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Vaso grego de figuras vermelhas (hídria). Séc. IV a.C. Cerâmica. Procedente de um ateliê sul-itálico. Grupo AV Libation Painter. A cena representa o mito de Pandora, no momento em que ela, por curiosidade, abre a caixa e liberta todos os males que afligem a humanidade; apenas consegue reter a esperança, que é o único consolo que resta ao homem. Acervo: Museu Arqueológico de Barcelona. Foto: Rainer Guggenberger

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Plato’s Reception of Xenophon

William Henry Furness Altman

ABSTRACT

Beginning with Platonic dialogues presently considered to be inauthentic like *Alcibiades Major* and *Theages* (including the still embattled *Hippias Major*), proceeding through middle period masterpieces like *Symposium*, *Meno*, and *Republic*, and ending with late dialogues like *Statesman* and *Laws* – which famously and directly attacks “the education of Cyrus” – this article’s purpose is to disrupt the modern prejudice that Plato wrote before Xenophon in every instance in which their writings may be seen to overlap, as well as the ancient prejudice that the two Socratics whose writings survive intact were rivals.

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KEYWORDS

Plato; Xenophon; Pseudo-Plato; *Theages*; *Clitophon*; Aulus Gellius.

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Apart from the certainty-disrupting fact that the Athenian Stranger criticizes "Cyrus's education" in *Laws* 3 (*Lg*. 694c6-7),[1] the modern prejudice that Plato wrote before Xenophon in every instance in which their writings may be seen to overlap is strong; this article's purpose is to disrupt that prejudice. The ancient counterpart of the modern prejudice of "Plato's Priority" is that Xenophon and Plato were rivals, and thus, e.g., that Plato was criticizing Xenophon in *Laws*.[2] So strong was this prejudice in antiquity that the overlap between Meno's obituary in *Anabasis* and the character depicted in Plato's *Meno* became explicable only by the equally erroneous claims that either a later Xenophon was correcting Plato's prior portrait in a negative direction (Ammianus Marcellinus in his "Life of Thucydides") or that a later Plato was doing the same thing to the earlier Xenophon's (Athenaeus).[3] While a modern scholar may well smile that it occurred to neither Ammianus nor Athenaeus that "Meno the Thessalian" is the same scoundrel in both texts, the notion that the latter is closer to the truth – that Plato wrote *Meno* with *Anabasis* 2.6 in hand and further that he expects his readers to find Xenophon's scoundrel behind *his* Meno's studied but specious sincerity – runs against a virtually unquestioned modern assumption,[4] and thanks to the passage about Skillus (*An*. 5.3.7-8), the composition of *Meno* can be made to predate the composition of a unitary *Anabasis*. My purpose, then, is to disrupt equally both the modern and the ancient prejudices, and although the overlap between the two greatest Socratics is best understood on the basis of mutual influence, I will focus attention here on the more controversial subject of "Plato's reception of Xenophon".

The proper place to begin disrupting the modern prejudice is with the Platonic dialogues that moderns no longer believe were written by Plato himself; here at least it has remained possible to suggest that "the author" or *der Verfasser* of the Platonic *dubia* depended on the writings of Xenophon. Before turning to the consideration of the canonical dialogues, then, the first part of this paper will consider the relationship between [Plato] and Xenophon, beginning with the pair of dialogues named *Alcibiades*. Since the publication of Nicholas Denyer's commentary in 2001, assertions of Plato's authorship of *Alcibiades Major* have been more frequent, and it is revealing that one of Denyer's first lemmas lists a dozen parallels between it and the dialogues between Socrates and Euthydemus in *Memorabilia* 4.[5] These parallels do not figure in Denyer's evident sympathy for an authentically Platonic *Alcibiades*, but he is clearly open to the possibility that the dialogue is both genuine and that it was written with Xenophon in mind.[6]

But it was not always thus. When Heinrich Arbs drew attention to many of the Xenophontic parallels in *Alcibiades Major* almost a century earlier in 1906, his purpose was to prove that Plato could not have written it:

> I believe I have collected all the passages in Xenophon that were models for the author. What can be concluded? First it can now be concluded with even more certainly that Plato was not that author. Not only was Plato too great to be forced to imitate another so obviously but Xenophon – whom the best authors of that age never mention – in no case would he have imitated. Therefore, since the author of *Alcibiades Major* reproduced Xenophon, it is for that reason manifest that he was not a great author.[7]

As for *Second Alcibiades*, Athenaeus cited the views of some that Xenophon was actually its author (Athenaeus 11.114), and thanks to the anonymously sourced "Spartan Prayer" in that dialogue (*Alc.2* 148b5-c5), it is easy to see that whoever wrote it presupposed his reader's familiarity with Xenophon's *Memorabilia* if the wise and unnamed creator of that prayer is to be identified as (Xenophon's) Socrates himself, as Harold Tarrant has recently suggested.[8] These passages and many others illustrate a principal but overlooked advantage of inauthenticity claims where Plato and Xenophon are concerned: at least with respect to [Plato], it remains possible to maintain Xenophon's literary priority and influence. Although it would be too much to say that the *Alcibiades* dialogues came to be regarded as inauthentic *because* their author was familiar with or inspired by Xenophon, that inspiration and familiarity will begin to suggest – at least to those who have grown uncomfortable with the methods and results of nineteenth-century German philology – that the question of Plato's reception of Xenophon is not as out of place as it might first have appeared, especially since Friedrich Schleiermacher, Plato's most important German translator,[9] was a pioneer in the twin projects of marginalizing Xenophon as both intellect and source,[10] and in purging the Platonic canon of some of its most ostentatiously Xenophon-echoing dialogues.[11]

Next consider the more interesting relationship between Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* and *Theages*, generally ascribed not to Plato but [Plato]. Theages' father Demodocus, like Ischomachus in *Oeconomicus*, is a well-rounded Athenian "gentleman" or καλὸς κἀγαθος (*Thg*. 127a3; cf. *Oec*. 6.14-17). He is also a farmer, and in soliciting Socrates for advice about educating his son, he promptly turns to an agricultural metaphor: "planting" Theages was easy enough (*Thg*. 121c3-4) – the first sexual joke in the dialogue – but nurturing his growth is difficult and fear inducing (*Thg*. 121c4-7). But in the speech introducing this metaphor (*Thg*. 121b1-122b1), he first refers to preparing the earth (ἡ γῆ) in which farmers like him will then plant, a subject of limited applicability to Theages but one to which, as we shall see, Ischomachus will devote considerable attention:

> *Demodocus*: Let us proceed, then. Socrates, all growing things [τὰ φυτά] likely take the same turn, both those growing from the earth and also animals, both the other kinds and man. For also in the things that grow, what happens to be the easiest thing for us who work the land [ὅσοι τὴν γῆν γεωργοῦμεν] is the preparation of all the things before the planting and the planting itself.[12]

Although Ischomachus will also discuss planting (*Oec*. 17.2-17.10) – the fact that he does so is particularly germane to Lovers (cf. *Am*. 134e4-8) – he first discusses preparing the earth for planting (*Oec*. 16.10-17.1), and the passage in which he does so (especially 16.11-12) creates an important connection to *Meno*. For the present, however, the important point is to establish that Demodocus – who has merely referred, and for no good reason, to a subject about which Ischomachus has spoken at length[13] – is modeled on Xenophon's gentleman farmer, and that Plato has already indicated this in the second speech of Demodocus: the conversation between them takes place in the portico of Zeus the Liberator (*Thg*. 121a6-7), the same location Xenophon had chosen for the dialogue between Socrates and Ischomachus (*Oec*. 7.1).[14]

Finally, since he has connected the third speech of Demodocus to Xenophon's Ischomachus by means of agriculture in general and the preparation of fields in particular, and since he has accomplished the same result in the second by means of the portico of Zeus, the author of *Theages* has also contrived the dialogue's opening words with Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* in mind:

> *Demodocus*: O Socrates, I am in need of some private conversation with you if you've free time [σχολή]. And even if your lack of free time [ἀσχολία] is not something very pressing, nevertheless, for my sake, make free time [σχολήν]. *Socrates*: But I happen to be free [σχολάζων] not only otherwise, indeed, but also for your sake, and very much so.[15]

The justification for this peculiar overuse of the word σχολή and its derivatives can be found in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (Socrates is speaking):

> So, happening one day to see him sitting in the cloister of the temple of Zeus Eleutherius apparently at leisure [σχολάζειν], I approached, and sitting down at his side, said: 'Why sitting still, Ischomachus? You are not much in the habit of doing nothing [σχολάζειν]; for generally when I see you in the market-place you are either busy or at least not wholly idle [οὐ πάνυ σχολάζοντα].'[16]

It is difficult to see how *der Verfasser* of *Theages* could have made his debt to Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* any more obvious, and since Plato outlived his fellow Socratic by at least eight years, the dodge that it could just as easily be Xenophon who is copying *Theages* – the knee-jerk response to all such parallels among the canonical dialogues – can only tend to prove that its writer was likely to have been Plato, for *Theages* would then need to have been written during his lifetime.

The principal difference between Ischomachus and Demodocus is that they stand in opposite relation to Socrates; this explains why it is Socrates who has σχολή in one dialogue, Ischomachus in the other. To begin with, a father is seeking advice from Socrates about the education of his son in *Theages* whereas in *Oeconomicus*, Socrates is describing the education in farming and gentlemanliness he himself received from Ischomachus. But when we consider *why* Xenophon's Socrates is describing this education to someone else, it becomes obvious that like *Theages*, Xenophon's dialogue is equally concerned with Socrates educating a son at the behest of the boy's father, for Socrates' only interlocutor in *Oeconomicus* is Critobulus,[17] the son of his friend Crito. Considering how large a role Critobulus plays in Xenophon's Socratic writings[18] – only Euthydemus in *Memorabilia* 4 can compare,[19] and the echoes of dialogues with "him" in *Alcibiades Major* have already been noted – Plato's references to Critobulus deserve mention: in *Euthydemus*, Crito shares with Socrates his worries about the young man's education much as Demodocus does in *Theages* (*Euthd*. 306d4-307a2), he is present to offer support of in *Apology of Socrates* (*Ap*. 133d9), and finally is present for Socrates' death in *Phaedo* (*Phd*. 59b7).[20] It turns out that the fact that Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* is a dialogue between Socrates and Critobulus is its most easily forgotten feature.

