

PARMENIDES' INQUIRY AND THE LITERARY REPRESENTATION OF THE WAYS*

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Abstract: *Critics often consider the division in Parmenides' poem among fields of knowledge or not knowledge, depicted in a polar perspective. In the tale of the journey the division emerges, for example, with the allusion to the day and the night or with the image of the door and in a polar perspective unravels the speech given by the goddess in the vibrant exhortation to achieve both the truth and the opinion, which does not convince. In the complex panorama of the preserved fragments, the desire to describe the result of inquiry, being, as redemption from the darkness, which conditions the life of mortals, is woven with the desire to stress the choice among the ways of inquiry, not all positive, not all oriented towards the truth. Certainly, the ways of inquiry. But how many? The division involves the opinion, the ghost of not being, the doctrines of Heraclitus or the common people, with the metaphors of deafness and blindness. It is useful to check the literary tradition and this paper will try to understand the choice among the ways of inquiry by means of the peculiar pattern of the Priamel, the frame of parallel structures which underlines in Sappho's song or in the corpus of Pindar the new conception that the author offers.*

Keywords: *Literary memory; choice of the ways; Spaltung; light and darkness; Priamel*

A INVESTIGAÇÃO DE PARMÊNIDES E A REPRESENTAÇÃO LITERÁRIA DOS CAMINHOS

Resumo: *A crítica costuma considerar a divisão, no poema de Parmênides, entre campos do conhecimento e do não-conhecimento, como retratada em uma perspectiva bipolar. Na narrativa da jornada, a divisão surge, por exemplo, com a alusão ao dia e à noite ou com a imagem da porta; porém, em uma perspectiva bipolar, o discurso da deusa, em sua vibrante exortação para que se alcancem tanto a verdade quanto a opinião*

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não é convincente se enquadrado em uma perspectiva bipolar. No complexo panorama dos fragmentos preservados, o desejo de descrever o resultado da investigação – o ser – como salvação da escuridão que condiciona a vida dos mortais é entrecido com o desejo de enfatizar a escolha entre as formas de investigação, nem todas elas positivas e nem todas orientadas à verdade. Certamente, há formas de investigação. Mas quantas? A divisão envolve a opinião, o fantasma do não ser, as doutrinas de Heráclito e a posição do povo com suas metáforas da surdez e da cegueira. É útil verificar a tradição literária, e este artigo tentará compreender a escolha entre os modos de investigação por meio do peculiar padrão do Priamel, a moldura de estruturas paralelas que sublinha, nas canções de Safo e no corpus de Píndaro, a nova concepção que o autor oferece.

Palavras-chave: *Memória literária; escolha dos caminhos; Spaltung; luz e escuridão; Priamel*

An impressive degree of stylization emerges from the preserved fragments of Parmenides' poem: although it is rich in speculative nuclei and so deeply rooted in the history of thought, the poem acts as a test for the great cultural maturity during the Archaic period. This paper underlines Parmenides' play with the literary tradition for a problem which is crucial for his philosophy and not ignored by critics, the choice of the ways.

Often from the unstable plot of the preserved fragments emerges the choice of the ways, a sign for Parmenides' conscience, on which the theoretical foundation for the school of Elea grows. The tale of the journey already suggests the choice of the ways (28 B 1, 1-5 DK).

*ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὄσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἰκάνοι,
πέμπον, ἐπεὶ μ' ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι
δαίμονες, ἢ κατὰ πάντ' ἄστη φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα·
τῆ φερόμην· τῆ γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι
ἄρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ' ὁδὸν ἠγεμόνευον.*

The relative of ὁδόν, the controversial ἢ κατὰ πάντ' ἄστη φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα, indicates Parmenides' profile and invokes the necessity to understand the function that the choice of the ways has: knowledge is the aim of Parmenides' θυμός, the aim of the man who pursues knowledge. Immediately after, the iteration of τῆ confirms the relative of ὁδόν and underlines the choice of the ways with emphatic force (cf. HEITSCH, 1991,² p. 130-139). If indeed the chariot is pulled by the mares, ἵπποι, the choice of the ways must derive from the daughters of the sun, κοῦραι δ' ὁδὸν ἠγεμόνευον. With the

citation, Sextus Empiricus (VII, 111-114) suggests an allegoric interpretation of the text.¹ The result is not plausible: the image of the ὄρμαί, the mares, and ὀράσεις, the daughters of the sun, in the conquest of knowledge advances too rich in detail. Nonetheless, on the basis of the literary tradition, an allegorical interpretation is possible.² Parmenides' memory refers to Hesiod's passage, in the *Works* (vv. 286-292), that indicates the choice between evil, κακότης, poverty or ethical misery, and good, ἀρετή, prosperity or intellectual rigour. Undoubtedly, Prodicus in the *Horai* (84 B 2 DK) depends on the literary tradition for the choice of the ways or between the women of Heracles and Sophocles recalls the literary tradition with the sequence of the *Krisis Satyrike* (360-361 R), that Athenaeus (686 c-687 c) offers.³

