Genesis and Substance in Posidonius' Stoicism

Eduardo Boechat


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Eduardo Murtinho Braga Boechat

ABSTRACT
The article analyses the metaphysical theory proposed in two fragments of Posidonius preserved in the doxography of Arius Dydimus, f. 20 and f. 27 Diels (F 92 and F 96 E – K). The result of the research is the following. Posidonius reoriented Stoic ontology by rejecting the two orthodox Chrysippian genera (or ‘categories’), the material substrate (ὀủσία) and the peculiarly qualified individual (ἰδίως ποιὸς or ποιότης). He subsumes both genera under the heading ‘substance’ (ὀủσία) which now applies to the predominant qualities that define a body during all the times at which it exists, and classifies as ‘qualities’ (ποιόν) or ‘matter’ (ὕλη) its remaining, or non-essential, material features. The analysis of the fragment on Generation and Destruction (F 96 E – K) alongside relevant Posidonian fragments (F 14 and F 84/97a E–K) also reveals that substance is analogous to soul in the case of animals. The substantial soul underlies the qualities of the body that are liable to suffer alteration.

KEYWORDS
Stoic Metaphysics; Posidonius; Generation and Destruction; Cosmogony.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.17074/cpc.v1i36.23424
I. THE NON-ORTHODOX CONCEPT

The Posidian fragment regarding the process of genesis as described by Arius Dydimus (Epitome fr. 27 Diels) turns up twice in Stobaeus’ Eclogae. The passage occurs in a section (I. 20) entitled On Generation and Destruction which is mostly concerned with whether the cosmos is destructible. It is followed by a reference to criticism of Mnesarchus, the pupil of Panaeitus. The fragment recurs in Stobaeus at the end of I. 17; this is the chapter which contains Chrysippus’ orthodox classification of mixtures as juxtaposition, fusion and blending (παραθέσει, συγχύσει, κρᾶσιν). As we shall see, there is substantial evidence that Posidonius revised the Stoic position and proposed a new concept of genesis.

From Posidonius: Posidonius says that there are four kinds of destruction and generation that occur from what is to what is. For he rejects as unreal any destruction from or generation into what is not, as we said before. Of change into what is, he distinguishes: dismemberment (κατὰ διαίρεσιν); alteration (κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν); fusion (κατὰ σύγχυσιν); breaking up of a whole, called dissolution (κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν). Of these four, alteration is related to substance; the other three have reference to qualities supervening on substance. And it is along these lines that processes of generation come about. Substance does not admit of increase or diminution by addition or subtraction, but only of alteration (πὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὔτε ἀὔξεσθαι οὔτε μειοῦσθαι κατὰ διαίρεσιν ή ἀφαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι), as it happens with number and measure (καθάπερ ἐπ’ αριθμῶν καὶ μέτρων συμβαίνειν). So, increase and diminution occurs in peculiarly qualified individuals, like Dion and Theon, therefore the predominant quality of each thing persists from generation to destruction (διὸ καὶ παραμένειν τὴν ἐκάστου ποιότητα ταῖς ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναφέρεσις), as in the case of animals, plants and things like that that admits destruction. In peculiarly qualified individuals (ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδιως ποιῶν), he says that there are two receptive parts, in respect to
the subsistence of the being (κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν) and of the qualified thing (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιῶν). It is the latter, as we have often kept saying, that admits of increase and diminution. This same peculiarly qualified thing (τὸ ποιῶν ἰδίως) is not the same as the substance from which it is made (ἐξ ἓς ἐστι τοῦ). Nor on the other hand is it different from it, but is all but the same, in that it is a part of the substance (διὰ τὸ καὶ μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας) and occupies the same place as it, whereas whatever is called different from something must be separated from it (κεχωρίσθαι) and not be thought of (θεωρεῖσθαι) as even part of it. (Arius Dydimus Ἱ. 27 Diels = F 96 E 1K)

Let us first have a look at the *status quaestionis*. In fact, the two most authoritative commentaries give different interpretations of this passage. In his methodical work, Kidd subdivides the fragment into two sections; Description (up to ‘... And it is along these lines that processes of generation come about’) and Explanation. Analysing the first section, he considers the four types of change – dismemberment, alteration, fusion, and dissolution – having related Stoic classifications as background (Chrysippus’ and the one mentioned in Philo, *De Aet. Mund.* 78 ff). Kidd does not assign any conceptual innovation to the doxa, but cautiously points out that alteration (or transmutation) of substance (ἀλλοίωσις) was a key term for Posidonius, for the philosopher distinguished this kind of change from the others. Accordingly, the second part of the text was supposed to explain the ἀλλοίωσις – change in the sense that it somehow sets substance (οὐσία) apart from peculiarly qualified individuals (ἰδίως ποιῶν). However, Kidd maintains that there is no effective difference between both: ‘Since I do not see how ἀλλοίωσις can apply to οὐσία simpliciter but to the peculiar qualified οὐσία of an ἰδίως ποιῶν, which is what anyway Posidonius seem to be saying here, I do not think that there is an opposition of οὐσία and ἰδίως ποιῶν.’

Contrastingly, Long and Sedley’s analysis does not regard the ἀλλοίωσις – change as the key term of the passage. They propose that Posidonius’ doxa basically reproduces the Stoic concept of the first and second genera (the so-called Stoic
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Categories): the metaphysical distinction presumably elaborated by Chrysippus to answer the sceptical Academy’s Growing Argument. In Stoic ontology, the first genus, substance (or material substrate), does not remain identical yet it is incessantly changing; it is the second genus, the peculiarly qualified individual that remains unalterable. So, the sentence ‘substance does not admit of increase or diminution ... but only of alteration’ would reaffirm the Stoic idea that any change of a 'substance', i.e. a material substrate, can constitute a change of identity. On the other hand, what does endure, and constitutes a proper subject of growth, is the 'peculiarly qualified' individual, e.g. Theon, whose uniquely identifying characteristics must for this purpose be lifelong (cf. διὸ καὶ παραμένειν τὴν ἑκάστου ποιότητα [τά] ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναιρέσεως).