The greatest difference between Demodocus and Ischomachus is that only one of them is real: for all we know, the latter is nothing more than one of Socrates' characters, introduced into a dialogue with Critobulus for a pedagogical purpose, *i.e.*, to teach *him* agriculture and gentlemanliness. In other words, Ischomachus has more in common with Diotima than he does with Demodocus, and although my present concern is the influence of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* on some inauthentic dialogues, there is at least one Platonic dialogue that seems to have influenced it: Plato's *Symposium*. In order to educate Agathon, Socrates describes a conversation in which *he* was the neophyte (*Smp*. 201d1-e7); Xenophon's Socrates does the exact same thing through Ischomachus in *Oeconomicus*, and given the dialogue's concern with τὰ φυτά, "neophyte" is the right word. As a result, when Socrates says to Critobulus (whom the typical reader has by this point completely forgotten): "Concerning the ploughed field [ἡ νεός] you see, o Socrates, that the same things seem so to both of us" (*Oec*. 17.1), we are already being told one joke – for "both of us" are Socrates[21] – even before the gentleman's merely apparent interlocutor, but in fact his creator,[22] confirms this to be the case.

Xenophon has long played a significant role in discussions of the Platonic *Clitophon* but albeit not because of this curious dialogue's connections with *Oeconomicus*. It is in *Memorabilia* that Xenophon must be said to have responded to Clitophon's charge (*Clt*. 410e3-8; cf. 408b5-410a6) that while Socrates was peerless in offering protreptic orations to his auditors that effectively exhorted them to the practice of virtue, he was incapable of leading them to it (*Mem*. 1.4.1) or of explaining to them *the thing to do* next (ἔργον at 410a6; cf. 408d5, 409b5, 409b6, 409c1, 409d5, and 409e8). Here I have used the conventional tense – *i.e.*, Xenophon "responded" – to express without endorsing the possibility that he wrote *Memorabilia* 1.4 after [Plato] had already written *Clitophon*, a view that in fact depends on the reification of a large number of chronological speculations into alleged facts.[23] As indicated at the start, it is not impossible to argue, precisely on the basis of [Plato], that the *Verfasser* of *Clitophon* had Xenophon in mind; it is only against Xenophon's priority to *Plato* that an apparently invincible prejudice has arisen. In any case, my plan is to call attention to parallels between *Oeconomicus* and *Clitophon* that suggests the former's influence on the latter, regardless of who wrote it and when.

A consideration of the way the character Ischomachus functions in the dialogue will begin to indicate the scope of those parallels. Socrates introduces "him" only after offering Critobulus an exhortation in praise of agriculture and the farmer's life (5.1-17), climaxing with a conceit that will reappear in William Jennings Bryan's "Cross of Gold" speech.[24] Easily recognizable as a protreptic oration,[25] this eloquent "hymn"[26] is prefaced by an account of the kings of Persia designed to ennoble agricultural activity in the eyes of Critobulus (4.4-25) and then followed by a statement of the young man's concern about the unforeseeable vicissitudes to which the farmer's life is subject (5.18). Deftly exploiting this concern by linking agriculture and war as equally unpredictable and thus as equally dependent on service to the gods (5.19), Socrates summarizes the previous arguments (6.1-5) and then conjures up a brilliant image – flagged as crucial by his false claim to be repeating what he has already said (6.6) – of the patriotic spirit that farmers, as opposed to city-dwellers, would show in wartime (6.6-7); they alone would vote to ἀρήγειν (LSJ: "aid, succor") their city. After making the fateful claim that that "this kind of work [ἡ ἐργασία] seems to be the easiest to learn and the most pleasant to accomplish [ἐργάζεσθαι]" (6.9), Socrates concludes: "And on account of these things, this way of life also is of best repute with respect to cities in that it also seems to produce the best citizens and those most well-disposed to the commonwealth [τῷ κοινῷ]" (6.10). Understood as the third and final part of a protreptic oration, this conclusion provokes the following response:

> And then Critobulus: 'Of the fact that the most beautiful, best, and most pleasant life is produced by agriculture [ἀπὸ γεωργίας] I very much consider myself to be sufficiently persuaded. But you told me that you have discovered the reasons why some farmers are so successful that husbandry yields them all they need in abundance, and others are so inefficient that they find farming unprofitable. I should like to hear the reasons in each case, in order that we may do what is good and avoid what is harmful'.[27]

It is this response that causes Socrates to introduce Ischomachus (6.12-7.1): he will use a successful farmer and gentleman to give Critobulus what he wants, *i.e.*, the causes of success. There is therefore already a structural parallel with *Clitophon* even though Critobulus has not specifically asked – albeit having already been persuaded of agriculture's benefits – what it is now necessary for him to do. As already indicated, the key word in Clitophon's complaint is ἔργον: he wants Socrates to tell him what it is necessary for him to do (πρακτέον at *Clt*. 408e1) next. Although there are already indications that it is toward a similar request that Socrates has been leading Critobulus – hence the use of ἡ ἐργασία and ἐργάζεσθαι (*Oec*. 6.9) – it will not be the youth who makes Clitophon's demand in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, for once Socrates introduces Ischomachus, Critobulus will speak no more. Instead, it will be Socrates who makes the demand, thereby building on the reversal already implicit in *Theages*: just as it was Socrates who had free time in the one while Ischomachus had it in *Oeconomicus*, so too it will not be Clitophon but Socrates himself who poses "Clitophon's question" to Ischomachus.

With respect to the important word ἔργον, he comes close to doing so when he reports himself to have said to Ischomachus:

> 'But now your own deeds [τὰ δ᾽ αὖ σὰ ἔργα],' said I, 'yet tell me them, so that you can enjoy explaining those things for which you are esteemed, and so that I, having heard a complete account of a gentleman's deeds [τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ κἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔργα] and learning them [καταμαθῶν], if I'm able, will acknowledge to you my gratitude'.[28]

Although we must never forget the joke at the center of *Oeconomicus* – it is really Socrates who is teaching Critobulus τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ κἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔργα – the conversation with Ischomachus thus allows Socrates to express his willingness not only to learn but also to imitate those ἔργα, now specifically linked to virtue:

> 'Assume, therefore, that it is possible for me to be a good man, and give me a complete account of your occupations [τὰ σὰ ἔργα], that, so far as I am able through hearing to learn [καταμαθεῖν], I may endeavor to follow [μιμεῖσθαι] your example from tomorrow morning; for that's a good day for entering on a course of virtue [ἀρετῆς].'[29]

Because so few have understood the real joke in *Oeconomicus*, it has become possible to imagine that the reason the next words in the dialogue are "You're joking, Socrates" (*Oec*. 11.7) is that Socrates is not really serious in being interested in precisely those things he is in the midst of discussing, and which ἔργα he is in fact using Ischomachus to teach Critobulus.

But despite the preparation in the eleventh chapter of *Oeconomicus*, it is only in chapter 15 that Socrates's persistent questioning prompts Ischomachus to ask: "Is it the art of agriculture [τῆς γεωργίας] itself that you are telling me now to teach?" (15.2), thus allowing Socrates to anticipate Clitophon's demand: "teach me the works themselves of agriculture [δίδασκέ με αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα τῆς γεωργίας]" (15.9). Socrates connects that demand to the protreptic phase that has prefaced and prompted it – exactly as if he had not himself already offered Critobulus a protreptic oration *in propria persona* that he is now merely continuing through the fictional agency of Ischomachus – at the end of the chapter:

> 'An excellent preamble [προοίμιον],' I cried, 'and not of a sort to damp the hearer's curiosity. Come, describe it to me, all the more because it [sc. ἡ γεωργία] is so simple to learn. For it is no disgrace to you to teach elementary lessons, but far more a disgrace to me not to understand them, especially if they are really useful'.[30]

It is therefore in the technical discussion that follows, first of preparing the fields (chapter 16), then of sowing them with seed (chapter 17), and finally of tending the growing crops (chapters 18 and 19) – the triad anticipated in *Theages* – that Ischomachus fulfills Socrates' request, and he will do so by reminding him of how much he has forgotten that he already knows. Chapters 16-19 of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* therefore stand in the place of what is missing in *Clitophon*.

The parallels between *Oeconomicus* and both *Theages* and *Clitophon* are structural; in the case of the Platonic Lovers,[31] the connections are at once more numerous and arguably less thematic. Philosophy is the theme of Lovers whereas the word "philosopher" appears only once in Xenophon's dialogue, when Socrates explains the fact that he will "gladly learn [ἡδέως μανθάνειν]"[32] on the grounds that doing so "is especially [characteristic] of a wisdom loving [φιλοσόφου] man" (16.9). Since the musician's first definition of τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν (*Am*. 133c1) hearkens back to Solon's apothegm "I grow old always being taught [διδασκόμενος] many things" (*Am*. 133c6), it is easy for Socrates to get him – the more promising of the dialogue's pair of rival lovers (*Am*. 132d2-6) – to confirm that φιλοσοφία is πολυμαθία (*Am*. 133c10-d1), *i.e.*, much learning. If there is a structural connection between the two dialogues, then, it involves the constant interplay of teaching and learning in *Oeconomicus*, and it is worth mentioning that in addition to using Ischomachus to teach Critobulus, Socrates depicts "him" educating his wife (*Oec*. 7.4-10.13), his overseer (12.4-15.1), and of course Socrates himself throughout, while Ischomachus, in turn, explains how he was himself taught by the Phoenician steward (8.11-17, especially 8.15-16) – indeed he uses a story about him to teach his wife the same way that Socrates is using the story of Ischomachus to teach Critobulus – his father (20.22-29), and agriculture itself (19.18). Quite apart from the fact that *Meno* will turn on the question of whether virtue is teachable (διδακτόν at *Men*. 70a1), the discussion of πολυμαθία in Lovers should probably be recognized as thematically connected to all the teaching and learning that occurs in *Oeconomicus*.

