ABSTRACT
Often presented as inevitable, the fall of the Roman Republic is better understood in relation to the defeat of the republican solution to Egyptian Question: the annexation resisted by the Senate but achieved by Augustus in 30 B.C. was the result of a process to achieve dominatio (Tacitus, Annals, 2.59) that began in 65 with M. Licinius Crassus. Because Herman Strasburger, Ronald Syme, and Erich S. Gruen have made it more difficult to appreciate the significance of this terminus a quo by attacking the evidence of Plutarch, Suetonius, and Cicero, their work receives critical attention.

KEYWORDS
Cicero; Contra Rullam; Marcus Licinius Crassus; Augustus; Roman Egypt; Fall of the Roman Republic.
Israel Shatzman set the precedent by drawing much-needed attention to the significance of the Egyptian Question in late Republican Rome while restricting his investigation to the 50s.\(^1\) Given the wealth of information about these years, this restriction is understandable but now proves to be inadequate.\(^2\) Even within Shatzman’s parameters, important work has been done since 1971; in particular, Mary Siani-Davies’s magisterial “Introduction” to her edition of Cicero’s *Pro Rabirio Postumo* deserves mention in the Anglophone context.\(^3\) Unlike Siani-Davies, Shatzman did not consider several German doctoral dissertations written before 1971;\(^4\) naturally other German contributions to the field have been made since that time. It should be emphasized, however, that any limitations of Shatzman’s bibliography are of no great consequence in comparison with his crucial breakthrough: the identification of “the Egyptian Question in Roman Politics.” And the principal limitation that is relevant here is *chronological*: my purpose is to suggest why an adequate understanding of the Question requires revising both of Shatzman’s *termini*.\(^5\)

A good place to begin this revision is with a passage from Cicero’s second speech *Contra Rullum* of 63 B.C., our best source for seeing the Question as a dilemma, i.e., as a problem with two distinct solutions. Cicero undertakes to restage for the People a debate about Egypt held in the Senate; he professes neutrality,\(^6\) and emphasizes the difficulty of restaging the debate.\(^7\) He states the first position as a spectacle that he sees before his eyes but the object of vision is blurry; its proponent is unnamed:

> I see someone who asserts that the will was made [*Video qui testamentum facto esse confirmet*]; I am aware [*sentio*] that a decree of the senate exists stating that it entered upon the inheritance at the time when, after the death of Alexas, we sent commissioners to Tyre to recover for our people a sum of money deposited there by him.\(^8\)

Although Cicero, speaking in 63, is using the present tense, he is referring to an event that took place two years before in 65;\(^9\) the occasion of his lost speech *De Rege Alexandrino*.\(^10\) Without mentioning now that it was M. Licinius Crassus who made the case that provoked
that speech, and who therefore is this unnamed qui, Cicero recalls the support offered to this position by a distinguished consular:

I remember that Lucius Philippus frequently confirmed these things in the Senate: “I see a consensus among almost everyone [inter omnes iure video convenere] that he who holds this kingdom at this time is kingly neither by birth nor in spirit.”

Here, then, is the famous Piper: the protagonist of the Question as it appears within Shatzman’s parameters, the buffoon about whom there had long been almost no debate.

But the important part of Cicero’s restaging in Contra Rullum has yet to be heard. He continues:

On the other hand it is said [dicitur contra] that there is no will, that the Roman people ought not [non oportere] to show itself [videri] so eager to seize all the kingdoms upon earth; that our citizens are likely to leave Rome and emigrate to that country, attracted by the fertility of the land and its abundant supplies of everything [propter agrorum bonitatem et omnium rerum copiam].

Here, finally, is the real protagonist of the Question: Egypt itself, the bounteous land of the Nile, with its civilization-spawning fertility (bonitas) and its limitless wealth (omnium rerum copia). But first there is the question of staging: Cicero is here stating the other side of the Question (dicitur contra), summarizing what he had said against he who (qui) had proposed (in 65 B.C.) the annexation of Egypt in accordance with the will. And just as Cicero does not name his antagonist, he refuses likewise to name himself: this passage should be recognized as an invaluable testimonium to the lost De Rege Alexandrino. Having warned his audience that it is a big question not only to decide but to describe, he summarizes, as briefly as possible, the argument he himself had made: (1) there is no authentic will, i.e., Rome has no legitimate right to Egypt and (2) annexing Egypt is bad policy because (a) it will make Rome seem too greedy and (b) it will lead to emigration. In her splendid commentary on the fragments of this lost speech, Jane W. Crawford argues that an attack on avarice was the central theme of De Rege Alexandrino; the central item in Cicero’s summary (2a) confirms this view. More importantly, Cicero’s summary shows that the Question in 65 was not simply about the legitimacy of the testamentum but rather about the
wisdom of annexing Egypt. And it is this way of framing the issue that makes 30 B.C. the only natural terminus ad quem for an adequate understanding of the true significance of the Egyptian Question in Roman Politics: I added Egypt to the empire of the Roman People [Aegyptum imperio populi Romani adieci].

With these simple words, the adopted son of C. Julius Caesar announced the final solution of the Egyptian Question. The important point to make about this terminus ad quem is that it was by no means a republican solution: the new province of Egypt did not become the possession of the Roman People but rather the personal property of divus Augustus, and then of the monarchs who succeeded him, absentee Pharaohs of the land of the Nile. We know this because Tacitus describes how Germanicus, during the reign of Tiberius, visited Alexandria:

> Without the emperor's leave, contrary to the regulations of Augustus. That prince, among other secrets of imperial policy [dominationis arcana], had forbidden senators and Roman knights of the higher rank to enter Egypt except by permission, and he had specially reserved the country, from a fear that anyone who held a province containing the key of the land and of the sea, with ever so small a force against the mightiest army, might distress Italy by famine.

An awareness of the course, scope, and importance of the Egyptian Question in the thirty-five years before the future “Augustus” marched into Alexandria on what was then still called “the Kalends of Sextilis” (August 1, 30 B.C.) provides an important clue to this well-kept dominationis arcanum: the man who controlled Egypt would master Rome.

To use the words of the Declaration of Independence, the annexation of Egypt on these terms was made possible by “a long train of abuses and usurpations” including but not limited to Rubicon, Pharsalus, Pompey’s death, the Second Triumvirate (hence Cicero’s murder), Philippi, Actium, and, by no means the least important, the assault on Egypt from the West, through the scorching deserts of Libya, conducted by C. Cornelius Gallus, first governor of Roman Egypt and the first master of Latin Love Elegy. Perhaps Gallus’s twin distinctions are as inseparable as the two parts of an elegiac couplet: at the very least, the condition for the possibility of the imperial annexation of Egypt was a state of affairs any republican would mourn, based as it
was on the extinction of the Republic. The preservation of republican forms or substance under the Empire is not at present the question. But once the Egyptian Question is understood as a debate about the annexation of Egypt, the next step is to recognize that the historical resolution of that debate in 30 constituted the victory of the side that Cicero had already opposed in 65. In short: the republican solution to the Question was and remained not to annex Egypt.

