CDA AS DIALECTICAL REASONING: CRITIQUE, EXPLANATION AND ACTION

**Abstract**: In this chapter, I summarize how my approach to CDA has changed over 30 years, and then present the most recent version of it: CDA as ‘dialectical reasoning’. This emphasizes the relationship between critique, explanation and action. I discuss how this view of CDA might support political action to change social life for the better, referring to the ‘Kilburn Manifesto’ for transcending neoliberalism. The focus upon dialectical reasoning and political action differentiates this chapter from one in an earlier Routledge Handbook (FAIRCLOUGH, 2012).

**Keywords**: Critical Discourse Analysis; dialectical reasoning; Kilburn Manifesto.

**Introduction**

CDA is a form of critical social analysis. Critical social analysis shows how forms of social life can damage people unnecessarily, but also how they can be changed. CDA’s contribution is elucidating how discourse is related to other social elements (power, ideologies, institutions etc.) and offering critique of discourse as a way into wider critique of social reality. But the objective is not just critique, it is change ‘for the better’. Academic critique alone cannot change reality, but it can contribute to political action for change by increasing understanding of existing reality and its problems and possibilities. Better understanding requires better explanations. CDA offers better explanatory understanding of relations between discourse and other components of social life.

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1 The editors of Policromias—Revista de Estudos do Discurso, Imagem e Som thanks Mister Norman Fairclough by sending us this text. We think that this text, presented in this journal in Portuguese for the first time, is a successful manner to carry the Critical Discourse Analysis (and the discourse studies, in general) to the Brazilian academic public.

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CDA combines critique of discourse and explanation of how discourse figures in existing social reality as a basis for action to change reality. This in summary form is what I mean by ‘dialectical reasoning’: a way of reasoning from critique of discourse to what should be done to change existing reality, by way of explanation of relations between discourse and other components of reality. For example: critique of the discourse of modern universities, and explanation of how it figures within the ‘marketisation’ of universities, as a basis for action to change them. If universities represent students as ‘consumers’ (creating a problematic or ‘false’ analogy between the two), and this can be explained as part of a strategy to privatise universities, there is arguably something amiss which should be changed (Fairclough 1993). This relation between critique, explanation and (political) action is the essence of CDA. Though CDA is not itself action, it is a step towards it, identifying and sometimes advocating lines of action. We cannot move from critique towards action except via explanation: without explanatory understanding of social reality, including causal and dialectical relations (I explain ‘dialectical relations’ below) between discourse and other elements of social life, we cannot know what needs to be changed, what can be changed, and how. Explanation is of particular importance in this approach to CDA, and other key features of the approach depend upon it. The focus is not just on power in discourse but also power behind discourse, not just on critique of manipulation but also critique of ideology, not just on particular aspects of existing social reality (e.g. representations of migrants in the press) but also its capitalist character and how that impacts upon all its aspects (Fairclough 1989, 2014).

Social reality is mediated by ideas and discourse: there are social entities (people, events, practices, institutions), and there are beliefs/ideas about and representations of them, and analysis needs to encompass both and the relations between them. These relations are both cognitive and causal: both matters of representation-and-interpretation and matters of cause-and-effect, both epistemological relations which are open to critique, and ontological relations which require explanation (Bhaskar 1989: 101-2). Discourse is meaningful, but also a cause of and an effect of other social (and material) elements. One consequence is that objects of critical social analysis are simultaneously material and semiotic (discoursal), and analysis needs to focus upon (dialectical) relations between the two (Jessop 2004). A second consequence is that critical social analysis is ‘trans-disciplinary’, it brings together disciplines whose concerns are material facets of social realities, and semiotic/discoursal facets. CDA itself does not provide analyses of capitalism, neoliberalism, politics, media etc. which it needs for explanation but collaborates with other disciplines and theories, such as media or organization studies, or ‘cultural political economy’ (Jessop 2004, Fairclough 2010: 453-526), or ‘critical realism’ (Fairclough, Jessop & Sayer 2004).
A third consequence is that critical social analysis and CDA are both normative and explanatory critique: critique on the basis of norms or values, and critique on the basis of causal and dialectical relations. CDA begins with normative critique of discourse (simply ‘critique’ above), assessing it against norms (e.g. speak the truth, speak sincerely, speak justly), then moves via explanation of normatively problematic discourse to explanatory critique of features of social reality which lead to such discourse, and towards action - features of reality which have such effects need changing. Some forms of CDA are largely normative, but this is not enough to change reality: normative critique of people’s language and practices as, for example, racist needs to be combined with explanatory critique of aspects of social reality as producing such racism and needing to be changed.