There are more specific connections as well. The questions that lead the musician to exclude the illiberal or handicraft arts from the purview of a philosophical πολυμαθία (*Am*. 135b1-7) points to a distinction likewise found in Xenophon's dialogue (*Oec*. 4.1-3). Other connections include: the three references in Lovers to οἰκονομική and the οἰκονόμος (*Am*. 138c2-10), the philosopher who does not know how "to manage well [εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι]" his own οἰκία or household at the end of Lovers (*Am*. 138e4-7) in contrast to Ischomachus,[33] the presence in both dialogues of a kingly rule, practiced equally by an actual king (βασιλεύς) *and* the overseer of an οἰκία (cf. *Oec*. 21.10 and *Am*. 138c7-10), the absence of any distinction between "a kingly art [βασιλικὴ τέχνη]" as practiced by a βασιλεύς and its tyrannical counterpart (τυραννική) in Lovers (*Am*. 138c7-10) as opposed to the sharp contrast between those who secure willing obedience – whether as king, general, or overseer of an οἰκία (21.2-11) – and the tyrant who rules the unwilling with which *Oeconomicus* convincingly ends,[34] and finally the probable origin of the most thought-provoking passage in Lovers, to which it is now appropriate to turn.

Thanks to his skillful and measured use of the musician's athletic rival (*Am*. 134a3-b2),[35] Socrates has reduced the devotee of μουσική to a blushing silence (*Am*. 134b3-4); he next prepares for the metaphor of planting seeds – thus establishing the connection to *Oec*. 16.9-17.11[36] – by asking first who knows the beneficially "measured" quantity when it comes to the body (*Am*. 134e1-3) and then concerning the sowing of actual crops (περὶ σπερμάτων σπορᾶς at 133e4-5). This leads to a third and most important question, the one that stumps all three interlocutors, but must not stump Plato's readers:

> *Socrates*: 'And whom should we be justified in asking as to the moderate degree and kind, in regard to the sowing and planting [σπορά τε καὶ φύτευσις] of studies [μαθήματα] in the soul [prepared at 134d4-9]?' At this point we all [cf. τρεῖς ὄντες at 134e3] began to be full of perplexity [ἀπορίας μεστοί]; then I, playing with them [προσπαίζων αὐτούς], asked: 'Do you mind, since we are in perplexity [ἐν ἀπορίᾳ], if we ask these boys here [ταυτὶ τὰ μειράκια]?[37]

The reader will note that nobody other than Socrates actually speaks in this passage: all three of us (τρεῖς ὄντες), he says, were ἀπορίας μεστοί. But it is only "the rival lovers" who are really ἐν ἀπορίᾳ; we must not be. Socrates tells us – his *external* audience – that he was *playing* with his internal audience (*i.e.*, προσπαίζων αὐτούς), and by suggesting that they consult ταυτὶ τὰ μειράκια, Plato breaks the frame, for it is only "these boys here" who can identify the one who really knows how to cast seeds when those seeds are τὰ μαθήματα. And the connection to *Oeconomicus* extends to the basic dramatic structure of Lovers: Socrates sows more "seeds" in the stronger interlocutor than he does in the weaker one (*Oec*. 17.8-11).

And it is in the light of the hidden but nevertheless recognizably Socratic or Platonic "sower of μαθήματα" in Lovers that it is necessary to return briefly to *Theages*. Before testing Theages' determination to consort with him by emphasizing the absolute but unpredictable power of his Sign (*Thg*. 128d1-130e10), Socrates must first prepare the field, as it were, for planting. Theages desires to become wise, and when the wisdom he seeks becomes manifest as the wisdom needed to rule men, Socrates suggests that the boy desires to become a tyrant (*Thg*. 124e4-125a8); this forces the young man to deny such an aspiration (*Thg*. 125e5-126a6) and to declare that he seeks to rule "not by force, indeed, nor like the tyrants, but over the willing" (*Thg*. 126a7-8). This, of course, is the distinction toward which *Oeconomicus* as a whole will build (*Oec*. 21.12), and it is Critobulus' initial attraction to Persian kings (*Oec*. 4.4-5) that Socrates will exploit in order to redirect the youngster's attention to the less grandiose but equally royal alternative of ruling his own household well (*Oec*. 21.10-11). In the same way, Socrates leads Theages from a grandiose conception of absolute power (*Thg*. 125e8-126a4) to a more distinctively Athenian species of rule, the same kind that Ischomachus embodies (*Oec*. 11). Finally, it is worth pointing out that Theages asks Socrates: "are you not also one of the gentlemen [τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν]" (*Thg*. 126a8-9), a suggestion that provides the capstone to a structure that connects Demodocus to Ischomachus (as gentlemen farmers), Theages to Critobulus (as youths to be educated), and Socrates to Demodocus (as those who can prepare, plant, and tend).

By way of creating a transition between [Plato] and Plato, consider next the *Hippias Major*. Although this ingenious dialogue is currently regarded as authentic by the majority of Plato scholars, its authenticity has long been debated, and was vigorously denied by Charles H. Kahn.[38] Kahn's contempt for the value of Xenophon's testimony is absolute and he considers him an inept copyist.[39] As a result, when Kahn devoted an appendix in his *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue* to "On Xenophon's use of Platonic texts,"[40] it was unnecessary for him to discuss *Memorabilia* 3.8 – he does discuss two texts from 3.9 – because the parallel text in Plato is in *Hippias Major*. Although Kahn's reasons for rejecting the authenticity of *Hippias Major* did not include the reliance of its author on Xenophon, he can use it to prove "Xenophon's use of Platonic texts," bruiting the possibility that its author "is borrowing from Xenophon" in a note.[41] Here's the relevant text in *Hippias Major*:

> *Socrates*: But now once more see if this is in your opinion the beautiful: I say, then, that it is – but [ἀλλὰ γάρ] consider, paying close attention to me, that I may not talk nonsense – for I say, then, whatever is useful shall be for us beautiful. But I said it with this reason for my thought; beautiful eyes, we say, are not such as seem to be so, which are unable to see, but those which are able and useful for seeing. Is that right? *Hippias*: Yes. *Socrates*: Then, too, in the same way we say that the whole body is beautiful, part of it for running [πρὸς δρόμον], part for wrestling [πρὸς πάλην]; and again all the animals, a beautiful horse or cock or quail and all utensils and land vehicles, and on the sea freight-ships and ships of war; and all instruments in music and in the other arts, and, if you like, customs and laws also – pretty well all these we call beautiful in the same way looking at each of them – how it is formed by nature, how it is wrought, how it has been enacted – the useful [τὸ χρήσιμον] we call beautiful, and beautiful in the way in which it is useful, and for the purpose [πρὸς ὃ χρήσιμον] for which it is useful, and at the time when it is useful; and that which is in all these aspects useless we say is ugly. Now is not this your opinion also, Hippias?[42]

Rather than turning promptly to the parallel use of πρὸς δρόμον and πρὸς πάλην in *Memorabilia* 3.8, there are three larger and contextualizing issues that need to be considered first: (1) Plato's Socrates is going to reject the identification of καλόν and χρήσιμον a few moments later (*Hp. Ma*. 296d2-3) while Xenophon's Socrates implies it in 3.8 and states it in 4.6, (2) Plato's Socrates, through Diotima, is more broadly going to reject any relative or πρός τι conception of αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν in *Symposium* (211a3-4), and (3) Plato's Socrates use of ἀλλὰ γάρ at the beginning of this passage constitutes the single most important reason for the late Ernst Heitsch's recent decision to prove that *Hippias Major* is inauthentic.[43]

Heitsch's objection to ἀλλὰ γάρ is that it is nothing more than "strongly adversative," *i.e.*, that the γάρ, which should tell us "for what reason" Hippias should pay careful attention, has become meaningless.[44] But if Plato is responding to Xenophon's Socrates, and rejects "his" identification of the καλόν and χρήσιμον in *Memorabilia* 3.8 and 4.6, and indeed regards any attempt to explain τὸ καλόν in terms of πρός τι as wrong-headed, then he *has* provided the allegedly missing γάρ: "for I *will* be talking nonsense". With respect to the relationship between *Hippias Major* and *Symposium*, it is especially unfortunate that Kahn, the discoverer of Plato's use of "proleptic" composition,[45] should have rejected the latter in particular: thanks to the introduction of αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν (286d8) it both anticipates and presupposes the conceptions Socrates will use Diotima to introduce. The primary reason that *Hippias Major* has fallen under suspicion is that a by no means metaphysically "innocent" conception of the middle-period forms seems to be already present in what seems formally to be an "early" dialogue,[46] and a close second is the claim that the crudely comic and juvenile expedient of Socrates' abusive "double" is unworthy of Plato. We can dispose of both objections by linking *Hippias Major* to *Symposium* by a Kahn-style prolepsis, for the Double does to Socrates in the one what Diotima does to him in the other, and both for the sake, ultimately, of αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν.

