Hektor leads them to battle, in anger (χωόµενος) for Sarpedon (553). Janko comments: "Glaukos' speech could not fail: the Trojans are grief-stricken . . . and anger fuels their ardor." In other cases, anger is directed against the rebucker. Sometimes this anger is destructive, as, for example, when Achilles and Agamemnon quarrel in Iliad 1. At other times, anger against the rebucker is combined with a more positive response, in which the person rebuked exhibits the courage or strength he has been accused of lacking. After Agamemnon rebukes Odysseus (4.336-348), Odysseus is angry with Agamemnon (ὑπόδρα ἢδων: 349; χωόµενος: 357) and tells him: "only watch . . . the very father of Telemachos locked with the champion of the

27 A nuanced account of anger in the Homeric epics is given by Konstan 2006, 41-55.
Trojans" (353-355). Agamemnon then takes back his reproach, saying that Odysseus does not deserve it (356-63). Odysseus reacts in a similar way in *Odyssey* 8. He at first declines to compete in athletic contests, and as a result is taunted by Euryalos, who accuses him of being a mere business man (158-64). Odysseus replies:

> Now you have stirred up anger [thumos] deep in the breast within me
> by this disorderly speaking, and I am not such a new hand
> at games as you say, but always, as I think, I have been
> among the best when I still had trust in youth and hands' strength.

> But even so for all my troubles I will try your contests,
> for your word bit in the heart, and you have stirred me by speaking (178-185)

This same kind of "I'll show you!" response is made by Hektor after Glaukos accuses him of lacking the courage to stand up against Aias (*II*.17.166-8). Hektor replies:

> now I utterly despise your heart for the thing you have spoken
> when you said I cannot stand in the face of gigantic Aias.

> Come here, friend, and watch me at work; learn, standing beside me,
> whether I shall be a coward all day, as you proclaim me,
> or whether I stop some Danaan, for all his fury,
> from his fighting strength .......... (*II*. 17.173-4, 179-81)

Rebukes may arouse *aidôs* (shame) as well as anger, for example when Diomedes feels *aidôs* at the rebuke of Agamemnon (4.402). At *Iliad* 15.661-66, Nestor urges the Achaians to keep *aidôs* in their hearts so as not to turn in fear. Appeal to a sense of shame (*aidôs*), sometimes combined with an appeal to *nemesis* (anger or indignation) are common. Poseidon begins his rebuke to the Argives by appealing to shame:

> Shame [aidôs], you Argives, young fighting men, since I for my part
> have confidence that by fighting you can save our ships from destruction;
> but if you yourselves go slack from the sorrowful fighting
> now is seen your day to be beaten down by the Trojans.

He concludes: *Let every one of you plant in his heart's depth aidôs / and nemesis* (*II*. 13.95-98, 121-2).\(^{29}\)

As this last passage shows, there is a close connection between *aidôs* and *nemesis*, one of the "anger-terms" used by Homer.\(^{30}\) Scholars have often interpreted *aidôs* as the subjective counterpart of *nemesis*. Richard Janko writes: "One should feel *aidôs*, 'a sense of shame,' before one's comrades (15.661ff) or the gods (*Od*. 9.269-71) . . . *nemesis* is the proper

\(^{29}\) Poseidon's speech is analyzed by Janko 1992, 54-5, who notes other passages that open with the same appeal to shame: *II*. 5.787=8.228 (ἀδίκος, Ἀργεῖοι, κάκος ἐλέγχεα), or involve an appeal to shame (15.561-4, cited p. 59). See also 17.336.

\(^{30}\) See Cairns 2003, 21, on "anger-terms."
indignation felt by others at one's misconduct. ... [A]idôs is thus the subjective counterpart of nemesis."  This interpretation might appear to be supported by Achilles' rebuke to Aias and Idomeneus in Il. 23.494: "If another acted so, you yourselves would feel *nemesis.*" However, David Konstan makes a strong case against this subjective-objective distinction, arguing that "both sentiments are best treated as self-regarding, the one indicating respect, the other disapproval." This interpretation is supported by the fact that *nemesis* can be directed against oneself if one does a shameful act. At Il. 16.544-46, for example, after Patroklos has killed Sarpedon, Glaukos urges his companions to keep *nemesis* in their hearts, lest they and the corpse suffer shameful things. Cairns writes:

> [T]he nemesis of Sarpedon's fellow soldiers is directed not at Patroclus but at themselves; the breach of aidôs is their own, or would be. There are two sides to the reaction of shame at the prospect of disgrace: the inhibitory, when the agent suppresses the action which might lead to ignominy; and the angry, resentful aspect, which comes into play when the reprehensible action is abandoned and positive steps are taken to wipe out any suggestion of an insult; this emotion can be covered by aidôs ... but here it is expressed by nemesis.  