An approach to CDA

There have been three main versions of my approach, which has changed over time largely in response to social changes. The first, oriented to the post-WorldWar2 social settlement, centred upon critique of ideological discourse as part of a concern with the reproduction of the existing social order (Fairclough 1989). The second, corresponding to the shift to neoliberalism from the 1970s, centred upon critique of discourse as part of social change, especially part of attempts to impose ‘top-down’ neoliberal restructuring (Fairclough 1992). The third, corresponding to the 2007+ financial and economic crisis, centres upon critique of deliberative discourse as part of a wider concern with struggles over strategies to overcome the crisis (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). The emphasis shifts between versions, but in a cumulative way that incorporates earlier concerns into new syntheses. For example, critique of ideology remains important throughout. Fairclough (2014) gives a detailed account of these changes and a critical comparison with other approaches.

Fairclough (1989), the main formulation of the first version, is a radical view of CDA. It emphasises power behind discourse as well as in discourse - how people with power shape the ‘order of discourse’ and the social order, as well as controlling specific interactions like interviews. It correspondingly emphasises ideology rather than just persuasion and manipulation. It views discourse as a stake in, as well as a site of, social struggle including class struggle. It aims to raise consciousness of how language contributes to the domination of some people by others, as a step towards social emancipation. The 2007+ crisis indicates a continuing need for radical change. As the huge gap between rich and poor has continued to increase even during the crisis, it would seem that only a struggle for
fundamental social and political changes can reverse this and other damaging
tendencies. If CDA wants to contribute, it needs to be radical.

The core of the first version is critique of ideology. Let’s take an example.
Current debates about overcoming the crisis are often about return to eco-
nomic ‘growth’, and it is generally just taken for granted that ‘growth’ is nec-
essary, though this is not true for all economies. It is capitalist economies that
require continuous growth, because that is the nature of ‘capital’, and failure
to grow adequately is regarded as a crisis. Moreover it is not just growth that
is necessary, so also is the discursive assumption that it is: the need for growth
must be beyond question, mere common sense. Yet the real reason why growth
is necessary for capitalism is difficult to legitimize in societies which claim to
be democratic – why should those who already have more than enough always
require more? Where reasons are given, they tend to be ‘rationalizations’, spu-
rious ‘reasons’ that are nevertheless more persuasive. Sometimes these take a
proverbial form: ‘a rising tide raises all boats’. ‘Trickle-down’ economics claims
that entrepreneurs should be richly rewarded for producing growth because it
benefits us all, but this is arguably a rationalization, as this is not really why
businesses are driven to continuously increase their turnover and profits (Fair-
clough & Fairclough 2012). A focus on ideology goes with a focus on explana-
tion: ideology critique is a form of explanatory critique which explains why
features of discourse which are open to normative critique are nevertheless
necessary for maintaining the social order. It also goes with a focus on critique
of power behind discourse and of capitalism. Approaches to CDA which lack
these focuses may talk about ideologies, but they cannot do ideology critique.

The second version of my approach (Fairclough 1992) focused upon critique
of discourse as a part of top-down social change in the implementation of neolib-
eral capitalism. An example is the ‘marketisation’ of universities as part of a general
push to restructure public services on a market model. This was partly a discursive
process: marketising universities meant making their discourse more like that of
private corporations, and wider changes in structure, management and practices
first appeared in new representations of the nature and activities of universities.
This included ideological change in common sense assumptions, e.g. students are
consumers, universities are businesses in competition.