If Kahn had been forced to address the relationship between *Memorabilia* 3.8 and a genuine *Hippias Major*, he would have needed to show that Xenophon was following and/or copying Plato, and thus was either misunderstanding the historical Socrates or rejecting Plato in having his Socrates uphold the identity of καλόν and χρήσιμον. And it is obvious that textual parallels like the following can always be explained in either of two ways:

> 'For what is good [ἀγαθόν] for hunger is often bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; what is beautiful for running [πρὸς δρόμον] is often ugly for wrestling [πρὸς πάλην], and what is beautiful for wrestling [πρὸς πάλην] ugly for running [πρὸς δρόμον]. For all things are good and beautiful [καλόν] in relation to those purposes [πρὸς ἅ] for which they are well adapted, bad and ugly in relation to those [πρὸς ἅ] for which they are ill adapted.'[47]

In other words, one could plausibly claim that there is no better reason to imagine that Plato has borrowed πρὸς δρόμον and πρὸς πάλην from Xenophon than that it is Xenophon who has done the borrowing. But in fact there is a better reason: Plato's Socrates asserts the identity of καλόν and χρήσιμον then attacks it; Xenophon's Socrates first applies πρὸς δρόμον and πρὸς πάλην to καλόν (3.8.4), next equates καλόν and ἀγαθόν (3.8.5), and then follows up with the quoted passage (3.8.7). In other words, Plato's Socrates reverses Xenophon's, and that indicates that he is responding to "him". The fact that Xenophon's Socrates generalized from running and wrestling to the doubled πρὸς ἅ confirms the point, for nothing could be more inconsistent with the Diotima discourse than this ruthless relativizing of τὸ καλόν.

To make the contrast with "middle-period Platonism" even more pronounced and obvious, it is necessary to recall that Memorabilia 3.8 does not begin with discussion of what is καλόν but rather of what is ἀγαθόν. As a result, when Xenophon's Socrates says: "If you are asking me if I know anything good [τι ἀγαθόν] which is nobody's good [μηδενός ἀγαθόν], neither do I know nor do I need to do so" (3.8.3), the gap between him and the Socrates who introduces the Idea of the Good in Plato's Republic becomes an apparently unbridgeable chasm. It is therefore possible that it was the ruthless relativism of Xenophon's Socrates in Memorabilia 3.8 (and 4.6) that sparked Plato to go beyond "him," and perhaps even the historical Socrates, by making τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ καλόν the de-relativized pillars of his "doctrine of ideas". What gives me pause are the obviously dialectical contexts of both 3.8 and 4.6, the two places where Xenophon's Socrates implies or states that what is καλόν is χρήσιμον. But perhaps I should add: does so seriously. In Xenophon's Symposium 5, τὸ καλόν is defined "in relation to the functions on account of which we would acquire each of them". On this basis, Socrates claims to be more beautiful than Critobulus on the basis of his bulging eyes, thick lips, etc. This functional defense of beauty naturally falls flat, and Socrates loses the beauty contest. The question is: did he expect to win it, or was he not only "in on the joke," but the joker. A similar problem arises in 3.8. The discussion of τὸ ἀγαθόν and τὸ καλόν arises from an attempt by Aristippus to trap Socrates; it is precisely the relativized versions of both that allow Socrates to escape the trap. In other words, if Socrates had specified some across-the-board and in-all-circumstances "beautiful," it would have been Aristippus who could have been able to play the relativism card. But consider the context:

> When Aristippus attempted to cross-examine Socrates in the same fashion as he had been cross-examined by him in their

> previous encounter, Socrates, wishing to benefit his companions, was not replying like those guarding themselves [οἱ φυλαττόμενοι] lest somehow their account may be undone.[48]

The claim that Socrates did not respond guardedly simply does not ring true. Even if Xenophon had not denied it, one might have thought that Socrates *was* responding guardedly; the fact that he feels it necessary to deny it rather confirms than resolves such doubts.

Naturally it is not on the basis of the Platonic *dubia* that a meaningful case for Plato's reception of Xenophon depends, and since both wrote an *Apology of Socrates* and a *Symposium*, this seemed to confirm the ancient prejudice that the two were rivals. But none of our ancient sources indicate which member of the two paired sets was written first, and despite some resistance with respect to Plato's Priority in both cases,[49] it remains – in accordance with the modern prejudice – the consensus position today. Here I will focus attention on the relationship between the two *Symposia*,[50] beginning with the observation that every sensitive reader of Plato's must realize that Socrates' claims about comedy and tragedy in the wee hours of the morning (Plat. *Smp*. 223c2-d6) is the key to the interpretation of this brilliant dialogue, and that Plato himself is the poet who reveals himself to have mastered both comic and tragic poetry, the proof of that dual mastery being *Symposium* itself.[51] Unlike Plato's, Xenophon's *Symposium* is explicitly comic from beginning to end: his narrator narrates the victory party Callias gave for his beloved in order to show Socrates at play (Xen. *Smp*. 1.1), and since the party ends with a sexually titillating pantomime (Xen. *Smp*. 9.2-6) that puts most everyone in the mood to have sex (Xen. *Smp*. 9.7), Xenophon gives us the classic comic ending. By replacing a soon to be sexually consummated pantomime about Ariadne and Dionysus with the equally comic story of Alcibiades' failure to consummate a sexual relationship with Socrates (Plat. *Smp*. 218b8-219d2), Plato went beyond Xenophon while standing on his shoulders. By staging his *Symposium* only a few years after Xenophon's, and thus by displacing the hopeful days that followed the Peace of Nicias in 421 with the impending disaster of 415 arising inevitably from Alcibiades' ambition to conquer Sicily, Plato added tragedy to his masterpiece while at the same time preserving the comic structure he inherited from Xenophon.

> While obviously calling into question the modern dogma of Plato's Priority, the foregoing also indicates the basis for rejecting the ancient dogma of Literary Rivalry, suggesting instead that Plato unblushingly built on Xenophon's foundations.[52] Since Plato's *Symposium* is widely and appropriately recognized as one of the crown-jewels of literary art whether ancient or modern, it is far more charitable to Xenophon without in any way being disrespectful to Plato to claim that the latter built on the foundation that the former had provided him. Given the well-documented evidence of Plato's debts to the epic, lyric, tragic, and comic poets, as well as to a writer of mimes, rhetoricians, sophists, and historians, it has clearly done his reputation no harm that he can be seen once again standing on the shoulders of giants beginning with Homer. To tax Xenophon with failing to recognize Plato's literary excellence by writing his *Symposium* after reading his predecessor's, and producing in its place a careless imitation (see below) of an unsurpassable masterpiece is as uncharitable as it is unlikely, especially since he showed himself more than willing to confess himself the mere continuator of Thucydides as he did in *Hellenica*.[53] To be sure Xenophon is not as great a writer as Plato is, but then again, who is? The more we consider the possibility that Plato could not have achieved the acme of literary art without the help Xenophon provided for him, the more we will come to realize that Plato's reception of Xenophon is as crucial for understanding the literary art of the one as it is for recognizing the preeminent and indispensable excellence of the other.

Current thinking on the relationship between Plato's Symposium and Xenophon's is, of course, dominated by the modern prejudice of Plato's Priority, and the results of this domination are devastating for Xenophon without in any way enhancing our appreciation for Plato. In addition to an imitator's poor taste, Xenophon also presently stands convicted of being a careless copyist, attributing to Pausanias what

Plato attributes to Phaedrus (cf. Plat. Smp. 178e3-179a2 and Xen. Smp. 8.32-34). In Xenophon's Symposium, only Socrates delivers a speech on ἔρως, the sole topic of all the speeches in Plato's – including those of Phaedrus and Pausanias – until the comic disruption caused by the arrival of Alcibiades. In that speech, Xenophon's Socrates is only prepared to bless the relationship between his host Callias and the recently crowned youth Autolycus on the grounds that their relationship will not be sexual but will rather have as its laudatory goal the youngster's acquisition of virtue (Xen. Smp. 8.11). In the course of rejecting sexualized pederasty, Xenophon's Socrates invokes a distinction between two aspects of Aphrodite (Xen. Smp. 8.9-18), while associating Pausanias with the sexualized form of ἔρως, which he rejects with contempt (Xen. Smp. 8.32). It is here that Xenophon's Socrates attributes to Pausanias the view that an army in which every soldier is either the lover or the beloved of another soldier, would be unbeatable. Since it is Phaedrus and not Pausanias who cites this army of lovers in Plato's Symposium, and since Plato wrote first – as we presently all seem to think that we know – Xenophon shows himself to be Plato's probably tasteless, but in any case, careless imitator.

What this interpretive model fails to explain is why it should be the speech of Plato's Pausanias that Xenophon took as his model while composing the speech of Socrates.[54] Despite the fact that the two speeches are diametrically opposed on the basic question – Plato's Pausanias endorses sexualized pederasty even under the worst conditions – there are equally obvious similarities, for here it is Pausanias who invokes the two different aspects of Aphrodite (Plat. Smp. 180d3-181c6) and uses the acquisition of virtue to justify the version of boy-love ἔρως he is defending (Plat. Smp. 184b6-e4). The priority of Xenophon's Symposium makes better sense of what Plato is doing here: by allowing his Pausanias to borrow two persuasive elements in the speech of Xenophon's Socrates – education in virtue and the heavenly Aphrodite – while employing them in defense of the same position that Xenophon's Socrates had rejected while attacking Pausanias by name, Plato created a highly deceptive speech against what we still call "Platonic Love" despite the fact that, thanks to Xenophon, it is more proper to recognize such asexual love as "Socratic". So important is deception to Plato's Pausanias that he defends the boy's decision to sexually gratify his lover even if that lover's claim to teach the boy virtue is fraudulent (Plat. Smp. 185a5-c3). Although Pausanias defends sexualized pederasty in both Symposia, Plato's Pausanias is far more deceptive, not only because he explicitly defends the lover's use of deception – note καλὴ ἡ ἀπάτη at 185b1 – but because what allows his own speech on ἔρως to be an exemplar of deception is that it imitates the speech of Xenophon's Socrates while arguing for a position that speech opposed diametrically, and does so, moreover, in a brilliant dialogue that has immortalized the opposing and Socratic conception of "Platonic Love".