Both commentaries are insightful, and I am going to basically offer a conciliation of the diaphonia. Yet before submitting my interpretation, I would like to call attention to two features of the abstract which, as far as I know, have been overlooked so far. The first one regards what we could call the metaphysical aspect of genesis. The text seems to be the first Stoic doctrine addressing the metaphysical question of genesis as it explicitly mentions the canon nihil fit ex nihilo (... τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων καὶ τὴν εἰς τὰ ὄντα). It is not only the fact that Arius does not introduce any other Stoic in this section (fr. 27). As scholars have already remarked, there is no evidence that the Early Stoa were similarly wary of the Eleatic veto against genesis out of not-being. Further, the metaphysical doxa sounds as a reference to the very beginning of Aristotle’s De Generatione et Corruptione. The book correspondingly begins by asking whether there is a distinction between generation and alteration; the key terms in Posidonius’ doxa. So, when we remind that the study of Aristotle had a significant impact on Posidonius the suspicion is that he attempted to increment Stoic philosophy by addressing the metaphysical question of genesis in the context of a Aristotelian heritage.

Another apparently overlooked feature regards the
complementary physical aspect of genesis. One should consider that the process of blending (krasis) is missing in the doxa. This is unexpected in the sense that what we know about the process of cosmogony and zoogony in the Early Stoa specifically refers to the mixture of elements as a case of blending. Blending is, in fact, the quintessential Stoic idea about mixture as it is directly connected with the physical concept of pneuma. It is through blending that the pneuma sustains matter. As one reads in Chrysippus’ excerpt in Alexander’s De Mixione, the soul blends with the body while preserving its own substance in the mixture with it (‘As clear evidence of this being so they make use of the fact that the soul, which has its own individual existence just like the body which receives it, pervades the whole of the body while preserving its own substance in the mixture with it.’ cf. 217. 36° = LS 48 C 10). The absence of krasis in Posidonius’ abstract, therefore, suggests a conflict with the orthodox notion of physical genesis.

These features may work as a starting point for reviewing F 96 E – K. So, if one begins by considering the ontological content of Arius’ abstract, one should realise that it does not reproduce Chrysippus’ concept of the first and second genera, as Long and Sedley argue (1987, p. 173). The fragment undeniably echoes the gist of the Growing Argument as formulated in Plutarch’s invective (On common conceptions 1083a-1084a = LS 28 A) and in the related material (cf. LS 28). One similarly finds Dion and Theon, increase and diminution, and the body considered according to two different categories in F 96 E – K. However, Posidonius’ idea of two ‘receptive members’ does not match Chrysippus’ first and second genera. Chrysippus seems to conceive two analogous yet quasi-independent substrates (‘But these men alone have seen this combination, this duplicity, this ambiguity, that each of us is two substrates’ LS 28 A 4) – if not bodies (‘two bodies sharing the same colour’ LS 28 A 3). Contrastingly, Posidonius conceives a clear relationship of dependence (or priority) between two aspects of the body. The peculiarly qualified individual is said to be both made out of (cf. ἐξ ἧς ἔστι τοῦτο) and part of substance (cf. διὰ τό καὶ μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας).
Regarding the absence of blending in the opening section of the text, one should bear in mind that it is actually consistent with Posidonius’ physical doctrines. As I have recently shown, he partially adopted the Peripatetic theory of elements by conceiving active and passive elements as interactive due to a new relationship of mutual contrariety (fire and air are hot; water and earth are cold).\(^{12}\) Accordingly, the theoretical shift logically requires a new concept of mixture. Whereas in the Early Stoa the mixture between pneumatic (fire and air) and material elements entails the notion of ‘body goes through body’, i.e. blending (\textit{krasis}), the adoption of active and passive elements bearing mutually contrasting qualities should conversely require the Peripatetic notion of ‘a quality meets a quality’ (\textit{GC II 7}).\(^{13}\) The blending–process, therefore, is not expected to take part in Posidonius’ ‘Generation and Destruction’.

As we see, Posidonius’ entry about ‘Generation and Destruction’ in Arius (f. 27) most likely represents an innovation within Stoicism. On the one hand, the metaphysical concept of genesis solves the puzzle of the Academic \textit{Growing Argument} by proposing an original ontology at variance with Chrysippus’ solution. On the other hand, the list of kinds of change witnesses that he abandoned the physical notion of genesis as the outcome of blending. One could further point out the circumstances that led Posidonius to departure from the orthodox position. Indeed, the doxa seems to be another facet of Posidonius’ far reaching Aristotelianism\(^{14}\) as the adoption of a Peripatetic theory of elements (F 93 E ̶ K) corroborates the apparent allusion to Aristotle’s \textit{De Generatione et Corruptione}. Still, one should additionally consider that both the concept of the first and second genera and also the blending–process were under constant attack. More specifically, both standpoints were equally criticised for virtually conceiving two entities occupying the same space (cf. Themistius \textit{On Aristotle’s Physics} 104, 9-19 ‘For one body will pass through another body through and through, and two bodies will occupy the same place’ [LS 48 F]). So, Posidonius’ ‘Generation and Destruction’ was most likely devised to meet the challenge on
both flanks; metaphysical and physical genesis. It would not be the only time that Posidonius reoriented Stoic thought following sceptical invectives.  

2 SUBSTANCE IN POSIDONIUS (f 92 e – k)  

So, if Posidonius’ doxa in Arius does not match the views of the early Stoics, what are its actual conceptual innovations? What does his concept of genesis stand for? Before submitting my interpretation, I should say some words about Arius’ collection and my method of tackling the text. In fact, despite its significance for Stoic and Posidonian studies, Arius’ testimonies, a rare sort of discursive doxography, are not easily grasped by scholars. His description of the theories can be sometimes too concise and the indirect discourse which make regular use of accusative-cum-infinitive constructions present further complications for the interpreters. Accordingly, as I reckon, the most reliable method of making sense of Posidonius’ fragments in Arius consists in relating it to his other fragments here; it is reasonable to expect a conceptual coherence within the same corpus. Further, taking Arius’ collection as starting-point, one can enlarge and deepen the picture of Posidonius’ physical concepts by bringing into focus the relevant excerpts from the larger compilation of Posidonius’ attested fragments (i.e. the Edelstein-Kidd collection). I try and follow this interpretative guidance in this article.  