Thus, the *aidôs* that is necessary for courageous action has a component of anger, for it involves a disposition, when acting shamefully, to feel *against oneself* the anger (or indignation) that one would be justified in feeling against another person who did shameful things.

There are many other examples of anger aroused by rebukes of oneself. Odysseus's anger against himself is expressed vividly in his memorable rebuke of his own heart: "Striking the heart in his breast, he rebuked it in words (ηννρησε το µυθ): 'Endure, heart' " (Od. 20.17-18; quoted in Rep. 4.441b). The same phrase appears in rebukes in Il. 2.245 (Odysseus to Thersites) and 17.141 (Glaukos to Hektor). Another example of anger against oneself, this time combined with shame, is provided by Achilles' reaction when he learns of the death of Patroklos (Iliad 18). Konstan argues correctly that Achilles is motivated by grief over the loss of Patroklos rather than anger over a slight after this event. However, the close connection just discussed between shame and anger suggests that not only grief but also anger against himself motivates Achilles. He had earlier rejected the appeal, made by Aias during the Embassy, to cease from his wrath in reverence (aidôs) for those who supplicate him within his house (9.640). Now he bitterly regrets doing so. When he first learns of his companion's

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31 Janko 1992, 59. Other examples of this view are given by Konstan 2006, 117.
32 This passage is discussed by Cairns 1993, 98.
33 Konstan 2006, 118.
34 Cairns 1993, 84. See also Cairns 2003, 33-38.
35 Konstan 2006, 52.
death, Achilles has to be restrained for fear lest he cut his throat (18.32-34). He also expresses his desire to die when he tells Thetis that he wishes she had never married Achilles' father (86-7). His words at 98-104 are a powerful expression of a desire, brought about by shame and anger against himself, to die in avenging his friend:

I must die soon, then; since I was not to stand by my companion when he was killed. And now, far away from the land of my fathers, he has perished, and lacked my fighting strength to defend him.

. . . I was no light of safety to Patroklos, nor to my other companions who in their numbers went down before glorious Hektor, but sit here beside my ships, a useless weight on the land. (Il. 18. 98-104)

Although this passage is not usually classified as a rebuke, it contains the three elements of Fenik's typical rebuke:

(1) criticism: "I was no light of safety to Patroklos . . ."
(2) description of situation: "he has perished"
(3) call to action: "I must die soon." That is, Achilles resolves to take vengeance on Hektor, even though he knows that this will cost him his life (114-116).

This passage is of particular interest because Socrates misquotes it in Apology 28d2-4, where he compares himself to Achilles. According to Socrates, Achilles says: "May I die soon, having done justice to the one who acted unjustly, so that I may not remain here, laughed at beside the curved ships, a weight on the land." Socrates suppresses Achilles' shameful action in failing to stand by Patroklos, and his anger against himself. In mentioning justice, moreover, Socrates attributes to Achilles a motive different from that of the Homeric hero. In the Iliad, Achilles acts because he is ashamed of failing to protect his friend, and because he desires vengeance and honor. In contrast, Socrates represents Achilles as motivated by a desire for justice. In these ways, Socrates, who has no reason to be ashamed of or angry with himself, rewrites the text of Homer's text in order to make Achilles a more suitable model.

Homer rebukes, then, often appeal to aidôs and nemesis, and can arouse anger in the person rebuked against (1) the rebuker, (2) an enemy, (3) the person himself, if he is doing (or if he should do) something shameful.

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36 Labarbe 1949, 340-344 provides an exhaustive survey of the differences between Plato and our text of Homer, arguing that Plato's memory failed him. Analyses of the differences based on the assumption that Plato deliberately manipulated the text are provided by Benardete 1963; Hobbs 2000, 183-184; Stokes 1997, 142-144; West 1979, 59-60, n.79, and 155-160.
III. Socrates' Rebukes to the Athenians

What does all this have to do with Plato's *Apology*? When Socrates arouses anger in the jury, he does so within a context that is established by means of his references to military service in general and to Achilles in particular. In particular, he evokes the Homeric rebuke by using the same four elements that Minchin finds in this pattern, and by alluding to a praiseworthy foil. In so doing, Socrates, like the Homeric heroes, attempts to arouse in the members of the jury shame, and anger against themselves, in order to provoke them to pursue virtue.