Beginning with Hegel’s lectures on *The Philosophy of History*, it has become a commonplace to assume, tacitly or no, that the fall of the Roman Republic was inevitable and rational: so commonplace is this view that it would require a first-rate historian of ideas to record all the variations on the theme: “A government intended to rule an Italian city-state was inadequate for administering a world empire.” Perhaps the truth is less grandiose: the Republic could not annex Egypt because any Roman who controlled it would *ipso facto* master Rome. To begin with, this understanding of the Augustan *arcanum* avoids any speculative theory of historical determinism: it was not inevitable that Rome would annex Egypt. Consider the phrase “*dominationis arcanum*” in a double aspect: it was not only the emperor’s imperial secret but also the secret of his empire, i.e., the empire’s secret basis. No doubt there were other imperial secrets (Tacitus uses *arcana*) but it would be hard to imagine a more tangible one than the wealth of the Nile, its *omnium rerum copia*. Augustus could not have transformed Rome from brick to marble without Egypt. And an awareness of the power Egypt conferred is useful not only because it suggests the correct interpretation of *Aenid* 1.286-96: a second doubling of this *arcanum*, this one based on a chronological distinction, sheds a new light on the fall of the Republic.

Here’s the point: there is no good reason to think that this particular *dominationis arcanum* was discovered only after the annexation of Egypt. Even after 30, the secret was not simply that control of Egypt conferred; that is, had already conferred, power to Augustus, but rather that it *would* confer power on whosoever controlled it, and thus that access to it by distinguished Romans must be carefully regulated. Here then is a third sense of the words *dominationis arcanum*: Egypt was the secret basis of gaining a lasting *dominatio* in Rome and thus whoever sought *dominatio* must control Egypt. One advantage to configuring the secret in these terms is that this was an *arcanum* of which the most acute exponents of both positions in the debate over the Egyptian Question might be equally aware: if those who sought something more than a
localized and temporary imperium dreamed of Egypt, opponents of annexation feared that the power Egypt would confer would destroy the Republic. Both were correct. But the fall of the Republic was not inevitable: the Republic was at risk because there were those who knew that the Roman who ruled Egypt would rule Rome.

“Caesar, Pompey, and…Crassus”; it is in that order; and with some reasonable facsimile of that hesitation; that the so-called “First Triumvirate” is most often remembered. But a willingness to reconsider late Republican history in the light of the terminus ad quem of the Egyptian Question; and whatever differences there may be between Erich S. Gruen and Sir Ronald Syme, they constitute a formidable phalanx against every attempt to do anything of the kind; points the student back to 65 B.C. as the Question’s terminus a quo: it was then that M. Licinius Crassus began taking steps that indicate he had discovered the domination sarcanum. It was to his first attempt to bring Egypt into the empire that Cicero referred in 63:

But if Alexandria is aimed at, why not follow the same course as that taken under the consulship of Lucius Cotta and Lucius Torquatus? Why not openly [aperte] as before? why not make for that country, just as then, frankly and straightforwardly [recto et palam]? or, Romans, have those who [ii qui] by a direct route [per cursum rectum] haven’t been able to grasp a kingdom [regnum] now decided that by foul mists and darkness [taetris tenebris et caligine], they are about to arrive in Alexandria?33

The simple fact, as Cicero clearly realized, is that caligo was now required; thirty-five years of it were duly dispensed by those who (ii qui) had failed to reach Alexandria per cursum rectum. For the student, the terminus a quo of 65 illuminates the tenebrae of 63. Others learned a different lesson: the defeat of the direct route in 65, and the failure of the indirect approach in 63, taught Crassus that even greater indirection was required.

Without Pompey, Cicero could not have defeated the indirect approach of 63: the passage of Contra Rullum devoted to unveiling the plot to grab Egypt is brief and merely suggestive; Cicero’s deconstruction of the Agrarian Law as a veiled attack on Pompey is explicit and pervasive. An awareness of the central role the Egyptian Question plays in “the Roman Revolution” rearranges the broad structures of late
republican historiography: the two central players now become Crassus and Cicero, the first statesmen to learn this important *domination sarranum*. In 63, Cicero could use Pompey to defeat Crassus’s solution to the Egyptian Question; even with an absent Pompey, the *novus homo* had demonstrated the insight and eloquence necessary for accomplishing the unthinkable: a *contio* had rejected a *lex agraria* on the advice of a *consul popularis*. It is difficult, as ever, to say whether Crassus was primarily motivated by his desire for increased power, his rivalry with Pompey, or his determination to detach his rival from Cicero (the brains of the outfit) in the run-up to the creation of “the First Triumvirate,” but his comparatively well-documented interest in the Egyptian Question suggests a way to reduce the three to one. If the Rullan bill of 65 was an indirect route to Alexandria, the alliance with Pompey in 60 was even less of a *cursus rectus*, and the initial agreement of the triumvirs to uphold, for a price, the republican position on the Egyptian Question is indicated by Caesar’s recognition of the Piper’s *regnum* in 59. What this suggests to me is that Crassus had made a conscious decision to uphold temporarily that position until, whether by weakening Pompey, isolating Cicero, or both, he could try again by the direct route.

Had Pompey possessed the secret, it is unlikely that he would have returned from the East before securing Egypt. When the Piper invited Pompey to invade Egypt on the King’s behalf, he refused. Can we imagine Crassus wasting such an opportunity? If it was not his strictly discretionary guarantee to uphold Egyptian independence during his Eastern campaign that explains the curious passage in Lucan’s *Civil War*, Pompeius Magnus had indeed performed a great service for Egypt, simply by not behaving like his Egypt-conquering predecessors Alexander and Cyrus the Great. Unlike Augustus in 30, Pompey did not return, armed and enriched, from Egypt in 62: he possessed neither the *dominationis arcanum* nor the will to use it. In fact, the will to *dominatio*, and the original discovery of its Egyptian *Arcanum*, are probably inseparable, at least in the first instance; it was in Crassus, not in Pompey, that the two first became one. The same pattern would continue after Pompey’s return to Rome: when his ally Gabinius invaded Egypt in 55, his purpose was to restore the Piper, i.e., to uphold the republican solution, albeit in its currently bastardized form. But this restoration indicates that Egypt played a larger part in the renegotiation at Luca than it had in the original compact of 60, and the debate over the
restoration of the Piper in 56 deserves some additional comment, falling, as it does, in the midst of Shatzman’s chronological perimeters.

At first sight, these well-documented events brought the Egyptian Question into the open; in fact, they concealed it. It is because of Shatzman’s focus on 59-54 that even the astute scholar, he who first recognized that the Question merited independent consideration, thought it was about who would restore the Piper, not about the wisdom of Roman annexation in general. Rome’s annexation of Cyprus in 58 is one of many contemporary indications pointing toward the real issue, indeed it was the Piper’s willingness to see Egypt partitioned by piecemeal annexation that led to his expulsion in the first place, and thus his need to be restored. And whatever the merits of attempts to establish the independent agency of Clodius, the fact that Cicero’s enemy engineered the Cyprus annexation, shortly after having secured the banishment of the man who had blocked the Rullan bill of 63, suggests the temporarily chastened form that the more radical solution to the Question took in 58. As a general principle, it is only when the chronological parameters are extended in both directions that the obscure controversy of 56 can be seen in its true light. And on this basis, the restoration of the Piper by Lentulus Spinther likewise indicates the form that “the republican” solution to the Question took at that time; corresponding to Clodius’s annexationist program of piecemeal partition, the Piper’s restoration by the governor of Cilicia (which now included Cyprus) was probably no closer to the pure republican position than the tribune’s had been to its opposite. In any case, this solution was thwarted. And it deserves mention that although the oracle was used as a pretext to deny the commission to Spinther, the gods nevertheless seem to have been on the side of the Republic: entering Egypt “with a host”, for whatever purpose, at whatever time, would indeed cause Rome “both pains and dangers.”