Such changes in discourse included changes in discourses (ways of repre-
senting reality), genres (ways of interacting discursively) and styles (ways of being,
identities, in their discourse aspect), all of which are different in the ‘market uni-
versity’. These were evident in a variety of spoken and written texts (e.g. policy documents, publicity materials for recruiting students, management meetings). Over time the order of discourse changed - the configuration of discourses, genres and styles which defines the discursive character and potential of universities - as part of a general shift in their structure, management and practices. There were changes in intertextuality and more specifically interdiscursivity: different discourses, different genres and different styles came to be combined in new ways, producing hybrid articulations of academic and market discourse (Fairclough 1993). All versions of this approach to CDA are ‘textually-oriented’ (Fairclough 1992): discourse analysis includes detailed analysis of texts, both linguistic (grammatical, semantic, pragmatic, genre) analysis, and interdiscursive analysis of hybrid articulations. Dynamically and historically, such hybrid combinations result from the recontextualization of market discourse in universities, shifting discourse (discourses, genres, styles) from one context to another. Discourse can contingently (subject to circumstances and conditions) be operationalized: enacted in ways of (inter)acting, inculcated in ways of being, materialised in e.g. the forms of buildings. It is because changes in discourse can mutate and generalize into wider social changes in these ways that they are such a significant part of social change. This is a matter of the dialectical relations between discourse and other social elements, which I return to below. Operationalization can be intra-semiotic: discourses can be enacted as genres or inculcated as styles. All the italicized terms in this paragraph are concepts and categories in this second version (Fairclough 2012).

The third version focuses upon critique of political debate as an element of struggles over strategies to overcome the 2007+ crisis. The focus is upon deliberation (practical argumentation) about what should be done because that is the primary genre of political discourse, requiring an ‘argumentative turn’ that incorporates argumentation theory into CDA. Concerns in earlier versions (e.g. ideology) do not disappear, they are now addressed in terms of arguments and their elements (premises, conclusions). Action (genre) is seen as the primary aspect of discourse, and representation and identity (discourses, styles) are addressed as aspects of actions rather than in isolation. Critical social analysis needs the focus upon practical argumentation to go beyond just claiming that discourse may have constructive effects on social reality, to showing how it can do so: discourses provide reasons for/against acting in certain ways. Discourses may have constructive effects where practical arguments which include these reasons stand up to critical evaluation and lead to decisions, which lead to action, and to transformative effects on reality (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012).
CDA as dialectical reasoning

CDA is analysis of discourse, but it is also itself a form of discourse. In Fairclough (2013) I suggested that it is a form of practical argumentation: argumentation from a set of premises to a claim about what should be done. According to Fairclough & Fairclough (2012), the premises in practical argumentation are: a Circumstantial premise which represents an existing state of affairs, a Goal premise which specifies an alternative state of affairs as goal on the basis of a Value premise (the values and concerns one is arguing from), and a Means-Goal premise which claims that the advocated line of action in the conclusion of the argument (Claim) is a means of achieving the goal. The values and goals in CDA follow from its critical aims, including for instance the value of social justice and the goal of a just society. Practical argumentation moves from problems to solutions: the Circumstantial premise doesn’t just represent an existing state of affairs, it ‘problematizes’ (Fairclough 2013) it, diagnoses what the problem is, what needs changing, while the Goal premise and the Claim advocate a solution, what change to aim for (the goal) and what action to take to achieve it (the Claim).

CDA is more specifically ‘dialectical reasoning’, a form of practical argumentation which gives prominence to the connection between critique, explanation and action. We can characterize it as four steps:

1. Normative critique of discourse.
2. Explanation of normatively criticized discourse in terms of features of the existing state of affairs (existing social reality).
3. Explanatory critique of the existing state of affairs.
4. Advocating action to change the existing state of affairs ‘for the better’.