It is also important to realise that the abstract, as mentioned above, deals with both aspects of genesis: physical and metaphysical. Indeed, one could say that whereas Kidd has more to say about the physical aspect of genesis that is basically limited to the first half of the text, Long and Sedley focus on the ontological aspect that occupies the second half. So, in order to grasp the whole theoretical content of the fragment, one should start by tackling its ontological message. There is clearly more information about the notion of genesis and identity in the text than about the notion of mixture which precedes genesis. As we shall see, the interpretation of the innovative process of mixture
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So, what metaphysical concept does the fragment convey? Again, it is not the first and second genera as theorised by Chrysippus. Both Chrysippus and Posidonius conceive an ontological dichotomy between substance and the peculiarly qualified individual. However, as mentioned above, whereas the former considers two quasi-independent substrates, the latter regards a relationship of dependence between two aspects of the body (i.e. whole and part). Accordingly, the cornerstone of Posidonius’ concept of genesis, the gist of the abstract, consists in the relationship between substance and alteration. One reads ‘alteration is related to substance’ and also ‘substance does not increase or diminish … but only of alteration’. Specifically, these sentences contradict the supposition that Chrysippus’ material substrate (the first genus) represents Posidonius’ ‘substance’. Whereas the first genus does not remain identical as it relentlessly comes to be and passes away, a straightforward reading of these sentences suggests that substance only admits alteration, or genesis, following the ἀλλοίωσις—change. Moreover, Arius’ abstract does not express that Posidonius’ ‘substance’ is always in flux and in motion – an idea that Plutarch recurrently ascribes to Chrysippus’ material substrate.

Now, Posidonius’ dichotomy might be clarified as we bring into focus another fragment in Arius that similarly conveys an ontological distinction. It is another compressed account featuring gnomic language that generated debate between scholars, yet recent research has managed to make sense of it without recourse to emendations. This is Arius’ Epitome fr. 20.

"Ἐφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσιδώνιος τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοιότητα καὶ ὲλην ἀποτελεῖται καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι καθ’ ὄνομα κατεσταγμένον ἵδιον ἔχει σχῆμα ὑπόσχηται καθ’ ὰμήν· ὀνὴ ἐν τινι σχῆμα καὶ ποιήση ἔχει. Διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν ὁμοιότητα τῆς ὠσίαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόσχηται ἐμποιήσαν μόνον.

Posidonius claimed that the substance of the wholes is both unqualified matter and also formless insofar as in no way has it a shape detached of its own, nor quality by itself either. Yet
it is always in some shape and quality; and the substance, which is according to its subsistence, differs from matter in thought only. (F 92 E – K)

The passage as a whole has a three-part structure as the indirect discourse entails three infinitive clauses. The first two clauses are closely connected since the second one could be easily rendered as an adversative clause. The third colon sounds as a gnomic utterance yet it is, of course, concluding the whole passage. Regarding its context, it is important to note that the excerpt occurs immediately after the doctrines of Zeno and Chrysippus concerning ousia (i.e. substance or being): Ζήνων, οὖσίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρωτὴν ὕλην ... Accordingly, despite the fact that Stobaeus (1. 132, 27-133, 11) intertwined Arius’ text with Aetius’ doxography ‘on matter’, the Posidonian entry also purports to define ‘substance’ (Ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὄλων οὐσίαν ...). I now offer an interpretation that basically summarizes the insights of White (2007) and Alesse (2007).

If one starts the analysis from the beginning, one realises that καὶ ὕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον should read as the nominal predicate of the subject τὴν τῶν ὄλων οὐσίαν (with adverbial καὶ probably meaning etiam). White’s translation: ‘the substance of the wholes is also unqualified and formless matter ...’ The statement thus reiterates the standard formulation of Stoic materialism as it, following the tradition of Zeno and Chrysippus, equates substance with matter (cf. above Arius fr. 20 = SVF I 87). Posidonius seems to be saying: the being of the wholes (i.e. of bodies, or what exists) is simply material (_UDPIOV KAI AMOPOFOV). Yet, the following dependent clause specifies the conditions according to which the plain identification would apply: ‘insofar as in no way has it a shape detached of its own, nor quality by itself either.’ Accordingly, the overtly hypothetical, or theoretical, circumstance clarifies the aspectual viewpoint of the identification: the first sentence purports to introduce one of the two aspects of ‘substance’ (ousia): the passive principle (cf. D. L. 7. 134 = F 5 E–K: τὸ μὲν οὖν τάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον οὐσίαν, τὴν ὑλήν ... εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ ἀμόρφους). The whole sentence in this
sense should mean: the being of the bodies is also the passive, material principle.

The following sentence corroborates this interpretation since it adds a caveat. ‘Yet it is always in some shape and quality’. Such statement promptly reminds that the plain identification of substance and matter is purely theoretical. No material substance is ever entirely devoid of qualities; the passive principle is always permeated by the active principle which imbuers every individual with qualities and shape. At last, the concluding sentence noticeably sounds as conveying the passage’s main idea: Διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὑλῆς ... That is, the gist of the fragment is that although the principles always coexist (ἀεὶ δ’ ἐν τινι σχήματι καὶ ποιότητι ἐναι), one can somehow distinguish them; and the subtle ontological contrast between substance and matter, active and passive principles, features in this last clause.

