In recent years, epistemologists have witnessed the re-emergence of the modern epistemological project of amelioration, sometimes known as an exercise in “regulative” epistemology. There is a growing debate of many exciting themes. For instance, virtue and vice epistemology have forced us to think about themes that are not so closely related to the attempts of explaining what knowledge is or of vindicating knowledge’s possession in the face of skeptical challenges.

In the face of this facts, it is such a pleasure to recommend *Intellectual Virtues and Education*. Edited by Jason Baehr, this collection of essays addresses the theme of teaching intellectual virtues and, as far as I know, it is the first book to systematically address such theme. The main idea behind the project seems to be that educational theory and practice can be benefited by the adoption of a virtue terminology. Moreover, there is this optimistic hope that we can advise school and academic practices in a way that can be conducive to the cultivation of intellectual virtues. As we can expect, this cannot be the work solely of philosophers, but it requires the engagement of psychologists, educators, and many other professionals.
Each part of the book tries to answer different questions related to the teaching of intellectual virtues and each one concentrates four essays. The first division of the book is dedicated to specify which intellectual virtues are central to education. There, contributions were made by Wayne D. Riggs, Lani Watson, Ian James Kidd, and Allan Hazlett. The second division of the book is devoted to describe the relations of intellectual virtues and other educational aims and practices. This part of the book receives the contributions from Harvey Siegel, Duncan Pritchard, Emily Robertson, and Ben Kotzee. The final division of the book is dedicated to answer the question about how intellectual virtues can be fostered in the classroom. Its contributors are Heather Battaly, Robert C. Roberts, Robert K. Garcia and Nathan L. King, and Steven L. Porter.

In the concluding remarks of the work, Baehr notes that there are some common, shared features that are endorsed in many essays as components of an intellectual virtue, namely, an ability component, a motivational component, an affective component, and a judgment (or prudential) component. These components might be worthy of note in the educational context because it can be the case that different components of an intellectual virtue will demand different didactic methods to progress in its inculcation. In this review, I will argue that some of the essays in the collection highlight two more components of an intellectual virtue that helps us to think about some issues of teaching intellectual virtues.

Let me start with the ability component. Such component refers to the proficiency peculiar to each intellectual virtue. In fact, as Baehr noted, this component provides us tools for individuating intellectual virtues. For instance, in her contribution, Lani Watson has argued that to be an inquisitive person in a way characteristically virtuous from an intellectual point of view, one needs a proficiency to formulate good questions. This also provides us tools for discriminating, as Harvey Siegel does in his contribution, between abilities and mere dispositions. For instance, I can be an inquisitive person without being inquisitive in a way characteristically virtuous from an intellectual point of view. This is so because, as Watson has argued, a mere inquisitive person is a person that is characteristically disposed (or motivated) to sincerely engage with the act of questioning\(^1\), without necessarily making good questions.

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\(^1\) See p. 41
Baehr, I think, does not note, but the classification of intellectual virtues he argued for in his monograph, *The Inquiring Mind* (2011), is an enormous contribution, not only to our inquiries on the nature and structure of intellectual virtues, as corroborated by Watson’s inquiries on the virtue of inquisitiveness, but also to the question, competently treated by Ben Kotzee, of how we can measure the learning of intellectual virtues. I explain. First, most of the essays not only corroborates the adequacy of Baehrian taxonomy of intellectual virtues (e.g., Watson’s contribution), but also potentially extends Baehrian taxonomy (e.g., Kidd’s discussion about the virtue of intellectual humility and Robertson’s identification and description of the testimonial virtue).

In his debate about the virtue of intellectual humility, Ian James Kidd emphasized intellectual humility as a virtue that calibrates our *confidence* in ourselves. Intellectual humility, as I see it, is the proficiency to recognize our own cognitive limitations, including the possibility of error and our epistemic dependence. In Baehr’s taxonomy, it is an intellectual virtue grouped as a virtue of *cognitive integrity*, since it contributes to people do not be corrupted in the process of inquiry by the deleterious tendencies of human mind, such as self-deception. But if we took Kidd’s contribution as a reference, we have reasons to also group intellectual humility as a virtue of *appropriate confidence and deference*. This group is not part of the initial Baehrian taxonomy, but it may be argued that we need it too. Here is one reason. In its initial classification, Baehr laid aside virtues like intellectual autonomy, sobriety, and discipline. Autonomy and sobriety, at least, are required to appropriately trust in ourselves or to defer appropriately – to not take enthusiastically ideas for which we do not have evidence in support (intellectual sobriety) or to not be inappropriately influenced by others (intellectual autonomy).