Between two, the choice of the ways or of the women by Heracles. What about the choice of the ways in Parmenides' poem? Between two? In the literary tradition the choice of the ways is often depicted in a polar perspective. The choice between evil, κακότης, poverty or ethical misery, and good, ἀρετή, prosperity or intellectual rigour, is the result of the *Spaltung*, the division that Hesiod's analysis often indicates between the usual conception and the new conception, that suggests something positive: for example, in the *Works* (11-26), with the abrupt correction for ἔρις, a single γένος in the *Theogony* (211-232), yet now two, ἄρα, the rejected one and the positive one, crowned with praise (cf. MOST, 1993, p. 73-92). But in Parmenides' poem?

The chariot moves on εἰς φάος, towards the light of knowledge (28 B 1, 6-10 DK).

ἄζων δ' ἐν χνοίησιν ἴει σύριγγος αὐτήν
 αἰθόμενος (δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπέιγετο δινωτοῖσιν
 κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν), ὅτε σπερχοῖατο πέμπειν
 Ἥλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα Νυκτός,
 εἰς φάος, ὠσάμεναι κράτων ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας.

Here the division grows in a polar perspective: towards the light of knowledge, accompanied by the daughters of the sun, to leave the dwellings of the night, amidst the darkness of not knowledge.⁴ Quickly, Parmenides' memory refers to Tartarus from Hesiod's passage, in the *Theogony* (vv. 736-757), and offers the image of the threshold between the ways of the day and the night (28 B 1, 11-14 DK). It is not difficult to understand the

function that the threshold has in separating the light of knowledge from the darkness of not knowledge.⁵ The connection to the literary tradition is quite obvious: the light has here a strong symbolic value. Hesiod's passage, in the *Theogony* (vv. 211-225), offers the canon, placing Moros or Thanatos, the terrible origin of evil, in the kingdom of the night. Even the epithet of the keys, that Dike guards at the threshold, ἄμοιβοί, has a polar perspective, because Dike opens or closes the door (28 B 1, 15-21 DK). Now, she opens.⁶ But what may happen if the chariot does not belong to the man who pursues knowledge? The speech given by the daughters of the sun is persuasive and of great importance.⁷

It is, therefore, between two ways the choice that suggests the tale of the journey. Undoubtedly, the first one does not involve the group of the πολλοί, of the mortals in the darkness of not knowledge, it is not the common πάτος, attended by the πολλοί, but it does allow a contact with the light of knowledge (28 B 1, 22-28 DK).

*καί με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρὶ
δεξιτερὴν ἔλεν, ὧδε δ' ἔπος φάτο καί με προσηύδα·
ὦ κοῦρ' ἀθανάτοισι συνάρορος ἠνιόχοισιν,
ἵπποις ταῖ σε φέρουσιν ἰκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ,
χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακῆ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι
τήνδ' ὁδόν (ἧ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτός πάτου ἐστίν),
ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε.*

The speech given by the goddess indicates the division in a polar perspective and the gesture of sharing with the right hand offers a sign of the choice.⁸ Quickly, Parmenides' task is clear: to learn, πυθέσθαι, both the truth, ἀλήθεια, with an immobile heart, and the opinion, δόξα, which does not convince but penetrates the mind of mortals (28 B 1, 28-32 DK).

*χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκκυκλέος ἀτρεμεῖς ἦτορ
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθῆς.
ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεται, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα
χρῆν δοκιμῶς εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.*

On the basis of parallel structures, the division depends here on Hesiod's investiture, in the *Theogony* (vv. 24-28), with the speech given

by the Muses in a polar perspective, with the false, ψεύδεα, the canon rejected, perhaps the deceptive canon of Homer, and the truth, ἀλήθεια, the core of Hesiod's analysis, of the inspiration by the Muses.⁹ The division, with ἡμὲν and ἡδέ, refers to Hesiod's investiture, with ἴδμεν as an anaphor. Of course, the discussion on πάντα περῶντα, the sequence which suggests the relationship between the opinion, δόξα, and the result of inquiry on the cosmos, is out of place here.¹⁰ For the opinion, the δόξα, the goddess reveals a group of doctrines on the cosmos and she offers it to Parmenides' fertile listening: both the truth, ἀλήθεια, with an immobile heart, and the opinion, δόξα. Parmenides' task, the goddess restates for the opinion, δόξα, is to understand, ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεται. In the poem, immediately after the section on the truth, ἀλήθεια, the opinion, δόξα, occupied a long stretch, which in the preserved fragments emerges with about 50 hexameters.¹¹ But the dwellings of the night, with the threshold in a polar perspective, between the light of knowledge and the darkness of the common πάτος, attended by the πολλοί? Why is Parmenides' task to achieve, πρθέσθαι, or to understand, ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεται, even the opinion, δόξα? Does the goddess locate it in the darkness of not knowledge? If so, what is the point of the result of inquiry on the cosmos? Undoubtedly, it is inevitable to see a subtle shift.¹² In the speech given by the goddess the relationship with the literary tradition does not fade away. The division confirms a polar perspective with ἡμὲν and ἡδέ. In any case, the goddess offers the opportunity to go further on. It is no longer the problem of not knowledge. The division here refers to Hesiod's investiture, with the false, ψεύδεα, the canon rejected, perhaps the deceptive canon of Homer, and the truth, ἀλήθεια, the core of Hesiod's analysis, of the inspiration by the Muses. But it indicates two fields of knowledge: the opinion, δόξα, the canon rejected, pervades the mind of mortals and, according to the goddess, it is out of place to keep silent (cf. PULPITO, 2008, p. 133-141). Parmenides' task derives from this, to achieve, πρθέσθαι, or to understand, ἀλλ' ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεται, even the opinion, δόξα, which does not convince and which hides the false, ψεύδεα. How about the *incipit* with the darkness of not knowledge? Does it not matter now to distinguish the light of knowledge from the darkness of not knowledge in a polar perspective?

We must consider the complex panorama of the preserved fragments. According to the critics, the relationship between the speech given by the goddess and the image that indicates the ways of inquiry, is clear (28 B 2, 1-8 DK).

*εἰ δ' ἄγ' ἐγὼν ἐρέω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μῦθον ἀκούσας,
 αἴπερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιός εἰσι νοῆσαι·
 ἢ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,
 Πειθοῦς ἔστι κέλευθος (Ἀληθείη γὰρ ὀπηδεῖ),
 ἢ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεῶν ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,
 τὴν δὴ τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπὸν·
 οὕτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἔδν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν)
 οὔτε φράσαις.*

The first one makes the persuasion accessible, *πειθοῦς κέλευθος*, because it has truth, *ἀλήθεια*, to guide it. On the other hand, the second one does not convince, at all, *πᾶν*, with emphatic force.¹³ The first one, on the basis of the refusal of not being, has being as the aim. Instead, the second one instead suggests the function of not being, as indispensable, *χρεῶν*, perhaps for a conflict with being. At the end, the result: it is not possible, for lack of support, *ἀνυστόν*, to acquire, *γνοίης*, or to say, *φράσαις*, the architecture of not being (cf. MOURELATOS, 2008,² p. 194-221). The division emerges in a polar perspective, with the literary tradition, between two fields of knowledge (cf. GIANNANTONI, 1988, p. 207-221). Which is crucial, being or the ghost of not being? Here the sequence, reconcilable with the speech given by the goddess, with the division between the truth, *ἀλήθεια*, and the opinion, *δόξα*, indicates being for the truth, *ἀλήθεια*, the persuasion. What about the relationship between the opinion, *δόξα*, and the ghost of not being? On the basis of the friction with being, critics often see in Parmenides' not being the segmentation that the mind of mortals suggests with the deceptive order of the names.¹⁴ The division emerges here between being, which is far from the deceptive order of the names, a sphere of thought, *νοεῖν*, which confirms it, and the ghost of not being, the false, which does not convince, with the death or the birth, that *αἴσθησις* indicates, with the dynamic of the cosmos, treacherous, nonetheless fertile for the opinion, *δόξα*.