It can be used for critical analysis of political discourse, e.g. political debates, whose main argument type is practical argumentation. So CDA is a form practical argumentation which critically analyses, and is in a sense in dialogue with, practical argumentation in politics.

The focus of such critical analysis is upon discourse as a part of political activity types, such as political problem-solving, seeking political solutions to problems like the funding of education. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle characterizes politics as action in pursuit of the highest good, based upon decisions, which arise out of deliberation (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). So change in reality (achieving the ‘highest good’) requires action, action requires decision, decision requires deliberation. We can link this to Levinson’s idea of ‘activity types’ (1992) and his question ‘in what ways do the structural properties of an activity constrain
(especially the functions of) the verbal contributions that can be made towards it?’ We can broaden this question to ask how ‘verbal contributions’ (e.g. debates or other forms of deliberation) affect the activity they are a part of, as well as how they are affected by being part of the structure of that activity. The Aristotelian sequence deliberation-decision-action-change is instantiated for instance in political problem-solving, and the deliberation in this case includes parliamentary debate, which we should analyse as a step in the sequence and in relation to the other steps (decision, action, change).

Dialectical reasoning extends earlier accounts of dialectical relations between discourse and other social elements (Fairclough 2010) and of the ‘constructive’ effects of discourses on the wider social reality. It also offers a distinctive approach to ‘problematization’ of existing states of affairs, which involves steps 1-3 above and is based upon CDA’s theory of discourse, including the claim above that relations between discourse and social entities are both cognitive and causal. On the basis of this theory, CDA sees normative critique of discourse as a ‘point of entry’ into explanatory social critique, and problematization, of existing social reality. This is a contribution of CDA to critical social analysis with august precursors: Aristotle advocated starting from phainomena and endoxa, generally accepted beliefs and opinions, what people say; and Marx began his critique of political economy with a critique of the discourse of the political economists (Fairclough & Graham 2002).

The problematization of the existing state of affairs begins with normative critique of its discourse, then moves to explanation of what features of the existing state of affairs bring about normatively criticized features of discourse, and what effects such features can have on the state of affairs. This identifies dialectical relations between discourse and other social elements: for instance, representation of students as consumers can be internalized in their beliefs and behaviour. The next step is explanatory critique of the existing state of affairs: for example, marketisation of universities can be criticized because of what it leads to (its consequences), and ‘false analogies’ it rests on (as assumptions) such as that between students and consumers. Explanatory critique identifies the problem in (‘problematizes’) the existing state of affairs, in this case the marketisation of universities. This provides a normative view of problematization: in political deliberation, problematization is often open to critique for lacking this explanatory basis. Because identification of the problem is linked to advocacy of a solution, problematization links the existing state of affairs represented in the Circumstantial premise to the goal (Goal premise) and advocated action to achieve it (Claim) which constitute the advocated solution. How the existing state of affairs is problematized limits the range of possible solutions (goals and actions).
The movement from problematization to advocated solution is itself characterized by dialectical relations between discourse and non-discursive social elements. The problem (marketisation of universities) is a problem of structures and practices not just of discourse, yet any solution would be discursive: an ‘imagined’ state of affairs (goal) which the ‘imagined’ action (in the Claim) would be a means of achieving, to replace the problematized state of affairs (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). But this means that, as well as being steps in political problem-solving, action and change are imagined in deliberation, and how they are imagined affects what range of actions and changes are possible: only actions which are imagined can be decided upon and taken, limiting the possibilities for change. In terms of dialectical relations, imagined actions may be realized (operationalized) in real actions, and thereby imagined change may be realized in real change. So the discourse (deliberation) is affected by its position in political problem-solving, but it also affects the range of possibilities in the subsequent steps of decision, action and change, constraining it further or enabling it to be widened, through dialectical relations both within the deliberation and between the deliberation and the other steps.