The purpose of this paper is not, of course, to retell the complicated story of the Egyptian Question in late republican Rome; no article could accomplish anything of the kind. And that is the point: there is a need for a detailed and thorough account of “the last generation of the Roman Republic” that puts the Question at the center of “the Roman Revolution.” Aside from drawing attention to the importance of the Question in general, it is specifically the expansion of Shatzman’s chronological limits for which I am arguing throughout, and since the terminus ad quem is rather obvious, much of the rest of this paper
will defend in more detail my *terminus a quo*. But before turning back to 65, a few additional remarks about the multiple meanings of Tacitus’s *dominatio sacra* are in order.

Thus far, three meanings of this golden phrase have been introduced: the Egyptian *arcaneum* is: (1) an *imperial secret* known only by the emperors, (2) the secret basis of their *dominatio*, once again known only by the emperors, and (3) the secret basis of *establishing* that *dominatio*, discovered well before there were any emperors. Naturally it is this third version that is relevant to the period before 30, and it is now necessary to introduce a further distinction with respect to it. Having been discovered, the next step was to act upon it. Within the wide array of possible actions, two ways of applying the secret can be distinguished: (4) a direct and (5) an indirect approach. Not surprisingly, it was the direct approach that was discovered first, by Crassus in my version of events. But although the change of Crassus’s policy between 65 and 63 might suggest that he likewise discovered the indirect approach, I do not think this is truly the case: Carrhae was the poisoned fruit of his enduring commitment to (4). For Crassus, then, (3) and (4) were practically indistinguishable: he would get himself as close to Egypt as was practical at the time. Thus it was only when (5) was discovered as alternative to (4) that (4) ultimately became distinguishable from (3): a new version of the secret had been discovered. Postponing for a moment the complicated question of the first Caesar’s role, a clear title to this discovery belongs only to the second.

Consider Antony, last obstacle to the theophany of Augustus. Reaching Egypt first with Gabinius, Antony not only embodies (4) but also illustrates, by antithesis, the power of (5). Although Antony’s defeat required considerable effort and skill, there were already indications of the bankruptcy of the direct route to Egypt. Postponing for now further discussion of the early failures of 65 and 63, the following pattern is remarkable: the losers in Rome’s final Civil War invariably head to the East. The first to do so is Pompey: is the ultimate explanation of his decision to abandon Italy in 49 to be found in his final flight to Egypt after Pharsalus? Other explanations are, of course, at hand; likewise with Brutus and Cassius. But when the same ruinous pattern reappears in Antony, the thoughtful historian must pause and wonder why. I suggest that the final form of the secret was that the only way to secure Egypt was to appear not to wish to do so: it would be a political Columbus who first discovered that the road to the East went west.
The transitional figure between Augustus and Crassus is, of course, the first Julius Caesar; it was he who proved that the fastest route to Alexandria led through Gaul. But did he really learn the secret of (5)? His ruinous dalliance with Cleopatra suggests that he did not: Egypt beckoned, and pulled ambitious Romans like a magnet. In this context, Antony was following the examples of both Crassus and Caesar; not one of the three had the winning combination. The core of the Egyptian Question was, after all, the Roman annexation of Egypt. Wealthy as the land of the Nile might be, it was only control of Egypt by a Roman qua Roman that would make him supreme: hence Augustus’s final solution to the Question. Of course the son could never have reached the goal without the father. But it also seems that mastering the highest form of the Egyptian domination sarcanum required the son to learn from the failure of his father no less than from his success. Somewhere between the success that crowned the elder Caesar’s brilliant discovery of the western route to the East, and the mistakes he made after actually reaching it, the second Caesar learned that Egypt must be loved as well as hated, pursued relentlessly but no less resolutely shunned. Augustus learned as much about the Egyptian Question from Caesar as Caesar had learned from Crassus.

It is only when we realize that seemingly disparate actions are in fact “pursuing invariably the same object” that they can be configured as “a long train of abuses and usurpations”; it is only on the basis of the “absolute despotism” toward which it was relentlessly tending that the train “evinces a design.” The Roman annexation of Egypt and the despotism that eventually followed in its wake are indisputable historical facts; the historiographical controversy arises from construing those facts as the result of “design,” of men “invariably pursuing the same object.” In the case of the Egyptian Question in late republican politics, there is no need to speculate about the identity of these men or to manufacture out of whole cloth the hypothesis of “design” in order to explain the train’s ultimate destination: all that is necessary is to give the facts about their due. Unfortunately, these facts came under attack in the twentieth century.

The salient facts are these: (1) Plutarch ascribes to Crassus as Censor (in 65) “the dangerous and violent policy of making Egypt tributary to Rome,” Several passages from this speech have already been quoted; the following contains Cicero’s clearest reference to Crassus and...
Caesar, usually taken to refer to the former’s greed and the spendthrift ways of the latter.56

Entrust then now, O Romans, all these powers to these men whom you suspect of sniffing after the decemvirate; you will find some of them who never think they have enough to keep \[ad habendum\], and others who never think they have enough to squander \[ad consumendum\].57

CICERO, CONTRA RULLAM II, 65 (FREESE)

It is telling, for example, that the missing opening of Cicero’s first speech Contra Rullum was evidently devoted to the annexation effort of 65.

Having listed the relevant passages and cited some of the relevant German scholarship in n. 59, it is now useful to consider a revealing but representative Anglophone treatment of the aforementioned facts:

In 65 a graver peril [sc. to Egypt] threatened. The influential Marcus Crassus in the year of his censorship attempted to revive the testament of Alexander, and a tribunician bill was promoted that may have proposed the annexation of Egypt. But the ambiguities of Cicero in his brief surviving references to the affair once more render the details of the business uncertain. Possibly no more was intended than a specious sequestration of the treasures of the Ptolemies under specious pretexts. The sponsors made much of the illegitimate status of Auletes, and drew analogies between his supposed murder of Alexander II and the crimes of the former Numidian usurper Jugurtha.58 The bill was defeated by conservative forces, and no more is heard of schemes for the annexation of Egypt in the Republic.59

Noteworthy features in this passage include (1) the obfuscation introduced by “may have proposed,” (2) the use of Cicero to justify uncertainty, (3) the speculative introduction of a benign purpose for the proposed bill,60 and (4) the suggestion that interest in annexation disappeared after 65. But most striking of all is the fact that (5) Caesar’s name does not appear in the passage despite the fact that the only evidence of a tribunician bill is specifically linked to Caesar, not Crassus.
And this last point is revealing: the twentieth century critique of the facts that establish my terminus a quo, —and “the long train” that follows it only “evinces a design” once “the same object” it was “invariably pursuing” is recognized,— is best understood as a refined form of Caesarian apologetic that modifies (while preserving) a nineteenth century critique of Cicero.