A polar perspective, with the literary tradition, between two fields of knowledge: the sequence that Simplicius refers to for the comment on the text of Aristotle's *Physics* (116, 25-118, 25 D) perhaps suggests the division among three fields of knowledge or not knowledge, rather than two (28 B 6, 1-9 DK).

χρῆ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ' ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι,
 μηδὲν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· τὰ σ' ἐγὼ φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα.
 πρώτης γὰρ σ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ ταύτης διζήσιος <εἴργω>,
 αὐτὰρ ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ τῆς, ἣν δὴ βροτοὶ εἰδότες οὐδὲν
 πλάττονται, δίκρανοι· ἀμηχανίη γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν
 στήθεσιν ἰθύνει πλακτὸν νόον· οἱ δὲ φοροῦνται
 κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῶλα,
 οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτ' ἐνενόμισται
 κοῦ ταῦτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.

Of course, the controversial εἴργω derives from integration. Among the ways of inquiry, with being for the truth, ἀλήθεια, it makes it inevitable to assume two ways of the error: if the first indicates the ghost of not being, the second one suggests the relationship with being, it discovers at the same time the identity and the otherness of not being with being. But the possible ἄρξει refers to the division between two fields of knowledge.¹⁵ In any case, among the ways of inquiry, the error here emerges with emphatic force. Why does the identity and the otherness of not being with being happen? The term παλίντροπος has often evoked the doctrines of Heraclitus, the famous reflection on ἀρμονίη (22 B 51 DK) or in general the reciprocity between the ways ἄνω and κάτω (22 B 60 DK). But it is inevitable to see in the wandering, πλάττονται, and in the trouble, ἀμηχανίη, the group of the πολλοί, of the mortals in the darkness of not knowledge.¹⁶ Parmenides' polemic descends on the πολλοί with the metaphors of deafness and blindness, κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε, the metaphors on the πολλοί in Hesiod's passage, in the *Works* (293-297), which puts it in odds with the man who pursues knowledge, πανάριστος, and offers the result to the fertile listening of an ἐσθλός. The *corpus* of Pindar recalls the metaphors for the group of the πολλοί, of the mortals in the darkness of not knowledge.¹⁷ But a subtle shift emerges both with the doctrines of Heraclitus, the identity and the otherness of not being with being, and the group of the πολλοί. The sequence indicates the division between the light of knowledge and the darkness of not knowledge in a polar perspective: the speech given by the goddess, with Parmenides' task, to learn, πυθέσθαι, both the truth, ἀλήθεια, with an immobile heart, and the opinion, δόξα, is not reconcilable with the metaphors of deafness and blindness, κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε. For the refusal of not being, the identity of thinking, νοεῖν, with being indicates the truth

ἀλήθεια (cf. WIESNER, 1996, p. 163-236). But it is difficult to consider the opinion, δόξα, reconcilable with the darkness of not knowledge, with the metaphors of deafness and blindness, κωφοὶ ὁμῶς τυφλοὶ τε. Should we postulate in the poem, immediately after the light of knowledge, immediately after the truth, ἀλήθεια, a long stretch in the darkness of not knowledge? With the doctrines of Heraclitus, the identity and the otherness of not being with being, or the group of the πολλοί, the division emerges, that the *incipit* offers, with the relative of ὁδόν, the controversial ἢ κατὰ πάντ' ἄστη φέρει εἰδοῦτα φῶτα, or the image of the threshold and the keys, that Dike guards at the threshold. In any case, even here, the division falls in a polar perspective, both among three and between two fields of knowledge or not knowledge: the purpose is to distinguish the truth, ἀλήθεια, because the choice of the ways indicates being.

The section on the truth, ἀλήθεια, the section that refers to being and suggests every feature of it, recalls the relationship of being both with the ghost of not being and with the opinion, δόξα. Undoubtedly, both with the ghost of not being and with the opinion, δόξα: here too the division that emerges is among three fields of knowledge or not knowledge, rather than two (28 B 7, 1 - 8, 6 DK).

*οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῆ εἶναι μὴ ἔοντα·
ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα
μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολὺπειρον ὁδὸν κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,
νωμῶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχῆσσαν ἀκουήν
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολὺδηριν ἔλεγχον
ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα. μόνος δ' ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο
λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν· ταύτη δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔασι
πολλὰ μάλ', ὡς ἀγένητον ἔδον καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,
ἔστι γὰρ οὐλομελές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδ' ἀτέλεστον·
οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν,
ἔν, συνεχές· τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσει αὐτοῦ;*

The sequence underlines the choice of the ways. If the refusal falls on the first one, on the ghost of not being, soon the second one emerges, the habit rejected, full of experience for the eye that does not see, for the ear that rumbles, the negative habit which finds support in the deceptive order of the names and which offers the dynamic of the cosmos.¹⁸ The choice of the ways derives from reason, because it culminates in the test, πολὺδηριν

ἔλεγχον, of being, of the truth, ἀλήθεια. More than one proof makes it possible to postulate the comprehensive totality of being, far from oscillations or gaps, with an immobile heart.¹⁹ Of course, among the ways of inquiry, the first one emerges in connection with the second one, μηδέ. But it is difficult to mix one with the other, because the first one indicates the ghost of not being, while the second one, the habit rejected, full of experience for the eye that does not see, for the ear that rumbles, is after all the opinion, δόξα, which finds support in the deceptive order of the names and which offers the dynamic of the cosmos.²⁰ In any case, the division falls under a polar perspective: it indicates being, with the refusal of not being, with the truth, ἀλήθεια, and the refusal of the opinion, δόξα.

It is possible to go further on. For being, with the refusal of not being, for the truth, ἀλήθεια, and the refusal of the opinion, δόξα, the form of the text obeys the *Priamel*, the peculiar pattern of parallel structures which finds a paradigm in Sappho's song for the superiority of ἔρωσ (16, 1-4 V). The combining of parallel structures, with two or three foils, leads to the choice of the cap: being in Parmenides' poem, the truth, ἀλήθεια, or the superiority of ἔρωσ in Sappho's song, after the grand scheme of parallel structures, with the ghost of not being or the opinion, δόξα, in Parmenides' poem, with the army of knights, the infantry or the fleet of ships in Sappho's song (cf. LARDINOIS, 2021, p. 163-174). While the text involves the group of the πολλοί, with two or three foils, the choice of the cap derives from the personal approach, ἐξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα in Parmenides' poem and ἔγω δέ in Sappho's song. It is a paradigm that the *corpus* of Pindar underlines, for example, in *I Olympian* (vv. 1-7): the water or the gold, that shines in the darkness, the sun in the clear sky, but the competition is crowned with praise.²¹

The ways of inquiry in Parmenides' poem. But how many? Undoubtedly, being emerges for the truth, ἀλήθεια. But what is to discern in a polar perspective, the darkness of not knowledge or the opinion, δόξα, the ghost of not being or the doctrines of Heraclitus, if not the group of the πολλοί, with the metaphors of deafness and blindness? For the fields of knowledge or not knowledge, for the choice of the ways, an even fast reflection on the relationship with Sappho's song or with the *corpus* of Pindar indicates the necessity to insert Parmenides' poem in the literary tradition which makes it possible. The *Priamel* has a long *Nachleben* and it often pervades the text where the author reveals the new conception he suggests: two or three foils for the common sense and a cap that offers the personal approach

(cf. RACE, 1982, p. 1-30). Sappho's song is a paradigm for the *incipit* of Isocrates' *Helen* (1-2): it is a paradigm because Sappho's song indicates the superiority of ἔργος and underlines the choice of Helen. The *Priamel* here emerges with emphatic force (cf. TULLI, 2008, p. 91-105). It refers to the masks of Antisthenes, of able eristics, of Plato: with the division among the fields of knowledge or not knowledge, soon the cap, an ἔγω δέ for the new type of rhetoric, which finds the purpose and the fertile origin in παιδεία and in politics. The *Priamel* marks the *incipit* of Isocrates' *Euagoras* (1-4), with the division for the honour to the deceased, among dances or charming sounds, gymnastic exercises, horse or boat race and the speech.²² On the basis of parallel structures, two or three foils for the common sense and a cap that offers the personal approach. Undoubtedly, the *Priamel* helps in enhancing the new conception that Parmenides' poem suggests: in a polar perspective, with the literary tradition. In the tale of the journey and in the complex panorama of the preserved fragments that critics arrange, in the articulation towards the truth, ἀλήθεια, the text indicates being. The division involves the darkness of not knowledge or the opinion, δόξα, the ghost of not being or the doctrines of Heraclitus, if not the group of the πολλοί, with the metaphors of deafness and blindness: only foils that Parmenides' taste for hoarding, so deeply rooted in the literary tradition, gathers to show the new conception he suggests, the cap, being, an inescapable hinge of thinking, νοεῖν, because it is an inescapable hinge of physics.