Here is another reason. Emily Robertson’s contribution shows us an intellectual virtue not commonly described, namely, *testimonial virtue*. In many passages, she emphasized the close relation between testimonial virtue and *appropriate deference*. After all, in Robertson’s words, persons who possess testimonial virtue have a cultivated disposition to exercise due caution in

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2 I will not discuss this here, but I think it is plausible to replace the name of such group for virtues of *transparency*, since cognitive integrity is a *particular* intellectual virtue of such group, maybe a supervenient one, while “transparency” is a more technical term in epistemological debates involving self--knowledge (see, for instance, Coliva 2016).
receiving testimony and a trained (but reflectively revisable) sensibility for whom is to be trusted in what circumstances backed by relevant knowledge for making that judgment\(^3\).

All this reveal that there is a success component of intellectual virtues, but that this success component is not (necessarily) tied to cognitive achievements and epistemic goods as traditionally endorsed, but to the different demands and challenges we face in our cognitive life, particularly in the school and academic lives – our focus here. Moreover, if, on the one hand, the ability component of an intellectual virtue gives us a tool for individuate intellectual virtues, on the other hand, the success component of an intellectual virtue gives us a tool for generalize intellectual virtues, grouping them according to their contributions to particular demands we face in the cognitive life. Such generalization should serve as the basis for a taxonomy of intellectual virtues.

In addition, Baehrian taxonomy seems to be very useful in the specific contexts of school and academic life, not only because the cognitive demands described by it are common demands that we face in these contexts, but also because, with this groups in mind, we can operationalize intellectual virtues in a way that can be useful to measure student’s growth in intellectual virtues. Consider, for instance, three groups: (a) mental flexibility; (b) appropriate confidence and deference; and (c) consistency in evaluation\(^4\). The groups (a) and (c) are present in Baehr’s initial classification. The group (b), however, is my own addition giving the reasons above\(^5\).

Psychological literature provides us many creative examples of how to measure each one of this groups. For instance, Duncker’s candle task and Asch’s conformity experiments can measure, respectively, virtues of the group of mental flexibility, such as open-mindedness, inventiveness, flexibility, agility, and adaptability, and virtues of the group of appropriate confidence and deference, such as intellectual autonomy, intellectual courage, and testimonial virtue.

\(3\) See p. 130.

\(4\) Here, again, I think it is perfectly plausible to replace the name of such group for virtues of correction in evaluation, since consistency is a particular intellectual virtue of such group and, also, because the challenge that the virtues of such group contribute for us to resolve, such as objectivity, impartiality, and intellectual justice, is to correct our judgments. Consistency is only one way to make such correction.

\(5\) I would add a group of virtues related to organization in the studies, such as intellectual discipline, but I do not have space to discuss this here.
Of course, the adequacy of these measurements can be limited, but so are the proposals discussed by Ben Kotzee in his contribution.

Recently, a psychological research led by Dan M. Kahan have shown that subjects highest in numeracy tend to use their quantitative-reasoning capacity selectively to conform their interpretation of the data to the result most consistent with their political outlooks\(^6\). The tasks elaborated by Kahan and his team can be useful to measure virtues of the group of correction in evaluation, such as fair-mindedness, consistency, objectivity, impartiality, and open-mindedness.

Now, someone may doubt that this can be the case because – it can be argued – the present propose can not measure important components of an intellectual virtue, such as the motivational and affective components. I agree with it, but I think it is still useful to measure the learning of intellectual virtues. For instance, if it is right to say that an inquisitive person tends to be more motivated to learn, then we can expect that if our adopted didactic methods are efficacious in inculcating virtuous like inquisitiveness, then students will be more motivated to learn.

Lani Watson discussion about inquisitiveness also highlight another important component of an intellectual virtue. She calls attention to the fact that inquisitiveness can only be cultivated under the repeated exercise of a particular epistemic practice – namely, questioning. However, if we think about other intellectual virtues, we realize that there are virtues that can be cultivated under the repeated exercise of more than one epistemic practice. For instance, intellectual autonomy can be exercised by interpreting a text, reasoning about some issue, observing some phenomenon, and by questioning too. Giving this, I think we can expect that some students can manifest the proficiency proper to intellectual autonomy in some epistemic practice – let me say, reasoning – without being intellectually autonomous in many other epistemic practices – let me say, interpretation. If this is the case, it can be explained by the fact that, in the specific case of the student at issue, the proficiency proper to intellectual autonomy has a limited set of epistemic practices in its etiology, which can be fixed by giving to this student opportunities to exercise intellectual autonomy in other situations. Here, I am highlighting an etiological component of intellectual virtues. Such component would be useful to diagnose possible deficiencies, by a pupil, in learning an intellectual virtue.

There is much more to be said about such immeasurable contributions to the project of educating for intellectual virtues, but this is more than I can write here, in a book review. In conclusion, I praise such a formidable effort to put education and virtue epistemology in what seems to me the right path.

References

