

COMPLEX DEMONSTRATIVES AND REFERENTIAL DESCRIPTIONS AS DESCRIPTIVE DESIGNATORS¹

Felipe S. Amaral

UnB

1. INTRODUCTION

Singular complex demonstratives in English are expressions of the form ‘that F’ and ‘this F’, where ‘F’, the nominal of the demonstrative, is a common noun frequently modified by other expressions. Singular definite descriptions in English are expressions of the form ‘the F’. In this paper, I will start from the substantive assumption that both expressions have a referential meaning, a meaning in virtue of which the object the speaker has in mind in uttering them is part of their literal content in the context of the utterance (v. e.g., DEVITT, 2008).² In what follows, I will call singular referential complex demonstratives ‘complex demonstratives’ and singular referential definite descriptions ‘referential descriptions’.

In the philosophical literature, the debate around the semantics of complex demonstratives and referential descriptions has become to a significant extent polarized. For, these expressions are very often said to be either ‘directly referential’, in the sense that they only contribute their actual extensions to literal content, or else quantifiers, in the sense that they only contribute a condition on possible extensions to literal content, a condition containing the content of their nominals.

1 My thanks to Michael Devitt, Kent Bach, Stephen Neale, Robert Fiengo, Frank Pupa and an anonymous reviewer for *Analytica* for helpful comments and suggestions on a previous version.

2 I equate literal content with semantic content, i.e. the proposition semantically expressed relative to the context of utterance.

In the background of this polarization is a working hypothesis about the semantic partitioning of natural language terms.³ This hypothesis says, in brief, that every term in natural language is either referential or quantificational, where referential terms are semantically simple and rigid, whereas quantificational terms are semantically complex and typically non-rigid (v. NEALE, 1993; DEVER, 2001; cf. RUSSELL, 1918). Against this background, complex demonstratives and referential descriptions are assimilated to either of two semantic paradigms: the paradigm of the bare demonstrative or the paradigm of the quantifier.⁴

I think this polarization overlooks an important contender: complex demonstratives and referential descriptions are both referential and descriptive without being quantificational. In short, they are what I call *descriptive designators* (v. e.g. BURGE, 1974; DEVITT, 2004). Indeed, I will urge that this contender is methodologically superior to its rivals. Since it covers the empirical ground the rivals cover, we should endorse it.⁵

The breakdown of this paper is as follows. In section 2, I will argue that complex demonstratives have nominals that are ‘fully significant’ semantically, in the sense that they help to determine reference and contribute the properties they describe to literal content. In section 3, I will extend these arguments to referential descriptions and suggest, siding with Michael Devitt (2004) and Tyler Burge (1974), that in light of the usage similarities between complex demonstratives and referential descriptions both expressions have a similar semantics (see also RAMACHANDRAN, 1996 for a comparable claim). I will then provisionally hypothesize that

3 I understand ‘term’ as any expression occurring in argument position, and take an argument position to be the position exemplified by grammatical subject or object (compare DEVER, 2001, p. 271).

4 This may strike one as oversimplified, since a number of theorists in the ‘direct reference’ tradition hold that nominals in complex demonstratives play an active role in reference determination – in *prima facie* disanalogy with bare demonstratives, which do not have any nominals (although there is room for disagreement here, since direct reference theorists might propose that the reference of bare ‘that’ or ‘this’ is determined via the application, in the context of the utterance, of a syntactically null nominal with the semantic import of ‘thing’ or ‘entity’). Be this as it may, when I speak of ‘an assimilation’ of the semantics of referential descriptions and complex demonstratives to the two semantic paradigms above my main concern is *literal content* (i.e. the proposition semantically expressed).

5 In the philosophical literature, the descriptive designator view has its modern roots in the work of Tyler Burge (1974). Different versions have been proposed by Mark Richard (1993), Josh Dever (2001) and Michael Devitt (2004). Surprisingly, this sort of view has received very little attention.

the paradigm of the `descriptive designator' does a very good job in capturing this semantics, for it captures the idea that these terms are referential and descriptive without being quantificational. In section 4, I will consider two objections to this proposal and argue that both are inconclusive. In section 5, I will turn to the above hypothesis about the semantic partitioning of natural language terms and argue that it is dubious. Last, I will recommend, on methodological grounds, that complex demonstratives and referential descriptions be understood as descriptive designators.

2. NOMINAL RELEVANCE

In this section, I intend to primarily address the following two questions: `does the nominal of a complex demonstrative help determine the reference of its tokens relative to a context of use?' and `does a complex demonstrative nominal contribute to the literal content of its tokens the property it represents?' In 2.1, I will present two arguments for a positive answer to the first question. In 2.2, I will present five arguments for a positive answer to the second.

2.1 REFERENCE DETERMINATION

The first argument for nominals playing a role in reference determination starts from the very plausible claim that complex demonstratives appear to be *very frequently* used by speakers to refer to particular objects speakers think, and intend their audiences to think, satisfy their nominals. In other words, by using complex demonstratives, speakers very frequently appear to refer to objects *as satisfiers of their nominals*. There are at least four aspects to this usage frequency.

The first is *token frequency*. Speakers appear to use complex demonstrative tokens very frequently to refer to particular things they think, and intend their audiences to think, satisfy their nominals. This strongly suggests that nominals in complex demonstratives are relevant to reference determination.

The second aspect is *positional frequency*. Complex demonstratives in all term positions (subject, direct object, indirect object, and object of preposition) appear to be very frequently used to refer to particular things that speakers think, and intend their audiences to think, satisfy their nominals.

The third aspect is *speech-act frequency*. Under all types of speech-acts, complex demonstratives appear to be very frequently used to refer to particular things speakers think, and intend their audiences to think, satisfy their nominals. Thus, in `representatives' (that glass you are holding is cracked.), in `directives' (shut that door!), in `commissives' (I promise this carburetor will be fixed.), in `expressives' (I am sorry for that broken vase.), and in `declarations' (That science project is worth an A.) complex demonstratives are used to refer to particular things speakers think, and intend their audiences to think, satisfy their nominals.

And the fourth aspect is *cross-linguistic frequency*. In various languages, complex demonstratives appear to be very frequently used to refer to particular things that speakers think, and intend their audiences to think, satisfy their nominals. In fact, it is not wholly implausible to think that that in *most, if not all*, languages that have complex demonstratives, they turn out to be used very frequently in this way.