At the end, the refusal of not being reveals being in a polar perspective. The section on the truth, ἀλήθεια, indicates Dike as the guarantee or the necessity of the balanced argumentation: she protects against not being and takes the helm on being (B 8, 12-18 DK).

οὐδέ ποτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχὺς
 γίγνεσθαι τι παρ' αὐτό· τοῦ εἶνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι
 οὔτ' ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε Δίκη χαλάσασα πέδησιν,
 ἀλλ' ἔχει· ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷδ' ἔστιν·
 ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· κέκριται δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη,
 τὴν μὲν εἶν ἀνόητον ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀλήθης
 ἔστιν ὁδός), τὴν δ' ὥστε πέλειν καὶ ἐτήτυμον εἶναι.

The image derives from Hesiod's fable, αἴνος, in the *Works* (vv. 213-285), of the sparrow and the hawk: on the throne of Zeus, the noble father, Dike guarantees, with the strength of Zeus, the ethical norm with which

the city should flourish. But soon the sequence indicates the choice of the ways.²³ The first one is the not being, which obscures the truth, ἀλήθεια, the second one suggests being. On the basis of the *Priamel*, a cap comes, which is not reconcilable with the death or the birth, which pervades the architecture of physics, and it is the comprehensive totality of being, far from oscillations or gaps, with an immobile heart.

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Notas

¹ Perhaps κατὰ πάντ' ἄστη hides a collation error on the Laurentian code, N (85, 19), which Coxon, Mckirahan (2009, p. 271-273) discovers, instead of κατὰ πάντ' ἄτη. But, with the theme of the journey for the *incipit*, which offers, embedded, the theme of the inquiry, the relationship of the text with Homer, with the *incipit* of the *Odyssey* (I, vv. 1-10), is clear: κατὰ πάντ' ἄστη has the strength of the most likely solution, because it derives from πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω. Cf. Lapini (2013, p. 37-86).

² Cf. Cerri (1999, p. 96-101). Sextus Empiricus finds the canon perhaps in Plato, according to Tarán (1965, p. 17-31), in the *Phaedrus* (246 a-d). Cf. Pellikaan-Engel (1978, ² p. 65-78).

³ Cf. Snell (2009, ⁹ p. 219-230). In Hesiod's analysis, the choice of the ways is the theoretical foundation for unfolding the result of the best social commitment. Cf. Arrighetti (1998, p. 376-401). In the section that Xenophon offers in the *Memorables* (II, 1, 21-34), the text of the *Horai*, according to Sansone (2004, p. 125-142), is evident in the style too.

⁴ According to Burkert (1969, p. 1-30), the conquest of knowledge is in darkness, because in darkness the mystery rite indicates it is possible: for example, with Orpheus (113 F B, 164 F B, 208-209 F B, 211 F B, 248 F B), not to mention the laminae of Vibo Valentia (474 F B) and Turi (487-490 F B). Cf. Gemelli Marciano (2013, p. 45-105). But what about εἰς φάος? And προλιποῦσαι? The result is not reconcilable with the text. Gaiser (1985, p. 22-23) discovers here the fertile origin of the plot on which Plato depends, in the *Republic* (514 a-518 b), for the relationship between the darkness of the cave and the ideal dimension. Cf. Calabi (2003, p. 327-354).

⁵ Regali (2016, p. 7-22) recalls the function of the threshold in the literary tradition during the Classical period. Cf. Sassi (1988, p. 383-396).

⁶ According to Bremer (1976, p. 353-362), it is possible to glimpse Dike already in the sun of the *Iliad* (III 275-287) or of the *Odyssey* (XII, vv. 319-323).

⁷ Cf. Tulli (2016, p. 31-46). From the *Spaltung* derives the epithet for the night in the *Theogony* (vv. 211-225), ἐρεβεννή, if not ὀλοή, or for the αἰδώς in the *Works* (vv. 317-319), οὐκ ἀγαθή. Cf. Arrighetti (2006, p. 57-70).

