

2021.2 . Ano XXXVIII . Número 42

CALÍOPE

Presença Clássica

2021.2 . Ano XXXVIII . Número 42

CALÍOPE

Presença Clássica

ISSN 2447-875X

Dossiê sobre Xenofonte

(separata 8)

organizadores do dossiê:
Luis Filipe Bantim de Assumpção | Rainer Guggenberger

Programa de Pós-Graduação em Letras Clássicas
Departamento de Letras Clássicas da UFRJ

CAPA
Busto de Xenofonte, c. 323-30 a.C. Museu de Antiguidades (Biblioteca de Alexandria, Egito).

EDITORAÇÃO
Fábio Frohwein de Salles Moniz | Rainer Guggenberger

REVISORES DO NÚMERO 42
Arthur Rodrigues Pereira Santos | Fábio Frohwein de Salles Moniz | Rainer Guggenberger | Ricardo de Souza Nogueira | Ticiano Curvelo Estrela de Lacerda | Vinicius Francisco Chichurra

REVISÃO TÉCNICA
Fábio Frohwein de Salles Moniz

Programa de Pós-Graduação em Letras Clássicas | Faculdade de Letras – UFRJ
Av. Horácio Macedo, 2151 – sala F-327 – Ilha do Fundão 21941-917 – Rio de Janeiro – RJ
www.letras.ufrj.br/pgclassicas – pgclassicas@letras.ufrj.br

Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and Plato's *Laws*

William Henry Furness Altman

ABSTRACT

The passage about the flaws of Cyrus the Great in *Laws* 3 has led scholars both ancient and modern to conclude, accurately, that Plato was responding to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* but they have erred in assuming that this response was critical. Current scholarly debate is focused on whether *Cyropaedia* deserves a "sunny" reading, championed by Vivienne Gray, or a "darker" one, and this article aligns Plato with the "darker" reading: he was the first reader who demonstrably identified Cyrus himself, and specifically his inattention to the παιδεία of his sons (*Lg.* 694c6-7), as the cause of Persia's post-Cyrus decline. But Cyrus must *appear* to embody Xenophon's political ideal, and this explains why the text's narrator adulates him, just as the Athenian Stranger appears to be Plato's spokesman. Against these misconceptions, both authors use Herodotus to undermine their spokesman's credibility, and an analysis of how they do so shows that Plato is not so much criticizing as imitating Xenophon. By aligning Plato's Athenian Stranger with Xenophon's Cyrus, the article argues that both *Cyropaedia* and *Laws* deserve a "darker" reading, thus creating a revealing parallel between the last chapter of *Cyropedia* – where Persia falls apart – and Plato's *Epinomis*.

KEYWORDS

Plato and Xenophon; Herodotus; *Laws*; *Cyropaedia*; Vivienne Gray; *Epinomis*.

SUBMISSÃO 6.2.2021 | APROVAÇÃO 20.3.2021 | PUBLICAÇÃO 4.9.2022

DOI https://doi.org/10.17074/cpc.v1i42.41360

When the Athenian Stranger criticizes Cyrus the Great's conception of παιδεία (694c6-8),[1] it has generally been assumed that Plato is criticizing Xenophon.[2] While affirming the traditional view that Plato is *responding* to *Cyropedia* in *Laws*,[3] this paper will explain why the foregoing assumption is wrong, and the first step is to recognize that the *appearance* that Plato is criticizing Xenophon rests on two prior assumptions: that the Athenian Stranger speaks for Plato, and that Cyrus the Great embodies Xenophon's ideals. Partly because Xenophon's relationship to Cyrus has recently become a matter of lively scholarly dispute, it is easier to criticize the second of these assumptions first.

Although there is still strong support for "a mirror of princes" reading of *Cyropedia*, a growing chorus of scholarly voices has discovered countervailing evidence that a "dark" reading of the text is appropriate, *i.e.*, that despite appearances, Xenophon is not really praising Cyrus. Meanwhile, the foremost defender of the "sunny" reading of *Cyropedia* as "mirror" is correct when she observes: "The driving force behind the attribution of the decline [sc. of the Persian Empire] to a failure of education by Cyrus is Plato in *Laws* 693-5, who argues that the Persians proved strong or weak depending on the education [sc. παιδεία] of the royal princes, and is said to draw his interpretation from *Cyropaedia*".[4]

In this paper, I will use three passages from *Cyropaedia* to elucidate a lengthy passage in *Laws* 3 (693d2-696a3) that includes the words of the Athenian Stranger that made it impossible to miss that Plato was writing with Xenophon in mind:

> *Athenian Stranger*: I now divine [μαντεύομαι] this about Cyrus: while otherwise being a general both good and civic [φιλόπολις], about a correct education [παιδεία] he didn't grasp anything, and to housekeeping [οἰκονομία] he paid no attention.[5]

The first of these three passages (8.7.6-8.8.2) climaxes with the succinct revelation of Persia's decline in the immediate aftermath of Cyrus's death: the Athenian Stranger refers to it three times (694c1-2, 695b2-c2, and 695d7-696a3), and in due course, an analysis of the passage between 694c5 and 695c2 will substantiate the crucial connection implied by these references. But it is important to grasp from the start why the Stranger must resort to *divination* (μαντεία at 694c2) in order to explain why things fell apart with Cyrus's son Cambyses and were later "nearly saved" by Darius (694c1-4) and thus why the critical claim just quoted is and must be prefaced with μαντεύομαι.[6] By allowing the Athenian Stranger to do nothing more than *divine* the cause of Persia's post-Cyrus decline described in 8.8, Plato is opening the door for us to move from divination to demonstration. On the basis of texts that precede the final chapter – I will be emphasizing 2.2.17-2.3.15 and 7.5.55-8.1.39 as well as 8.7.6-24 – it is only the reader who compares what the Stranger says in *Laws* 3 to what Xenophon writes in *Cyropedia* who can go beyond the Stranger's μαντεύομαι and discover even stronger evidence that Cyrus himself was responsible for the decline that followed his death.[7] But for the present, the crucial point is that since the critical reading offered by the Stranger bears directly on the extent to which Cyrus could provide a proper education for his sons, Gray is correct: Plato should be regarded as "the driving force" behind the "darker" reading of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*.

In order to appreciate what Plato is doing to promote a "dark" reading of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* in *Laws* 3, it is first necessary to consider the treatment of 8.8 in Gray's "sunny"[8] alternative. Fully aware that others have used the book's final chapter to cast retrospective doubt on Xenophon's otherwise "sunny" presentation of Cyrus,[9] she argues that Persia's subsequent decline proves Cyrus's exemplarity.[10] Basing her argument on Xenophon's insistence in *Memorabilia* 1 that Socrates cannot be held responsible for the subsequent actions of Alcibiades and Critias,[11] Gray uses the alleged parallel between Socrates and Cyrus to show that the latter is no more responsible for the misdeeds of

his sons. Nor is Gray alone here: among others,[12] Christian Mueller-Goldingen and Louis-André Dorion have explained 8.8 in the same way,[13] *i.e.*, that it was precisely because Persia no longer had an ideal leader like Cyrus to guide it that its decline immediately followed his death. Plato's Stranger, by contrast, searches for the cause of that decline in Cyrus himself, and finds it primarily in his failure to provide an adequate education to his sons and in his failure to give attention to housekeeping.

The structural background of Gray's position must be clearly understood at the outset. It is only in the eighth and final book of Xenophon's *Cyropedia* that the post-Cyrus decline of the Persian empire is revealed to the reader, and since the tale of that empire's growth has so often departed from the historical record preserved paradigmatically by Herodotus, the word "revealed" is appropriate: it comes as a surprise. This surprise has spawned three interpretive responses: (1) the authenticity of *Cyropedia* 8.8 has been denied, thus leaving intact a tale of growth and success, (2) the decline has been attributed to Cyrus's absence – this is Gray's alternative – thus preserving a "sunny" reading of the text as a whole, and (3) the sources of the decline have been sought in Cyrus's own actions, an interpretive move that commences with Plato. The most notorious example of (1) is found in Walter Miller's 1914 Loeb Library translation of *Cyropaedia*[14] where he addressed those who had just read 8.7: "[T]he reader is recommended to close the book at this point and read no further". Referring to earlier editors who had rejected 8.8 as inauthentic, he expressed his own verdict succinctly: "It spoils the perfect unity of the work up to this chapter; Cyrus is born, grows to manhood, completes his conquests, establishes his kingdom, organizes the various departments of his empire, dies".[15] If the last chapter of *Cyropaedia* did not shake our certainty that it was ever Xenophon's true intent to glorify Cyrus and the institutions he created, nobody would have proposed excising it.