The unrefined form of that apologetic and critique is found in Theodor Mommsen. Despite being a resolute and influential enemy of the “Achselträger,” Mommsen inadvertently defended Cicero’s position; — i.e., his opposition to Crassus and Caesar on the Egyptian Question in 65 and 63,— by making a refreshingly strong case for the kind of foresighted Caesar that Caesar’s twentieth century defenders of have found it advisable to suppress.

Writing at the dawn of German enthusiasm for a simultaneously patriotic and self-aggrandizing conception of Realpolitik, Mommsen does not blush to ascribe such projects to his hero Caesar.

Perhaps because of Germany’s defeat in the First World War, perhaps because of subsequent developments, a new form of Caesarian apologetic appeared on the scene in 1938 with the publication of Hermann Strasburger’s *Caesars Eintritt in die Geschichte*. Having already destroyed the notion that there were “democratic” or “conservative” parties in Rome, Strasburger here took the critical axe not only to the “first conspiracy of Catiline” and “Caesar’s Egyptian escapade” but to every detail of Caesar’s early life that could be used by republicans to configure his career as “a long train of abuses and usurpations.”

Thanks to Ronald Syme, and perhaps also because Strasburger was a Mischling tainted by “Jewish blood,” *Caesars Eintritt in die Geschichte* became more influential among “the English-speaking peoples” than in his native Germany. Syme’s portrait of Caesar as a resolute defender of his own dignitas in *The Roman Revolution* (1939) depended explicitly on Strasburger’s pioneering work. And first in his review of Matthias Gelzer (1944), then in his *Sallust* (1964), Syme explicitly rejected Caesar’s involvement in the Egyptian annexation scheme of 65. This rejection was accepted and embraced by Erich S. Gruen who, building on what Strasburger had already done with Plutarch and Suetonius, took his critical axe to Cicero’s *Contra Rullum* in *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (1974): the tribune’s far-sighted piece of legislation did not aim at annexing Egypt, it was not intended to weaken Pompey, and neither Caesar nor Crassus stood behind it. Most importantly, the
confluence of Mommsen’s animus toward Cicero, Strasburger’s whitewashing of Caesar’s early career, and Syme’s comprehensive vision is visible in Gruen’s “Introduction”:

Caesar’s dramatic triumph casts antecedents in the shade. Hence earlier events have become precursors and determinants of that denouement—a dangerous fallacy. And perspective can lead us astray in another direction. Information on the late Republic rests heavily on the pronouncements of Cicero. A figure of no small significance, he looms even larger through the survival of his voluminous writings. But Cicero’s attitudes grew out of personal—and atypical—experiences. One cannot understand the history of the late Republic as an extension of Cicero’s biography or as an evolving blueprint for Caesar’s dictatorship.

But what of Crassus? To be sure, “the coupling of Crassus with Caesar was the work of propagandists in the 50s and later,” but already in Strasburger, then in Syme, and finally as reflected in the passage from Sherwin-White quoted at length above, there is a noteworthy tendency “to throw Crassus under the bus,” i.e., to reject only Caesar’s involvement in the plan to annex Egypt, and leave Crassus “holding the bag.” But Gruen goes considerably farther than his predecessors, and “bites the bullet” even in the case of Crassus:

Crassus in 65 advocated the annexation of Egypt, an issue of high controversy and debate. A long line of historians interprets the maneuver as an effort of Crassus (and Caesar) ‘to obtain a position of strength from which they could bargain with (Pompey).’ Hidden aims and postulated purposes, however, can be set aside. The proposal reached for the revenues of Egypt; taxes from the land would bring rich dividends to Roman coffers. Egypt was Rome’s by bequest, so proponents of the bill urged. Crassus openly argued for military action, if it should be necessary. This measure, like that on the Transpadani, failed of achievement. But Crassus had taken a firm stand as champion of Roman imperialism and the Roman treasury.

But not, it would seem, as champion of M. Licinius Crassus! And this is not the most revealing passage from Gruen’s review of Allen
Ward’s *Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic* (1977), still by far the most valuable monograph on the subject, and another must likewise be quoted at length (the page references are to Ward):

No more edifying is the persistent idea that Crassus operated as a confederate of Julius Caesar. That interpretation pervades a good portion of Ward’s book. Caesar acts with Crassus’ friends already in 70. The cash of Crassus advances Caesar’s career. Then in the mid-60s the two men jointly hatch a dozen schemes to harass Pompey and elevate their own positions vis-à-vis the great general: they champion the Transpadani, seek the annexation of Egypt, encourage various consular candidates, sponsor agrarian legislation, collaborate in the courts, and foster Catiline’s revolutionary aspirations in order to precipitate a crisis from which they could benefit (pp. 128-192, *passim*). In Ward’s narrative, Crassus and Caesar are virtually interchangeable, the actions of the one unhesitatingly used to exemplify the policy of both. The whole reconstruction relies on questionable evidence, a throwback to an older theory long ago undermined by Strasburger.

If I have dealt at considerable length with Gruen, Syme, and Strasburger, it is because in combination they have managed to obscure the significance of certain facts upon which the justification of my proposed *terminus a quo* entirely depends. Influential though their cumulative affect has undoubtedly been, not least of all in the United States, there is still time for us to reconsider Roman History with the same skepticism they so effectively applied to their predecessors. In addition to Ward, it should be obvious from the notes that the writings of Matthias Gelzer are of great value for freeing the events of 65 from the *caligo et taetrae tenebrae*—, and it would be most unjust if Cicero’s spirit did not return at the end, with which his student Strasburger obscured them. Of course it is not only a question of 65: my purpose throughout has been to show that joining 65 to 30 B.C. in relation to the Egyptian Question opens up the way for a new approach to the fall of the Roman Republic. After learning valuable lessons from Mommsen’s open Caesarism, as well as from the Hegelian orientation on which it was based, there are several authorities, long since eclipsed by the rather more covert Strasburger school, that deserve careful reconsideration, foremost among them, L.G. Pocock. But the important thing is to keep one’s eye on the prize: a twenty-first century account of the Republic’s
fall that is worthy of our own republican traditions and future, an account that does not present that fall as inevitable, but rather as the result of a brilliantly conceived but continually evolving plan to defeat the Republican Solution to the Egyptian Question.
RESUMO
A questão egípcia na política romana (65-30 A.C.)