⁸ It is not the common πάτος; perhaps not of a recoverable etymology, the term recalls trampling. According to Glauco, in the *Iliad* (VI, vv. 200-205), it is the space that Bellerophon, devoured by torment, abandons, according to Poseidon, in the *Iliad* (XX, vv. 133-137), it refers to the areas of the melee in the army, and it is the space of man, in the *Odyssey* (IX, vv. 116-121), to distinguish, in a polar perspective, from the space of the goats in the forest. Frisk (1966, p. 324-334) denies the relationship with trampling. However, the result is not plausible. Cf. Kullmann (1958, p. 157-172).

⁹ Here it is not difficult to see the refusal of the plot that Homer offers, reconcilable with the false, for the purpose it has, κηληθμός; the refusal transpires in the quotation of famous words from the *Odyssey* (XIX 203-204), the comment on the false, ψεύδεα, by means of which the protagonist, the πολύμητις, disguised as Aethon, tricks Penelope. Cf. Neitzel (1975, p. 1-19). Here Parmenides' memory of the literary tradition reaches the peak. Cf. Tulli (2019, p. 1231-1238).

¹⁰ Cf. Trabattoni (1998, p. 5-20). From the study of the language comes the most likely solution, πάντα περ ἔοντα, that Passa (2009, p. 125-128) suggests. Cf. Condello (2016, p. 495-511).

¹¹ It is a long stretch which Popper (1998, p. 105-222) discovers full of great modernity. Cf. Rossetti (2017, p. 29-92).

¹² Miller (2006, p. 1-47) indicates the problem.

¹³ Does Parmenides' contact with the recipient arise here? Is the form mimetic or diegetic? However, even with the not recoverable gap between the masks, the relationship between ἐγώ and σύ, between ἐρέω and κόμισαι, is striking for its protreptic ambition. Cf. Mansfeld (1994, p. 1-11).

¹⁴ The sharp interpretation of Calogero (1977,² p. 1-67) digs in the plot of harsh words, with Reinhardt (2012⁵, p. 5-88), to perceive speculative nuclei of great charm.

¹⁵ Diels (2001², p. 34 and 68) suggests εἶργω, controversial, but often adopted, for the syntactic solution after the γάρ σ' and for the relationship with the great image that indicates the ways of inquiry, διζήσιος. The possible ἄρξει of Cordero (2004, p. 97-124), with γάρ τ' for the γάρ σ' that Simplicius offers, has being as a sphere. It is difficult to postulate γάρ σ' for γάρ σοι and perhaps ἄρξω, that suggests Nehamas (1981, p. 97-111) and finds support in the cogent interpretation of Curd (1998, p. 24-63), is to be rejected. Cf. O'Brien (1987, p. 216-226).

¹⁶ The function which the term *παλίντροπος* has, according to Bormann (1971, p. 70-90), is decisive: the truth, ἀλήθεια, shines and obscures Herclitus' doctrines. Vieira (2013, p. 473-490) indicates the roots of the famous reflection on ἀρμονίη in the literary tradition.

¹⁷ In *VII Nemean* (vv. 23-30) and in *VII Paeon* (b 1-20 M), the relationship between the truth, ἀλήθεια, and the light involves the inspiration of the Muses. Cf. Tsitsibakou-Vasalos (2010, p. 30-76).

¹⁸ Of course, the result that the habit indicates, on the basis of αἴσθησις, is often barren, mirrored by the style which articulates the sequence with oxymoric force: ἄσκοπον ὄμμα, the eye that does not see, or ἠχίησσαν ἀκούην, the ear that rumbles. Cf. Pfeiffer (1975, p. 16-51).

¹⁹ Ferrari (2010, p. 39-79) suggests a new organization of the preserved fragments, with ἄσκοπον ὄμμα, the eye that does not see, or ἠχίησσαν ἀκούην, the ear that rumbles, after the *incipit*, after the tale of the journey.

²⁰ It is not difficult to glimpse in the text, πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον, the image of the school of Elea, which advances δι' ἐρωτήσεων, as Plato confirms, in *Sophist* (216 a-218 b). Robbiano (2006, p. 89-120) indicates the relationship that the sequence has with the choice of the ways.

²¹ The sharp interpretation of Dornseiff (1921, p. 85-112) is crucial. Cf. Bundy (1986, p. 1-33).

²² At the peak by means of Isocrates' literary production. Cf. Alexiou (2010, p. 65-72).

²³ The relationship with Hesiod's analysis is lexical too: with the truth, ἀλήθεια, in subtle *variatio* with ἐτήτυμον, the term that for the proem of the *Works* (vv. 1-10) announces the παιδεία of Perse with protrectic force. Cf. Strauss Clay (1993, p. 23-33).