While it is important to recognize that Plato is responding to *Cyropedia* through the Athenian Stranger, it is also important that it is necessarily a response to Xenophon's text *as a whole*, seeking

the cause of what is revealed in 8.8 in what has happened before. But this response is found only in the third of the twelve books of Plato's *Laws*, long before Plato's text reaches *its* conclusion. But where does *Laws* end? The clearest evidence that the Athenian Stranger does not speak for Plato is found in *Epinomis*, a dialogue that most modern scholars consider inauthentic precisely because what the Stranger says in it cannot be squared with what they consider Plato's views or intentions to be. In a word, there is ancient evidence that Plato's *Laws* was once equipped with its own destabilizing and certainty-shaking *epilogue*, but that unlike *Cyropedia* 8.8, *Epinomis* continues to be regarded as inauthentic. As a result, it generally plays no part in the interpretation of the twelve books of *Laws* that precede it, and to which it was clearly intended – whether by Plato or someone else – to be a sequel, *i.e.*, to explain "what happened next". Not surprisingly, the proof of its inauthenticity is its incompatibility with the dialogue it allegedly follows, concisely described by Leonardo Tarán: "[T]he author of the *Epinomis* misunderstood or chose to misunderstand the *Laws*, a thing which cannot be attributed to Plato".[16]

For the proponents of (3), Plato can be recognized as both praising and illuminating Xenophon by being the first to offer a "dark" reading of his text in *Laws* 3. But for the proof that Plato is also imitating Xenophon, we must wait for the end of *Laws*, and since *Epinomis* – unlike 8.8 – has for the present gone missing, the wait will be a long one. In comparison with 8.8, what makes *Epinomis* more difficult to assimilate with a "sunny" reading of *Laws* is that it is not the Athenian Stranger but Plato who has died in the interim. In addition to its alleged incompatibility with *Laws* and its "tacit denial of the separate existence of ideas",[17] *Epinomis* is considered inauthentic because *Laws* was Plato's last work, and since he died even before finishing it (Diogenes Laertius, 3.37) it must necessarily have been someone else who wrote its sequel. Once having been attributed to Philip of Opus, *Epinomis* can safely illuminate what happened to Plato's Academy after Plato's own death in much the same way that 8.8 describes what happened to Persia after the death of Cyrus. But the parallel breaks down

because the hero of *Laws* is still alive in *Epinomis*, and his words and actions there reflect back on what he has said and done in *Laws* in a far more direct way than the subsequent decline of Persia reflects negatively on Cyrus's own words and actions in *Cyropaedia*. In other words, if Tarán is right about the absence of Platonic Ideas in *Epinomis*, a rereading of *Laws* on its basis – the kind of rereading that 8.8 has sometimes prompted in Xenophon's readers beginning with Plato – would need to determine the extent to which those Ideas are actually present in *Laws*. Naturally that is a project well beyond this paper's scope.

But what is not beyond its scope is the preliminary claim that an examination of Plato's response to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* in *Laws* 3 cannot tell the whole story, and thus indicates the need for a project of this kind. The parallel between *Epinomis* and 8.8 is that both are destabilizing epilogues added to lengthy works that otherwise appear to embody and illustrate their authors' respective ideals. The crucial fact from which this paper begins is that Plato is the first reader of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* who demonstrably recognized the possibility that the roots of 8.8 should be sought and found in what precedes it. The additional fact that he did so in a lengthy work of his own, to which it is at least conceivable that he likewise attached a similarly destabilizing epilogue, calls for reconsideration of the traditional view – itself predicated on a naïve or "sunny" reading of *Cyropaedia* – that Plato was *criticizing* Xenophon in *Laws* 3. In contradistinction to this view, modern proponents of a "darker" reading of *Cyropaedia* may find it useful to consider the possibility that Plato was not criticizing Xenophon but rather *imitating* him, and that his Athenian Stranger is modeled on a Xenophon's Cyrus in the crucial respect: both merely *seem* to embody their creators' ideals.

Herodotus will play an important part in the discussion that follows, and the reader's awareness that the *Histories* stand in the background of both *Laws* 3 and Xenophon's account of Cyrus will serve as a readily available check on the veracity of both the Athenian Stranger and the narrator of *Cyropedia*. "Xenophon shapes a story of Cyrus, which is composed of dialogues that were

never spoken, battles that never took place, and people summoned and dismissed from the written page without any shadow of historical reality".[18] Although it has been generally acknowledged that Xenophon's account deviates from Herodotus, it has not been generally acknowledged that it is through these deviations that Xenophon undermines the veracity of his book's narrator,[19] and indeed that narrator has conventionally been identified with Xenophon in much the same way that the Athenian Stranger's views have been identified with Plato's. While it is significant enough that Plato is criticizing Cyrus the Great with Xenophon's text in mind, he also manages to imitate him by repeatedly drawing attention to his deviations from Herodotus, especially because his Athenian Stranger introduces further deviations from Herodotus on his own. It is therefore important to recognize from the start that there are at least three voices in this dialogue, and that Herodotus helps us to distinguish both Plato and Xenophon from their alleged spokesmen.

Herodotus' inspiring tale of Greek resistance to Persian despotism has made his book immortal, and the dialectic between freedom and slavery is the theme that connects *Laws* 3, *Cyropedia*, and Herodotus. At the risk of oversimplification, the more committed the reader is to the love of freedom and the hatred of tyranny – as any Athenian democrat must be – the easier it becomes to separate both Cyrus and the Athenian Stranger from their creators, for it is above all in connection to the whitewashing of despotism that "dark" readings of both *Laws* and *Cyropedia* depend. Consider the historical dimension of the traditional "mirror of princes" reading of Xenophon's text:[20] when Cyrus takes steps of dubious morality but of considerable political expediency in order to require the attendance at court of his most powerful followers (8.1.16-19), it should be obvious that Louis XIV and his advisors at Versailles would not have regarded Xenophon as being critical of his hero even while doing things that thinkers of a more democratic age would regard as despotic. In short, a "sunny" reading that would please *le roi soleil* would emphasize the very same passages in Xenophon's *Cyropedia* that would seem

"dark" in democratic Athens, or indeed to any readers who had witnessed democratic governments being overthrown, as Xenophon tells us his intended readers had (1.1.1). And since the context of the discussion of Cyrus in *Laws* 3 is not the simple superiority of freedom to slavery but rather the dangerous excesses to which both are equally liable, the reader must preserve the spirit of Herodotus not only while reading both texts but even more so while juxtaposing them.

It should be recognized as virtually impossible to analyze responsibly a passage culled from a Platonic dialogue in order to illustrate a phenomenon like "Plato's criticism of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* in *Laws*," but an attempt must now be made. Clearly the theme of legislation is central to the dialogue as a whole, and it is therefore necessary to situate the passage concerning Cyrus in that context. For that purpose, it is useful to begin at the end where the Stranger refers to three proper ends of legislation:

> *Athenian Stranger*: We said that it is necessary for the law-giver to legislate aiming for three things: how the law-given city will be free, friendly to itself, and will have intelligence. These they were, were they not? *Megillus*: Very much so.[21]

Introduced at 693b3-4, freedom, amity, and rationality are repeated promptly at 693c7-8, 693d8-e1, and 694b6, thus underlining their importance from the start. By bookending the passage under consideration, this triad will constitute a kind of template for assessing the truth-value of the Stranger's praise for Cyrus's Persia and explains why he has been discussing the interplay of freedom and slavery in both Persia and Athens:

> *Athenian Stranger*: Therefore on account of these things [sc. the triad of freedom, amity, and rationality], having selected among political arrangements both the most despotic [δεσποτικώτατον] and the freest [ἐλευθερικώτατον], we are now investigating which of those is rightly arranged politically. And having taken ahold in the case of each a certain measured mean [μετριότης] between the despotism [τὸ δεσπόζειν] of one of them and the freedom [τὸ ἐλευθεριάσαι] of

> the other, we discovered that wellbeing [εὐπραγία] came to be in them at that time especially, but that the extreme toward which each was tending – the slavery [δουλεία] of one of them, the opposite of the other – was no more advantageous to one of them than to the other.[22]

This passage is important because when the investigation of Persia and Athens is introduced at 693d2-694a1 – the first will eventually be called δεσποτικώτατον and thus paradigmatic of τὸ δεσπόζειν; the other the representative of τὸ ἐλευθεριάσαι and thus ἐλευθερικώτατον – the Stranger speaks in more analytical and less pejorative terms of monarchy and democracy (693d4-5), and links the triad of legislative goods (693d8-e1) to a synthesis – embodied in Crete and Sparta (693e6-8) – that must necessarily partake of both.[23] In the preface to the discussion of Persia and Athens, then, the Stranger doesn't praise or even mention despotism, and he refers to slavery (δουλεία at 693a1) only in the context of what the Persians were attempting to impose on Greece. And since the first of his triad of legislative goods is freedom (693b4, 693c7-8, and 693d8), one might easily get the idea that monarchy is its antithesis (693d2-6); to disarm this hardly implausible view, the Stranger juxtaposes from the start "the monarchical [τὸ μοναρχικόν]" (693e5) to an as yet unnamed city (cf. 693d5-6) that admires freedom *more greatly than it should*, and indeed exclusively (693e5-6). It is only then that he names the Athenians and the Persians as representatives of these two extremes (693e8-694a).

This, at least, is the impression one might get from taking the passage about Cyrus's Persia out of context. In fact, the Stranger has just been discussing the Persian War, and how only Sparta, unlike its allies Argos and Messene – he has been discussing the three of them at length (683c8-692c8) – joined Athens to fight the Persians, and thus resisted their attempt to tyrannize Hellas (τυραννοῦσι at 693a4) as they had Asia, and thus to reduce it to δουλεία (692d1-693a5). Moreover, in explaining how Messene and Argos went astray by following the path of self-interest and greed (690d5-e6), he traces the malady to their kings (690e7-691a9), making the general statement that it is not "among

the peoples [ἐν τοῖσιν δήμοις]" (690e8) that "taking advantage of established laws [τὸ πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν τεθέντων νόμων]" arises but that it is rather "a disease of kings, living highhandedly thanks to luxury [διὰ τρυφάς]" (691a1-2). It is to prevent what happened to the kings of Messene and Argos that the Stranger will soon enough introduce his legislative triad (at 693b4), but before doing so, he makes some important general statements – important because they bear directly on what he will later say about Cyrus – first regarding youthful leaders in general (691c5-d4), and then about how easy it is for tyranny to develop in a young man (692b4-6). Naturally the reader who encounters *Laws* 3 for the first time could hardly be expected to know that in *Laws* 4 the Stranger will desiderate a tyrannical city (709e6) and a mindful, fast-learning, courageous, and impressive young tyrant to establish it (709e6-7)[24] in anticipation of the one for which he begins to legislate in earnest anticipation of practicable results after 702b4-e2.