Muitas vezes apresentado como inevitável, o declínio da República romana pode ser compreendido melhor se colocado em relação com o fracasso da solução republicana da assim chamada questão egípcia. A anexação do Egito não cumprida pelo Senado, mas realizada por Augusto em 30 a.C., foi o resultado de um processo que tinha como objetivo a *dominatio* (Tácito, *Anais*, 2.59) e que foi começado no ano 65 a.C. por M. Licínio Crasso. As obras de Herman Strasburger, de Ronald Syme e de Erich S. Gruen serão criticadas, uma vez que atacaram as evidências encontradas em Plutarco, Suetônio e Cícero, dificultando dessa maneira a apreciação correta do significado desse *terminus a quo*.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE
Cícero; *Contra Rullam*; Marco Licínio Crasso; Augusto; Egito romano; declínio da República romana.
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES


______. Pompey, the Roman Aristocracy, and the Conference of Luca. Historia, 18, 1969.


concluding with a useful corrective to Gruen (see n. 11 above): “Rullus’s

65; she offers a succinct but useful summary of the 63 attempt on 9-10,

15 classical vein, to “the Golden Apple of Discord.”

political power.” I would liken Egypt to California in an

exotic country full of riches and, for those seeking it, a possible source of

the imagination of the Romans and served to cultivate the image of Egypt as an

Mediterranean. The increasing frequency of business transactions between Italy

Auletes [sc. the Piper] Egypt remained a rich and potentially glittering prize, in

and Egypt and the official accounts of various embassies seemed to have excited

Magna enim mihi res non modo ad statuendum, sed etiam ad
dicendum videtur esse. While leaving the audience in no doubt as to the

momentousness of the decision to be made (magna res ad statuendum), Cicero

prepares them for the abbreviated, elliptic, and merely suggestive account of it

that he must give (ad dicendum).

All subsequent students of the period are in debt to Badian, 1967, p. 178-192

for an adequate understanding of this testamentum.

9 The translation is that of Freese, 1930. There is something to be said for

regarding “I am aware ... . . . by him” as a quotation; the subject of sentio is, on

this reading, the person who spoke these words originally, not Cicero now (see below). Cicero, Contra Rullam 2, v. 41.

10 Cf. Contra Rullam II, v. 44: “But if Alexandria is aimed at [sc. in 63 B.C.], why

not follow the same course as that taken under the consulship of Lucius Cotta

and Lucius Torquatus [sc. in 65 B.C.]?” See Freese’s note (a) on 418 of Cicero VI:

“The reference is probably to Crassus, who, when censor in 65, had a design to

make Egypt tributary to the Romans, but was so vigorously opposed by his

colleague Catulus that both resigned.” Unfortunately, the salgo (Contra Rullam

II, v. 44) that obscured the Question in 63 B.C. has scarcely lifted: taetae tenebrae, —primarily in the form of denying that Crassus (and Caesar) were behind

Rullus, —remains today. For an influential statement, see Gruen, 1974, p. 389:

“Moderns have seen it as a plot of Crassus and Caesar. The conjecture is hasty

and ill-founded.” On which, more hereafter.

11 See Crawford, Cicero, 1994, p. 43-56. In defense of my terminus a quo, consider 44: “The matter [sc. ‘annexing Egypt’] lay dormant, then, until the year

65, when M. Crassus undertook to reactivate this will.” A good account of this
dormancy is Gruen, 1984, p. 672-719.

12 V. Cicero, Contra Rullam 2, v. 42.

13 “To seem” would be a better translation for videri. Naturally the same man

by whom it is said that there is no will is not the same man who said “I am aware”
that there is one; it therefore makes more sense to regard “auctoritatem... . . .
recuperaret” (2.41) as a quotation, on the model of Freese’s suggestion (see

previous note). Cicero, Contra Rullam 2, v. 42 (Freese).

14 Cf. Siani-Davies, 2001, Pro Rabirio Postumo, p. 7: “By the time of Ptolemy

Auletes [sc. the Piper] Egypt remained a rich and potentially glittering prize,

with Alexandria still one of the foremost commercial centers of the

Mediterranean. The increasing frequency of business transactions between Italy

and Egypt and the official accounts of various embassies seemed to have excited

the imagination of the Romans and served to cultivate the image of Egypt as an

exotic country full of riches and, for those seeking it, a possible source of

political power.” I would liken Egypt to California in A.D. 1850 or, in a more
classical vein, to “the Golden Apple of Discord.”

15 See Siani-Davies, Pro Rabirio Postumo, 2001, p. 8-9, on Crassus’s attempt in

65; she offers a succinct but useful summary of the 63 attempt on 9-10,

concluding with a useful corrective to Gruen (see n. 11 above): “Rullus’s

1 SCHATZMAN, 1971, p. 363-369. It deserves mention, however, that he begins

with Cicero’s speech against Rullus (Contra Rullam 2, v. 41) in 63 B.C. (363) and

this important passage is quoted below. For an anticipation of his work, not
cited by Shatzman, see BOUCHE-LECLERQ, 1902, p. 241-265.

2 THOMPSON, 1994, p. 310-326. An indication of increased attention to the

Question is the addition of Dorothy J. Thompson, “Egypt, 146-31 B.C.” to J.A.

Crook, A. Lintott, and E. Rawson (eds.). Cambridge Ancient History, volume 9,


See also (in the same source), A.N. SHERWIN-WHITE, 1994, p. 229-273, especially

271 ad fin.

3 SIANI-DAVIES, 2001. Her bibliography is indispensible.


5 HAVAS, 1977, p. 39-56. A useful account not cited by Siani-Davies, provides

support for my terminus a quo.

6 Contra Rullam 2, v. 41: Hic ego consul Romani non modo nihil indicco, sed ne quid sentium quidem proferee. This is a remarkably precise and accurate statement: Cicero

the man leaves no doubt that he has an opinion (quid sentium) but that as Consul,

“I am not making a judgment; indeed I am not going to bring forth (profere)

what I think.” The prefix on the verb profere is necessary because Cicero will

merely suggest what he thinks in 2.42 (see below).

7 Contra Rullam II, v. 41: Magna enim mihi res non modo ad statuendum, sed etiam ad
dicendum videtur esse. While leaving the audience in no doubt as to the

momentousness of the decision to be made (magna res ad statuendum), Cicero

prepares them for the abbreviated, elliptic, and merely suggestive account of it

that he must give (ad dicendum).

8 All subsequent students of the period are in debt to Badian, 1967, p. 178-192

for an adequate understanding of this testamentum.

9 The translation is that of Freese, 1930. There is something to be said for

regarding “I am aware ... . . . by him” as a quotation; the subject of sentio is, on

this reading, the person who spoke these words originally, not Cicero now (see below). Cicero, Contra Rullam 2, v. 41.

10 Cf. Contra Rullam II, v. 44: “But if Alexandria is aimed at [sc. in 63 B.C.], why

not follow the same course as that taken under the consulship of Lucius Cotta

and Lucius Torquatus [sc. in 65 B.C.]?” See Freese’s note (a) on 418 of Cicero VI:

“The reference is probably to Crassus, who, when censor in 65, had a design to

make Egypt tributary to the Romans, but was so vigorously opposed by his

colleague Catulus that both resigned.” Unfortunately, the salgo (Contra Rullam

II, v. 44) that obscured the Question in 63 B.C. has scarcely lifted: taetae tenebrae, —primarily in the form of denying that Crassus (and Caesar) were behind

Rullus, —remains today. For an influential statement, see Gruen, 1974, p. 389:

“Moderns have seen it as a plot of Crassus and Caesar. The conjecture is hasty

and ill-founded.” On which, more hereafter.

11 See Crawford, Cicero, 1994, p. 43-56. In defense of my terminus a quo, consider 44: “The matter [sc. ‘annexing Egypt’] lay dormant, then, until the year

65, when M. Crassus undertook to reactivate this will.” A good account of this
dormancy is Gruen, 1984, p. 672-719.