To those who think that linguistic items have the semantic properties they have *in virtue of* frequent cooperative use constrained by grammar, it would be rather odd, on the face of it, if the usage phenomena alluded to above were not symptomatic of the relevance of nominals to reference determination. For, let us assume that nominals in complex demonstratives *started out* as mere pragmatic appendices, uttered merely to help audiences to focus on the right object the speaker has in mind by his or her use of a complex demonstrative. With time and widespread use in the community, why would not this fact *become* semantically relevant? In other words, why would not it constitute a *convention* of using nominals to determine the referents of complex demonstrative tokens?

Another piece of evidence confirming the relevance of nominals to reference determination involves the phenomenon of `quantifying into' the nominal of a complex demonstrative. Consider the following example, adapted from Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig (2000):

(0) Each woman in this room admires that man on stage she is winking at.

Suppose there are exactly two women in the room and each is nearby the same portion of a stage (the only stage in the room). Suppose that exactly two men, both well-known theater actors, occupy the stage. And suppose that each woman in the room is winking at the same man on stage, the actor to which they happen to be nearest. Last, suppose speaker and audience

are not too far from the stage, but not too close either. They can *see* each woman in the room winking at a particular man on stage although from their position it would be practically impossible for the speaker to use a pointing gesture to single out a man on stage.

In this scenario, the speaker may utter (0) to express the idea that each woman in the room admires a *particular* man on stage, namely the one she is winking at, as speaker and audience can *see*. In fact, this referential reading of (0) appears to be *preferred* in the present scenario (contrast this with NEALE, 2008b, p. 293).

Now, this reading requires the semantic contribution of the nominal. For, if the nominal were entirely inert semantically, (0) would be read as 'each woman in this room admires *him*', where 'him' would (presumably) refer to one man on stage. Yet, there are two men on stage, and the speaker is not sufficiently close to the stage so that a pointing gesture (or a glance in the direction of the relevant man) would settle the referent. Thus, without the semantic contribution of the nominal an utterance of (0) would lack the reading it has in this context. The question then becomes: *what* semantic role does the nominal play in this context?

At face value, there are two options: the nominal is part of literal content or it merely determines reference. In the first case, the referent of the demonstrative occurrence would have to be a man on stage and winked at by each woman *in the world of evaluation*, the world where the literal content of the utterance receives a truth-value. In the second case, the referent would have to be a man on stage and winked at by each woman *in the context of the utterance*, regardless of what this man *is* in the world of evaluation (cf. SALMON, 2008, p. 271). Which option should we choose?

It is not easy to answer this. Nonetheless, for the purposes of the present discussion the key point about quantifying into the nominal is this: in scenarios like the one above the nominal apparently plays a role at least in reference determination.

At this juncture, one may protest that the occurrence of 'that man on stage she is winking at' in (0) is not *really* an occurrence of a complex demonstrative, being instead a "stylistically altered definite description" (SALMON, 2006, p. 446), in which case (0) does not add to the case for the significance of the nominal in reference determination for *complex demonstratives*.

One important problem with this line of argument, however, is that it appears to contain an unsupported premise, which may be expressed as follows: the existence of a bound pronoun *inside* the nominal of ‘that man on stage she is winking at’ is conclusive evidence that this expression *as a whole* is a definite description in disguise (i.e. semantically equivalent to a definite description here understood as a quantifier). Note, moreover, that there is nothing *incoherent* with the idea of a bound value of a pronoun inside the nominal of a complex demonstrative collaborating with the value of the rest of the nominal to determine the *reference* of the complex demonstrative (NEALE, 2008b). Since it has not been shown that this idea is not true, the above protest appears to be inconclusive.

Furthermore, *if* the occurrence of ‘that man on stage she is winking at’ in (0) were a ‘stylistically altered definite description’, it would seem to follow, given a Russellian quantificational analysis of definite descriptions, that ‘that F’ – the linguistic form – is ‘referential-attributive’ ambiguous, having a referential meaning and also an attributive quantificational meaning (viz. the meaning of a definite description in its attributive use) (see KING, 2008, p. 113 for a comparable point). Now, given the similarities in use between complex demonstratives and definite descriptions, it is unclear why *definite descriptions* would not be referential-attributive ambiguous, too! For, what would be the principled basis for denying this of definite descriptions (once we accept it of their demonstrative siblings)? Note, moreover, that the relative frequency of *referential uses of definite descriptions* appears to be significantly greater than the relative frequency of *attributive uses of complex demonstratives*, in which case it would be rather odd to claim that complex demonstratives have an attributive meaning while definite descriptions lack a referential meaning. Thus, to suggest that ‘that man on stage she is winking at’ in (0) has the semantic import of a definite description – as several theorists currently do – generates significant tension with the idea that *definite descriptions* have only one (attributive, quantificational) meaning – an idea that is dear to these same theorists.

To conclude: quantifying into the nominal of a complex demonstrative provides positive evidence for the hypothesis that nominals play an active role in reference determination. For, without this hypothesis, we do not have a satisfactory account of the intuitive referential readings examples like (0) have.

2.2 LITERAL CONTENT

Having argued for the significance of the nominal to reference determination, I now turn to the contribution the nominal makes to literal content. (To express this idea in a pre-theoretic way, I will often speak of the nominal as `being part of' literal content.) I will concentrate on five reasons.

2.2.1 REDUNDANCY

One important piece of evidence in favor of nominals being part of literal content involves redundancy. When we use the nominal of a complex demonstrative as the predicate of a sentence that has this complex demonstrative as its subject, we induce redundancy. For example: an utterance of `that table is a table' is redundant. A very good explanation for this is that the nominal `table' is part of the literal content of `that table'.

2.2.2 CLEFTS

In a so-called `cleft' sentence, the word order is such that a constituent of the sentence is `promoted to the foreground while the remainder of the sentence is backgrounded' (HAEGEMAN, 2006, p. 85). This promoted constituent expresses the `focus' or the `highlight' of what is said. A standard way of achieving this effect is by adding `it is [...]' (or `as for [...]') to the target constituent, and moving it to the front of the sentence. Consider the following:

- (1) John bought the last copy of Bill's book.
- (1') It was *John* who bought the last copy of Bill's book.
- (1'') As for *John*, he bought the last copy of Bill's book.

On the plausible assumption that clefted sentences are equivalent in literal content to their non-clefted counterparts, and that clefted constituents are part of literal content in cleft sentences, if terms within nominals of complex demonstratives are `cleftable', nominals of complex of demonstratives are part of literal content (RICHARD, 1993, p. 218). Thus, consider the following examples:

- (2) That book by Tom has a green cover.
 (2') As for *Tom*, that book by him has a green cover.
 (3) That book Tom wrote has a green cover.
 (3') As for *Tom*, that book he wrote has a green cover.