On the basis of the Persian Wars and Herodotus, then, the reader of *Laws* 3 might easily assume that Athens was resisting slavery and preserving freedom while Persia was attempting to impose the one and destroy the other, and thus that the democratic freedom of Athens was infinitely preferable to Persian despotism. Although the Stranger's discussion of Athens – of its democratic excesses and failure to respect the measured mean (698a9-701b4) – is not strictly relevant to the relationship between Plato's *Laws* and Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, the fact remains that the discussions of Cyrus's Persia is parallel to the older and more respectable Athens of Marathon. It is in the context of praising this older Athens that the Stranger first describes – as if it were an ideal – being voluntarily enslaved to the laws (698b6, 698c1-2,[25] 699c1-6, and 700a5), and it is only in the context of book 4 and the remainder of *Laws* that the reader can reach a conclusion as to whether this is an ideal which they too are willing to embrace. The important point is that although it is preceded by a discussion of young tyrants and the polarity of freedom and slavery originating in the Persian Wars, the parallel discussion of Persia and Athens that follows, although initially framed in terms of an amiable,

rational, and freedom-preserving synthesis of monarchy and democracy, culminates in a much freer use of despotism and slavery, neither of which is rejected except in the most extreme of cases, and both of which are necessary if the desired measure mean is to be achieved.

Thanks to the use of τρυφή (691a1-2, 695b3 and 695d7) and πλεονεκτεῖν, there have already been what in retrospect must be allusions to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* in *Laws* 3.[26] Even before the first mention of the Persian king at 685c6, the following passage – which echoes 1.1.1 (cf. 676b9-c2) – has introduced the theoretical basis of any "dark" reading of *Cyropaedia* based on 8.8:

> *Athenian Stranger*: And when a kingdom is overthrown, by Zeus, or indeed when any kind of rule has ever been overthrown, surely it isn't by any others but rather by [the kings] themselves?[27]

Other relevant parallels include 680e1-2 with 8.7.9-10, 681b4-6 with 7.5.86, and 677b1-4, 695a1-5, 678c2-3 with the end of Herodotus (*Histories*, 9.122).[28] The connection to Herodotus is particularly significant because it is in the context of freedom and slavery that Cyrus's Persia first appears:

> *Athenian Stranger*: Let us listen then. For the Persians, when they preserved the due balance [τὸ μέτριον] under Cyrus more than both slavery [δουλεία] and freedom [ἐλευθερία], they became, first of all, free [ἐλεύθεροι], and, after that, masters [δεσπόται] of many others.[29]

It is important to realize that the Cyrus who the Stranger describes here is not yet Xenophon's: it is in Herodotus that Cyrus liberates Persia from the Medes (*Histories*, 1.125-129).

Since Xenophon is just as familiar with the Cyrus of Herodotus as Plato shows himself to be here, Plato is drawing attention to the discrepancies between the two accounts. This is an important point: to begin with, the fact that the narrator of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* is unaware of matters with which Xenophon himself is perfectly familiar, *e.g.*, the fact that the

Persians *conquered* the Medes, is central to the claim that the two must be distinguished.[30] Suffice it to say of the many differences between Herodotus and Xenophon that the Cyrus of the latter is far and away the more attractive of the two, and moreover that there is no good reason – other than an unshakeable resistance to a "dark" reading of *Cyropaedia* – to regard these differences as what Gray calls "the subversion of Herodotus"[31] rather than the proof of the fictional and even deceptive character of Xenophon's "sunny" portrait of Cyrus. By beginning with Cyrus the liberator – subsequent "darker" readings, by contrast, will emphasize his opportunism in taking advantage of the Medes, his allies –, this passage also indicates that just as Xenophon should not be identified with the narrator of his *Cyropedia*, neither should Plato be identified uncritically with the Athenian Stranger. Here, Plato not only manages to draw attention to the difference between Xenophon and Herodotus, but also initially uses the terms slavery and freedom exactly as if the one were good, the other bad, *i.e.*, exactly what his Athenian Stranger's search for a measured mean between the two *will not do*. Plato can achieve this result because his Stranger will eventually combine the two *within* a polity, whereas it is initially an *external* slavery from which the Cyrus of Herodotus delivers Persia, thereby securing her freedom from the despotic Medes, a polarity already referenced in the Stranger's account of Athens and Sparta resisting slavery in the Persian Wars (692c5-693a5).

It is only after this initial reference to Cyrus's role which is securing freedom from the Medes – a freedom which plays no role whatsoever in *Cyropaedia* – that the Stranger begins his interpretation of Xenophon:

> *Athenian Stranger*: [1] For when the rulers gave a share of freedom to the ruled [ἄρχοντες μεταδιδόντες ἀρχομένοις] and advanced them to a position of equality [καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἴσον ἄγοντες], the soldiers were more friendly towards their officers and showed their devotion in times of danger; [2] and if there was any wise man [φρόνιμος] amongst them, able to give counsel, since the king was not jealous [οὐ φθονεροῦ τοῦ

> βασιλέως ὄντος] but allowed free speech [παρρησίαν] and respected those who could help at all by their counsel, – such a man had the opportunity of contributing to the common stock [εἰς τὸ μέσον] the fruit of his wisdom. Consequently, [3] at that time all their affairs made progress, on account of freedom as well as friendship, and community of mind [δι' ἐλευθερίαν τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ νοῦ κοινωνίαν]. *Cleinias*: Probably that is pretty much the way in which the matters you speak of took place.[32]

This is the first passage in *Laws* 3 where Plato's words not only presuppose his own knowledge of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* but which will require his readers to return to Xenophon's text in order to determine the truth-value of the various claims the Athenian Stranger is making here. But before unpacking this passage and juxtaposing its three parts with the relevant passages in Xenophon, it is necessary to assure my own readers how they can be sure that it is Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* that Plato is now channeling: this passage is immediately followed by the two references to divination (694c1-8) already quoted above. In other words, the passage just quoted describes as ideal the Persia of Xenophon's Cyrus *as long as he lived*, and immediately after it, he will refer for the first of three times time at 694c1-2 to its destruction as described in 8.8, whereupon the Stranger will promptly set out to divine the causes of that destruction.

In the meantime, Plato makes it is our responsibility to examine the textual basis on which the Stranger's "sunny" portrait of Cyrus's Persia rests. Having marched to the aid of his allies, Xenophon's Cyrus reaches Media at the start of book 2[33] and without soliciting or receiving counsel from others, he promptly undertakes an egalitarian reform of the army; the decision to equip the common soldiers (ὁ δῆμος at 1.5.5; cf. 2.2.22) with the same weapons as his elite officers (οἱ ὁμότιμοι) is the obvious basis for "[1]".[34] The textual basis for "[2]" arises from "[1]," and it thus constitutes the basis for "[3]," where the Stranger will use evidence from *Cyropaedia* to validate the legislative triad that guides the discussion as a whole. In addition to being central to the Stranger's account of and praise for Cyrus's Persia, the events to which "[2]"

refers, bear on the equality of leaders and led – the basis for friendship or φιλία in the triad – in a complex manner. Just as "freedom" originally meant Persia's liberation from Median despotism as described by Herodotus, so too "equality" in Xenophon's account at first meant that officers and men fighting with the same weapons, but a shift in the meaning of both occurs during the events described in "[2]". It is here that Chrysantas, an officer called "exemplary for φρόνησις" at 2.3.5 (cf. φρόνιμος at 694b2)[35] offers counsel in public for the first time in a meeting of both officers and men,[36] to which the Stranger's τὸ μέσον (694b5) refers here. His speech will be followed and overshadowed by the first speech of Pheraulus (2.3.8-15), a commoner whose ability to give counsel validates not only the Stranger's claims about Cyrus's lack of envy and encouragement of free speech, but provides the textual basis for the existence of *internal* freedom, egalitarian friendship, and common rationality in the Persian army.

The problem with this "sunny" account of 2.3 is that the counsel that both Chrysantas and Pheraulus bring εἰς τὸ μέσον – doubtless at the behest and instigation of Cyrus himself, who has already promoted the same views in private (2.2.19-20) that they defend in public – is explicitly opposed to equality (ἰσομοιρία): as victors, the members of Cyrus's army will receive rewards based on merit in manifest contrast to sharing the spoils equally. Cyrus stages the public meeting as an apparently open and equal referendum on inequality, and the speeches of Chrysantas and Pheraulus are the means by which Cyrus persuades the army to grant him the exclusive ability to judge who deserves to be rewarded (2.3.16). As Chrysantas has already pointed out (2.2.19), Cyrus possesses this power as general; putting it to the vote is hazardous. This counsel Cyrus ignores because he wants the commons to freely surrender any claim to the equal distribution of spoils, knowing as he does that this surrender is simultaneously the popularly sanctioned award to himself of determining merit for both officers and men (2.2.21). As long as rewards are assigned on the basis of virtue, all seems well, and it is easy to see why the arrangement appeals to the Stranger, whose ideal will manifest

itself in the Athenian section as voluntary enslavement to the laws. But Plato has opened the door to a "darker" reading of *Cyropaedia* – even before referring to 8.8, as he is just about to do for the first time – by prompting the reader to pay special attention to the textual basis of "[2]," *i.e.*, the way the speeches of Chrysantas and Pheraulus fail to constitute convincing proof that Cyrus encourages freedom and equality because, while being a king, he is nevertheless without envy (οὐ φθονεροῦ τοῦ βασιλέως ὄντος). A reader who returns to *Cyropaedia* under Plato's guidance will already have recognized that the Stranger is praising Cyrus for actions that serve to increase his own power, and which promote "equality" to the extent that officers and men alike are equally inferior to him.