12 V. Cicero, Contra Rullam 2, v. 42.

13 “To seem” would be a better translation for videri. Naturally the same man

by whom it is said that there is no will is not the same man who said “I am aware”
that there is one; it therefore makes more sense to regard “auctoritatum... . . .
recuperarent” (2.41) as a quotation, on the model of Freese’s suggestion (see

previous note). Cicero, Contra Rullam 2, v. 42 (Freese).

14 Cf. Siani-Davies, 2001, Pro Rabirio Postumo, p. 7: “By the time of Ptolemy

Auletes [sc. the Piper] Egypt remained a rich and potentially glittering prize,

with Alexandria still one of the foremost commercial centers of the

Mediterranean. The increasing frequency of business transactions between Italy

and Egypt and the official accounts of various embassies seemed to have excited

the imagination of the Romans and served to cultivate the image of Egypt as an

exotic country full of riches and, for those seeking it, a possible source of

political power.” I would liken Egypt to California in A.D. 1850 or, in a more
classical vein, to “the Golden Apple of Discord.”

15 See Siani-Davies, Pro Rabirio Postumo, 2001, p. 8-9, on Crassus’s attempt in

65; she offers a succinct but useful summary of the 63 attempt on 9-10,

concluding with a useful corrective to Gruen (see n. 11 above): “Rullus’s
proposal was rejected, but, rather than being an isolated event, it should be seen as part of the great power struggle then raging in Rome prior to Pompey’s return. Had the proposal been accepted, then Crassus and Caesar would have been able to bypass the Senate’s opposition to direct Roman intervention in Egypt, and, in the process, put themselves in a position to counterbalance Pompey’s political power.”

16 A third edition of Crawford’s *Fragmentary Speeches* should include it under the heading “Testimonia Incerta with Notes” p. 47-48.

17 Note that this point, unlike the critique of avarice that applied to both Senate and People, would be even more persuasive for senators; see GRUEN, 1974, p. 395: “The aristocracy was another matter. Their stance will have been based on hard calculation, not readily swayed by Cicero’s grotesque prognostications. Some may indeed have been sympathetic to a proposition that would remove the poor to the land and offer other advantages to the economy.”

18 CRAWFORD, 1994, p. 55: “This is the culmination of the argumentation aimed at persuading the senators [note that Cicero is addressing a *contio* in *Contra Rullam 2*] to act honestly and without thought of personal gain in these proceedings.”

19 See BRUNT; MOORE, 1967, p. 32; cf. 71 (on 27.1): “The statement that Egypt was brought under the power of the Roman people (30 B.C.) is also found in other Augustan documents [citation deleted].” *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* 27.1.

20 The important point is made by SYME, 1939, p. 300.

21 BRUNT; MOORE, 1967, p. 71: “Though Egypt was undoubtedly a province [citation deleted], Augustus and his successors were regarded by the natives as Pharaohs, and it was administered virtually as a private appanage of the emperor”. See HERKLOTZ, 2007.


23 HUZAR, 1988, p. 343-382, opening paragraph.


26 GRUEN, 1974, p. 497 (last word): “When Augustus emerged triumphant, he was able to restore the veneer of the Republic; the substance was irrecoverable.”

27 HEGEL, 1956, p. 312-13., Beginning with: “The Republic could no longer exist in Rome.” Incidentally, this is the passage (quoted below) to which Karl Marx referred in the first sentence of *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*.

28 More insightful is BADIAN, 1968, p. 7: “It became clear to the Roman governing class at an early stage that large increases of territory could not easily be administered within the existing city-state constitution.” Cf. 43 and 59.


31 GRUEN, 1974, p. 2: “An effort will be made to understand the Ciceronian era in its own terms, without the categories imposed by retrospective judgment.”

32 Particularly with regard to C. Julius Caesar; see in particular SYME, 1939, p. 25.

33 I have modified Freese’s translation. CICERO, *Contra Rullam 2*, v. 44.

34 Although well aware of Egypt’s importance, Syme has little to say about the Egyptian Question in his classic before the memorable passage prompted by Antony and Cleopatra (*Roman Revolution*, 260-261). Note the dexterity with which he presents the imperial solution as a matter of course on 273, a sentence which inadvertently supports my presentation of the Question: “Egypt was clearly not suited to be converted into a Roman province; it must remain an ally or an appanage of the ruler of Rome.”

35 See AFZELIUS, 1940, p. 214-235.

36 GRUEN, 1974, p. 89: “The motives of Crassus are, as ever, obscure.”
Censor had shown a marked interest in the enormous riches of Egypt. His interest in Egypt; cf. Dio, 39.15, v. 2.

40 One wonders how L. Licinius Lucullus, who had seen Egypt first-hand in 87-86, would have acted in Pompey's place; see Plutarch, Lucullus 2.5-3.1 and Thompson, 1994, p. 317-318. Even though we have some reason to suspect the continuation of his own personal probity; see Ferrero, 1901, p. 242-246. His stories may well have inspired his younger kinsman to discover the arcanum.

41 Cicero, by contrast, learned the secret indirectly, from Crassus's actions, without the impetus of his own will; hence his refusal of the legatio to Alexandria offered him in 59; see Ate. 2.5.1.


43 Cf. Shatzman, 1971, p. 369: “What is noteworthy [sc. about the debates of 56] is that the senate mainly dealt with the question who would be appointed for the restoration of the king and not whether the restoration conformed to the interests of Rome.”


45 See Badian, 1968, p. 22; p. 29-31; p. 36-37. On Cyrene and Egypt; note also the chapter title (29): “The Senate against Expansion.” For the Piper's expulsion, see Siani-Davies, 2001, p. 17: “Perhaps, the reduction of Cyprus to a Roman province was a hidden part of the payment Ptolemy Auletes had to make to the Romans for his recognition.”

46 The classic statement is Gruen, 1966, p. 120-130; the character of both its thesis and presentation is indicated by the words “on the whole” in the sentence to which 121 n. 2 is attached. Once the centrality of the Egyptian Question is recognized, Cicero Ad Quintum 2.3, v. .2 becomes the crucial text (translation W. Glynn Williams): “Maddened and white with rage, he [sc. Clodius in February 56] asked his partisans (and he was heard above the shouting) who the man was that starved the people to death; his rowdies answered ‘Pompey.’ Who was bent upon going to Alexandria? They answered ‘Pompey.’ Who did they want to go? They answered ‘Crassus.’” Gruen does his best to neutralize this evidence in “P. Clodius,” 129 n. 49: “Crassus clearly did not want the Egyptian expedition.”

45 Censor had shown a marked interest in the enormous riches of Egypt. His...
attempt to make the country tributary to Rome was thwarted by his colleague Catulus. Crassus was supported by Caesar, who was aedile in 65 and who was said by Suetonius to have tried to use tribunes to get himself appointed to administer Egypt. It was maintained by some that the late Pharaoh had bequeathed his kingdom to Rome. The prize glittered, fascinating a generation of Roman politicians.” See also p. 197-198, where Stockton cites TACITUS, Ann., 2, v., 59.

55 See CHARLESWORTH, 1926, p. 9-16; SYME, 1988, p. 205-217: “The war by Caesar’s heir was a war solemnly and legally declared against Egypt.”