Through an understanding of ‘dialectic’, we can comprehend the relation between a form of deliberation and the way it affects and is affected by other steps in an activity type (e.g. parliamentary debate in political problem-solving). Dialectic is one of three interconnected facets of argumentation recognized since classical times: logic, dialectic and rhetoric. Dialectic is the dialogical aspect of argumentation, including the critical questioning of arguments in dialogue. Dialectical deliberation is a way of arriving at and settling on ‘imaginaries’ for possible alternatives to problematized states of affairs (goals in Goal premises) and for actions (means) to achieve them, in a critical dialogical process. Such advocated solutions emerge from evaluating different arguments and reasons, weighing them against each other, retaining what is good and discarding what is bad. This is an epistemological process of determining the right thing to do, the right way to change the existing state of affairs, and the right way to achieve that.

Bhaskar (1989, 1993) suggests a general notion of dialectic which dialectical deliberation is an instance of: ‘any process of conceptual or social conflict, interconnection and change, in which the generation, interpenetration and clash of oppositions, leading to their transcendence in a fuller or more adequate mode of thought or form of life, plays a key role’. Dialectical deliberation is a discursive (more specifically, argumentative) process, but the dialectic is not purely discursive. It includes dialectical relations been discourse and other elements of states of affairs in which discourse is operationalized, including decision, action and change as steps in an activity type. So there is a ‘relational’ dialectic as well as the epistemological (and purely discursive) dialectic. But through the relational dialectic, de-
liberation as a step in an activity type also contributes to an ‘ontological’ dialectic in which a clash between the existing state of affairs and imagined alternatives can lead to a more adequate states of affairs. And it contributes to a ‘practical’ dialectic, in which a clash between existing ways of acting and imagined alternatives can lead to better ways of acting. Dialectical deliberation is a learning (epistemological) process in which learning about better reasons and arguments is at the same time learning about better states of affairs and better actions which might achieve them.

CDA can be seen as dialogue with the political argumentation which it critiques, a sort of deliberation that is however one-sided because those whose argumentation is challenged don’t usually take part. But CDA also aims to contribute to deliberation in political action to change the existing state of affairs ‘for the better’. CDA is not itself politics, but its critique and analysis can support politics, as critical social analysis in general aims to do. Through dialogue with existing practical arguments, CDA formulates its own practical arguments in support of action to achieve goals which offer solutions to the problems it diagnoses (its own problematizations of existing states of affairs). CDA does not always explicitly advocate solutions, sometimes it is just ‘negative’ critique of existing states of affairs, but possible solutions are usually implicit. Arguably CDA should explicitly link diagnosis of problems to identification of solutions, ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ critique.

Practical argumentation can be critically questioned in three main ways (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012). A practical conclusion (Claim) can be questioned on the grounds that the consequences of the advocated action would undermine essential goals; premises can be questioned in terms of truth or ‘rational acceptability’; the argument itself can be questioned on the grounds that the conclusion (Claim) does not follow from the premises. The critical questioning of Claims and of Circumstantial and Goal premises, like the problematization of the existing state of affairs discussed above, requires explanation. It is only on the basis of explanatory analysis of the existing state of affairs that we can determine what consequences are likely to follow from what actions, whether the problematization of the state of affairs is adequately supported by explanation, and whether the imagined state of affairs (goal) is achievable in the existing state of affairs. Consequently, the critique of Claims and Circumstantial and Goal premises is explanatory critique, as well as normative critique.

My emphasis on explanation is not new, it has been a feature of my approach from the beginning (Fairclough 1989), but the integration of critique, explanation and action enabled by the turn to argumentation is new. The argumentative turn also has other advantages. It is a response to criticism that CDA merely seeks to justify conclusions and solutions which accord with practitioners’ political ‘biases’.
By being explicit about its own argumentation, CDA makes it clear that its objectives are critical, explanatory and transformative but not justificatory, and also how its argumentation can be critically questioned and challenged, and be open to retrospective evaluation in the light of subsequent events. The most encouraging example in my work was a paper on marketisation of universities published 22 years ago (Fairclough 1993), whose analysis (problematization) of the state of affairs in universities in terms of relations between marketisation and changes in discourse, and whose suggested solutions, appear to have been broadly vindicated by events. CDA could provide the process of public deliberation with a systematic critique of proposals and alternatives. Deliberation in public decision-making has a number of stages (see the 8-stage model in chapter 6 of Fairclough & Fairclough 2012), and CDA could be included at the stage where proposals (eg by government) are critically tested, and, if found deficient, assessed against alternatives. Where available alternatives are themselves deficient, CDA can produce its own alternatives and arguments in support of them.