In the immediate sequel, Plato will depict the Stranger returning to *Cyropaedia* in order to discover the "darker" basis of the post-Cyrus decline of Persia, and as already indicated, the result of the Stranger's interpretive μαντεύομαι will be to attribute this decline to Cyrus's failure to grasp what constitutes a correct education (παιδεία) and to his failure to pay attention to housekeeping (οἰκονομία at 694c7). This combination initially shifts the reader's attention from the second book of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* to its seventh: in *Cyropaedia* 7.5, all of the following subjects are introduced for the first time: (1) Cyrus's housekeeping arrangements for his new house in captured Babylon, a description prefaced once again by a speech of Chrysantas (7.5.55-58), (2) the importance of eunuchs in those housekeeping arrangements (7.5.59-65), (3) the role of homebred Persians, hardened by the austere conditions of their native land in that housekeeping scheme (7.5.66-70), and (4) the education of children (7.5.86). The last of these appears at the end of a speech (7.5.72-86) that Cyrus delivers to his army's elite (7.5.70-71); it is the first indication that Cyrus himself may have children; whether he does or doesn't, it is only here that he makes the important claim that "we ourselves will be better since we will want to provide ourselves as the best possible examples [παραδείγματα] to our sons" (7.5.86), and moreover that our sons, "not even if they might want to be, may easily become wicked, neither seeing nor hearing anything base,

and passing their days amongst pursuits both noble and good". Naturally 8.8 will give the lie to this prognostication in particular, but this we can only discover by returning to 7.5, as I am claiming the Stranger's emphasis on οἰκονομία in particular requires us to do.

Nor does Plato expect us to confine ourselves to 7.5, but rather to proceed to book 8 which begins: "Cyrus, on the one hand, therefore spoke in this way; but after him, Chrysantas arose and spoke as follows:" (8.1.1). The Stranger's "sunny" portrait of pre-despotic Persia (694a3-b7and) has already highlighted the importance of an earlier speech of Chrysantas; now another of his speeches has already been indicated, once again offered in direct support of Cyrus's wishes, that will allow Plato to connect the Athenian Stranger's remarkable views about voluntary slavery to the despotic οἰκονομία that prevails after the move to Babylon:

> Just as we deem ourselves worthy to lead those under us, then, so too let us ourselves perform obediently [πειθώμεθα] the things incumbent upon us. To this extent it is necessary to distinguish [ourselves] from slaves in that slaves involuntarily serve their masters, but we, if indeed we deem ourselves to be free, then it is necessary to do willingly what seems to be of greatest worth. And you will discover, he said [sc. Chrysantas], that even where a city is arranged without monarchy, the one that most of all wishes to obey its rulers, that one will least of all be compelled to give way to its enemies. Let us therefore not only be present, as Cyrus commands, at this government center [ἐπὶ τόδε τὸ ἀρχεῖον], but also let us practice those things through which we will most be able to maintain what is necessary, and let us provide ourselves for Cyrus to use however may be necessary.[37]

The reference to being present ἐπὶ τόδε τὸ ἀρχεῖον is particularly important: in the pre-Cyrus Persia, it was where the boys were educated (1.2.3), and it will now become central to Cyrus's housekeeping. Regardless of Chrysantas' plea for voluntary obedience, Cyrus will find it necessary to devise three ways to compel the elite's presence at his court (8.1.17-19), and it is between that plea and the description of those compulsions that

Xenophon makes his most extensive comments about Cyrus's οἰκονομία (8.1.13-16). Thereafter, there are too many important passages in book 8 to count, but mention should be made of Cyrus himself as "a seeing law" (8.1.22), his decision to reward unquestioning obedience to him rather than the greatest virtues and labors of his subordinates (8.1.29), the explicit claim that he is providing himself as a paradigm (8.1.39) – thus personalizing the comments on education at the end of 7.5 – his choice to use luxurious Median artifice to enchant the conquered (8.1.40-42), the endorsement of paternal imagery (8.1.44) first introduced by Chrysantas (8.1.1), and finally the means by which he created rivalries between his followers in order to ensure that they were more devoted to him than they were to each other (8.1.47), a project to which 8.2 as a whole is devoted, and which will obviously have disastrous consequences in the case of his own sons, the existence of whom, however, will not be acknowledged until 8.7.

Commenting on Chrysantas' speech, A.B. Breebaart wrote: "[W]e may notice that the first step to monarchical equipment is the result of open deliberation about the adaptation of Cyrus' principles of leadership to a new context",[38] thus allowing the Plato-guided reader to assimilate 7.5 with 694b1-6. He goes on to make this crucial observation:

> Cyrus favored mutual envy and distrust amongst the peers. The whole procedure must have looked horrifying to Greek thinkers on the state and the κοινωνία of its citizens.[39]

My claim is that it was precisely this kind of horror that first Xenophon and then Plato while alluding to Xenophon are attempting to provoke in their freedom-loving audience. What makes Breetbaart's article so useful[40] is that he palliates and rationalizes the most horrifying aspects of Cyrus's imperial οἰκονομία at the expense of self-contradiction, unapologetically observing that "the court-aristocracy is a community of shared interests" thanks to the steps Cyrus takes to neutralize "the

menace of horizontal ties between the members of the subjected aristocracy":[41]

> In this 'meritocracy' performance and achievement are remunerated [cf. 8.1.29 where it is prompt obedience rather than virtues or labors that are remunerated] by royal favors and gifts; mutual jealousy between the competitors has to be promoted in order to increase their dependence on the monarch.[42]

What makes Breetbaart's article so revealing is that in order to sustain a "sunny" reading of such abhorrent practices, he must abstract entirely and improbably from the concerns of those he calls "Greek thinkers":

> It is perhaps true that Xenophon did not always achieve to smooth down [sic] Persian institutions according to acceptable ways of social intercourse between Greeks. But it is unjustified to envisage the patterns of Cyrus' state with the eyes of Greek thinkers on the best civic constitution.[43]

Why? Are not both Xenophon and Plato themselves "Greek thinkers"? Both are most certainly considering "the best civic constitution" as they reveal the inner workings of "Cyrus' state," and by emphasizing the role of eunuchs in particular, it was Plato's intention to undo whatever "smoothing down" Xenophon's narrator had achieved – thanks to his limpid prose and the Herodotus-negating narrative on which "his" admiration for Cyrus depends – thereby accustoming *our* eyes to see for ourselves how incompatible Cyrus' Persia is with "the best civic constitution".

Since it is "mutual jealousy between the competitors" that will cause the post-Cyrus quarrel between his sons, Breetbaart's astute observations on that subject could easily be assimilated to a "dark" reading, and particularly in the light of the Athenian Stranger's criticisms regarding both παιδεία and οἰκονομία, the late arrival of Cyrus's sons is a remarkable feature of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. The sons of Cyrus appear at the beginning of Cyrus's deathbed speech (8.7.6), where they are named for the first and last

time (8.7.11). Evidence about their education is confined to a defense of primogeniture (8.7.10), and the ineffectiveness of the exhortation to filial amity that follows (8.7.13-24) – to which the discussion of Cyrus's immortality is best understood as an adjunct (beginning at 8.7.17) – promptly becomes manifest at 8.8.2. Since the rise of impious oath-breaking is the first evidence of Persia's degeneration (8.8.2-3), it must be significant that Cyrus emphasizes the impact that a quarrel between his sons would, or rather will, have on public trust (8.8.23). Confined as it is to a single speech, Xenophon has made it easy to "divine" Cyrus' lack of interest in educating his sons. Insofar as their education is otherwise ignored, Xenophon has provided the Stranger with an *argumentum ex silentio*, and insofar as that education is confined to a single speech, Xenophon has long since provided us with Cyrus's own verdict on the ineffectiveness of speeches alone with respect to virtue (3.3.50-54). As the principal evidence regarding Cyrus's attempt to educate his sons, 8.7.6-8.8.3 is the last of three passages relevant to the Stranger's "dark" reading of *Cyropaedia*.

Of these three, it is unquestionably 7.5.55-8.2.28 that offers the most support for such a reading. In her thoughtful and balanced chapter covering 7.5 through 8.7, Deborah Gera begins using expressions like "slightly disturbing," "one wonders," "again leaves us uneasy",[44] before making this perfect observation:

> Each of the less than ideal features of Cyrus' behavior as ruler of an empire, taken by itself, is perhaps no more than slightly disquieting; viewed cumulatively, they are disturbing and require some sort of explanation. The discrepancies and difficulties are too numerous and obtrusive not to have been deliberately included by Xenophon.[45]

It is in the context of things that first appear in 7.5 – the role of eunuchs in Cyrus's housekeeping arrangements (7.5.58-60) stands out – that Plato allows his Stranger to open the door to a "darker" reading. After all, the Stranger could hardly attribute the cause of Persia's post-Cyrus decline to his encouragement of the kind of voluntary slavery that Chrysantas had praised and that – in order

to secure the presence of his most powerful followers at court (8.1.17-20) – Cyrus was well prepared to use force in order to compel. To put it simply, Plato will not select from this rich canvass the most outrageous elements in support of a reading that locates the cause of Persia's subsequent collapse in Cyrus himself.