It is because Xenophon has already depicted Pausanias as an intemperate defender of sexualized pederasty that Plato can present him as dangerously deceptive as well, *i.e.*, not as better or more benign, but as worse and all the more dangerous precisely because he appears to be better or even "Socratic". But Pausanias is only one of three characters that the hypothesis of Xenophon's literary priority enables us to better understand and appreciate Plato's artistry in just this way. In the description of the Thirty Tyrants in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, Plato's relative Critias is revealed to be a consummate villain. It is therefore natural to assume that the suave and articulate Critias we meet as Alcibiades' companion in *Protagoras*, as Charmides' guardian in *Charmides*, and as Timaeus' host in *Timaeus* and *Critias*, is more benign than Xenophon's. Since unmasking this appearance as parallel to the case of Pausanias would require the consideration of four dialogues, it is regrettably more economical to turn instead to the third and indeed paradigmatic case: the portraits of Meno the Thessalian in Xenophon's *Ana-*

basis and Plato's *Meno*. As already mentioned, while our ancient sources divide on which portrait was painted first, an uncritical acceptance of the ancient prejudice led both Ammianus and Athenaeus to believe that Plato's portrait was sympathetic to Meno while Xenophon's was the opposite, and true it certainly is that Xenophon's Meno, like his Critias, is a consummate villain.

My claim is that we cannot fully understand Plato's *Meno* without the awareness that his Meno is an even more deceptive and dangerous version of Xenophon's precisely because those who have read *Anabasis* 2.6 know that he merely appears to be a sincere seeker of the truth about virtue. The crucial point is that Xenophon's statement that Meno deemed himself to be worthy of admiration and attention by "demonstrating most of all that he was both able and willing to commit injustice [ἐπιδεικνύμενος ὅτι *πλεῖστα δύναιτο καὶ ἐθέλοι ἄν ἀδικειν*]" (Xen. *An*. 2.6.27; translation and emphasis mine) places his acceptance of the Socratic Paradox that no man does wrong willingly in the proper light: Plato's Socrates gains Meno's assent only to the proposition that Meno would never willingly do wrong *to himself*. Since Xenophon has already painted Meno's character in the darkest colors (*An*. 2.6.21-29), Plato can afford to allow "him" to present himself from the start (*Men*. 70a1-4) as the sincere seeker of virtue that we already know he is not. Just as Plato's Meno is more deceptive than Xenophon's – who made his base motives evident (δῆλος) and his desire to be unjust explicit[55] – so too is his Pausanias, who apes the language of Xenophon's Socrates in order to achieve an explicitly antithetical end. Instead of joining Marcellinus and Athenaeus in regarding Meno's character as a point of emulous rivalry between the two Socratics, then, it makes better sense to find in Xenophon's prior revelations the unacknowledged root of Plato's amazing ability to create deceptive characters, and make those whose aims were anything but Socratic appear likeable. Plato does this repeatedly, and not always, of course, with Xenophon's help: many scholars have found Plato's Gorgias and Protagoras in their eponymous dialogues to be far more sympathetic than we might expect from an enemy of the sophists. But there are other examples of the same phenomenon that do implicate Plato's reception of Xenophon, with Critias and Charmides foremost among them. Although Plato scarcely depended on Xenophon for information about these famous members of his own family, he had good reason to believe that readers of the future *would* depend on Xenophon for this information, and particularly in the case of Critias – whom Thucydides never mentions – it is not difficult to see that the guardian of Charmides in Plato's *Charmides* is the same man whom the youngster will follow into the orbit of the Thirty in Xenophon's *Hellenica* (*Hell*. 2.4.19) or who Socrates insulted and outsmarted in *Memorabilia* (*Mem*. 1.2.29-38). In short, it is thanks to Xenophon that Plato can make the wicked even wickeder, and thus their deceitfulness even more deceptive, and as we will see in due course, Plato will repay the debt in *Laws* after expressing his gratitude in *Meno*.

But before all that, the phrase "readers of the future" in the previous paragraph raises the most basic of all questions regarding Plato's reception of Xenophon, and that is: was Plato writing for a distant futurity that extended into eternity – as both Thucydides and Xenophon tell us that they were (Thuc. 1.22.4 and *Cyn*. 13.7) – or was he writing only for his contemporaries, a class that however seemingly realistic, is, like the knowledge we presume "them" to have had, and its lost sources, the stuff of pure speculation. Leaving aside our ignorance of whether Plato's dialogues were published or indeed what contemporary "publication" meant, there is the fact that both Thucydides and Xenophon repeatedly provide us with the information we need to know in order to understand a wide variety of ancient phenomena foundational to Plato's dialogues including but by no means limited to the career of Alcibiades, the beginning and end of the Peloponnesian War, the Battle of Arginusae, Meno's character, and the King's Peace of 387. By referring to the latter in Plato's *Menexenus* (*Mx*. 245b2-e6), Socrates (d. 399) becomes guilty of a gross anachronism; so much is universally acknowledged. But how do we know that this is the case? The irrefragable answer is that *we* know thanks to Xenophon's *Hellenica*; the trick, then, is for those who do not acknowledge Plato's reliance on his reader's familiarity with Xenophon to show that "Plato's intended readers" – and that means those ineffable contemporaries once again – had other sources of information of which we know nothing about this and all the other things that Aspasia sees fit to distort in her Funeral Oration. If Plato was just as determined to create "a possession for eternity" as Thucydides was, then he needed Xenophon's writings to survive along with those of the great historian that the latter was happy to continue. Having chosen a genre that did not allow him to make the same claim on eternity that Xenophon and Thucydides did, Plato allowed the consummate care with which he wrote and the perennial value of the things he had written to speak for themselves as to whether he too regarded his writings as "a possession into eternity".

As an example of the purely historical aspect of Plato's reception of Xenophon, consider the following passage from his *Apology of Socrates*:

> My Antiochian tribe happened to be presiding over you when you decided to judge in a group the ten generals – they who had not picked up those from the naval battle [ἡ ναυμαχία] – illegally, as at a later time it seemed to all of you. At that time [τότε] I alone among the presidents opposed you, and voted in opposition to do nothing against the laws.[56]

Thanks to Xenophon, there was no need for Plato to mention "Arginusae," for into eternity every reader would know that this is what ἡ ναυμαχία really means here. But the even more important word in this passage is τότε. Unlike Xenophon, who narrates his own personal opinions and explains his own indirect access to the speech in his *Apology of Socrates*, Plato makes you believe that you are there, actually hearing it, which of course Xenophon tells explicitly that he was not. In a broader sense, the operative τότε for the reader is the putative "then" of Socrates' speech itself: we are looking back to an ancient past, made vivid by Plato's artistry, and imagining how things were *then*. But when this imagined Socrates himself uses the word τότε, he too is recalling a scene from the past, and he too will make a bygone "then" seem vivid, and indeed just as *present* as Plato is presently in the process of making Socrates "himself". It is this use of τότε that causes us to entirely forget the broader sense of that word as just described: we take Socrates to be real because he is so believably talking about what happened way back *then*, at the time of Arginusae. On a literary level, it is deceptive: by describing a past event vividly, a fictional character – himself merely a past event – becomes more real, for just as he is making real what happened to him τότε, so also do we accept uncritically the concealed τότε of the speech itself. But the deception can only work effectively if there is already a vividly described τότε for Plato's Socrates to describe, and thanks to Xenophon, there is. Picking up Thucydides' self-consciously and explicitly immortal narrative shortly before the Battle of Arginusae, Xenophon has preserved the τότε to which Plato's Socrates now refers.[57]

Even in a purely historical example, then, Xenophon allowed Plato to be deceptive, and not only because *Hellenica* allows us to recognize *Menexenus* as deliberately anachronistic. Deception is the common factor, for here again – as in the case of Meno, Critias, and Pausanias – it was Xenophon who allowed Plato himself to be recognized as deceptive. It seems almost as senseless to imagine that Plato was not responding to Thucydides' Funeral Oration of Pericles in *Menexenus* as it is to deny that there are numerous passages in his dialogues that depend on his readers' prior familiarity with Xenophon's writings. After all, Xenophon is the first philosopher whose writings survive complete while Plato is his nearly contemporaneous runner-up in attaining this remarkable distinction.

If we ask, "how did Xenophon attain this surprising priority?" we might consider looking to the Academy's library for the answer, since Plato's dialogues repeatedly depend on information Xenophon's writings contain. And it is, of course, not only a question of deception: consider here the dialogue between Socrates and Plato's brother Glaucon in *Memorabilia* 3.6. Quite apart from the fact that it is Xenophon who informs us that Glaucon *was* Plato's brother, we must ask: "Was it the purpose of Xenophon's Socrates to wean Plato's brother from whatever had attracted him to a political career,[58] or was he indicating the kinds of questions Glaucon would need to be able to answer if he were to pursue such a career in a manner creditable to himself and his family, and serviceable to Athens?" And if we can still find a way to think beyond the Straussian reception of the two great Socratics – which is presently tending to combine the modern prejudice for Plato's Priority with the ancient prejudice for Literary Rivalry[59] – the second alternative hews far closer to what happens in Plato's *Republic* than the first, especially since the philosopher's return to the Cave of political life is enshrined in that great dialogue's most important and telling image.

But as befits a dialogue named after a character immortalized for wickedness by Xenophon, it is Plato's *Meno* that illustrates the full scope of his reception of Xenophon. All four of its characters reveal Plato to be paying his respects to Xenophon in general and to his *Oeconomicus* in particular. Consider first the way Plato's Socrates re-enacts Xenophon's Ischomachus, "himself" the avatar of Plato's Diotima. It is remarkable that so many more readers have recognized Diotima as a by no means necessarily historical or even actual person whom Socrates is merely using to educate Agathon and the rest of us than have done the same with Ischomachus, imagining *with no more basis* that Xenophon's Socrates is describing an actual encounter rather than educating Critobulus and the rest of us by allowing Socrates to present himself as the one being schooled. To begin with, then, there can be no question of a one-way reception: Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* is just as dependent on Plato's *Symposium* as I am claiming the latter is on Xenophon's. Having borrowed from Plato – and perhaps from Socrates himself – a didactic pseudo-interlocutor to help him teach others through the fiction that he himself was once taught, Xenophon created in the imaginary dialogue between Socrates and Ischomachus the pattern Plato would use to pay playful homage to his predecessor in *Meno*, a playfulness that becomes more palpable in the original Greek since it is now knowledge of γεωμετρία (geometry) rather than farming (γεωργία) that is being recollected through questioning, a process that comically aligns the slave-boy in *Meno* with Socrates "himself" in his "dialogue" with Ischomachus. Meanwhile, Xenophon has already added comic touches of his own as when Ischomachus tells Socrates three times that agriculture is so simple to learn that he will soon be able to teach it to others (*Oec*. 15.10, 18.9, and 20.24), the very thing Socrates, through Ischomachus, is presently doing.