The argumentative turn also helps to avoid a confusion about how CDA should be evaluated which can arise from quantitative tendencies in the current popularity of corpus linguistics. Numbers may have a very minor supporting role, but the quality of CDA is a matter of how well its argumentation and the critique and analysis incorporated within it stand up to critical questioning and to the turn of events. It may also provide a yardstick against which work which is claimed to be CDA can be measured. For example, much work in CDA focuses upon the contrast between positive self-representation and negative other-representation, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction, sometimes focusing narrowly on, for instance, the pronoun ‘we’. Such issues of representation are important, but we need to establish their importance by integrating our analysis of them into critical and explanatory analysis of the social and discursive activity in which they assume importance.

The Kilburn Manifesto

The Kilburn Manifesto (KM) is a political manifesto for transcending neoliberalism (Hall, Massey & Rustin 2015). Why use a manifesto to illustrate CDA as dialectical reasoning? Because CDA’s concern is not just with criticizing existing reality but also with political action to change it, and manifestos are part of political action. KM has arisen from a body of analysis and debate centred recently around the journal Soundings, but extending back to the 1970s crisis and emergence of neoliberalism, and including earlier manifestos. Stuart Hall’s Gramscian political approach in cultural studies, which I drew upon in Fairclough (1989), has been
particularly influential. Can CDA, as well as learning from it, help to take further KM's view of neoliberalism and the political struggle against it? Can there be a ‘give-and-take’ between the critical analysis of CDA and the politics of such political groups? I refer to parts of the KM by chapter number, apart from the introductory Framing Statement.

Discourse in KM

Hall, Massey & Rustin (Framing Statement: 8) begin by stating that ‘mainstream political debate does not recognise the depth of the crisis, nor the consequent need for radical rethinking ... We therefore offer this analysis as a contribution to the debate, in the hope that it will help people on the left think more about how we can shift the parameters of the debate, from one concerning small palliative and restorative measures, to one which opens the way for moving towards a new political era and new understandings of what constitutes the good society’. Discourse (‘debate’) is at the heart of KM, and the central idea is that a social ‘settlement’ like neoliberalism (or a part of it such as marketised universities) has its particular ‘parameters’ or ‘terms of debate’ which must be changed in changing the settlement. Changing the terms of debate can produce a form of debate which ‘opens the way’ to transcending neoliberalism. CDA can use this idea, but it can also help to take it further.

Discourse figures in two main ways in KM, as ‘debate’ (a form of deliberation) and as ‘vocabularies’ (i.e. ‘discourses’ in the sense of particular ways of representing aspects of reality). On the one hand there is debate, the forms of argument that feature within it, and the ‘terms of debate’, including what can/cannot be politically debated and how this changes as social settlements change, e.g. from social democracy to neoliberalism. On the other hand, there are the vocabularies which are predominantly used to describe people and things, world views and the theories which underlie them, the various social (political, cultural) effects they have, and again how they change as socioeconomic settlements change. There is a separate chapter on vocabularies (Chapter 1). They are ‘enacted’ in practices (e.g. the ‘freedom of choice’ ascribed to individuals is enacted in the ‘mandatory exercise’ of ‘free choice’ in e.g. choosing your doctor), and both of them ‘embody and enforce the ideology of neoliberalism’, affirming that one is ‘above all a consumer, functioning in a market’. Such vocabularies affect our identities, our relationships, and our world, contribute to forming ideologies and ‘common sense’, and contribute to placing us in a ‘political straitjacket’ by limiting the options we have. ‘Discourse matters’. In the changes of vocabulary associated with neoliberalism, people
are enjoined to be (‘interpellated as’) ‘consumers’, be they students, patients, passengers or whatever. The ‘so-called truth underpinning this change in descriptions’ is that ‘individual interests are the only reality that matters’ and these are ‘purely monetary’, and the ‘theoretical justification’ which lies behind this is ‘the idea of a world of independent agents whose choices, made for their own advantage, paradoxically benefit all’ (Chapter 1: 9-11).