These features of Socrates' address are especially clear from his words at 29d2-30b4, in which he speaks "in his accustomed manner":

> I cherish and love you, O Athenian men, but I will obey the god rather than you. As long as I breathe and am able to do so, I will never stop philosophizing and exhorting and showing you, saying, in my accustomed manner: "O best of men, being an Athenian, of the city that is greatest and most renowned for wisdom and strength, are you not ashamed of caring for how you will acquire the most money, and for reputation and honor, but as for truth and how your soul will be as good as possible, you neither care for these things nor consider them? And if someone of you disagrees and says that he does care, I will not immediately let him go, nor will I go away, but I will question and examine and refute him. And if he does not seem to me to have acquired virtue, but says that he has done so, I will blame him for valuing least that which is worth most, and for placing more value on inferior things... I do nothing other than go around and persuade you... to care neither for your bodies, nor for money, either instead of, or so much as, how your soul will be as good as possible, saying: 'Virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things for humans.' " (Ap. 29d2-30b4). 37

In this speech, Socrates makes use of all four of the elements Minchin finds in Homeric rebukes:

(1) Socrates addresses the Athenians: "Oh Athenian men" (29d2); "Oh best of men, being an Athenian" (29d7).

(2) He then states the problem: "are you not ashamed of caring for how you will acquire the most money, and for reputation and honor, but as for truth and how your soul will be as good as possible, you neither care for these things nor consider them?" (29d9-e3).

(3) Socrates also provides a generalization from a broader perspective: people who act in this way value most highly what is in fact inferior (30a1-3): "virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things for humans" (30b2-4).

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37 My translation follows the interpretation of de Strycker and Slings 1994, 138-140, 234-235. Alternatively, 30b3-4 can be rendered: "It is goodness that makes money and everything else good for men" (Burnet 1924, ad loc). Although neither translation is without difficulties, this issue does not affect my main points.
(4) Socrates does not explicitly propose action in this passage. However, such a proposal is implicit in his statement of the problem: care for virtue and your soul more than for money, honor and reputation.

Moreover, just as Homeric heroes compare those they rebuke to a praiseworthy foil, for example, their fathers, so Socrates compares the Athenians to a similarly praiseworthy foil: their fatherland, "the city that is greatest and most renowned for wisdom and strength" (29d7-8). Like many Homeric rebukers, Socrates appeals to shame ("Are you not ashamed?" 29d9). The Homeric model makes it reasonable to suppose that Socrates rebukes the members of the jury not in order to arouse their anger against himself, but in order to arouse the shame and anger against themselves that will stir them to pursue virtue.38

The idea that Socrates attempts to arouse anger against themselves in the members of the jury is supported by his explicit statements in the Apology. Those examined by people who imitate his methods, he says, are angry with him and not themselves (23c8-d1). The implication is that the appropriate response is anger with oneself. In other dialogues also, shame and anger with oneself are identified as the intended result of the elenchos.40 For example, in Sophist 230b4-d4, those who undergo the "purification of the elenchos" are said to be angry with themselves and mild toward others" (230b8-c1), and those practicing the elenchos realize that people will never benefit from learning "until someone by cross-examining brings the person examined to a state of shame (aischynê)" (230d1-2).41 In Theaetetus 168a, Socrates says that a properly conducted elenchos leads to self-blame and self-hatred on the part of the person refuted, and affection for the refuter. In Hippias Major Socrates himself models the appropriate response to the elenchos: shame and anger with oneself, and a resolve to become able to fight better against arguments. He reports his reactions to a certain questioner, who asks if he is not ashamed of daring to speak on matters he knows nothing about (304d5-8). This questioner, before whom Socrates says that he would be most ashamed if he were to think he said something of value while actually saying nothing, turns out to be himself (298b7-11).42 After going away from this questioner, Socrates is angry with himself, and he blames and threatens himself. As a result, Socrates

39 I read αὐτοῖς with Burnet 1924, ad loc; Stokes 1997, ad loc; de Strycker and Slings 1994, ad loc, rather than αὐτοῖς with Buttrey 1981.
40 The passages from Soph., HM, and Thm cited below are noted by de Strycker and Slings 1994, 292-3, on 23c8. On anger with oneself see also Rep. 4.440b1-2.
41 On this process see Belfiore 1992, 331-335
42 On Socrates' questioner see Woodruff 1982, 43-44, n. 47, and 107-108.
Belfiore, Elizabeth  
Rebuke and anger in Plato's *Apology*

says, using a military metaphor, he resolves to learn so that he will be able to fight (ἀναμαχόµενος) the arguments of the questioner (286d3-7).

IV. The Verdict

Unlike the typical Homeric rebuker, Socrates does not succeed in stirring the majority of the jurors to become angry with themselves and to pursue virtue. On the contrary, they strike Socrates in anger, as he predicted they might (31a3-5), by voting to condemn him. Nevertheless, his speech, and his "accustomed manner" of addressing the Athenians (29d2-3) do succeed with a great many people. Socrates persuades almost half of the jury that he is innocent (35e1-36b2). Moreover, he has won over a great many other people, including the young men who will blame the Athenians after his death (39d1-3), and the men whose names and relatives he mentions at 33e1-34a2. Why does Socrates succeed with some people and not with others? Here again, a comparison of Socrates and Homeric rebukers can help us to answer this questions.