Oeconomicus is not the only work of Xenophon to which Plato has connected his *Meno*, and it is also in the aggregation of less obvious connections to Xenophon's other writings that Plato prepares us appreciate the extent of his debts to the son of Gryllus. Consider first the curiously opaque comparison Socrates makes between the self-made father of Anytus and Ismenias the Theban at *Meno* 90a1-5: "*Socrates*: Anytus, in the first place, is the son of a wise and wealthy father, Anthemion, who became rich not by a fluke or a gift – like that man the other day, Ismenias the Theban, who has come into the fortune of a Polycrates [τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα] – but as the product of his own skill and industry". Along with Anytus himself (*Hell*. 2.3.42 and 44), Ismenias of Thebes enters the historical record in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, where we are told that he was bribed by the Persians to stir up a war between Thebes and Sparta in 395 (*Hell*. 3.5.1). But since Socrates died in 399 and Meno could only have been in Athens before 401, there is an obvious anachronism. One thing is certain: thanks to *Meno* 90a1-5, any scholar who tries either to explain τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα or to fix the date of Plato's dialogue will need to cite *Hellenica* 3.5.1 and 5.2.25.[60] And in addition to his presence in *Hellenica* 2, it is Anytus – and not Meletus, as in Plato's *Apology* – who is attacked in Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates* (*Ap*. 29-31), where he reports Socrates' prophetic remarks about his son (*Ap*. 30). Xenophon does not tell us the name of this besotted youngster, but since Plato tells us the name of Anytus' father (*Men*. 90a2) – he is the only source who does so – the suggestion is that whatever χρήματα Anytus inherited from one Anthemius (his father) would be misspent by another. This bears directly on the argument about the sons of prominent Athenians between Anytus and Socrates in *Meno* (*Men*. 92e3-95a1), and since Xenophon tells us what Plato does not – *i.e.*, that Anytus failed to give a proper education to his son and who came to a bad end as a result – anyone who has read Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates* before reading *Meno* will not only more clearly recognize the hollowness of Anytus' views on education (*Men*. 92e3-93a4) but will also laugh when Plato's Socrates tells Meno that Anytus does not yet know what slander really is (*Men*. 95a4-6), for it is Xenophon's Socrates who will teach him.

Thanks to a variety of factors, *Meno* has proved to be an important if not entirely unproblematic text for those students and critics of Gregory Vlastos whose goal is to reconstruct "the philosophy of Socrates" on the basis of Plato's so-called "Socratic dialogues".[61] These factors include prominently the discussion of a unitary virtue, the claim that Virtue is Knowledge, and the conversion of Meno to the Socratic Paradox that nobody wants bad things. Plato's reception of Xenophon has no bearing on the fact that the dialogue does not simply uphold "the Unity of Virtue" nor establishes "Virtue is Knowledge" as much more than a corrigible hypothesis, but Xenophon's Meno unquestionably helps us to understand why it takes so much time for Socrates to persuade Plato's Meno that he does not do wrong voluntarily (*Men*. 77b6-d4), and can only persuade him that he doesn't because Meno agrees he would never willingly harm *himself* (*Men*. 77e5-78b2). Throughout this paper, it has been difficult to establish exactly where parallel passages and literary echoes cross over into the domain of a philosophically significant reception, but the hollowness of Meno's "conversion," and his obvious willingness to assert his ready willingness to do bad things to others and harm them crosses that line. Having already encountered Meno the Thessalian in *Anabasis*, the reader recognizes the moral bankruptcy of the Socratic Paradox in this purely self-interested form, and that recognition is philosophically significant. In conclusion, then Plato's *Meno*, thanks to all of its four characters, should be recognized as his homage to a fellow Socratic, a veritable *tombeau de Xénophon*.

And then there are the great political dialogues of "the late Plato". In describing the basis for the alleged rivalry between Plato and Xenophon, Aulus Gellius uniquely preserves the following information: that Xenophon, "with almost the first two of its books having been read [*lectis ex eo duobus fere libris*]," wrote his *Cyropaedia* in response to Plato's *Republic* (*Noctes Atticae*, 14.3). Although this information obviously implicates "Xenophon's Reception of Plato," it will ultimately improve our understanding of "Plato's Reception of Xenophon". To begin with, Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* is increasingly recognized as a particularly enigmatic example of the art of writing: the sunny portrait of Cyrus the Great has tempted readers, particularly in ages where monarchy was dominant and democracy only to be found in books, to find in him Xenophon's ideal ruler, the exemplary image of the perfect prince.[62] But a re-examination of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* in the light of the information preserved by Aulus Gellius allows us to see this enigmatic text in a new and darker light.[63] Never more so than today is the interpretation of *Cyropaedia* contested,[64] and that in itself is a good thing given that the promotion of dialogue was central to Socratic pedagogy both during Socrates' lifetime and after his death. Presently the reception of *Cyropaedia* is contested by the rivalry between "sunny" readings that find in Cyrus Xenophon's ideal, and "dark" readings that trace the origins of Persia's decline after Cyrus's death to Cyrus himself, and not, as "sunny" readings would have it, to his absence.[65] There are three passages in "almost the first two books" of Plato's *Republic* that help us to resolve this interpretive dilemma.[66]

Plato begins Socrates' discussion of the education of the guardians more than halfway through *Republic* 2, and the problem that motivates this discussion is that the city's soldiers must be at once fierce to their enemies and gentle to their friends (*R*. 375b10-13). The principal historical inaccuracy in Xenophon's portrait of Cyrus is that he does not present the Persian conquest of Media as Cyrus' military victory over an open enemy – as Herodotus had done – but as his strategic out-maneuvering of a friend.[67] In the first dialogue with his father, the young Cyrus reveals a keen interest in how to take advantage of friends as well as enemies (*Cyr*. 1.6.30), and thus the education of the guardians that begins in *Republic* 2 is germane to and indeed prophylactic against the practices of Xenophon's Cyrus, who successfully takes advantage of both friends and foes throughout the *Cyropaedia*. Near the end of that text, Cyrus compares himself to a shepherd, and by that point, Xenophon has become open enough about his alleged hero that Cyrus admits that he dispenses to his subjects what he calls "the happiness of sheep" (*Cyr*. 8.2.14).[68] Thrasymachus, of course, invokes this ruler-shepherd analogy in *Republic* 1 in a most unappealing light – at least as far as the good of the sheep is concerned (*R*. 343b1-c1) – but it appears in *Cyropaedia* from the start (*Cyr*. 1.1.1-2), and its later appearance suggests that the secret of ruling human beings is treating them as animals. But by far and away the most important way in which Xenophon responds in his *Cyropaedia* to "almost the first two books" of Plato's *Republic* arises from Glaucon's creation of two statues at the beginning of book 2 (*R*. 361d4-6, summarizing 360d8-361d3). These are, of course, the perfectly just man who appears to be perfectly unjust – and I take it that by "him" Plato expected us to recognize the way Cave-dwellers would perceive Socrates (*R*. 517a4-6), he who "went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon" (*R*. 327a1) – and the perfectly unjust man who nevertheless appears to be perfectly just (*R*. 361a2-b1).

Does this archly deceptive villain ever make an appearance in Plato's *Republic*? The ring-based ability of Gyges to do something similar is at once superficial, mythic, and artificial; Thrasymachus may speak well in defense of the self-serving shepherd, but Socratic dialectic elicits from him a famous blush. As for the tyrannical man of *Republic* 9, his tormented soul is scarcely an attractive object of a reader's desire, and offers the reader no temptation to tyranny. But in the absence of an attractive tyrant, or rather of an unjust man who nevertheless appears to be better than he actually is, are we meaningfully rising to the challenge created by Glaucon's two statues? On the basis of Aulus Gellius, I am suggesting that Xenophon did not think so. Despite the fact that a voluntary return to the Cave requires the transcendence of self-interest, Plato had made the choice for justice too easy, and Xenophon wrote his *Cyropaedia* to fill the gap created by Glaucon's speech in *Republic* 2. The hypothesis that Xenophon's Cyrus is the perfectly unjust man who nevertheless appears to be perfectly just explains why the interpretive dilemma posed by the *Cyropaedia* is intrinsic to the text's Socratic purpose: a "sunny" reading honors the fact that Xenophon created in Cyrus a character who indeed appears to be perfectly just, while "dark" readings divine the truth, but without as yet being able to account for the countervailing evidence on which "sunny" readings rely. Rather than a one-sided solution, both a "sunny" and a "dark" reading of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* are equally necessary if we are to honor the fact that, inspired by Plato, Xenophon intended to create and succeeded in creating *Glaucon's second statue*. For naïve proponents of a "sunny" reading, the last book's last chapter, describing the decay of Persia, comes as exactly the kind of shock that Xenophon clearly intended it to be; it is only the re-reader, whose first reading of the text was "sunny" but who now returns to the text knowing from the start how the story will end – and does so in search for the ample but easy-to-miss evidence of Cyrus' responsibility for that decay – who will learn the true lesson of Xenophon's "education of Cyrus".