57 Cicero, Contra Rullam ci2, v. 65 (Freese).

58 Most of this sentence is devoted to fragment 6 of De Rege Alexandrino; see CRAWFORD, 1994, p. 50; p. 54.

59 SHERWIN-WHITE, 1983, p. 265. The attached note reads in part: “Crassus: Plut. Crassus 13.2, ‘to make Egypt subject to tribute’; Suet. 11, in a context full of anachronisms, has a tribunician bill dispatching young Caesar, then aedile, to Egypt.” The anachronisms are that (1) the words amicum atque socium come to the forefront of the Egyptian Question only in 59 (but see fr. 8 of De Rege Alexandrinio, CRAWFORD, 1994, p. 50), while (2) expulerant applies only to 58 or 57; see BUTLER; CARY, 1927, p. 54. Unlike Cary and Butler, Strasburger uses these errors to dismiss the passage entirely; see STRASBURGER, 1966, p. 113-14.

60 Cf. SUMNER, 1966, p. 569-582; and GRUEN, 1974, p. 391-94.


62 MOMMSEN, 1870, p. 208: “This was Marcus Cicero, notoriously a political trimmer [ein politischer Achselträger], accustomed to flirt at times with the democrats, at times with Pompeius, at times from a somewhat greater distance with the aristocracy, and to lend his services as an advocate to every influential man under impeachment without distinction of person or party (he numbered even Catilina among his clients); belonging to no party or,— which was much the same,— to the party of material interests, which was dominant in the courts and was pleased with the eloquent pleader and the polite and witty companion.”

63 Roughly speaking, the thesis of this remarkable book is that thanks to distortions, Caesar made his authentic entrance into history only in 58, when he entered Gaul. Cf. WELCH; POWELL, 1998.

64 GRUEN, 1974, 75 n. 117, attached to a sentence ending: “anti-Caesarian propaganda in the 50s.” Cf. STRASBURGER, 1966, p. 24-107-109; p. 112-114; p. 120; p. 124-125.

65 See SCHMITTHENNER, 1982, p. XXXIII.

66 His actions should be interpreted in a more traditionally Roman and aristocratic fashion [the attached note cites Strasburger, Caesars Eintritt, ‘126ff.’]. His ambition was that of the Roman noble, the consulate, sharpened by the fact that he came of a patrician house recently emerged from centuries of obscurity.” Cf. SYME, 1939, p. 25. Syme spent a week in Germany with Strasburger in August 1939; see SCHMITTHENNER, 1982, p. XXXII.

67 SYME, 1944, p. 92-103; GELZER, 1944.

68 SYME, 1964, p. 98, n. 71: “Suetonius Divus Iulius 11. This [sc. ‘In another version of the episode, it is alleged that Caesar, using tribunes, attempted to get himself a special command in Egypt’] is accepted by GELZER, 1960, p. 36. For due skepticism, H. Strasburger, o.c. 112ff.” (SYME, 1964).


70 Egypt is mentioned only in passing at GRUEN, 1974, p. 391: “Of greater significance, Rullus’ bill directed the decemvirs to offer for sale foreign dominions that had fallen into Roman hands since 88. Here was a prospect of lucrative revenue indeed, for the clause encompassed wealthy areas in Asia Minor, Cyprus, and, perhaps, Egypt. Not that one should follow Cicero’s imaginative speculations about decemvirs’ auctioning off whole provinces, nations, or kingdoms.”
Caesarian apologetics have always emphasized the equal or greater ambitions of Pompey; a characteristic feature of these apologetics in the twentieth century is to emphasize Caesar's early attachment to Pompey, not to Crassus; see, for example, GRUEN, 1974, p. 79-81, beginning: "Caesar's stature in the 60s could not bear comparison with that of M. Crassus or Cn. Pompeius Magnus. Careful examination of Caesar's activities in that decade reveals a consistent thread not always sufficiently stressed. The ambitious patrician advanced his career by attaching himself to the following of Pompey the Great." Despite the considerable caligo involved,— Gruen must consign Caesar's connection with Crassus to taetrae tenebras,— this is, in the proper context, a salutary development: had Caesar not wished to seem to be (cf. CICERO, De Oratore, 2, v. 176) Pompey's ally, he could not have served the interests of Crassus in 60. Despite earlier appearances (2.12), it turns out that Antonius had instructed Sulpicius to attach himself to Crassus (2.89) in De Oratore; for the young man's true colors, see 3.147.

Gruen's only problem is to simultaneously uphold the notion that Rullus's bill was farsighted:— "Despite the rhetoric [sc. of Cicero], however, one can discern a blueprint, intelligent in design and farsighted in conception" (GRUEN, 1974, p. 389)—, and that Caesar had nothing to do with it (389): "Moderns have seen it as a plot of Crassus and Caesar. The conjecture is hasty and ill-founded." Gruen resolves this conundrum at 393: "That Julius Caesar was behind the proposal has often been surmised. It would not be inappropriate. As we have seen, other acts of this individual, in 63 and before, exhibit efforts to curry favor with Pompey. And several features of the bill parallel those later advocated in Caesar's own agrarian legislation [sc. of 59]. But hypothesis is suspended here."
qualified for any task they should undertake, may ever be found, whose ambition would aspire to nothing beyond a seat in Congress, a gubernatorial or a presidential chair; but such belong not to the family of the lion, or the tribe of the eagle. What! think you these places would satisfy an Alexander, a Caesar, or a Napoleon?—Never! Towering genius disdains a beaten path”.


82 Cf. the last sentence of Matthias Gelzer’s article on Crassus, “Licinius” (68), Real encyclopädie 13.1 (1926), p. 295-331: “Das Endurteil über Crassus muß also lauten daß er geistig und moralisch die Ansprüchen, die sein Ehrgeiz stellte, weder als Politišer noch als Militär jemals gewachsen war, daß er eine bedeutende Rolle nur spielte, sofern andere ihn brauchten, daß er aber als typische Erscheinung der römischen Revolutionsepoche im Geschichtsbild des republikanischen Römerstums mit seiner brutalen Wolfsnatur eine unentbehrliche Gestalt ist.” Once Crassus’s awareness of the central importance of the Egyptian Question is given its due, little of this portrait holds true, but the part that does will justify the question to which this note is attached. Particularly in need of revision is the claim (330) that he was “als Politiker von einer unfruchtbaren Machtgier getrieben, die jeglicher Idee ermagelte”.

83 Cf. the last sentence of Matthias Gelzer’s article on Crassus, “Licinius” (68), Real encyclopädie 13.1 (1926), p. 295-331: “Das Endurteil über Crassus muß also lauten daß er geistig und moralisch die Ansprüchen, die sein Ehrgeiz stellte, weder als Politišer noch als Militär jemals gewachsen war, daß er eine bedeutende Rolle nur spielte, sofern andere ihn brauchten, daß er aber als typische Erscheinung der römischen Revolutionsepoche im Geschichtsbild des republikanischen Römerstums mit seiner brutalen Wolfsnatur eine unentbehrliche Gestalt ist.” Once Crassus’s awareness of the central importance of the Egyptian Question is given its due, little of this portrait holds true, but the part that does will justify the question to which this note is attached. Particularly in need of revision is the claim (330) that he was “als Politiker von einer unfruchtbaren Machtgier getrieben, die jeglicher Idee ermagelte”.