On the other hand, what the Stranger *does* say serves to implicate those elements. To begin with, the principal purpose of the early mention of παιδεία in the Stranger's discourse περί γε Κύρου (694c5-6) is to leave the reader in no doubt that Plato is referring to Xenophon's Κύρου παιδεία. For reasons already indicated, *Cyropaedia* offers little evidence about the manner in which Cyrus educated his sons, and as a result, the Stranger is obliged to "divine" its nature in order to fill a textual void. But insofar as the question of παιδεία does admit of any textual illumination, 8.7.6-8.8.3 is implicated from the start, especially since the discussion arises from what befell Persia thanks to Cyrus's son Cambyses (694c1). It is therefore the Stranger's critical comment on Cyrus's inadequate attention to οἰκονομία (694c7-8) that is more illuminating, particularly if the reader looks to the evidence in *Cyropaedia* rather than *Oeconomicus* for textual confirmation that Cyrus's household arrangements were responsible for Persia's subsequent decline.[46] Despite the earlier reference to παιδεία with which 7.5 ends, Cyrus's attention to οἰκονομία, whether it is insufficient or otherwise, only becomes thematic once he establishes his residence or οἰκία (7.5.56) in Babylon.[47] This directs the reader's attention will to 7.5, 8.1, and 8.3 in much the same way that the "sunny" portrait of a free, friendly, and rational Persia that precedes it had relied on misreading of 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.

What makes the interplay of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and Plato's *Laws* so interesting, complex, and important is that it is by no means certain that either Magnesia or Cyrus' Persia represent what their authors regard "the best civic constitution". My claim is that neither does so, and as a first step I am showing why it is an error to assume that Plato is *criticizing* Xenophon by locating the subsequent collapse described in 8.8 in Cyrus himself:

> [T]his narrative, which attempts to give Plato the last word over his contemporary, ignores the polemical conclusion of Xenophon's work which supplies the reader with a catalogue of problems following the death of Cyrus and thus seems to assent to the verdict of the *Laws*.[48]

Above all, this narrative begs the question of how Xenophon intends us to read his *Cyropaedia*. In other words, the view that Plato is criticizing Xenophon depends entirely on a "sunny" reading that not only absolves Cyrus of responsibility but must also find in Persia's post-Cyrus decline the culminating proof of his excellent leadership. Plato was the first to undermine this approach, and if we can follow Plato's lead by searching *Cyropaedia* for the evidence to which his Stranger's μαντεύομαι merely points, we will not only be in a position to separate Xenophon from his narrator but to confront the parallel possibility that Plato was not criticizing but rather imitating Xenophon in his *Laws*. Moving beyond his Stranger's μαντεύομαι, Plato directs us to the texts in *Cyropedia* that bear most directly on παιδεία and οἰκονομία.

As already indicated, the Stranger's basis for a "dark" reading is Cyrus's decision to entrust the education of his sons to women and eunuchs but a firmer basis for such a reading can easily be found in Xenophon's text; far more egregious examples can be discovered in 7.5, 8.1, and 8.2. By connecting παιδεία to the eunuchs, the Stranger demonstrates the limitations of his μαντεύομαι in comparison with the texts in Xenophon to which he merely points: even though eunuchs enter the narrative at 7.5.60 and the palace-centered education of children does so at 7.5.86, Xenophon never explicitly connects the two; it is the Stranger who has "divined" their combination. But if Plato is not criticizing Xenophon but rather teaching us to understand his *Cyropaedia* better, then we must consider the possibility that any inadequacies in the Stranger's "divination" are intentional, and thus become, in turn, the basis for distinguishing Plato from *his* character. Thanks to Herodotus, we know that Xenophon's narrator has attempted "to smooth down" the most objectionable aspects of Cyrus' conduct beginning with the fiction that he was coming to Media's

aid rather than setting about to conquer it; only in the almost detachable and sometimes detached epilogue does the appearance of uniform adulation break down. Before 8.8, Cyrus unquestionably appears to be Xenophon's ideal leader, and there is just enough of Sparta and Socrates in his profoundly ahistorical Persia to persuade the uncritical reader that this fantasy constitutes Xenophon's conception of "the best civic constitution". And for much the same reason – despite the unique absence of Socrates in *Laws* – we naturally assume that the Athenian Stranger represents Plato's ideal lawgiver, and are therefore inclined to take his criticisms of Cyrus to be Plato's criticism of Xenophon. But even without the excised *Epinomis*, the Athenian Stranger's comparison of Athens and Persia has, thanks to Herodotus once again, already planted the seeds of doubt in *Laws* 3.

At this point, then, it is necessary to return to *Laws* 3 in order to determine whether we can divine or determine whether it was Plato's purpose to criticize Xenophon or to imitate him through "the education of Cyrus". This question follows immediately from the "sunny" vs. "dark" dilemma, for if a "dark" reading of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* is the appropriate one, this would not only reveal to the reader the gap between Xenophon and Cyrus, but also, by extension, begin to suggest a parallel gap between Plato and the Athenian Stranger. As already indicated, however, too much cannot be expected in relation to this "by extension" because if there really is a parallel "dark" reading of *Laws* to match the "dark" reading of *Cyropaedia*, then Plato is unlikely – if he has learned as much from Xenophon as he is now revealing that he is willing to teach us about him – to give the reader proof of this so close to the beginning of *Laws*. Although in retrospect we can see that there are confirmatory indications that Xenophon has made a "dark" reading of *Cyropaedia* possible from the start, it is only in the context of 8.8 that an interpreter has a reasonable chance of defending such an interpretation, and what makes Plato's response to *Cyropaedia* so significant is that he was the first to recognize the crucial role the last chapter plays in making it possible to discover criticism of Cyrus in Xenophon's

apparently adulatory and straightforward text. But since *Laws* 3 is scarcely the last chapter of Plato's *Laws*, it is hardly to be expected that it will already contain compelling proof that *Laws* as a whole deserves the same kind of "dark" reading to which the Athenian Stranger, however inadequately, will open the door in his criticism of Cyrus's grasp of παιδεία and οἰκονομία. At this stage, in fact, it is only the inadequacy of that criticism that provides any evidence that the Stranger is no more Plato's ideal than Cyrus is Xenophon's.

The Athenian Stranger begins his divination project by emphasizing the role of women in educating Cyrus's sons:

> *Cleinias*: What makes us say this? *Athenian*: Probably he [sc. Cyrus] spent all his life from boyhood in soldiering, and entrusted his children to the women folk to rear up [τρέφειν]; and they were bringing them up [ἔτρεφον from τρέφειν] from earliest childhood as though they had already attained to Heaven's favor and felicity, and were lacking in no celestial gift; and so by treating them as the special favorites of Heaven, and forbidding anyone to oppose them, in anything, and compelling everyone to praise their every word and deed, they reared them up [ἔθρεψαν from τρέφειν] into what they were. *Cleinias*: A fine rearing [τροφή], I should say! *Athenian*: Say rather, a womanish rearing [τροφή understood] by royal women lately grown rich, who, while the men were absent, detained by many dangers and wars, reared up [τρεφουσῶν from τρέφειν] the children. *Cleinias*: That sounds reasonable.[49]

It is fair to say that the Stranger has conjured up this image with no textual basis whatsoever, and the heavy-handed emphasis on τρέφειν and τροφή – at best the most elementary stage of παιδεία – must necessarily shed more light on Plato's *Laws* than on Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. Rather, the Stranger has filled in a textual void regarding Cyrus's concern with the education of his sons by hypothesizing that they had already been born before the culminating capture of Babylon, and that it was his military adventures that caused him to entrust their education to others, with disastrous results. The Stranger continues:

> *Athenian Stranger*: And as for their father, then: even while acquiring flocks and cattle and herds [ἀγέλας] – many of them, both of men and of many other things – yet for those to whom he was intending to pass these things, he ignored their not being educated in the paternal craft, it being the Persian one – for the Persians are shepherds, children of a difficult environment [τραχεία χώρα] – rough and suitable to produce shepherds, extremely strong and able to camp out in the open and to keep watch and, if it should be necessary to campaign, to campaign as a warrior.[50]

This passage brings us closer to Xenophon's text. In discussing Cyrus's own traditional Persian education, Xenophon says nothing about shepherding; the foregoing therefore owes more to Herodotus.[51] But there are many indications that Cyrus's ability to rule over men as effectively as men rule over flocks of animals is of great concern to Xenophon throughout *Cyropaedia* beginning with 1.1.2 (cf. 8.2.14). Moreover, the description of these hardy Persians, schooled in hardship by the τραχεία χώρα in which they were born, recalls Cyrus's bodyguard (cf. διὰ τὴν τῆς χώρας τραχύτητα at 7.5.67) that Xenophon describes immediately after introducing the eunuchs (7.5.59-65), both groups being in turn crucial to the housekeeping institutions Cyrus installs in Babylon. But even here, it is not to Xenophon alone that the Stranger's account directs the reader but once again to Herodotus, where at the very end of the book, Cyrus warns against moving the Persians, born and bred amidst hardships and economic privation, to an opulent environment like Babylon, a city of the plains. In other words, in order to ensure his own personal security, Xenophon's Cyrus transplants some hardy Persians, presumably shepherds, to Babylon in direct opposition to the prognostications of Herodotus' Cyrus, and thus points for the first time to a ruinous mistake regarding οἰκονομία for which Cyrus himself would be responsible. But a more direct connection to *Cyropaedia* appears in what follows:

> *Athenian*: [The consequences of] an education [παιδείαν], the Medic kind – corrupted by so-called happiness – he

> overlooked; thus his own sons, having been educated [παιδευθέντας] by both women and eunuchs, were becoming as a result [more grammatical is: 'from whence they were becoming'] just as they were likely to become, having been reared up [τραφέντας] by a rearing without reproof [τροφῇ ἀνεπιπλήκτῳ].[52]

While continuing the emphasis on τρέφειν and τροφή, this sentence introduces two crucial elements: eunuchs and the Median basis of the education Cyrus's sons received. Quite apart from the role that Median influence plays in Cyrus's own education (1.3-4), his decision to embrace Medic luxury and artifice in captured Babylon (8.40-42) at the very least sets the wrong kind of example for Cyrus's sons. With the eunuchs already introduced earlier in 7.5, it is only at the end of that chapter that Cyrus claims that the youth will be prevented from seeing or hearing anything base or shameful because Cyrus and his officers will be their paradigms (7.5.86). Parading through the streets of Babylon in Median robes while wearing makeup and high heals (8.3.13-14), the antics of Cyrus and his new Persian elite will scarcely guarantee that their sons will spend their days amidst "good and noble pursuits" (7.5.86) as introduced at the beginning of *Cyropaedia*. Although their school is still ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρχείοις (cf. 1.2.3-4), the Persian youth are now being educated in Babylon, not Persia, and even if traditional Persian education as described in 1.2 has nothing to do with shepherding, it was still very much "a school of hard knocks" (1.2.8-13). Once again, the ghost of Herodotus' last story hovers above the Stranger's criticism of Cyrus's housekeeping as well as of the education he gave his sons. By moving his house and thus the royal school from rugged Persia to Babylon, Xenophon's Cyrus subjected them to a loss of virtue that Herodotus' Cyrus had predicted, now enhanced – as Plato's Stranger emphasizes – by Median pampering and the influence of eunuchs whose only loyalty was to Cyrus himself (7.5.59-60).

Having merely divined the cause of Persia's decline, the Stranger concludes his account with a second reference to 8.8:

> *Athenian Stranger*: And therefore [οὖν], with Cyrus dead, and his sons having taken over – full of luxury [τρυφή] and impunity [ἀνεπιπληξία] – first, the one killed the other, chafing at their equality [τὸ ἴσον], and afterwards, made insane both by drink and through a lack of education [ἀπαιδευσία], he lost his rule [ἀρχή] through both the Medes and the then so-called 'eunuch' [only at 695a7 and here], the latter having come to despise the folly of Cambyses. *Cleinias*: That, certainly, is the story, and probably it is near to the truth. (695b2-c2; Bury modified).

With τροφή unmasked as τρυφή,[53] the luxurious and eunuch-centered aspects of Cyrus's οἰκονομία now merge with his neglect of παιδεία, manifest here as an undisciplined ἀπαιδευσία. It is on the basis of this synthesis that the Stranger is entitled to his οὖν, and the story he has been able to divine – by filling out in a plausible manner the gaps in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* – is accepted as probable by Cleinias. Since Cambyses is preferred on the basis of his age, it might be difficult to understand why he chafes at equality (τὸ ἴσον at 695b4-5)[54] unless we recall that Xenophon explains at considerable length the mechanisms by which Cyrus created rivalry between his followers in order to secure their greater loyalty to him (8.2). About these mechanisms, the Stranger has said nothing, for Plato is merely using "him" to point us toward the true state of things, as when, for example, Xenophon forces us to wonder which of his sons was seated on his left and which on his right when they dined together (8.4.3).

In short, Plato has used his Stranger to argue for Cyrus's responsibility not so much on the basis of what Xenophon has written – apart, that is, from 8.8 – but rather on his imaginative reconstruction of things he has not.[55] His Stranger therefore expressly and appropriately makes use of μαντεία (694c2), and more specifically, by suggesting that we should make use of μαντεία while "thinking through [διανοηθέντες]" (694c2-3) the decline of Persia under Cambyses along with something like its restoration under Darius. While marking the connection to Xenophon obvious by his emphasis on παιδεία, Plato's Stranger is not so much validating a "dark" reading of Xenophon's text as opening

the door to one, creating in the process a narrative that fills in areas of silence in a merely speculative manner but does so in a way that repeatedly calls attention to texts that validate such a reading. It is therefore only the reader who reads both texts in tandem who will see how they fit together, and the most remarkable result of this coordinated reading is that the best textual evidence for the "dark" reading of *Cyropaedia* can be found in the texts *between which* his Stranger finds the silences that his "divination" must now fill. And it is a similar kind of literary subtlety – one that forces the reader to read two texts in tandem in order to trace the facts of the one to the silences of the other – that remains in play when the Stranger turns to Darius, and thus once again to Herodotus:

> *Athenian Stranger*: Further, the story tells how the rule [τὴν ἀρχὴν] came back to the Persians through Darius and the Seven. *Cleinias*: It does. *Athenian*: Following the story, let us investigate: for Darius was not a king's son, and not having been brought up with an education thoroughly luxurious [παιδείᾳ τε οὐ διατρυφώσῃ τεθραμμένος], and having come to the rule [τὴν ἀρχὴν] and having seized it as the seventh, he divided it into seven parts, of which some small vestiges remain even to this day; and he thought good to manage it by enacting laws into which he introduced some measure of political equality [ἰσότητα κοινήν τινα εἰσφέρων], and also incorporated in the law regulations about the tribute-money which Cyrus had promised the Persians, providing friendship and community [φιλίαν πορίζων καὶ κοινωνίαν] amongst all classes of the Persians, and won over the people by money and gifts; and because of this, the devotion of his armies won for him as much more land as Cyrus had originally bequeathed.[56]

The striking thing here is the merely apparent disappearance of Xenophon's Cyrus when the Stranger turns to Darius. Cyrus is not a king's son in Herodotus, and thus the alleged parallel between Darius and Cyrus immediately breaks down where Xenophon is concerned. Cyrus is an acknowledged prince from the beginning in Xenophon, and Cyrus's education –

the one he received as opposed to the one he bestowed – is the principal subject of the first book of *Cyropaedia*. A particularly formative part of that education takes place not in austere Persia but in luxurious Media. So when we compare Xenophon's Cyrus with both Darius and Herodotus' Cyrus – and this passage may be said to require us to undertake such a comparison – it becomes unclear whether the Stranger is right to compare Cyrus to Darius as fellow students in the austere school of rugged Persia instead of comparing the education of Xenophon's Cyrus to the one his sons received. Meanwhile, the Stranger's earlier discussion of the kind of equality that Cyrus brought to the Persian army fully justifies his use of nothing more than "a certain kind of ἰσότης" here.[57] But even if the evidence of 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 is sufficient to persuade us that Cyrus himself was committed to instilling a sense of equality, friendship, community among his soldiers, the Stranger's important observation that Cambyses killed his brother because of his discontent with τὸ ἴσον (695b4-5) has made manifest his failure to do so in the case of his own sons. And since the Stranger has emphasized Cyrus's inadequacy with respect to both housekeeping and education, Plato has already found a way to redirect our attention to the mechanisms by which Cyrus later managed to create rivalry, enmity, and unquestioning obedience among his most powerful "friends" (8.2, especially 8.2.27-28), devices that contradict his alleged commitment to ἰσότης, φιλία, and κοινωνία, *i.e.*, the basis of the first parallel between him and Darius.

The second and more important parallel implicates the kind of education they provided for their sons, and it is here – where the Stranger's attention would appear to be directed primarily at Darius – that Plato manages to make his most significant contribution the "dark" reading of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*:

> *Athenian Stranger*: After Darius came Xerxes, and he again was educated with the luxurious and kingly education [τῇ βασιλικῇ καὶ τρυφώσῃ πάλιν παιδευθεὶς παιδείᾳ] of a royal house: 'O Darius' – for it is thus one may rightly address the father – 'how is it that you have ignored the evil of Cyrus [τὸ Κύρου

> κακόν], and have reared up [ἐθρέψω] Xerxes in just the same habits of life in which Cyrus reared Cambyses?' And Xerxes, being the offspring of the same educations [τῶν αὐτῶν παιδειῶν γενόμενος ἔκγονος,], ended by repeating almost exactly the misfortunes of Cambyses. Since then there has hardly ever been a single Persian king who was really, as well as nominally, 'Great.' And, as our argument asserts, the cause of this does not lie in luck, but in the evil life [ὁ κακὸς βίος] which the sons of the excessively rich and tyrants [οἱ τῶν διαφερόντως πλουσίων καὶ τυράννων παῖδες] for the most part live; for never from this upbringing [ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς] can there come to be a boy or man or greybeard of surpassing goodness.[58]

Using the education of Xerxes as a pretext, the Stranger here returns to Cyrus, referring for the third and last time to 8.8 while criticizing Darius for ignoring τὸ Κύρου κακόν. The phrase is a remarkable one, especially in the context of a resolutely "sunny" reading of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, itself an account of ἡ Κύρου παιδεία. Quite apart from the possibility that the παιδεία βασιλική Cyrus *received* was responsible – obviously the parallel between τροφή and τρυφή is still in play, the latter already linked to the Median influence to which Cyrus himself was exposed – "Cyrus's bad" is at the very least the cause of the κακὸς βίος led by his son Cambyses. And by deducing from the cases of Cambyses and Xerxes his conclusion about the evil life led by the sons of rich and *tyrannical* men in general, Plato's Stranger has articulated the most damning thesis of any "dark" reading of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*: that Cyrus was an unusually gifted and effective τύραννος.