Since the pairs (2)/(2') and (3)/(3') are plausibly equivalent in literal content, and the clefted constituents are part of the literal content in (2') and (3'), the complex demonstrative nominals in (2) and (3) are part of literal content.

2.2.3 NARROW SCOPE

Another piece of evidence in favor of nominals being part of literal content involves the scope of complex demonstratives in relation to attitude verbs. Consider the following scenario, due to Jeffrey King:

“Suppose we are at a party where evil and vindictive Alan has just been named CEO of the Chanticleer toy company. Some of the guests are aware of this, some are not. Sherry, a Chanticleer executive, has long believed that Alan despises her. She has just heard the bad news about him being named CEO. Sherry believes that as CEO Alan will make her life miserable. She is moping around saying she must quit her job. Someone asks me what is wrong with Sherry. Pointing at Alan, I say: [(4)] Sherry believes that that guy who was just named CEO of Chanticleer hates her.” (KING, 2001, p. 110).

King argues that the complex demonstrative occurrence in (4) must be read with narrow scope if his utterance of (4) is to explain Sherry's behavior. For, if the complex demonstrative were read with wide scope instead, (4)'s utterance would not ascribe to Sherry the belief that Alan was just named CEO. Yet, this belief is central to the explanation of Sherry's despondent behavior at the party. After all, she has long believed that Alan despises her. Thus, the fact that (4) explains Sherry's depressed behavior at the party justifies the complex demonstrative's being read with narrow scope in the context of utterance.

In a recent article, Stephen Neale (2008a) challenges King's point. Briefly, Neale's main

claim appears to be that a narrow scope reading of the complex demonstrative in (4) is not required to explain Sherry's behavior. For, on the plausible assumption that (4) is interpreted with the demonstrative with wide scope, in tandem with the fact that the demonstrative nominal is cooperatively uttered by the speaker, King's utterance may very well *pragmatically imply without literally expressing* the proposition that Sherry believes Alan has just been named CEO. And by pragmatically implying this, King's utterance of (4) explains Sherry's behavior. After all, the fact that an *utterance* explains a person's behavior need not be an exclusive matter of *what* the utterance *literally expresses* (NEALE, 2008a, p. 122–123).

I think Neale is right to suggest that a reading of (4) where the complex demonstrative has narrow scope is not *required* to explain Sherry's behavior. But there are two important facts that a narrow scope reading helps to explain, both apparently overlooked by Neale. First, speakers *very frequently* use complex demonstratives in attitude contexts to communicate narrow scope interpretations of the demonstratives they utter. A very good explanation for this is that complex demonstratives *have* narrow scope *readings* in these contexts. Second, very often when we are inclined to think that a narrow scope interpretation of a complex demonstrative occurrence within the scope of 'believes' is forthcoming we can directly attribute the property described by the demonstrative nominal to the demonstrative referent without much communicative strain. In other words, we can *replace* the original sentence by another one in which the property represented by the nominal is directly attributed to the demonstrative referent, all this without much strain. Consider the following examples, with the original Sherry scenario in mind: "Why is Sherry behaving so despondently," you ask. Glancing at Alan, I utter,

- (5) She believes that that guy who was just named CEO hates her. [King's (4)]
- (5') She believes that that guy was just named CEO and hates her.
- (5'') She believes that he was just named CEO and hates her.

Neale can explain the fact that sentences like (5) are frequently used to communicate narrow scope interpretations without claiming these interpretations are part of what is literally expressed. And he can also explain why (5') and (5'') literally express what they in fact do. Yet, apparently he cannot explain why (5), (5'), (5'') seems to be intersubstitutable without significant communicative change (in the relevant context). On Neale's view, this would seem to be a

brute fact about human communication. The champion of narrow scope readings, in contrast, has a promising explanation: (5), (5') and (5'') *are equivalent in literal content*. Since explanatory unification is a core desideratum of philosophical methodology, we are justified in countenancing narrow scope readings for complex demonstratives in attitude contexts, which confirms the hypothesis that nominals are part of literal content in complex demonstratives.

2.2.4 INTERSUBSTITUTION

Another piece of evidence in favor of the contribution of nominals to literal content is the acceptability of substitutions of sentences of the form 'that F is G' for 'that, which is F, is G'. (This carries over to other languages.) Consider the following example:

- (6) That table looks expensive.
- (6') That, which is a table, looks expensive.
- (6'') That is a table and it looks expensive.

In normal circumstances, an utterance of (6') would carry the assumption by the speaker that the audience does not know, or does not believe, that the intended referent is a table, whereas an utterance of (6) appears to be free from such an assumption. Commonly, however, whenever (6) can be uttered, (6') can also – and arguably (6'') as well. Note that these substitutions appear to go through with complex demonstratives in other term positions, especially when the demonstrative pronoun receives stress. Thus, consider the following, where the caps represent stress on the demonstrative morpheme:

- (7) My grandmother wants to buy that table.
- (7') My grandmother wants to buy THAT, which is a table.
- (8) I left your book on that table.
- (8') I left your book on THAT, which is a table.
- (9) I will give that table a coat of paint.
- (9') I will give THAT, which is a table, a coat of paint.

One good explanation for the acceptability of these substitutions is that nominals in complex demonstratives are part of their literal content.

2.2.5 INFERENCEAL DISPOSITIONS

English speakers are disposed to infer sentences of the form ‘something is F' ’ from sentences of the form ‘that F is G' ’, and similarly ‘some F is G' ’ from ‘that F is G' ’. A promising explanation is that the nominal of the complex demonstrative is part of its literal content. For, in this case, ‘that F is G' ’ is plausibly equivalent to ‘that is F and G' ’, and from the latter it follows that *something is F* and *some F is G* .

We should note, nonetheless, that theorists who believe that nominals do not contribute to the literal content of complex demonstratives, yet do contribute to their reference determination (e.g. David Braun (1994) and Emma Borg (2000)), have an explanation of the inferential dispositions just mentioned. So, if the existence of these dispositions is to count in favor of nominals being part of literal content, we need to say why their proposal is unappealing.

In intensional logic, argument validity is often elucidated along the following lines: for all models M , and all worlds $w \in W$ in M , if the premises of an argument are true *in w* , its conclusion is also true in w (v. e.g. GAMUT, 1991, p. 53). David Kaplan (1989) suggests an alternative for arguments containing ‘indexicals’: for all suitable models S and all contexts $c \in C$ in S , if the premises of an argument are true *in c* , the conclusion of the argument is also true *in c* .