To return at last to the beginning, all three of our ancient sources for the rivalry between Xenophon and Socrates mention the same example of what makes the modern prejudice regarding Plato's priority so perfectly inaccurate and inadequate: the fact that Plato criticizes "the education of Cyrus" by name in *Laws* 3 (*Lg*. 694c6-7). This criticism would indeed be a more than adequate proof of the ancient prejudice if we could be sure that the Athenian Stranger represented Plato's ideal and that Cyrus the Great represented Xenophon's. But despite the fact that both of these identifications appear to be certain, neither of them is so. With respect to Xenophon, the relationship between his *Cyropaedia* and "almost the first two books" of Plato's *Republic* suggests that Cyrus only *appears* to represent his creator's ideal, and that we can only realize the benefit of "the education Xenophon" by resisting a temptation that must appear to be irresistible if it is to replicate the illuminating but jarring effects of an in-person Socratic ἔλεγχος. In this light, even if Plato and not his Stranger were criticizing "the education of Cyrus," that would not prove that either was criticizing Xenophon but only that they were rejecting a "sunny reading" of the *Cyropaedia*. In fact, the Athenian Stranger explicitly holds Cyrus responsible – through the education he provided for his sons and the house-keeping arrangements that influence their upbringing (*Lg*. 694c5-8) – for the decay described in *Cyropedia* 8.8 (see *Lg*. 695d6-696a3, note especially τὸ Κύρου κακόν at 695d8). Thanks to his criticism of Cyrus, Plato is in fact the first reader of Xenophon's *Cyropedia* – and the last for many centuries – who gave the text a "dark" reading,[69] and if such a reading or re-reading is the proper one, then Plato is honoring Xenophon by having his Athenian Stranger criticize Cyrus. And this is only the beginning. If the Athenian Stranger likewise only appears to be Plato's ideal, Plato was not only honoring Xenophon in his *Laws* but imitating him.[70]

Nor is the Athenian Stranger the only one of Plato's "strangers" who indicates the nature of his reception of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. When the Eleatic Stranger imagines a ruler who will be as superior as a king-bee is to the bees in the rest of the hive (*Plt*. 301d8-e4), he is endorsing an image applied to Cyrus by Artabazus in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* (*Cyr*. 5.1.24-26).[71] This suggests that Plato was not only responding to Xenophon in his *Laws* but also in his *Statesman*, and that the core of this response was the creation of characters who only appear to embody their creator's views but who in fact endorse practices that are antithetical to them. Since this kind of claim opens up a huge and controversial interpretive vista and space is limited, I will confine myself to an observation about an easily overlooked but important difference between Plato's *Laws* and Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. In a notorious passage in his Loeb Library translation of the latter, Walter Miller attached the following note to 8.7, the passage that immediately precedes the jarring "decay of Persia" passage in 8.8: "the reader is recommended to close the book at this point and read no further".[72] What Miller failed to achieve in the case of Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, the tradition has succeeded in doing in the parallel case of *Laws*: by collective assent, we have deleted *its jarring coda* by purging Plato's *Epinomis* from the canon of his authentic works. It is perfectly true that what the Athenian Stranger says and does in *Epinomis* cannot be squared with what the tradition is prepared to recognize as legitimately Platonic,[73] but this scarcely proves that Plato didn't write it, for once again Xenophon had not only made it possible for Plato to create characters who are all the worse for appearing to be better – as he did in the paradigmatic case of Meno the Thessalian, Critias, and Pausanias – but had now, through his Cyrus, inspired him to create new characters who would be so.

But the last word must belong to Aulus Gellius, whose sane and balanced approach rejected both the ancient prejudice of Literary Rivalry and the modern dogma of Plato's Priority, and who captured the essence of a more cooperative model in the following passage:

> For when a certain kind of great inborn ability [ingenia] for the study of the same thing arises in two or more famous men of either equal or nearly equal reputation [aut pari sunt fama, aut proxima], strife [contentio] likewise arises among their various devotees [fautores] about the extent of their industry and fame. Afterwards, then, the contagion of competition spreads from this external competition to these men themselves, and the race of those pursuing the same finish-line of virtue [cursus eorum ad eamdem virtutis calcem pergentium], when the result is close or doubtful, descends into suspicions of rivalry not by their own, but rather by the zeal of their supporters [faventes].[74]

At first glance it might seem incongruous to claim that both Xenophon and Plato were racing toward the same finish-line if they weren't rivals. The solution to this incongruity can be found in the image of *a relay race*, where the Socratic torch (cf. *R*. 328a3-4) was passed back-and-forth between the two greatest Socratics. The fact that the son of Gryllus ran the first leg (note πρῶτος at Diog. Laert. 2.48) is the basis for the possibility of "Plato's reception of Xenophon," while the relay race itself captures the cooperative character of their shared determination to keep the ironic Socrates alive into eternity.[75] Together, they illustrate the truth of what Xenophon wrote in *Memorabilia* 1.2.8 (E. C. Marchant translation): "Socrates was confident that those of his companions who adopted his principles of conduct would throughout life be good friends to him and to one another".

RESUMO

Começando com os diálogos platônicos atualmente considerados inautênticos, como *Alcíbiades Maior* e *Teages* (incluindo o ainda controverso *Hípias Maior*), passando por obras-primas do período médio, como *Banquete*, *Mênon* e *República*, e terminando com diálogos tardios, como *O Político* e *Leis* – que atacam de forma direta e notável "a educação de Ciro" – o objetivo deste artigo é desconstruir o preconceito moderno de que Platão escreveu antes de Xenofonte em todos os casos em que seus escritos possam ser vistos como sobrepondo-se, assim como o preconceito antigo de que os dois socráticos cujos escritos sobreviveram intactos eram rivais.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE

Platão; Xenofonte; Pseudo-Platão; *Teages; Clitofonte*; Aulus Gellius.

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Notas

1 Abbreviations for the works of Plato and Xenophon follow LSJ, citations for both are based on the latest OCT editions.

2 See Diogenes Laertius 2.57 and 3.34, Athenaeus 11.112-14, and Aulus Gellius 14.3.

3 Cf. Athenaeus 11.112 and βιος θουκυδιδου, 27, in volume 1 of Jones, 1900.

4 Cf. Waterfield, 2004, p. 93, n. 50: "I hardly need to argue that Xenophon was responding to Plato, since it is what the vast majority of scholars assume".

5 Cf. Denyer, 2001, p. 83 (on 103a1; abbreviations expanded): "All of Socrates' dealings with Euthydemus, as represented at Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, 4.2, 3, 5 and 6, make instructive reading: for comparisons on points of detail, see the notes on 104a5 [4.2.1; bracketed citations are to the passages in *Memorabilia* that Denyer cites in the relevant note], 104b7 [4.2.6], 104c2 [4.2.1 and 4.2.9], 104d7-9 [4.2.8], 104e5 [4.2.1], 105a7 ἐὰν θᾶττον, 106d6 ἐλπίδας [4.2.1], 112b1, 116e3-4 [4.2.19], 117e4 [4.2.26], 118b6-7, 118c3-4, 120c1 [4.2.6], 124b1 [4.2.24], 130d6 and 135c8 [4.2.22-23]".

6 Consider *Alc.* 123b3-c3, with which cf. *An*. 1.4.9: "*Socrates*: I [ἐγώ] once heard from a trustworthy man [ἀνὴρ ἀξιόπιστος] among those who had gone up [ἀναβεβηκότες] to the King, who said he traversed a region very ample and good in a journey of nearly a day which the inhabitants call 'the belt of the King's woman,' and there is also another which again is called 'veil,' and others, many places beautiful and good, chosen out for the ornamentation of the woman, and each of the places having names from each part of her ornaments". On ἀναβεβηκότες Denyer comments (after citing 1.4.9) in *Alcibiades,* 187: "it is hard not to catch in this word an allusion to Xenophon, the author of the *Anabasis*".

7 See Arbs, 1906, p. 31. Except when otherwise attributed, all translations are mine.

8 As in Tarrant, 2023.

9 Schleiermacher, 1817-1828; the project began with Schleiermacher, 1804).

10 See Schleiermacher, 1987.

11 Naturally *Alc.* stands at the head of this list; see Schleiermacher, 1996, p. 321, for his dismissal of Socrates' speech on Alcibiades' worthy and well-practiced rivals in Sparta and Persia (*Alc.1* 121a3–124b6) as an un-Socratic digression as "more Xenophontic than Platonic". (Cf. Denyer, *Alcibiades*, 187, on ἀναβεβηκόκτων at *Alc.1* 123b5). Schleiermacher also impugned the authenticity of *Thg*., *Clt*., *Alc.2*, *Am*., *Hp. Ma*., *Ion*, and both *Hp. Mi*. and *Mx*. (despite Aristotle, who cites both).

12 Thg. 121b1-6.

13 Although there is a sense in which my choice of tense begs the question, it is important to keep in mind that if the author of *Thg*. was [Plato], he was writing long after Xenophon's death. See Bailly, 2000, p. 135-38.

14 See Pomeroy, 1994, p. 264 (on 7.1). The connection is also noted in Gottesman, 2014, p. 35.

15 Thg. 121a1-5.

16 Oec. 7.1 (translation E, C. Marchant).

17 See Nails, 2002, p. 116-118.

18 In addition to *Oec*., he appears in *Mem*. (1.3.8 and 2.6) and *Smp*. (2.3, 3.7, 4.10-11, and 5). See Noël, 2015.

19 See Dakyns, 1890-1897, p. xl-xliv (3.1): "On the personal note in the Ἀπομνημονεύματα: Who is Euthydemus? (in Bk. IV)".

20 If, as both Diogenes Laertius and Athenaeus claim, Plato and Xenophon were rivals, Plato would never have given such a place of honor to Crito's son – he is the first one mentioned as present at *Phd*. 59b7 – nor to Hermogenes, Xenophon's source (cf. *Phd*. 59b7-8 and *Ap*. 2) for Socrates' last days. Note as well that Xenophon mentions Cebes and Simmias (*Mem*. 3.11.17).

21 Cf. Jaeger, 1944, p. 175: "Ischomachus is of course the protagonist. Socrates only puts the questions which draw him out". Preferable is Pangle, 1995, p. 138: "[T]he conversation Socrates retold or invented in the *Oeconomicus*".