As for Plato, the Stranger's account of Cyrus in *Laws* 3 follows some harsh remarks – in the context of Sparta, Messene, and Argos – about "a young soul, having received a command [ἀρχή] from which it was possible to become a tyrant" (692b5-6). For proponents of a "dark" reading of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, this constitutes a succinct summary of Cyrus's career: through a calculated series of carefully described steps, Cyrus converts the initial assignment to lead an expedition in support of Persia's ally Media into a warrant for achieving absolute rule over an extensive

empire. On the basis of *Laws* 3, then, Plato's readers will naturally assume that his Stranger is opposed to tyranny and tyrants; it will not be until *Laws* 4 that they will discover the need to revise that natural assumption. But the signs are already present, for it is by no means certain that the goals of amity, rationality, and especially freedom can only be achieved by the admixture of slavery and despotism, even in the apparently benign form of "being enslaved to the laws". It is only indirectly that Plato asks us to consider how unacceptable "Greek thinkers," as opposed to the advisors of Louis XIV, would find Cyrus's housekeeping arrangements (8.1.14-20); neither will the Stranger criticize Cyrus for using ostentatious religious observance to advance his political ends (8.3) or for presenting himself as "a seeing law" (8.1.22).

But the Stranger's criticism of Cyrus, though incomplete in important ways, is revealing enough:

> *Athenian Stranger*: We find that they [sc. the Persian kings] grew still worse [ἐπὶ ἔτι χείρους αὐτοὺς γεγονότας], the reason being, as we say, that by fully robbing the people of their liberty [τὸ ἐλεύθερον] and introducing despotism [τὸ δεσποτικόν] more than was fit, they destroyed friendliness [τὸ φίλον] and the common bond in the state [τὸ κοινὸν ἐν τῇ πόλει]. And with this having been destroyed, the plan of the rulers [ἡ τῶν ἀρχόντων βουλή] no longer plans on behalf of the ruled [ὑπὲρ ἀρχομένων] and the people, but for the sake of their own rule [ἕνεκα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρχῆς] if in any situation they believe that there will be even a little more for them.[59]

Although Plato makes the presence of the Stranger's legislative triad a bit less obvious in this passage than in many others,[60] he is really helping us to better understand the ideal of rationality. The most resolute modern defender of Cyrus readily admits his utilitarian and consistently self-serving ends,[61] but insists that from Xenophon's perspective, there is absolutely nothing objectionable about that: regardless of our own modern prejudices, the ancients need not blush for equating self-interest with morality.[62] But by explicitly distinguishing acting ὑπὲρ ἀρχομένων as opposed to doing so ἕνεκα τῆς αὐτῶν ἀρχῆς, Plato has once again found a way

to make even his Stranger's muted criticisms lead his readers back not only to a reconsideration of Cyrus's motivations in the general form of asking us to consider ἡ τῶν ἀρχόντων βουλή but to wonder about the Stranger's motives as well.

The Athenian Stranger's notion that there is nothing objectionable about τὸ δεσποτικόν per se, and thus that the error of the Persian kings was that they were merely "introducing it more that was appropriate [ἐπαγαγόντες μᾶλλον τοῦ προσήκοντος]" (697c9) indicates that Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* is not the only ancient text that deserves a similarly "dark" reading. After all, any reader of Herodotus – and of course that is likewise what Plato requires the readers of his *Laws* to be – would naturally assume that a juxtaposition of Persia and Athens, particularly with respect to freedom and despotism, would align freedom with one and despotism with the other. In order to subvert this polarity in the case of democratic Athens, the Stranger will repeatedly invoke the dubious claim that the Athenians who resisted the Persians were enslaved to their laws. With respect to the claims of both Xenophon's narrator and Plato's Stranger, Herodotus functions as a lie detector. As for Cyrus, the most compelling evidence that he had not yet robbed the Persians of their freedom is likewise found in Herodotus: his Cyrus, unlike Xenophon's, *restored their freedom* by liberating them from the Medes. Whatever else *Cyropaedia* may accomplish, it does not prove that Cyrus was primarily motivated by a desire to secure the good of his subjects as *opposed to* or even *as well as* his own.[63] It does, however, contain the eloquent statement of Chrysantas to the effect that Cyrus's Persians were free because unlike slaves, they unhesitatingly obeyed their king voluntarily (8.1.4), making themselves useful to him in any way he saw fit (8.1.5). As to whether anyone who values freedom would be willing to live in the Stranger's Cretan city, each reader of Plato's *Laws* must decide for themselves while passing judgment on themselves as they do so.

If there were no basis in the rest of his writings for the view that Cyrus might well represent Xenophon's paradigm or παράδειγμα of ideal leadership, its last chapter would hardly come

as a shock. With its author's encouragement, we have been reading *Cyropaedia* with the assumption that he is Xenophon's ideal, much as Plato's readers, even in the absence of any trace of an authorial voice, have been encouraged to read *Laws* as if the Athenian Stranger was *his* ideal. What makes the discussion *Cyropaedia* in *Laws* 3 so important is that through his Stranger's μαντεία, Plato was the first to assimilate its shocking conclusion with the rest of the book, and he did so not by taking it as confirmation that without its ideal leader, Persia would prove Cyrus's excellence by promptly falling apart.[64] Instead, he allowed one of his own most enigmatic characters to search for the origins of that collapse in the rest of *Cyropaedia*. It is important to grasp that the assimilation of 8.8 as confirmation of a "sunny" reading of the text as a whole is a recent phenomenon,[65] best understood as a reaction not only to "darker" readings that work backward from it, as Plato's was the first to do, but more importantly to the most radical defense of a "sunny" reading: the claim that 8.8 was written by someone other than Xenophon, and thus should be regarded as inauthentic. Despite their different fates, only the parallel between 8.8 and *Epinomis* would reveal the full extent to which Plato had both received and fully assimilated "the education of Cyrus," and it will only be when we revisit Plato's *Laws* as a whole in the dark light of his *Epinomis* that it will finally become possible to prove what *Laws* 3 only allows us to divine: that the Athenian Stranger is no more Plato's ideal than Cyrus is Xenophon's, and thus that Plato was not criticizing Xenophon but imitating him.

RESUMO

A passagem acerca dos pontos fracos de Ciro, o Grande, que se encontra no livro III de *Leis*, induziu pesquisadores, tanto antigos quanto modernos, a concluirem corretamente que Platão estava respondendo à *Ciropédia* de Xenofonte, mas eles erraram na suposição de que essa resposta fosse crítica. O atual debate acadêmico debruça-se sobre a possibilidade de a *Ciropédia* merecer uma leitura "refulgente", representada por Vivienne Gray, ou se merece uma leitura "mais escura", o que pretende este artigo, alinhado com Platão. O filósofo foi o primeiro leitor que, de maneira demonstrativa, identificou o próprio Ciro e, especificamente, a sua falta de atenção quanto à παιδεία de seus filhos (*Lg.* 694C6-7), como causa do declínio pós-Ciro da Pérsia. Contudo, Ciro precisava *aparentar* que se incorporava ao ideal político de Xenofonte – e isso explica por que o narrador do texto lhe adula – do mesmo modo como o estrangeiro ateniense aparenta ser o porta-voz de Platão. Tomando medidas contra mal-entendidos, os dois autores usam Heródoto para desacreditar a credibilidade dos seus porta-vozes. Uma análise da maneira como eles fazem isso mostra que Platão não exatamente critica, mas, na verdade, imita Xenofonte. Alinhando o estrangeiro ateniense com o Ciro de Xenofonte, este artigo argumenta que ambas as obras, *Ciropédia* e *Leis*, merecem uma leitura "mais escura", criando, dessa maneira, um paralelo elucidativo entre o último capítulo de *Ciropédia* – no qual a Pérsia desaba – e *Epinomis* de Platão.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Platão e Xenofonte; Heródoto; *Leis*; *Ciropédia*; Vivienne Gray; *Epinomis*.

REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS

BREEBAART, A.B. From Victory to Peace: Some Aspects of Cyrus' State in Xenophon's Cyrupaedia. **Mnemosyne**, 36, 1983, p. 117-134.

BURNET, John (ed.). **Platonis Opera**: Five Volumes. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1901-1907.

DANZIG, Gabriel. Did Plato Read Xenophon's Cyropaedia?. In: SCOLNICOV, Samuel; BRISSON, Luc (eds.). Plato's Laws: from Theory into Practice. **Proceedings of the VI Symposium Platonicum Selected Papers**. Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2003. p. 286-296.

———. Review of Vivienne Gray, Xenophon's Mirror or Princes. **Scripta Classica Israelica**, 31, 2012a, p. 196-199.

———. The Best of the Achaemenids: Benevolence, Self-Interest and the 'Ironic' Reading of Cyropaedia. In: HOBDEN, Fiona; TUPLIN, Christopher (eds.). **Xenophon**: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012b. p. 499-539.

DORION, Louis-André. La responsibilité de Cyrus dans le déclin de l'empire perse selon Plato et Xénophon. In: _____. **L'Autre Socrate**: études sur les écrits socratiques de Xénophon. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2013. p. 393-412.

EICHLER, Gustav. **De Cyrupaediae capite extreme**. Grimma: C. Roessler, 1880.