84 Praised by GRUEN, 1977, p. 118; ADEOCK, 1966 introduces the dodge, later picked up by Gruen and Sherwin-White, of offering a benign explanation of Egyptian annexation on 37: “It may be surmised that what Crassus in 65 B.C. had sought to achieve, but in vain, was that he should receive the honorable and possibly lucrative commission to regularize Auletes’ position vis-à-vis the Roman state.” ADEOCK is expressly linked to SYME (356) by TWMAN, 1979, p. 356-361. The other work Gruen praises in this passage (118) is of far greater value, and delineates the proper relationship between Crassus and Caesar, see CADOUX, 1956, p. 153-161, especially p. 157-158. The other work reviewed by both Gruen and Twyman is MARSHALL, 1976, harshly reviewed by John Briscoe, Classical Review 29 (1979), p. 112-114. Marshall’s account of 65 does have the great merit of emphasizing the republican position on the Egyptian Question: “a policy of non-interference in Egypt” (66-67) but this is more than balanced by his suggestion that Crassus lost interest in the Question (76).


86 Idem, ibidem, p. 125-127.

87 Idem, ibidem, p. 128-192.

88 GRUEN, 1977, p. 120-21. Cf. the last sentence of SYME, 1944, p. 103: “It will not be necessary further to insist upon the quality of Gelzer’s work in general or upon the solid and singular merits of this biography of Julius Caesar: the reviewer regrets only that, being confined in a distant city and lacking books, especially Strasburger’s study of the early years, he may not have been able to accord it the treatment it deserves.”

89 The case of Lily Ross Taylor is illuminating, and a reception study beginning with her “Caesar’s Early Career,” Classical Philology 36 (1941), p. 113-132 (which stops just short of 65) and her noncommittal review of Caesars Eintritt in the same year (and venue; p. 413-414), and culminating in her classic Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1949), would be an interesting exercise; see Party Politics, 122: “Report held that he [sc. Caesar] had cooperated with Crassus in his revolutionary schemes against Pompey in 65, but the stories were probably products of the propaganda of the next decade.” Although she retains her good sense and independence (Party Politics, p. 192 n. 51), an important moment of transition is her “Caesar’s Early Career,” Transactions of the American Philological Association 73 (1942), 1-24 on 17: “A German [sc. Strasburger], writing in an atmosphere permeated by Nazi propaganda, has seen the true nature of these reports [sc. about 65], which have had more influence on the modern view of Caesar than they seemed to have obtained among his contemporaries. Caesar was a skillful and adroit politician, but he had more loyalty and good faith than we have been inclined to believe [the attached note cites SYME, 1939, p. 70].” By conflating “the propaganda of the fifties that was designed to drive a wedge between Caesar and Pompey” (17) with “Nazi propaganda,” Taylor makes more than one revealing mistake. For Strasburger during the Third Reich, see

90 Reading the sources mentioned in Gruen, 1966, p. 120, n. 1 is a good place to start.

91 Particularly valuable is Ward, 1972, p. 244-258, best read in conjunction with Sumner, “Cicero, Pompeius, and Rullus,” its foil.

92 In addition to the “Licinius” article, see Gelzer, 1969 and Gelzer, 1968, particularly p. 39-47. At p. 40 n. 5, he responds to Strasburger’s argument (Caesars Eintritt, 1966, p. 114) that it is impossible that Caesar as aedile should have been proposed for imperium in Egypt. This “argument” (Strasburger uses a rhetorical question: “War es wirklich eine verständig begründete Hoffnung[...?]”) originates, likewise tentatively (“one can hardly believe that he, who looked without prejudice at fact”), with Rice-Holmes, 1967, p. 227 but it is asserted by Marshall, 1979, p. 66; cf. Ward, 1977, p. 133, n. 18. Proposing a more powerful man, like himself, would have revealed Crassus’s arcum; besides, was not the consul of 59 born in 100? See Taylor, 1941, p. 131-132.

93 Gruen, 1970, p. 233-236; on p. 236: “The concluding judgment on Cicero gives Gelzer some room for reflection. One wishes he had taken more. Cicero’s failure is not that he was an incompetent politician, but that he consistently overestimated his own influence. Greek-inspired ideals and his own rhetorical training and prowess led him astray. The instinct for power inherent in the natural born politician was lacking in Cicero. He could not operate outside the categories of the traditional Republican system. The pragmatic politician like Caesar who was not bound by philosophic ideals and therefore retained a free hand for change remained unintelligible for Cicero.” Although “ unintelligible” is contradicted by Plutarch (Caesar 4.4), it is not so much with the content, but only with the intent of this passage, that I take issue.

94 A genuine respect is evident in Strasburger, 1975 p. 817-824, where Gelzer’s Cicero is singled out, and Strasburger’s mention of its author’s “versteckter Anteilnahme und persönlicher Vorliebe” (823) does not, in context, read as damning; one is tempted to read Strasburger, 1990, especially the passage (p. 91-92), he seems to have wished to be added to the manuscript after his death, as a palinode for his willingness to fight for Hitler. On the other hand, consider his “Cäsar im Urteil der Zeitgenossen”. Strasburger, 1953, p. 229-264 at 263: “Man sah nur, daß er regierte, mit der überstürzenden Schnelligkeit, der virtuosen Leichtigkeit und der unbeirrbaren Selbstvertrauen, die das Geheimnis seiner militärischen Erfolge gewesen war.” For a similar ambiguity, cf. Syme’s 1939 reference to “the march on Rome” in Roman Revolution, 524.

95 Particularly useful on the terminus ad quem is Dundas, 2002, p. 433-448.

96 See Well, 1962, p. 297-323. Cf. Strasburger, 1953, p. 263: “Freilich ist zu bemerken, wie bald den Männern Cäsars und ihren Gesinnungsgenossen klar wurde, daß ihre Tat nicht das Mittel war, die republikanische Lebensform zu regenerieren” with Hegel, 1956, p. 313: “They [sc. Cicero, Brutus, and Cassius] believed that if this one individual were out of the way, the Republic would ipso facto be restored. Possessed of this remarkable hallucination, Brutus, a man of highly noble character, and Cassius, endowed with greater practical energy than Cicero, assassinated the man whose virtues they appreciated. But it became immediately manifest that only a single will could guide the Roman state, and now the Romans were compelled to adopt that opinion; since in all periods of the world a political revolution is sanctioned in men’s opinions, when it repeats itself”.

97 For the early U.S. reception of Strasburger in broad outline, see Allen, 1953, p. 227-236 [For a useful pre-Strasburger account of this use of regnum, see Hardy, 1917, p. 153-228 on 163: “The phrase regnum cogitation might as well or better refer to the attempt on Egypt in 65”]. As inspiration for the kind of reception study that would be helpful, consider the dialogue between Ridley, 1986, p. 474-502 and Simon, 1988, p. 222-240.

98 In particular, Appendix 2 (“Crassus and the ‘First Triumvirate’”; p. 146-151) in his A Commentary on Cicero In Vatinium, with an Historical Introduction and Appendices, a reprinting of the 1926 original (Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1967). Gruen, 1969, p. 71-108, should be reread in its light; indeed this dialectical approach can usefully applied throughout.