The gnomic language of this aphorismatic statement induced scholars to add emendations to the manuscript reading; however, as White pointed out,25 the problematic phrase falls neatly in line with the Stoic theory provided one understands the meaning of ‘subsistence’ (ὑπόστασις) and ‘in thought’ (ἐπινοίᾳ). Subsistence stands for the ontological status of the so-called incorporeals, the class of objects grasped through intellection by reason (cf. i.a. Sextus Empiricus Μ 1. 17). Contrasting to bodies that independently exist (i.e. they act and are acted upon), incorporeals subsist as their existence is derivative from bodies, that is, they are abstractions from bodily entities.26 Further, the concept of subsisting connects, on the one side, incorporeals items with, on the other side, a person’s cognition or ‘rational impression’ (cf. S. E. Μ 8. 70: ‘They [the Stoics] say that a 'sayable' is what subsists in accordance with a rational impression’). Incorporareals do not fully exist, they are to some extent thought-dependent as they actually subsist in accordance with someone’s thought (cf. S. E. Μ 8. 11–12 ‘the signification is the actual state of affairs revealed by an utterance, and which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance with our thought’). More specifically, the statement that one thing is distinguishable from another 'according
to the subsistence’ indicates that they are distinct following processes of mental abstraction. Yet if two things ‘according to the subsistence’ differ ‘only in thought’, then they are corporeally identical but this same thing bear two distinct propositional contents.27

To summarize, as Posidonius claims that substance differs from matter according to these specific circumstances (κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον) he means that the same body have two distinct lekta; that is, any corporeal body could be intellectually represented as the active (οὐσία) and the passive (ὕλη) principles. The definition of matter is explicit in the previous sentences: ‘it has no determinate shape or quality of its own yet it is always in some shape and quality’.28 Logically, as one expects, the intellectually graspable content of the other principle should be contrasting. In other words, substance is not in constant flux without no determinate shape or quality of its own;29 substance maintains its own determinate shape and quality.

The Posidonian distinction between a stable ousia and an unstable hule is meaningful because of the two eternally alternating phases of conflagration and ordering in the Stoic universe. As scholars pointed out, substance stands for ‘first or prime matter’ (cf. D. L. 7. 150): the pre-cosmic substance representing the principles at the very moment of total conflagration.30 ‘Matter’, its counterpart, stands for any particular body (including the cosmos) as we find them during the diakósmesis; the matter that is permeated with qualities and shapes as portrayed in the second sentence (ἀεὶ δὲ ἐν τινὶ σχήματι ...).31 Likewise, besides this diachronic perspective, the dichotomy also regards the universe according to a synchronic viewpoint: that is, as it exists at one point in time without reference to its history. So, the concept that ousia differs from hule in thought implies that one can distinguish the wholes’ underlying principles. Substance differs from matter insofar as the conception of any particular body (including the cosmos) mirrors the godly rational framework underlying it.32

As mentioned, this interpretation of F’ 92 basically reproduces the views of relevant scholarship of the last 20 years.
Stephen White’s article seems especially insightful in the sense that he observed the notional charge of ‘subsistence’ and ‘in thought only’. It is noteworthy though that there are some loose ends in this interpretation. For instance, it has not been noticed that, if Posidonius really held these ideas, his concept of ‘matter’ turns up to be heterodox in the sense that matter does not stand anymore for a three-dimensional inert medium, an effectively qualityless body. ‘Matter’ stands now for a relentlessly changing qualified object (‘it is always in some shape and quality’). Further, the notional charge of ‘subsistence’ and ‘in thought only’, as observed by White, clearly supports the view that Posidonius held that the principles were incorporeal. Such standpoint would again clash with what we know about Stoic principles. As we shall see, these difficulties are solved when we understand the whole conceptual picture conveyed by the combination of Arius’ fr. 20 and 27.

3 THE INTERPRETATION

We can now return to Arius’ fr. 27. F 92 throws light on F 96 as ‘substance’ and ‘matter’ are apposite to ‘substance’ and the ‘qualified individual’. More specifically, the fit juxtaposition of F 92 with the second half of F 96 discloses the theoretical content of the text, and lets us closer to the metaphysical aspect of Posidonius’ concept of genesis. The correspondence starts as the text conveys two members in the ‘peculiarly qualified individuals’:

... In peculiarly qualified individuals (ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν), he says that there are two receptive parts, in respect to the subsistence of the being (κατὰ τὴν τῆς οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν) and of the qualified thing (κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ποιοῦ). It is the latter, as we have often kept saying, that admits of increase and diminution...
The term τὸ ποιὸς ἰδίως is not actually found in Plutarch’s *On Common Conceptions* 1083a-1084a (= LS 28 A). Long and Sedley supply it to section (28 A) 3 based on the similarity of argument between Plutarch and the Anonymous Academic treatise (Oxyrhynchus Papyrus 3008 = LS 28 C) where the term also occurs. In any case, ‘peculiarly qualified individuals’ as presented in F 96 are those viewed as possessors of uniquely identifying qualities, the standard examples being Dion and Theon. Now, the meaning of their two receptive parts (fr. 27) is, as I said, illuminated as we understood it as reiterating the dichotomy between ‘substance’ and ‘matter’.

Like in Arius fr. 20, Posidonius again theorises about a single body (τὸ ποιὸς ἰδίως) bearing two distinct cognizable contents; that is, the distinction regards the aspectual ‘subsistence’ of both receptive parts (cf. Διαφέρειν...κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν). The active principle ousia overtly returns as one of the aspects (κατὰ τὴν τῆς ὀψιας ὑπόστασιν). Correspondingly, the opposite passive principle also returns: like ‘matter’ the so-called ‘qualified thing’ is something that remains yet it is in constant flux (...τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι).

The final part of the excerpt unfolds the philosophical theory that underlies the analysis of the body into two complementary components. Again, the juxtaposition with F 92 clarifies the metaphysical notions of the Stoic Posidonius.

μὴ εἶναι δὲ ταὐτὸν τὸ τε ποιὸν ἰδίως καὶ τὴν ὀψιαν [...]. The active principle ousia overtly returns as one of the aspects (κατὰ τὴν τῆς ὀψιας ὑπόστασιν). Correspondingly, the opposite passive principle also returns: like ‘matter’ the so-called ‘qualified thing’ is something that remains yet it is in constant flux (...τὴν αὔξησιν καὶ τὴν μείωσιν ἐπιδέχεσθαι).

This very peculiarly qualified thing is not the same as the substance from which it is made. Nor on the other hand is it different from it, but is all but the same, in that it is a part of the substance and occupies the same place as it, whereas whatever is called different from something must be separated from it (κεχωρίσθαι) and not be thought of (θεωρεῖσθαι) as even part of it.