Armed with this Kaplanian notion of validity, one can produce an account of the intuitive validity of arguments like ‘that F is G' \therefore ‘some F is G' ’ *insofar as one requires the nominal of a complex demonstrative to determine its reference in the context of the utterance*. For, then, in every context in which ‘that F is G' ’ is true, ‘some F is G' ’ will also be true. In this way, one can account for the mentioned inferential dispositions without subscribing to nominals’s being part of literal content. The question then becomes: *which* account of the mentioned inferential dispositions is better. Should we invoke tradition or should we follow Kaplan?

I think we have reason to invoke tradition. For, we would need independent evidence for the Kaplanian explanation in these cases. Furthermore, referential expressions similar to

complex demonstratives, for example complex pronouns (e.g. personal pronouns adjoined to common nouns), constitute similarly valid inferences. Thus, from, say, 'we musicians enjoy silence', we readily infer 'some musicians enjoy silence'. This is so very plausibly because the nominal of 'we musicians' is part of its literal content. Witness the blatant contradiction in: 'we musicians are not musicians'! But, then, we must ask why things should be relevantly different with complex demonstratives, which on the face of it are special cases of complex pronouns, cases where the pronoun is demonstrative. Since there does not seem to be a convincing explanation for an alleged difference, unification suggests that in both cases the inferences should be explained in the same, traditional way.⁶

In sum, we have good reason to think nominals play a role in reference determination and are part of literal content. Therefore, we have good reason to think nominals are *fully significant semantically*. In this way, an account of the semantics of complex demonstratives that assimilates them to the paradigm of the bare demonstrative appears to be mistaken.

3. EXTENDING THE ARGUMENT TO REFERENTIAL DESCRIPTIONS

The first aim of the present section is to propose that nominals in *referential descriptions* are fully significant semantically. This can be done briefly because there are arguments that mirror those for the full semantic significance of nominals in complex demonstratives.

First, speakers very frequently use 'the F' to refer to objects they think, and intend their audiences to think, are F. Second, we can quantify into the nominal of referential descriptions. Third, utterances of sentences of the form 'the F is F' are redundant. Fourth, we can 'cleft' positions inside nominals of referential descriptions. Fifth, there are narrow scope readings of referential descriptions in attitude contexts. And sixth, we are disposed to infer 'some F is G' and 'something is F' from referential 'the F is G'.

The second aim of this section is to hypothesize (provisionally) that referential descriptions are *descriptive designators*, non-quantificational terms that refer and describe. Two key premises to this proposal are: (i) complex demonstratives are descriptive designators and (ii) complex de-

⁶ Similarly valid arguments involving referential descriptions call for a traditional explanation. See e.g. Salmon (1982, p. 42).

monstratives and referential descriptions are very commonly used similarly (v. BURGE, 1974; RAMACHANDRAN, 1996; DEVITT, 2004). In what follows, I will focus on this second premise.

To add to the case for its truth, I put together a matrix of perceptual uses of complex demonstratives combining their term positions with each speech act type in which they are produced.⁷ For each cell of the matrix, and starting with a perceptually used complex demonstrative, we can very often substitute a referential description with the same nominal without much disturbance:

	Representatives	Directives	Commissives	Expressives	Declarations
Subject	1	2	3	4	5
Direct Object	6	7	8	9	10
Indirect Object	11	12	13	14	15
Object of Preposition	16	17	18	19	20

[Interlocutor holding only one vase]

- 1a. That vase you're holding is cracked. Be careful.
- 1b. The vase you're holding is cracked. Be careful.

[Only one woman in a red dress in focus]

- 2a. Did that woman wearing a red dress just wink at you?
- 2b. Did the woman wearing a red dress just wink at you?

[After technician fixes my DVD player]

- 3a. This DVD player should work now.
- 3b. The DVD player should work now.

⁷ A perceptual use of a complex demonstrative is a use according to which the speaker perceives the intended referent in the context of the utterance.

[Speaker congratulating hearer, after a concert, for executing a musical passage with great insight]

4a. That cadenza in the second movement was brilliantly performed. Congratulations.

4b. The cadenza in the second movement was brilliantly performed. Congratulations.

[Teacher telling student]

5a. I will not change your grade. This presentation is really worth a C.

5b. I will not change your grade. The/your presentation is really worth a C.

[Only one door in focus]

6a. She left that door open again. I cannot believe this.

6b. She left the door open again. I cannot believe this.

[Only one door in the context]

7a. Shut that door!

7b. Shut the door!

[Only one door in focus]

8a. I promise I will not leave that door open again.

8b. I promise I will not leave the door open again.

[Only one door in focus]

9a. Thanks for shutting that door!

9b. Thanks for shutting the door!

[Manager at a meeting about an unprofitable project]

10a. That's it. I am junking this MTV project.

10b. That's it. I am junking the MTV project.

[Only one woman in blue in the context]

11a. Silvio bought that woman in blue a house in Sardinia.

11b. Silvio bought the woman in blue a house in Sardinia.

[Speaker ordering his assistant; woman in question has fainted]

12a. You should get that woman a glass of water.

12b. You should get the woman a glass of water.

[Assistant committing to helping the woman]

13a. Ok. I will get that woman some water.

13b. Ok. I will get the woman some water.

[At a business meeting; one set of investors in focus]

14a. I guarantee these investors good profit.

14b. I guarantee the/our investors good profit.

[One student in focus]

15a. I grant this student a pass.

15b. I grant the student a pass.

[Only one woman in blue in the context]

16a. Silvio bought a house in Sardinia for that woman in blue.

16b. Silvio bought a house in Sardinia for the woman in blue.

[Speaker ordering his assistant; woman in question has fainted]

17a. You should get a glass of water for that woman.

17b. You should get a glass of water for the woman.

[Assistant committing to helping the woman]

18a. Ok. I will get some water for that woman.

18b. Ok. I will get some water for the woman.

[At a business meeting; one set of investors in focus]

19a. I guarantee good profit for these investors.

19b. I guarantee good profit for the/our investors.

[Only one woman in black on the podium]

20a. I bequeath my Raphael to that woman in black on the podium.

20b. I bequeath my Raphael to the woman in black on the podium.⁸

The acceptability of these substitutions, coupled with the independently motivated full semantic significance of nominals in both expressions, constitutes a strong argument that referential descriptions and complex demonstratives have a similar referential meaning, a meaning according to which the F-object the speaker has in mind is part of literal content (DEVITT, 2004, p. 288).