22 Cf. Hobden, 2017, p. 162: "For ironists, Socrates and Ischomachus stand in opposition".

23 For discussion, see Slings, 1999, 77-82.

24 Cf. *Oec*. 5.17 and Bryan's 1896 speech as quoted in Bensel, 2008, p. 230-232: "Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our farms and the grass will grow in the streets of every city in the country".

25 See Waterfield, "Xenophon's Socratic Mission," 102n67: "The actual Greek word προτρέπειν does not occur in *Oeconomicus*, as it does in *Euthydemus* [citations deleted]; but that does not alter the fact that Socrates is trying to encourage Critobulus to take up the proper management of his estates".

26 Cf. Cicero, *De senectute*, 59: Quam copiose ab eo agri cultura laudatur in eo libro, qui est de tuenda re familiari, qui *Oeconomicus* incribitur!"

27 Oec. 6.11; the translation of the second sentence is Marchant's.

28 Oec. 11.1.

29 Oec. 11.6.

30 Oec. 15.12 (Marchant).

31 For recent attention to *Am*., see Katz; Polansky, 2018, p. 397-421.

32 With Chaucer's description of the Oxford clerk – "Gladly wolde he lerne and gladly teche" (General Prologue, 308) – cf. Ischomachus' description of a farmer at *Oec*. 15.11 (Marchant): "The truth is that, whereas other artists conceal more or less the most important points in their own art, the farmer who plants best is most pleased when he is being watched, so is he who sows best. Question him about any piece of work well done: and he will tell you exactly how he did it".

33 In *Oec*., Socrates inspires Critobulus to learn οἰκονομική, an art Crito's son is inclined to despise, by linking it to the more glamorous arts practiced by the kings and generals the youth admires (cf. *Oec*., 4.12); in *Am*., Socrates humiliates the wise musician (*Am*. 139a6) by showing that a pentathlete philosopher is unworthy even of managing his own household *as long as* (ἕως) there is someone who possesses the kind of knowledge embodied in "the grand synthesis" described at *Am*. 138e1-7.

34 Oec. 21.12. The reason the authenticity of Lovers must be reconsidered in the context of Xenophon is that anyone who has read *Oec*. will be encouraged to doubt whether what Socrates says at *Am*. 138c7-10 is either Socratic, Platonic, or more importantly, true; cf. *Mem*. 4.6.12. It should also be added that *Oec*. is not the only work of Xenophon to which *Am*. refers; the comprehensive definition of a political (πολιτική) and "kingly art [βασιλικὴ τέχνη]" with which Lovers concludes (*Am*. 138b10-c10; see following note) is not only anticipated by *Oec*. 13.5 but also at *Mem*. 3.4.11-12 (cf. ἡ οἰκονομική and *Am*. 138c9-10) and *Mem*. 4.2.11 (cf. οἰκονομικοί and *Am*. 138c2), and no less importantly emerges from the τέχνη that allows someone "to punish correctly [κολάζειν ὀρθῶς]" horses and dogs (*Am*. 137b7-c12; cf. *Eq*. 8.13; although κολάζειν does not appear in *Cyn*., one is entitled to assume his ability to do so ὀρθῶς there as well) before being applied to human beings (cf. *Am*. 137c13-d4 with *Oec*. 5.15 and especially with κολάζεσθαι at 13.6-8, a passage that includes colts and puppies).

35 Thanks to the participle τραχηλιζόμενος (see LSJ on τραχηλίζω) at *Am*. 132c8, Sandra Peterson not only identifies the athlete *as a wrestler* (414), but building on the evidence that Plato was a wrestler (with 430n22, cf. *Plato the Teacher*, 67-68), she makes an interesting suggestion in the last sentence (430) of "Notes on Lovers" in Alessandro Stavru and Christopher Moore (eds.), *Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue*, p. 412-431 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2018): "Perhaps the wrestler wrote the narrative, to save the memory of an actual occasion". If there is any merit in this suggestion, a case could be made for identifying his "rival lover" as Xenophon – via the literary "Euthydemus" of *Mem*. 4 – and this would provide a playful basis for the many connections between *Am*. and *Oec*.

36 The connection is noted in Bruell, 1987, p. 106.

37 *Am*. 134e6-135a3.

38 Kahn, 1985, p. 269: "We cannot hope for such 'objective' confirmation in the case of *Hippias Major*. So those of us who are confident in the belief that the dialogue is not by Plato will remain firm in our disbelief until (to borrow an image) Plato himself should stick his head up from below to inform us that he *did* write this piece after all".

39 Kahn, 1996, p. 29-35.

40 Idem, ibidem, p. 393-401.

41 Idem, ibidem, p. 398, n. 11.

42 *Hp. Ma*. 295c1-e3 (translation W.R.M. Lamb).

43 Heitsch, 2011.

44 See Heitsch, 1999, p. 1-40.

45 See Kahn, 1981, p. 305-320, and Idem, 1988, p. 541-549.

46 See Woodruff, 1982, and especially Idem, 1978, p. 101-117; to defend authenticity, he must construe *Hp*. *Ma*. as "metaphysically innocent" (75).

47 *Mem*. 3.8.7 (E.C. Marchant translation).

48 *Mem*. 3.8.1 (Marchant modified).

49 It is, however, worth considering Arnim, 1923 on the relationship between the two *Apologies*, and Hug, 1852, p. 638-695, on the two *Symposia*.

50 See Altman, William H.F. *The Priority of Xenophon's Symposium Revisited*, forthcoming in Dustin Gish and Christopher Farrell (eds.), *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Xenophon*.

51 See especially Clay, 1975, v. 238-261.

52 Cf. Pohlenz, 1913, p. 400; the passage to which he refers is Xen. *Smp*. 8.1 (Marchant translation modified): '"Gentlemen,' said he, 'it is to be expected of us, is it not, when in the presence of a mighty deity [δαίμων; cf. Socrates in Plato. *Smp*.] that is coeval with the eternal gods [cf. Phaedrus' speech], yet youngest of them all in appearance [cf. Agathon's speech], in magnitude encompassing the universe [cf. Eryximachus' speech], but enthroned in the heart of man, – I mean Love, – that we should not be unmindful of him, particularly in view of the fact that we are all of his following?'"

53 Cf. Dillery, 1995, p. 9-11.

54 For a unique and praiseworthy attempt to do so, see Pentassuglio, 2012, p. 335-356.

55 Note especially *An*. 2.6.27: "demonstrating most of all that he was both able and willing to commit injustice [ἐπιδεικνύμενος ὅτι πλεῖστα δύναιτο καὶ ἐθέλοι ἂν ἀδικειν]". Cf. Altman, 2022, p. 38-40 on the so-called Socratic Paradox (*Men*. 78b1), which Meno accepts only to the extent that he would never willingly do anything bad *to himself*.

56 Plat. *Ap*. 32b1-7.

57 In the two-and-a half pages (131-33) that John Burnet devoted *Ap*. 32b1in his classic *Plato's* Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, *and* Crito; *edited with Notes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), he cites or mentions Xenophon eight times, beginning on 131 with the obvious and inevitable: "Xenophon gives a long account of the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae (406 B.C.) in the *Hellenica* (1.7.4 sqq.) but he is rather vague, as usual".

58 As per Strauss, 1964, p. 65.

59 See Pangle, 2018, p. 139, 215, 221 (n. 7), and 251 (n. 48).

60 It is on the basis of these passages that scholars have dated *Men*. to around 386. But if Plato wrote *Men*. in 386, and if Xenophon wrote his *An*. as a whole only long after he was settled in Skillus, described at *An*. 5.3.7-8 – and a unitary and hence a late *An*. dominates thinking on the subject; see Erbse, 1961, p. 257-287, and Breitenbach, 1967, p. 1569-1928 – then Plato's portrait of "Meno the Thessalian," although certainly referring to the same person, cannot be based on the villain Xenophon describes in *Anabasis* 2.6. For evidence that *Anabasis* 1-4 was written and made available to Xenophon's readership independently of *Anabasis* 5-7, see Xen. *Hell*. 3.1.2.

61 See especially Penner; Rowe, 1994, p. 1-25.

62 See especially Gray, 2011.

63 For the use of "dark" in this sense, see Gray, 2011, p. 56 (for "sunny" she prefers "innocent" on 56). Cf. Johnson, 2013, p. 82: "For G.'s second goal is to persuade us that we ought not to be tempted by interpretations in which Xenophon's presentation of leadership is less transparent, more nuanced, and less sunny".

64 See Tamiolaki, 2017, p. 190.

65 See Mueller-Goldingen, 1995, p. 262-271, and Dorion, 2013, p. 393-412.

66 To the extent that this passage has received scholarly attention, it has been used to argue that the original edition of Plato's *Republic* consisted of six and not the current ten books. Following Alline (1915), who states as a certainty on 15 that "la *Cyropédie* est la contre-partie des quatres premiers livres actuel," and thus "il faut donc supposer qu' Aulu-Gelle se réfère à une autre division que celle de nos manuscrits," the theory of an earlier six-book version of

Republic has recently been revived by Tarrant, 2012, p. 52-78, and Sedley, 2013, p. 70-89.

67 See McCloskey, 2012.

68 See L'Allier, 2004.

69 Cf. Gray, 2011, p. 260-61: "The driving force behind the attribution of the decline to a failure of education by Cyrus is Plato in *Laws* 693-5".

70 For further discussion, see my "Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and Plato's *Laws*". **Calíope**: Presença Clássica 38, 2021, p. 4-40.

71 See Skemp, 1952, p. 59-60 and 212 (n. 1).

72 Xenophon, 1914, p. 2.439.

73 Cf. Tarán, 1975, p. 32: "[T]he tacit denial of the separate existence of ideas creates a gulf between the *E*. and Plato's later works that no hypothesis of development can bridge".

74 Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights*, 14.3.

75 For a thoughtful exploration of this topic, see Long, 2014).