The first thing to be noticed is the puzzling language: μὴ
εἴναι δὲ ταῦταν ... μηδ’ ἕτερον. The paradox, which was implicit in the difference between substance and matter (F 92), comes to the surface here. As one reads, the paradoxical relationship between the qualified individual and its substance follows the rapport of part and whole. Scholars have remarked that this specific discussion in Hellenistic circles ultimately derives from Plato’s *Parmenides* (137 ff.). There is also a clear tendency in recent scholarship to read τὴν οὐσίαν instead of τῆς οὐσίας; the latter had been established by Bake’s 1810 edition of Posidonius and subsequently accepted by Diels and the majority of editors. The variance between both readings is actually crucial. I analyse first the problems with τὴν οὐσίαν before showing how the other option elucidates the Posidonian tenet.

Despite the fact that reputable publications prefer τὴν οὐσίαν to τῆς οὐσίας, this option, as far as I know, has never been consistently argued for. The grammatical reading of τὴν οὐσίαν sounds worse than of τῆς οὐσίας (‘because the substance is a part ...’, but a part of what?). Besides, it seems unlikely that Posidonius would hold that *ousia*, ‘the being of the thing’, is ‘part of’ its counterpart which is in constant flux. One reads earlier that ‘the qualified things supervene on substance’ (τοὺς ποιοὺς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γιγνομένους). Likewise, the ‘qualified thing’ is presented as being ‘made out of’ the *ousia* (... ἐξ ἧς ἔστι τοῦτο). Specifically, such relationship of whole and part between *poios* and *ousia* seems objectionable in the sense that, within the pair, it is *ousia* that turns up as ontologically prior to *poios*. According to Plato’s *Parmenides*, the urtext for the discussion, ‘the part is contained in the whole’ (ἢ οὐ περιέχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ ὅλου τὰ μόρια; 144 E 9 and 145 B 8) and, within the pair above, it is *poios* that is contained in *ousia* (... τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας).

There is, indeed, another Stoic fragment where a related paradox reintroduces the notion of part and whole. It is Philo’s *Aet. Mundi* (48-51) that presents Chrysippus’ solution to another puzzle about change and identity. Here the two individuals somehow manage to be so differentiated that when Dion’s foot is amputated he becomes indistinguishable from Theon. At the
second half of this excerpt, which is notoriously difficult to interpret, Philo says (50): 'Let the world be the counterpart of Dion, since it is complete, and the world's soul [i.e. the world after the conflagration] the counterpart of Theon, incomplete, since the part is less than the whole; and as Dion's foot was removed, so let all the bodily part of the world be removed from it ...' Yet even supposing, as Sedley does,37 that Philo indicates that Chrysippus understands Dion to be related to Theon as whole to part, that is, the cosmos would be the whole and its soul (i.e. cosmos after the conflagration) the part, it seems clear that Philo understands this relationship as another unwelcome consequence of Chrysippus' solution.38 Philo emphasises that, following his answer to the puzzle, Providence would be perishable ('For any one, copying the form of this argument and adapting it to the entire world, may prove in the clearest manner that providence itself is liable to corruption.' 49) and imperfect ('let the soul of the world take the place of Theon, who was imperfect, since a part is less than the whole'. 50). In fact, one could hardly infer from this passage that ousia stands for a part of poios in Posidonius’ F 96 E – K.

Conversely, the reading μέρος εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας is consistent with the content of the relevant Stoic fragments. In order to understand it, we should first realize that F 96 (also) concerns the everlasting cycle of creation and destruction undergone by the cosmos. This is the specific cosmological doctrine where the Stoics admittedly theorize about two entities occupying the same substance. That Posidonius followed the early Stoics concerning this viewpoint one can learn from a report in Diogenes Laertius of the Stoic distinction between different senses of the term 'cosmos':

They speak of cosmos in three ways: <in one> it is god himself who is the peculiarly qualified individual consisting of all substance (τῆς ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιόν), indestructible and ingenerable, being the demiurge of the cosmic order and consuming at set periods of time the whole substance in to himself and reproducing it again from himself; they also say that cosmos is the cosmic order itself (αὕτη δὲ τὴν διακόσμησιν) of the cosmos; and thirdly it is what is composed out of both. (138) Cosmos is the peculiarly qualified individual of the
substance of the whole (ὁ ἰδίως ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας), or, as Posidonius says in the Meteorology (the elementary treatise) a systematic compound composed from heaven and earth and the natural constitutions in them, or a systematic compound composed from gods and men and what has come into being for their sake. (D. L. 7. 137 – 138; D. L. 7. 138 = F 14 E – K)

§ 137 basically reiterates Chrysippus’ concept, as exposed in Plutarch’ On Common Notions 1077 c—e (cf. n. 25) and also in Philo above, that the soul of the cosmos survives the universal conflagration as the elements of the world-order are transformed back into fire. Accordingly, the first two definitions imply the two entities (Zeus and Providence in Plutarch, the world’s body and soul in Philo) which compose the same thing, the cosmos, as the third sense confirms. Posidonius’ fragment witness him following in the steps of his great predecessor. On the one hand, the idea of a ‘peculiarly qualified individual of the substance of the wholes’ (ὁ ἰδίως ποιὸς τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας) echoes the first sense of cosmos in § 137 (τῆς ἁπάσης οὐσίας ἰδίως ποιόν). This is god himself, or the world’s soul, who survives the ekpyrosis. On the other, ‘a systematic compound composed from heaven and earth and the natural constitutions in them’ represents the cosmic order (τὴν διακόσμησιν), the world’s body that is always in flux yet perishes in the conflagration. Still, the passage further confirms that he also conceived two entities occupying the same substance. The world’s soul (... τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας ...) and body (... καὶ τῶν ἐν τούτοις φύσεων) should stand respectively for ousia and poios: the two receptive parts of the individual in F 96.