Moreover, `conversational implicatures' induced with the help of complex demonstratives are typically preserved when we substitute referential descriptions with the same nominal. To use Paul Grice's terminology (1989), the implicatures do not `detach' when the substitutions are performed, a very plausible explanation for which being that both expressions express the same literal content. This adds to the case that the expressions have a very similar referential meaning. Consider the following scenario:

“As I am talking to a friend while he is doing the dishes, I notice that the glass he just stopped rinsing (still in his hand) is a bit soapy. Noticing he has not noticed this, and knowing how much importance he gives to cleaning his glasses, I interrupt what I am saying and utter the following with the intention of conversationally implicating he should give that particular glass another rinse: “Joe, *that glass* you are holding is still a bit soapy.” Based on my uttering what I uttered, the literal content of my utterance and assumptions Joe and I

plausibly share about the character of conversations, Joe would probably grasp the intended conversational implicature. Yet, he would have grasped the same implicature had I uttered the following instead: "Joe, *the glass* you're holding is still a bit soapy."

Note, in addition, that the very fact that the substitutions go through in a variety of situations calls for an explanation. Postulating that referential descriptions and complex demonstratives have a similar meaning unifies (and hence explains) this convergence in usage. So, we have further reason for the idea that referential descriptions and complex demonstratives have a similar meaning.

Now, if we hypothesize that complex demonstratives are descriptive designators, non-quantificational terms that refer and describe, we capture very neatly the following three facts about the meaning of complex demonstratives: (i) their nominals are relevant to reference determination, (ii) their nominals are part of literal content and (iii) the object the speaker has in mind in uttering them (i.e. the object the speaker refers to) is also part of literal content. On the descriptive designator view, 'that F' refers to * iff 'that' refers to * and 'F' applies to *, and 'that F is G' is true iff 'G' applies to the referent of 'that F'. Nothing else is required (BURGE, 1974; RICHARD, 1993; DEVITT and STERELNY, 1999; DEVER, 2001).

Given the widespread similarities in use between complex demonstratives and referential descriptions, we should arrive at similar conclusions about referential descriptions. Thus, referential 'the F' refers to * iff 'the' in 'the F' refers to * and 'F' applies to *, and 'the F is G' is true iff 'G' applies to the referent of 'the F'. Again, nothing else is required.

In section 5, I will return to this point and argue that this way of viewing things is preferable to its best rival, the 'Gödelian quantifier' view. But first let me turn to two immediate objections to the argument of this section.

4. BLOCKING THE SUBSTITUTIONS

When the usage similarities between complex demonstratives and referential descriptions are brought up in philosophical discussion, one often encounters significant resistance against the idea that they allow us to draw positive conclusions about the semantics of definite descriptions. I will discuss two sources of concern in this respect, and argue that both are inconclusive.

4.1 OSTENSIVE GESTURES, STRESS, AND CONTRAST⁹

When the speaker needs to make an ostensive gesture to make his demonstrative reference clear, and the nominal of the demonstrative radically underdetermines its intended referent, substitutions for referential descriptions are typically disallowed. Consider the following scenario:

“[...] if Diane is on a ski lift looking down at a ski run filled with male skiers and she points at a skier and says ‘I wish I could ski like that man’, there is nothing odd about her remark. But if she had said instead ‘I wish I could ski like the man’, there certainly would be something odd about her remark.” (KING, 2001, p. 67)

If this point were sufficiently general, if the cases of substitution block exemplified by it were overwhelmingly greater than the cases that allow the substitutions, there would be a strong presumption against the similarities in use between complex demonstratives and referential descriptions constituting an argument for their membership in the same semantic kind – the kind I have called ‘descriptive designators’. Yet, the problem, I think, is that the point does not seem to be sufficiently general.

The sort of case King describes very often involves the speaker intending to communicate a *contrast* between the intended referent and the other objects of the same kind available to perception. Evidence for this is that in such cases we very often find stress on the demonstrative pronoun, and ostensive gestures accompany the utterance, both conspiring to the effective communication of the intended contrast: ‘THAT man [pointing to the guy with index finger] is an awesome skier’ – as opposed to the other men in the ski run. Now, it is unclear (at least to me) whether complex demonstratives are used *mostly* in this way, where ostensive gestures, word stress, and communicative contrast are present.

In addition, speakers very often use complex demonstratives to refer to objects that are not present in the context of the utterance. Thus, consider ‘memory’ uses of complex demons-

⁹ For present purposes, an ostensive gesture is exemplified by the following: pointing with a finger, waving in the direction of something, grabbing something, embracing something etc. Glancing at something or subtly nodding at it are not, on my view, examples of ostensive gestures.

tratives, where the uttered demonstrative refers to an object speaker and audience can identify by memory: ‘that trip to Chile last year was great, wasn’t it’, where the speaker and the audience know which particular trip is being talked about (because it was memorable). In these cases, there is no question of an ostensive gesture to single out an intended referent, and stress and contrast are often absent too.¹⁰ Note, moreover, that memory uses are usually welcoming to the substitutions for referential descriptions, for if the audience is capable of grasping the referential content of a memory demonstrative in a given context, very often it already has sufficient means to understand the utterance when a referential description occurs instead.

Furthermore, complex demonstratives are not typically used to refer to things with the help of ostensive gestures (or counterparts thereof) in written media. And neither do they seem to preponderantly involve stress and contrast in such cases. This suggests a presumption for the felicity of the substitutions for referential descriptions. Likewise in more formal oral contexts, where politeness rules dictate a tendency for more describing and less gesturing.

In this way, it seems to me disputable that the case described in King’s passage is significantly more common than the cases that allow the substitutions. And if this is right, and I think it is, the mentioned substitution blocks, which undoubtedly exist, do not irrevocably undermine the argument of the last section.

4.2 THE ‘THAT-THAT’ CASES

Another potential problem involving the alleged usage similarities between complex demonstratives and definite descriptions involves uses of complex demonstratives in close succession to refer to different objects in mind. Thus, consider the following example: ‘that wine glass [speaker pointing to one glass] is way more durable than that wine glass [speaker pointing to another glass]’. This sort of utterance is felicitous. Yet, apparently, one cannot felicitously utter ‘the wine glass is way more durable than the wine glass’.

10 Stress and contrast do at times surface in cases where the intended referent is not around to be gestured at. Many of these cases, however, seem to involve anaphora. Consider the following dialogue. A: ‘That trip to Chile last year was great, wasn’t it?’ B: ‘Which one, the one with your sister?’ A: ‘No, the one with your brother.’ B: ‘Oh, *that* one. I agree.’