Both Socrates' rebukes to the Athenians and Homeric rebukes are usually addressed to a single person, and are specifically tailored to fit this person's individual character and situation. As I have noted, Minchin's four elements of the rebuke include an address by name, an account of a specific problem, and a proposal for specific action. Similarly, Socrates' usual procedure involves questioning, examining and refuting a single individual, who claims that he cares for his soul more than for honor and money. This is clear from his use of the singular in his self-quotation at 29d3-5: "O best of men". A sample of this kind of examination, addressed to an individual who makes specific claims, is given in the *Apology* in the form of Socrates' questioning of Meletus (24c4-28a1). In court, however, Socrates cannot examine and question each of the jurors individually, but must address a crowd. In this context, each individual is less likely to experience shame because his individual claims to care about the soul necessarily go unexamined. Both Socratic and Homeric rebukes addressed to individuals, whether in philosophical discussion or in battle, are more likely to succeed than rebukes to a large jury.

Socrates is also less likely to succeed in court than Homeric rebukers do because of an important difference in his usual procedure. Homeric rebukes are usually made in the heat of

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43 On this point see Brickhouse and Smith 1989, 214.  
44 Burnet 1924 correctly notes that those named are all followers of Socrates. De Strycker and Slings 1994 concur and argue that they are supporters of the democracy (173-175).  
45 Minchin 2002, 75-76.  
46 On Socrates' questioning of Meletus as an example of Socratic dialectic see de Strycker and Slings 1994, 103.
battle, when there is little time for discussion. Socrates' customary rebukes, however, are
usually made in the context of the questioning and examining that requires a great deal of
time and leisure. In court, of course, he does not have this time. Indeed, Socrates suggests
that leisure plays an essential role in the votes of the jury. The examinations he has conducted
prior to his appearance in court have required all of his time, thus causing him to neglect his
own affairs (31a-b, 36b-d, 37e-38a). Now, when he needs to make a defense, he says, it is
difficult to remove such great prejudices in so little time (19a1-2, 24a2-4). If he had had more
time than one day, he says, he would have been able to persuade the whole jury to acquit him
(37a9-b2). Socrates also alludes to the importance of leisure when he invites those who voted
to acquit him to remain and converse (dialegesthai) with him while the magistrates are busy
(literally, "lack leisure": 39e1-5). Moreover, Socrates suggests that those who have been
persuaded by him are those who have the most leisure to spend in conversation. The young
men who listen most to Socrates are "the most wealthy, those who have leisure" (23c2-3).
From what we know of the historical figures, this is in fact true of most of the followers he
names at 33e1-34a2.\footnote{Socrates mentions Crito and his son Critobulus, Lysanias and his son Aeschines, Antiphon and his son
Epigenes, Nicostratus the son of Theozotides and the brother of Theodotus, Paralios the son of Demodokos and
his brother Theages, Adeimantus the son of Ariston and his brother Plato, Achantoros and his brother
Apollodorus. Of these, Plato, Crito, Critobulus and Apollodorus offer to pay, on Socrates' behalf, a fine of thirty
minae, "a considerable sum" (West 1979, 65, n.115). Of the others, Nicostratus was wealthy, Antiphon well-off,
and Demodokos enjoyed many offices and honors. Only Aeschines was poor (Nails 2002).}
In contrast, the majority of the jury, those who vote to convict him, have not had these advantages.

Socrates has used the Homeric rebuke as a model throughout his speech, but he ends
with an allusion to the difference just noted between his method and that of the Homeric
rebuker: the absence of time for lengthy examination in Homeric rebukes. The best thing
about dying and going to Hades, he says, would be to be able to spend time examining the
dead, for example, Agamemnon and Odysseus, to see who is wise, and who thinks he is wise
but is not (41b5c1). This kind of examination, of course, is absent not only from the Homeric
battlefield, but also from the leisured conversations reported in the epics. In examining the
Homeric heroes, Socrates proposes to examine Homer himself, whose rebukes he has used as
a model adapted to his own purposes.

This paper has examined one previously unnoticed model for Socrates' speech in the
Apology, a model that helps to explain his motives for deliberately arousing anger in his
audience. The Homeric model does not, of course, explain why the philosopher is
represented as angering the jury and the Athenians in many other ways, for example, by his counter-proposal of dining in the prytaneum, and his refusal to give up philosophizing. These issues are beyond the scope of this paper. Socrates' use of the rebuke format, however, is evidence that the anger aroused by Socrates is not always a bad thing, but can be used, like the sting of the gadfly, to awaken those who are sleeping (30e1-31a2).