As I said earlier, the idea that ousia and poios in F 96 stand respectively for whole and part sounds more consistent than the other option. Stoic physics teaches that the cosmos expands to its maximum size in the periodic conflagration; that is, when ousia is instantiated. There is also evidence witnessing that the fiery element, or god, holds the whole substance in the ekpyrosis whereas it only occupies part of it during the world-order. Again, the clearly objectionable idea is the one found in Philo’s De Aer.
Mundi 50 where the post-conflagration ‘worldsoul’ is part of the of cosmic world.\textsuperscript{42} It is not clear whether Chrysippus really argued that the ‘worldsoul’ stands for the cosmos as part to whole: it could be another unwelcome consequence of Chrysippus’ point about Zeus and Providence. In any case, given Philo’s account, it is very unlikely that Chrysippus stated the opposite; it is very unlikely that he affirmed that the soul of the world is a whole and the cosmos its part. Now, one could speculate what allowed Posidonius to claim that the world during cosmic conflagration is a whole. There is a subtle yet effective difference in his particular cosmology propitiating this concept. I go (briefly) through this cosmological standpoint before analysing the dynamics of body and soul in Posidonius’ ontology.

So, one should bear in mind that Chrysippus’ conceptual framework involving the cosmic mass and its surrounding infinite void was problematic. The obvious difficulties facing this cosmological model turn up in Plutarch’s \textit{On stoic self-contradictions} 1054b–1055a where the Academic criticizes Chrysippus for stating that the cosmos was indestructible because its parts tend to the middle, in spite of theorizing at the same time about an extra-cosmic void which was deprived of absolute directions such as up, down and middle.\textsuperscript{43} Still, further problems can be detected in Chrysippus’ definitional statement in Arius Dydimus’ \textit{Epitome} f. 25 Diels about the compound stemming from the co-presence of occupied place and void: ‘If what can be occupied by an existent is partly occupied and partly unoccupied, the (resulting) whole will be neither void nor place, (τὸ ὅλον οὔτε κενὸν οὔτε τόπον) but another nameless thing (ἕτερον δέ τι οὐκ ὠνομασμένον).’ Specifically, the uncertainty about the status of this nameless whole (τὸ ὅλον) sounds as a theoretical liability when we remind that other Stoic sources categorically reject the idea that such compound could be considered a whole. Whole is predicated of what is ordered; the cosmos (expanded or not), for instance. The compound of cosmos (i.e. occupied place) and its surrounding limitless void should be distinguished from it; it is called \textit{to Pan}, the All.\textsuperscript{44}
Yet, there is evidence that Posidonius attempted to reorient Stoic physics in view of the very problems the Chrysippean conceptual framework was facing. He advanced the novel claim that the extra-cosmic void is not infinite or unlimited, as the early Stoics preached; rather, the void is precisely the size occupied by the cosmos when it expands in its periodic conflagration.\(^45\) I have dealt with the bearing of this doxa within Stoic cosmology somewhere else.\(^46\) Here it suffices to point out that Posidonius’ concept rendered the Stoic theory of void in line with that of ‘place’ (‘what is entirely occupied by being, or what can be occupied by being’ Arius’ *Epitome* f. 25 Diels). Simultaneously, it solves the difficulty apparent in Chrysippus’ formulation above (\(τὸ \ δόλον \ ... \ \ ἔξερον \ δὲ \ τὶ \ οὐκ \ ὑπομαζόμενον\)) by turning the conflagrated cosmic mass into a definite ‘whole’. In Posidonius’ *ekpyrosis* there is absolutely nothing apart from the cosmos; not even void.

Correspondingly, Posidonius’ doxa about the void (F 84/97a E−K) most probably purported to review the very nature of the cosmos during the periodic conflagrations. Further clues of his original intention can be gathered from the fact that the doctrine of *ekpyrosis* was being questioned, if not abandoned, by leading figures of the Stoa such as Panaetius (cf. Philo, *Aet. Mund.* 78). As Tieleman has recently observed,\(^47\) ‘the idea of the cosmic body as stretching out infinitely or at least very far is problematic from a Stoic point of view. Even if in such a stage the unicity of the divine cosmos is maintained, this does not hold good, at least not in a credible way, for its characteristic of being coherent and organic – an idea integral to its divine perfection.’ In other words, the *ekpyrosis* was susceptible to doubt because the idea of a loosely diffused cosmic mass within a disordered limitless void, i.e. to *Pan* (*Comm. not.* 1074 b–c), seemed to run counter the Stoic dogma of divine providence; particularly, when one reminds that the life of the cosmos (of God) reaches its peak of perfection at this moment. Conversely, Posidonius’ doxa (F 84/97a E−K) reaffirms the orthodox conflagration of Chrysippus\(^48\) yet it has the advantage of turning the resulting fiery substance into something more akin to an organic unity.\(^49\) More to the point, it redefines the
universe at the moment of the *ekpyrosis* as a perfect ‘whole’.

I think I have collected enough evidence to prove that the two receptive parts of F 96, the (peculiarly) qualified thing and substance, can be read as the everlasting cycle of world-order and total conflagration in the life-history of the universe. It should be also clear that the first entity (*poios*) is a part of the second one (*ousia*). It remains to confirm that Posidonius’ ontology, as conveyed in Arius f. 27, preaches that every animal in the world can be analysed according to the dichotomy body (i.e. *poios*) and soul (i.e. *ousia*). In this connection, I would like to draw attention to a relevant Stoic fragment that equally introduces soul as substance. Long and Sedley rightly collect it under the label ‘*the first and second genera*’ (LS 28 F) yet do not mention the passage in the comments (1987, 172-176). It is quite understandable. The content of the fragment openly diverges from the Chrysippean categories as portrayed in the same section.

But the philosophers who follow Chrysippus and Zeno and all who consider the soul to be body, collect its powers as qualities in the substrate (*ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ποιότητας*). They posit soul as substance already underlying (*ὡς οὐσίαν προοποκειμένη*) the powers, and out of these two dissimilar components they bring together a composite nature. Iamblichus *On the soul* (Stobaeus 1. 367 17-22; SVF 2. 826)

A thoughtful analysis shows that this excerpt corroborates my interpretation of F 96 above as it reproduces its main concepts. One reads that the philosophers who follow Chrysippus and Zeno – that is, a Stoic such as Posidonius – theorize about a composite nature made out of two entities: soul and the powers that consist of qualities in the substrate (*ἐν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ποιότητας*). Further, there is a clear relationship of ontological primacy between both parts. The substantial soul underlies the qualities (cf. *ἡν οὐσίαν [6] ἐξ ἦς ἐστι ... Arius f. 27*).
CONCLUSION

We can now make a first attempt to read the whole fragment (Arius f. 27 = F 96 E – K) taking into consideration the fruits of our research about its metaphysical charge. The result of the research is the following. Posidonius reoriented Stoic ontology by rejecting the two orthodox Chrysippean genera, the material substrate (οὐσία) and peculiarly qualified thing (ἰδίως ποιός or ποιότης). He subsumes both genera under the heading ‘substance’ which now applies to the predominant qualities that define an entity during all the times at which it exists (cf. F 92 E – K). We have also seen that substance is analogous to soul in the case of animated beings. On the other hand, Posidonius classifies as ‘qualities’ (ποιόν) the remaining, or non-essential, material features of the body. Substance underlies such qualities which are said to be liable to suffer alteration.