In light of this, one may hypothesize that the role speaker intention plays in the semantics of the two expressions explains those superficial differences: speaker intentions are relevant to the semantics of complex demonstratives but irrelevant to the semantics of definite descriptions (KING, 2001, p. 67–78). And, if this were right, complex demonstratives and referential descriptions *could not* be both descriptive designators, for there would not be such a thing as a referential description (a definite description whose meaning is partly constituted by the object the speaker intends to refer to). So, the argument of the last section collapses.

However, there is a significant problem here. For, we need to distinguish sharply two evidential claims: (a) definite descriptions of the same form (and used referentially) are *never* uttered in close succession to felicitously express content about two objects in mind; (b) definite descriptions of the same form (and used referentially) are *not often* uttered in close succession to felicitously express content about two objects in mind. It seems to me that it is (a) rather than (b) that justifies the strong conclusion that the semantics of definite descriptions is not properly explained by means of speaker intention (and hence should not be elucidated via the semantics of complex demonstratives). Yet, (a) is false. Consider this nice example due to Stephen Neale:

“At the end of a boxing match between a Russian and a Swede I might say to you, upon hearing that the panel of eleven international judges has declared the Swede the winner by ten votes to one, ‘I know why it wasn’t unanimous. ‘Why?’ you ask? I reply with: ‘the Russian voted for the Russian.’” (NEALE, 2004, p. 123)

It is hard to see how the felicity of the last utterance could be explained without recourse to speaker intention. And on the plausible assumption that the utterance is literally true, and that the speaker intends to express content about two different persons in mind, speaker intention is very plausibly part of the semantics of definite descriptions used referentially. Thus, the fact that definite descriptions are not commonly used in close succession to express content about two objects in mind is insufficient to establish that there are no referential descriptions.

Furthermore, the fact that we cannot usually substitute referential descriptions for complex demonstratives when the latter are uttered in close succession does not show that referential descriptions do not have a referential semantics. For, these close succession uses of complex demonstratives do not seem preponderant. Thus, the substitution blocks they involve appear to

be quantitatively insufficient to undermine the claim that complex demonstratives and referential descriptions are commonly used in the same way.

To conclude: the argument of section 3 appears to stand. Given the similarity in use between complex demonstratives and referential descriptions, and the full semantic significance of their nominals, which was argued for independently, a very plausible working hypothesis is that both expressions are descriptive designators, non-quantificational terms that refer and describe.

5. THE TERM HYPOTHESIS AND DESCRIPTIVE DESIGNATORS

The fate of the thesis that complex demonstratives and referential descriptions are descriptive designators depends significantly on the status of what I will call 'the term hypothesis': *every term in natural language is either referential or quantificational*, where referential terms are semantically simple and rigid, while quantificational terms are semantically complex and typically non-rigid (v. NEALE, 1993; cf. DEVER, 2001; NEALE, 2008b).

The first aim of this section is to show that, as understood, the term hypothesis is dubious. Thus, we are free to endorse the descriptive designator view about complex demonstratives and referential descriptions. The second aim of this section is to show that there are theoretical grounds *for* the descriptive designator view, the view according to which complex demonstratives and referential descriptions are terms that refer and describe without quantifying. Since this view covers the empirical ground covered by its rivals and it is simpler, we should endorse it.

5.1 THE TERM HYPOTHESIS

The term hypothesis describes a clean divide in natural language terms. There are the *referential* terms on one side and the *quantificational* ones on the other. No term is both.¹¹ Proper names (e.g. 'Aristotle'), indexicals (e.g. 'I'), and bare demonstratives (e.g. 'that') are said to populate the referential side. Complex terms like 'every man', 'most journalists', and 'the present King of France' are said to populate the quantificational side.

11 That is how I read the hypothesis, at least. If the intended meaning of the 'or' were inclusive, why state it using the form 'either ... or ...'?

On one interpretation – perhaps the strongest one – the term hypothesis implies that all referential terms possess three features: they are *semantically simple*, they induce *object-dependence* on the level of literal content, and they are (de jure) *rigid*.¹² Quantificational terms, in contrast, are supposed to lack these features: they are *semantically complex*, they are *object-independent*, and they are not (de jure) *rigid* (cf. DEVER, 2001, p. 271–272).¹³

As understood, I think the term hypothesis is dubious. Consider *semantic simplicity*. To say that a term is semantically simple is *inter alia* to say that its extension is not determined by the meaning of its proper parts (NEALE, 2008b, p. 294; cf. RUSSELL, 1918, p. 200; p. 244). Thus, take the proper name ‘Aristotle’ to refer to the great Greek philosopher. That ‘Aristotle’ refers to Aristotle is plausibly independent of the meaning of its proper parts. For, ‘Aristotle’ does not have any meaningful proper parts.

This is fine as far as it goes, but problems lurk. One apparent problem is that it is unclear whether bare demonstratives – stock examples of referential terms – are semantically simple in this sense. Several linguists have argued that ‘this’ and ‘that’ have meaningful components, a ‘th’ component and a locational component, represented by ‘at’ and ‘is’ in English (v. e.g. LEU, 2008; cf. ELBOURNE, 2008).

Moreover, a proper name like ‘Saul Kripke’ plausibly *has* its extension determined by the meaning of its proper parts, namely by the meaning of ‘Saul’ and by the meaning of ‘Kripke’. For one thing, ‘Saul’ and ‘Kripke’ are different words; evidence for this is that they can (and do) occur without one another. For another thing, when the words occur without one another, they have meaning (e.g. ‘I just saw Saul in the elevator’; ‘I just saw Kripke in the elevator’). Given that ‘Saul Kripke’ is a referential term, referential terms need not be semantically simple.

Next, consider ‘*object-dependence*’. According to the term hypothesis, referential terms induce object-dependence on the level of literal content, in the sense that (i) no complete proposition or literal content is expressed if the referential term has no extension and (ii) nothing constitutes understanding the whole proposition or literal content (expressed) if the referential

12 According to Kripke, an expression is ‘*de jure rigid*’ when its ‘reference [...] is *stipulated* to be a single object’ (1980: 21, fn. 21).

13 Neale (1993; 2008b) does not include object-dependence on his list. Dever (2001) does.

term has no extension (v. e.g., DEVER, 2001, p. 272; cf. EVANS, 1982, p. 42–63). However, even though object-dependence is plausibly a necessary feature of referential terms, it does not seem to be a sufficient one.