ENGLAND, E.B. (ed.). **The Laws of Plato**. Text edited with introduction, notes, etc. Manchester: University Press, and London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921. 2 vol.

GERA, Deborah Levine. **Xenophon's Cyropaedia**: Style, Genre, and Literary Technique. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

GRAY, Vivienne J. (ed.). **Xenophon**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. (Oxford Readings in Classical Studies).

———. **Xenophon's Mirror of Princes**: Reading the Reflections. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

GRUEN, Erich S. **Rethinking the Other in Antiquity**. Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011.

HIRSCH, Steven W. **The Friendship of the Barbarians**: Xenophon and the Persian Empire. Hanover NH: University Press of New England, 1985.

HUDE, Carolus (ed.). **Herodoti Historiae**. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908. 2 vol.

JOHNSON, David. Review of Vivienne Gray, Xenophon's Mirror or Princes. **Classical Philology**, 108, 2013, p. 82-86.

MARCHANT, E.C. (ed.). **Xenophontis Opera Omnia.** Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1900-1920. 5 vol.

MCCLOSKEY, Benjamin Orion. **Xenophon's Kyrou Amathia**: Deceitful Narrative and the Birth of Tyranny. Ph.D. Dissertation: Ohio State University, 2012.

MILLER, Walter (trans.). **Xenophon, Cyropaedia**. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914. 2 vol.

MUELLER-GOLDINGEN, Christian. **Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Kyrupädie**. Stuttgart; Leipzig: Teubner, 1995.

SCHÖPSDAU, Klaus. Persien und Athen in Platons Nomoi; zu Plat. Leg. III 693d-701e. In: GÖRLER, Woldemar; KOSTER, Severin (eds.). **Pratum Saraviense**: Festschrift für Peter Steinmetz. Stuttgart: Palingenesia, 1990. p. 25-39.

———. **Platon, Nomoi (Gesetze)**: Übersetzung und Kommentar. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck; Ruprecht, 1994. vol. 1.

———. Zum 'Tyrannenexkurs' in Platons Nomoi. In: MUELLER-GOLDINGEN, Christian; SIER, Kurt (eds.) **ΑΗΝΑΙΚΑ**: Festschrift für Carl Werner Müller zum 65. With assistance from Heike Becker. Stuttgart and Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1996. p. 133-150.

STADTER, Philip. Fictional Narrative in the Cyropaedia. In: GRAY, Vivienne J. (ed.). **Xenophon**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. p. 367-400. (Oxford Readings in Classical Studies).

TARÁN, Leonardo. **Academica**: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis. Philadelphia, PA: American Philosophical Society, 1975.

TOO, Yun Lee. Xenophon's Cyropaedia: Disfiguring the Pedagogical State. In: TOO, Yun Lee; LIVINGSTONE, Niall (eds.). **Pedagogy and Power**: Rhetorics of Classical Learning. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 282-302.

WEIL, Raymond. **L'"archeologie' de Platon**. Paris: Klincksieck, 1959.

[1] All citations including letters will be to Plato's *Laws* in BURNET, 1901-1907. References to Xenophon's *Cyropedia* will be based on MARCHANT, 1900-1920. All unattributed translations will be mine.
[2] ENGLAND, 1921, p. 1.394; HIRSCH, 1985, p. 97-100; SCHÖPSDAU, 1994, p. 458; DANZIG, 2003.
[3] See Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights*, 14.3; Athenaeus, *Sophists at Dinner*, 11.505f; and Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*, 3.34.
[4] GRAY, 2011, p. 260-261.
[5] 693c5-8. For ease of discussion, the bracketed forms are in the nominative case even when they appear in oblique cases in the text, and, in the case of adjectives, in the neuter.
[6] On which see DANZIG 2003, p. 292-294.
[7] While considering a form of literary irony practiced by both Xenophon and Plato whereby it is made difficult to decide whether a character or narrator is speaking for the author or voicing views the author knows to be false (cf. *Tht.* 157c4-6), Rainer Guggenberger suggested a parallel with the paradigmatically enigmatic utterances of the oracle, thus illuminating Plato's use of the verb μαντεύομαι in this passage.
[8] JOHNSON, 2013, p. 82.
[9] GRAY, 2010, p. 23.
[10] Idem, 2011, p. 250-251.
[11] Idem, ibidem, p. 251-253.
[12] See GRUEN, 2011, p. 59 n. 34.
[13] DORION, 2013; MUELLER-GOLDINGEN, 1995, p. 262-271.
[14] MILLER, 1914, p. 2.438-39 n. 2.
[15] Idem, ibidem, p. 2.438.
[16] TARÁN, 1975, p. 23.
[17] Idem, ibidem, p. 32.
[18] STADTER, 2010, p. 369.
[19] MCCLOSKEY, 2012.
[20] GRAY, 2011, p. 54.
[21] 701d7-10.
[22] 701e1-8.
[23] SCHÖPSDAU, 1990.
[24] On which see SCHÖPSDAU, 1996.
[25] Anticipated here by the addition of rulers (τοῖς τε ἄρχουσιν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις δουλεῦσαι), an unwillingness to be enslaved *to leaders alone* is castigated at 701b5.
[26] For the importance of πλεονεξία at 8.5.24, see GERA 1993, p. 290.
[27] 683e3-5.
[28] References to Herodotus will be based on HUDE, 1908.
[29] 694a3-5.
[30] MCCLOSKEY 2012, p. 111-115.
[31] GRAY, 2011, p. 147; cf. p. 150.
[32] 694a3-b7. Bury translation modified. The bracketed dividers are mine.
[33] See SCHÖPSDAU, 1994, p. 1.460 on 694a6-7 for the relevance of 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.
[34] See 2.1.9-11; note that the speech that follows, the first speech made by one of Cyrus's officers in support of Cyrus's own proposals, is anonymous (2.1.12-13). Thanks to the earlier reference to "planted" supporters (ἐνετοί at 1.6.19), "darker" readings tend not to view such speeches as proof of Cyrus's support of freedom of speech or his willingness to receive counsel from others, and the fact that the first such speech is attributed simply to "one of them [εἷς δ' αὐτῶν]" (2.1.12) supports this position.
[35] On which see SCHÖPSDAU, 1994, p. 462 on 694b1-5.

[36] He has spoken to a private gathering, likely at Cyrus's behest, at 2.2.17-19. The basis for suspecting Cyrus's agency (see previous note) is the introduction ἰσομοιρεῖν at 2.2.18; for Cyrus's interest in ἰσομοιρία, see 2.2.21. Note ἐμβαλεῖν at 2.2.19 and 2.2.21: although Chrysantas uses the verb first with respect to narrative priority, it is implementing a scheme only explained later.
[37] 8.1.4-5.
[38] BREEBAART, 1983, p. 120.
[39] Idem, ibidem, p. 126.
[40] See DANZIG, "Review of Gray" 199n3.
[41] Breetbaart, 1983, p. 123-24.
[42] Idem, ibidem, p. 125.
[43] Idem, ibidem, p. 126.
[44] GERA, 1993, p. 287, 292, and 294.
[45] Idem, ibidem, p. 296.
[46] Cf. WEIL, 1959, p. 126; cf. SCHÖPSDAU, 1994, p. 464 at "d".
[47] Cyrus's organization of the empire after the conquest of Babylon is usefully described as a διοίκησις – cf. διοικεῖν at 7.5.58 – in BREEBAART, "From Victory to Peace" p. 119, 121, 124, and 129.
[48] TOO, 1998, p. 286.
[49] 694c9-e5. Bury modified.
[50] 694e6-695a5. Bury modified.
[51] See SCHÖPSDAU, 1994, p. 468.
[52] 695a5-b2.
[53] See Idem, ibidem, p. 470 and 472; cf. p. 463 on 694c1-695b2.
[54] Cf. SCHÖPSDAU, 1994-2012, p. 472 on πλεονεξία.
[55] Cf. the astute observation in DANZIG, 2003, p. 294: "He [sc. Plato] criticizes Cyrus for mistakes that, in Xenophon's version, he never made." True enough; but since Danzig is guided throughout by the view that Plato is criticizing Xenophon (292) and doing so in a manner that shows "he is not really taking Xenophon seriously" (294), he fails to acknowledge that it is on the basis of what Xenophon actually *does* say about equality, παιδεία, and οἰκονομία that it becomes possible to make a far more compelling case for Cyrus's responsibility than the one the Stranger makes, while nevertheless confirming "his" thesis. The fact that the most important of those texts are found in 7.5, 8.1, and 8.2 (to say nothing of 8.8) undermines Danzig's suggestion (297) "that Plato did not get very far in his reading."
[56] 695c3-d6. Bury modified.
[57] For the rejection of ἰσομοιρία, see 2.2.18-2.3.16; the alternative is "Cyrus the judge [Κῦρος ὁ κρινῶν]" at 2.3.12; cf. 2.3.16.
[58] 695d6-696a3. Bury modified.
[59] 697c6-d4.
[60] In unconscious contradiction of the Stranger's legislative triad (693c7-8), Breebaart, 1983, p. 130 n. 44 identifies "compulsion [cf. ἐλευθερία], self-interest [φιλία], and rational organization [φρόνησις]" as "the foundations" of Cyrus's regime.
[61] DANZIG, 2012b.
[62] DANZIG, 2012a, p. 199; cf. DANZIG, 2012b, p. 538.
[63] MCCLOSKEY, 2012, p. 29.
[64] GRAY, 2011, p. 23.
[65] EICHLER, 1880.