Such metaphysical approach can be easily observed (and confirmed). τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὔτ’ αὔξεσθαι οὔτε μειοῦσθαι κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ή ἀφαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι: Again, substance is not either in flux or in constant generation and destruction (as described in Plutarch). Substance only admits alteration, or genesis, following the ἀλλοίωσις -change. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν φασι δύο εἶναι τά δεκτικά μόρια ... ἐπιδέχεσθα. I have already analysed this passage.
above. It clearly reiterates the ontological dichotomy of Arius f. 20 (= F 92 E – K). Contrasting to substance, the receptive member poia admits constant alteration. μὴ εἶναι δὲ ταὐτόν τὸ τε ποιὸν ἰδίως καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ... θεωρεῖσθαι. Again, poios idios means any given organic body – that is, a body as one finds them in the world. Accordingly, Posidonius’ doxa preaches that this changeable body is made out of an underlying persistent substance and represents a part of this substance.

This partial interpretation of the metaphysical charge of Posidonius’ doxa about genesis (F 96 E – K = Arius f. 27) should work as the conclusion for the present article. As promised above (cf. n11), I intend to offer a comprehensive analysis of the fragment in a forthcoming article. The notions still to be clarified are the complementary physical aspect of genesis and the reorientation of Posidonius’ Stoicism following his critical engagement with other Hellenistic philosophical schools.
RESUMO
O artigo analisa a teoria metafísica proposta em dois fragmentos de Possidónio preservados na doxografia de Ário Dídimo, f. 20 e f. 27 Diels (= F 92 and F 96 E – K). A pesquisa chega aos seguintes resultados. Possidónio reorientou a ontologia estoica ao abandonar as chamadas ‘categorias’ do estoicismo de Crisipo, o substrato material (οὐσία) e o indivíduo pecuariamente qualificado (ἰδιως ποιός ou ποιότης). Ele inclui os dois gêneros ortodoxos em uma nova categoria ‘substância’ que agora identifica as qualidades essenciais que definem um corpo durante todo tempo em que existe, e classifica como ‘qualidades’ (ποιόν) ou ‘matéria’ (ὕλη) as características materiais não essenciais do corpo. A análise do fragmento sobre Geração e corrupção (F 96 E – K) combinado a outros fragmentos pertinentes (F 14 e F 84/97a E–K) também revela que substância significa alma quando animais estão em foco. A ‘alma substancial’ é subjacente às qualidades do corpo que são passíveis de sofrer alterações.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE
Metafísica estoica; Possidónio; geração e corrupção; cosmogonia.
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2 Cf. KIDD, 1988, p. 390. See also the important remarks of Alesse, 2007.


4 Idem, p. 389

5 See HAHM, 1977, p. 60; SOLMSEN, 1960, p. 89; KIDD, 1988, p. 386-387. Justifies his translation ‘they reject as unreal’ by considering the passage in Philo (De Aet. Mund. 78 ff) which is attributed to Boethus. Yet the referred doxa does not seem to address directly the Eleatic paradox of genesis as the fragment in Arius.

6 ‘Our task now is to pick out the causes and definitions of generation and corruption common to all those things which come to be and perish in the course of nature; and secondly to investigate growth and alteration, asking what each of them is, and whether we are to suppose that the nature of alteration and generation is the same or different, as they are certainly distinguished in name.’ (GCI 1, 314 a 1–5) [Transl. C.J.F. Williams, 1982]

7 For Posidonius’ acquaintance with Peripatetic physics see F 18, F 49, F 93, F 125, F 130, F 131a, F 133, F 137a, F 142–146, F 155, F 169, and F 183 E–K.

8 Cf. the insightful remark of Anna Ju, 2013, 97: ‘This inclination may be read as a mark of Posidonius’ strong historical sense: he seems to have believed that the development of his own ideas and theories may have had the potential to resolve outstanding problems in the context of a Platonic – and an Aristotelian – heritage; also, he apparently accepted that such a heritage framed the questions which it was natural for his own thought to pursue.’

9 Arius fr. 38; D. L. VII 142.

10 TODD, 1976.

11 See KIDD, 1988, p. 389-390. LONG; SEDLEY, 1987, p. 173. Acknowledge the bearing of such notions in F 96 E – K (‘Crucial to this whole enterprise is the observation [28 D 9-12] that Theon, although constituted by his substance or matter, is not identical with it.’), yet they assume that Posidonius’ doxa merely complements Chrysippus’ one.

12 Cf. F 93 E–K (= Simplicius In De Caelo iv 3. 310 b1): ‘another is that in which heavy and cold things have the role of matter, light and hot things of form, as Aristotle himself says elsewhere and Theophrastus says in On the coming to be of the elements. Posidonius the Stoic borrows it from them and uses it all the time.’ Note that according to the orthodox list of qualities, as found i.a. in D. L. vii 137 (fire = hot, air = cold, earth = dry, water = moist), the material elements water and earth are basically regarded as a three-dimensional inert medium. For the comprehensive analysis of the fragment, see my article BOECHAT, 2016, p. 444-461.

13 Mansfeld, 1983 analyses the contrast between both theories of mixture, or the difference between Zeno’s corporealism and Aristotle’s approach by means of the formal cause.

14 ‘For there is much enquiry into causes in him [Posidonius], that is, “Aristotelising”, a thing which our School [the Stoics] sheers off from because of the concealment of causes’ (Strabo ii 3. 8 = T 85 E–K).