One good reason is that so-called ‘Gödelian definite descriptions’ – attributive descriptions of the form ‘the F identical to that’ – induce object-dependence on the level of literal content.¹⁴ Consider an utterance of ‘the man who is identical to that is a brilliant musician’, uttered by me to refer to a man in my (and in my interlocutor’s) visual field. Suppose the man is Alan Gilbert, the new music director of the New York Philharmonic. Have I literally expressed an object-dependent proposition in uttering what I uttered? It seems to me that I have because the literal content of ‘that’ in the restrictive relative clause composing the Gödelian description depends on Alan Gilbert. So, the content literally expressed depends on him. If no one had been in my visual field (e.g. if I had been hallucinating), nothing would constitute understanding it fully.

Now, is the Gödelian description I uttered a referential term? On the standard hypothesis that the definite article from which it is projected receives a Russellian interpretation, the answer is ‘probably not’. For, the description is a quantifier, and quantifiers are not referential terms (according to the term hypothesis, at least). The fact that the Gödelian description *contains* a referential term is arguably insufficient to *make* it referential (NEALE, 2008b, p. 307). Another way of expressing this point is to say that quantifiers like ‘the’ express *relations between properties*. And nothing precludes one of these properties from being (or comprising) the property of being identical to an object, the sort of property some metaphysicians have called *a haecceity*. Thus, we have reason to think that a term can be both quantificational and object-dependent without being referential. Gödelian descriptions are very good candidates.

And, last, consider *rigidity*. One often hears that ‘truly’ referential terms must be rigid in the sense that they refer to the same object in all possible worlds in which this object exists (and refer to nothing else in worlds in which it does not exist).¹⁵ But one is never given a convincing

14 On my usage, and following Stephen Neale, ‘Gödelian descriptions’ are descriptions of ‘the sort used in spelling out Gödel’s slingshot argument’ (NEALE, 2004, p. 171). As I construe it, a Gödelian theory of a given (singular) term is a theory according to which this term is synonymous with a Gödelian description.

15 Sometimes the claim is stronger, i.e. that a term is rigid iff it refers to the same object in all possible worlds *simpliciter*. We can overlook this second sense without damage to the argument.

argument for this blanket assertion about rigidity. One is often presented with intuitions about rigidity, which constitute one source of evidence, and arguably a very good one with respect to proper names, indexicals, and bare demonstratives. But intuitions about rigidity are much less firm when it comes to complex demonstratives and referential descriptions. Furthermore, once we become hesitant about the alleged semantic simplicity of all referential terms, the case for their rigidity starts to look disputable. Thus, it is probably better to suspend judgment (at this point) about the hypothesis that all referential terms are rigid.

In sum, terms that are very plausibly referential appear to lack certain features the term hypothesis suggests they have. And terms that are plausibly quantificational appear to have features the term hypothesis suggests they lack. Thus, the term hypothesis – at least as understood – is dubious.

5.2. WHY DESCRIPTIVE DESIGNATORS?

But why – one may press – *should* we endorse the descriptive designator view? We should endorse it, I believe, because we have good methodological reason to do so. It is simpler than its best rival.

First, given that nominals in *complex demonstratives* are fully significant semantically, and given that the object the speaker has in mind or refers to in uttering a complex demonstrative contributes to its literal content, we will probably have to choose – from a very high level of abstraction – between either of two options for the semantics of complex demonstratives: *the Gödelian description view*, according to which ‘that F’ is synonymous with a Gödelian definite description ‘[the x: x is F and x = that]’ or *the descriptive designator view*, according to which ‘that F’ contributes to the proposition expressed the referent of ‘that’ and the property F-ness. Now, Gödelian descriptions play no distinctive semantic role in the semantics of complex demonstratives. In particular, the quantifier ‘[the x]’, the variables it binds, and the identity relation are here employed merely to *re-describe* the truly efficacious mechanisms underlying the semantics of ‘that F’, namely (singular) reference and nominal application. Since the descriptive designator view is in essence a statement of these mechanisms and nothing else, it is simpler than its rival. Since it covers the empirical ground the rival covers, it is epistemically superior.

Second, the Gödelian description view suggests more complex *semantic representations* for `that F' than those suggested by the descriptive designator view. For according to the former, the semantic representations of `that F' are arguably composed by the counterparts of `the', `F', and `=that' (arranged in the relevant ways), whereas the semantic representations provided by the descriptive designator view are composed by the counterparts of `that' and `F' only (arranged in the relevant ways). On the assumption that understanding language involves computing semantic representations, the descriptive designator view is superior because less expensive cognitively (a fact that dovetails nicely with the early emergence of complex demonstratives in speech) (cf. SCHIFFER, 2005, p. 1176).

Similar considerations apply to referential descriptions. *Vis-à-vis* the descriptive designator view, the Gödelian view is methodologically less appealing; the `identical to that' restriction on the description nominal plays no significant semantic role. Furthermore, the Gödelian description view suggests more complex semantic representations than the descriptive designator alternative does. The `=that' item in a Gödelian description will probably have a counterpart in the semantic representation of referential `the F'. On the assumption that understanding language involves computing semantic representations, the descriptive designator view is superior because less expensive cognitively (a fact that also dovetails nicely with the early emergence of referential descriptions in speech).

Note, moreover, that the concept of a descriptive designator promises to unify other types of terms, terms that never really fit the quantificational mold very comfortably. Among these are complex pronouns (viz. combinations of personal pronouns and common nouns as in `them kids' and `you oboists'). On the face of it, these terms are not quantifiers. For, why would a pronoun *become* a quantifier once descriptive material is appended to it? An explanation of these terms's semantics by means of the descriptive designator paradigm provides further, albeit indirect, evidence for the thesis that complex demonstratives and referential descriptions are descriptive designators.

In sum, we have good methodological reason to think that the descriptive designator thesis is a promising thesis about the literal content (or meaning) of complex demonstratives and referential descriptions.

6. CONCLUSION

In this paper, I have proposed three main claims: (i) that complex demonstratives and referential descriptions have nominals that are fully significant semantically; (ii) that complex demonstratives and referential descriptions are likely to be descriptive designators; (iii) and that the 'term hypothesis' does not significantly undermine the descriptive designator thesis. In fact, on methodological grounds, we should endorse this thesis.

At the outset, I mentioned a polarization in the debate around the semantics of complex demonstratives and referential descriptions. On one side, there are those who assimilate these expressions to the paradigm of the bare demonstrative. On the other side, there are those who assimilate them to the paradigm of the quantifier. In my opinion, this polarization manifests an undue idealization of the purpose of natural language terms. For, given our epistemic condition, which implies vast ignorance of the particular objects we encounter in our daily lives and often inclines us to error, it is indeed very useful to have a class of terms that conventionally pick out particular objects we may have in mind without any descriptive commitments (FOLLESDAL, 1986; cf. NEALE, 1993). On the other hand, it is also very useful to have a class of terms that conventionally represent objects merely descriptively, either because we have not experienced these objects before or because this experience, however extensive, is beside the point of our communicative intentions. But this by no means excludes the usefulness of another class of terms, namely those that pick out objects in mind *while describing them*. These devices clearly help our interlocutors to focus on our intended referents, and their use surely facilitates our discussing these referents *as having the relevant properties*, round here and now. To such ends, quantifying over a very large set of objects would appear to be unnecessary.

If this is right, the polarization above overlooks a better partitioning of natural language terms, a partitioning that encompasses the class of terms that refer and describe without quantifying, complex demonstratives and referential descriptions being exemplars.

RESUMO

Na literatura filosófica, o debate em torno da semântica dos demonstrativos complexos e descrições referenciais tornou-se, em grande medida, polarizado. Isto porque estas expressões são vistas muito comumente ou como (i) 'diretamente referenciais', no sentido em que contribuem para o conteúdo literal somente suas extensões atuais ou como (ii) quantificacionais, no sentido em que contribuem para o conteúdo literal uma condição para determinação de possíveis extensões, uma condição que contenha o conteúdo descritivo de seus nominais. Neste artigo, apresento argumentos em favor de uma concepção alternativa, segundo a qual demonstrativos complexos e descrições referenciais são termos que se referem e descrevem *sem quantificar*. Em poucas palavras, eles são *designadores descritivos*.

Palavras-chave: *Filosofia da Linguagem; demonstrativos complexos; descrições referenciais*

ABSTRACT

In the philosophical literature, the debate around the semantics of complex demonstratives and referential descriptions has become to a significant extent polarized. For, these expressions are very often said to be either 'directly referential', in the sense that they only contribute their actual extensions to literal content, or else quantifiers, in the sense that they only contribute a condition on possible extensions to literal content, a condition containing the content of their nominals. In this paper, I present arguments in favor of an alternative view, the view according to which complex demonstratives and referential descriptions are non-quantificational terms that refer and describe. In a few words, they are descriptive designators.

Key-words: *Philosophy of language; complex demonstratives; referential descriptions.*

References

- BACH, Kent. 2006. What does it take to refer? *In*: LEPORE, Ernest; SMITH, Barry. (Org.). *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 516–554.
- BORG, Emma. 2000. Complex demonstratives. *Philosophical Studies*, 97, p. 229–249.
- BRAUN, David. 1994. Structured characters and complex demonstratives. *Philosophical Studies*, 74, p. 193–219.
- BRAUN, David. 2008. Complex demonstratives and their singular contents. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 31, p. 57–99.
- BURGE, Tyler. 1974. Demonstrative constructions, reference, and truth. *Journal of Philosophy*, 71, p. 205–223.
- DAVIDSON, Donald. 1967. Truth and meaning. *Synthese*, 17, p. 304–323.
- DEVER, Josh. 2001. Complex demonstratives. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 24, p. 271–330.
- DEVITT, Michael. 2004. The case for referential descriptions. *In*: REIMER, Marga; BEZUIDENHOUT, Anne (Org.). *Definite Descriptions and Beyond*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 280–305.
- DEVITT, Michael and STERELNY, Kim. 1999. *Language and Reality*. 2^a Ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- DONNELLAN, Keith. 1966. Reference and definite descriptions. *Philosophical Review* 77, p. 281–304.
- ELBOURNE, Paul. 2008. Demonstratives as individual concepts. *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 31, p. 409–466.
- EVANS, Gareth. 1982. *The Varieties of Reference*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- FOLLESDAL, Dagfin. (1986). Essentialism and reference. *In*: HAHN, Lewis; SCHILPP, Paul (Org.), *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*. La Salle: Open Court, p. 97–113.
- GAMUT, L.T.F. 1991. *Introduction to Logic, Vol. 2*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- GRICE, Paul. 1989. *Studies in the Way of Words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

- HAEGEMAN, Liliane. 2006. *Thinking Syntactically*. Malden: Blackwell.
- KAPLAN, David. 1989. Demonstratives. In: ALMOG, Joseph; PERRY, John; WETTSTEIN, Howard (Org.). *Themes from Kaplan*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 481–563.
- KING, Jeffrey. 2001. *Complex Demonstratives*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- KING, Jeffrey. 2008. Complex demonstratives, QI uses, and direct reference. *The Philosophical Review*, 117, p. 99–117.
- KRIPKE, Saul. 1980. *Naming and Necessity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- LARSON, Richard; SEGAL, Gabriel. 1995. *Knowledge of Meaning*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- LEPORE, Ernest; LUDWIG, Kirk. 2000. The semantics and pragmatics of complex demonstratives. *Mind*, 109, p. 199–240.
- LEU, Thomas. 2008. *The Internal Syntax of Determiners*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Linguistics Department, NYU, New York.
- LEVINSON, Stephen. 1983. *Pragmatics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- NEALE, Stephen. 1993. Term limits. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 7, p. 89–123.
- NEALE, Stephen. 2004. This, that and the other. In: REIMER, Marga; BEZUIDENHOUT, Anne (Org.). *Definite Descriptions and Beyond*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 68–182.
- NEALE, Stephen. 2008a. Heavy hands, magic and scene reading traps. *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy*, 3, p. 77–132.
- NEALE, Stephen. 2008b. Term limits revisited. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 22, p. 271–337.
- NEALE, Stephen. *forthcoming*. Implicit reference. In: OSTERTAG, G. (Org.), *The Philosophy of Stephen Schiffer*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- RAMACHANDRAN, Murali. 1996. The ambiguity thesis versus Kripke's defense of Russell. *Mind and Language*, 11, p. 371–387.
- RICHARD, Mark. 1993. Articulated terms. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 7, p. 207–230.
- RUSSELL, Bertrand. 1918. *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*. Chicago: Open Court.

SALMON, Nathan. 1982. Assertion and incomplete definite descriptions. *Philosophical Studies*, 42, p. 37–45.

SALMON, Nathan. 2008. That F. *Philosophical Studies*, 141, p. 263–280.

SCHIFFER, Stephen. 1995. Descriptions, indexicals, and belief reports. *Mind*, 104, p. 107–131.

SCHIFFER, Stephen. 2005. Russell's theory of definite descriptions. *Mind*, 114, p. 1135–1183.

SOAMES, Scott. 2009. Truth and meaning: in perspective. In: *Philosophical Essays*. Vol.1. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 208–247.