15 See KIDD, 1989 and STEVEN, 1995 for Posidonius’ polemical engagement with the sceptical Academy.


17 The physical aspect of genesis, or mixture, as portrayed in F 96 E – K will be analysed in a forthcoming article.

18 KIDD, 1988, p. 388.

19 ‘The prevailing convention is wrong to call these processes of growth and decay: rather they should be called generation and destruction, since they transform the thing from what it is into something else, whereas growing and diminishing are affections of a body which serves as substrate and persists.’ (Plutarch On common conceptions 1083 a – b)

20 Cf. KIDD, 1988, p. 389: ‘This is substantial change whereby one ἰδίως ποιῶν becomes a different ἰδίως ποιῶν; the οὐσία persists but the qualified entity transmutes κατ’ ἄλλοισσης. The οὐσία becomes something else.’
Cf. ‘all particular substances are in flux and motion, releasing some things from themselves and receiving others which reach them from elsewhere’. (LS 28 A 2)

WHITE, 2007, p. 44-48, provides the best analysis, yet he manifestly builds upon the works of Kidd, Reydams-Schils, and Alesse.


KIDD, 1988, p. 370, misunderstand the sentence (and the fragment) as he thinks that Posidonius is plainly identifying ousia with the passive principle: ‘Posidonius states that this principle, or the substance, or matter, or prime matter, is without quality and without form.’ Yet the subtly of the sentence consists in introducing τῶν ὅλων οὐσίαν, or being (cf. Zeno’s preceding definition), as both principles. See ALESSE, 2007, p. 162: ‘Che il termine οὐσία includa anche il senso del principio ativo e che non si identifichi quindi con sola ὕλη, è una progettiva avanzata in passato da alcuni interpreti ...’ She refers to LAPIDGE, 1973 and 1978 among others. Contra: GOURIMAT, 2009.

For incorporeals see i.a. LONG; SEDLEY, 1987 section 27; BRUNSCHWIG, 1988.

See WHITE, 2007, p. 47: “if F ‘according to its subsistence (κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν)’ is different from G, then there are distinct concepts F and G, and likewise distinct lekta as their content. And if F ‘subsistently’ differs from G ‘only in thought’, then it is identical with G only corporeally, and the concepts F and G are co-extensive but distinct”. Notice that this interpretation implies that Posidonius conceived the principles as incorporeals as portrayed in D. L. 7. 134 (= F 5 E–K).

I take that the fluid aspect of nature, as clearly depicted in the second infinitive clause, reflects the passive principle. Note that in the parallel passage of D. L. (7. 150) matter, the counterpart of ‘prime or first’ matter (i.e. ousia), is explicitly defined as fluid: ‘the matter of particular things both increases and diminishes.’

Cf. ALESSE, 2007, p. 159.


See esp. ALESSE, 2007, p. 160: ‘perché non c’è alcuna fase della vita di una singula διακόσμησις in cui la οὐσία sia priva de forma e qualità.’; also Reydams-Schils, 1997, p. 460-461: ‘Thus, there is pre-cosmic matter, completely drawn into the active principle, and matter underlying the generation of all things great and small’ p. 161).

‘If that mirroring is accurate, the propositions that articulate the content of our thought are true and express facts, or what “obtains”. If inaccurate, the propositions are false.’ WHITE, 2007, p. 47.

Cf. SEDLEY, 1982, p. 273 n. 26: ‘At Plutarch, Comm. Not. 1083 c – d, the term for that which endures through change has fallen out of the text. It is usually restored as ποιότης or ποιῶν, but that ποιῶς ἰδίως (or on) here too was the term used seems probable if one compares P. Oxy. 3008, an unrecognised doublet of the Plutarch argument.’


See SEDLEY, 1982, p. 273 n. 24: ‘Warning: the acceptance by all editors, subsequent to Bake’s 1810 edition of Posidonius ... is unnecessary and misleading, since the substance is a part of the qualified individual, not vice versa.’ KIDD, 1988, p. 390: ‘In line 22, τὴν οὐσίαν FP should be retained.’ Barnes (264, n. 80) refers to Sedley, 1982.

SEDELY, 1982, p. 269 n. 41.
See the relevant criticism in Plutarch’s *On Common Conception* 1077 c—e (= LS 28 O): ‘What really is contrary to our conception is these people’s assertions and pretences to the effect that two peculiarly qualified individuals occupy one substance ... At least, Chrysippus says that Zeus and the world are like a man and providence like his soul, so that when the conflagration comes Zeus, being the only imperishable one among the gods, withdraws into providence, whereupon both, having come together, continue to occupy the single substance of aether.’

See Salles, 2009, p. 127 ff. for the idea that the concept is essentially Chrysippean.


‘The god of the Stoics, in as much as he is a body, sometimes has the whole substance as his commanding-faculty; this is whenever the conflagration is in being; at other times, when world-order exists, he comes to be in a part of substance.’ Origen’s *Against Celsus* 4.14 (LS 46 H)


See Alessandrelli, 2014, p. 54: ‘from a reflection on the nameless entity stemming from the co-presence of full (place) and void, either Chrysippus or his disciples ultimately came to draw a distinction between the whole (Ὁ̄λον) and the all (Πᾶν).’ cf. S. E. M9.332 (= LS 44 A); Plutarch *Comm. not.* 1074 b – c.

This doctrine is preserved in the testimony of Aetius’ *Placita*. The chapter is headed ‘On what is outside the cosmos, whether there is void’ (II 9): ‘Posidonius <maintains that> it is not infinite, but just as large as is sufficient for the dissolution of the cosmos. In the first book of the ‘On the Void’ (F 84/97a E–K).’

Boechat, 2016, p. 441 ff; see also Algra, 1993.


Note that immediately after the parallel definitions of cosmos (7. 138 above), Diogenes mentions side by side the books of Chrysippus and Posidonius (F 21 E – K) about the divine providence (respectively, *On Providence* and *On Gods*). It is worth pointing out that *On Providence* is the very work featuring Chrysippus’ ideas about the conflagration that Plutarch criticizes in *On stoic self-contradictions*.