The connection between debate and vocabularies is suggested in: ‘Neoliberal ideas set the parameters – provide the “taken-for-granteds” – of public discussion, media debate and popular calculation’ (Framing Statement: 17). This actually connects debate with neoliberal ‘ideas’ rather than vocabularies, but since ideas appear in the discursive form of vocabularies (discourses), we may take it that it is latter that ‘set the parameters’ of debate, which amounts to providing the ‘taken-for-granteds’, the assumptions. The assumptions in debate depend on, and vary with, the discourse (vocabulary).

Changing the terms of debate

How can CDA as dialectical reasoning add to and help develop KM’s discourse-oriented analysis of neoliberalism and its view of political struggle to transcend it? What are ‘terms of debate’, and what is involved in changing them, from the perspective of this version of CDA, and how is it that a form of debate with the right terms, produced by changing the terms of debate, could ‘open the way’ to transcending neoliberalism, as the Manifesto suggests? What does ‘open the way’ mean?

The terms of a particular debate, such as the political debate in Britain about how to overcome the 2007+ crisis, depend upon which discourses are included or favoured, as opposed to excluded or disfavoured. For example, was a revolutionary political discourse included in this debate, and if so was it a favoured discourse or a disfavoured and marginal one? I would say that it was a marginal presence. The selection (inclusion/exclusion) of discourses determines what we can take to be other aspects of the terms of debate, including what is assumed or taken for granted. For example, the necessity of restoring economic growth in the aftermath of the crisis was an assumption associated with the most prominent economic discourses, both neoliberal and Keynesian. Other aspects of the terms of debate which are discourse-dependent include: how existing states of affairs can be problematized, and therefore what range of solutions (goals and actions) are available; what range of reasons for or against actions are available, and what counts as ‘reasonable’; what range of explanations are available, and what counts as ‘explana-
tory’. Changing the terms of debate is basically changing the range of discourses which are included and favoured, but doing so also changes these other aspects.

In terms of the ‘educative’ aspect of politics (see below), problematization makes a particularly clear connection for political activists between changing the terms of debate and opening up possibilities for action and change, because how states of affairs are problematized affects the solutions (action and change) that are available. Hall, Massey & Rustin (Framing Statement: 21) state that the purpose of KM is to develop ‘a political project which transcends the limitations of conventional thinking as to what is “reasonable” to propose or do’. But although KM is much concerned with explanation, it does not explicitly connect explanation to critique and action, nor to debate, whereas these connections are crucial in CDA as dialectical reasoning. The selection (inclusion/exclusion, favouring/disfavouring) of discourses delimits the range of both reasons and explanations and therefore what counts as ‘reasonable’ and ‘explanatory’, and these are important aspects of the terms of debate. For example, both neoliberal and Keynesian economic discourses provide reasons in favour of actions which promote economic growth, and arguments along these lines count as reasonable in the perspective of these discourses (though not in the perspective of Green economic discourses). And for many political-economic discourses, explanation in terms of structures is an essential condition for debate to count as explanatory. Changing the terms of debate with respect to explanation can mean adding it where it is absent, or improving it where it is present. Highlighting ‘reasons’ and ‘causes’, and as I suggest below ‘motives’, might give a useful focus to the ‘educative’ political aims of KM.

How is it, in the perspective of CDA as dialectical reasoning, that a form of debate produced by changing the terms of debate could ‘open the way’ to radical change, including the transcendence of neoliberalism? It is partly because changing the possibilities for problematizing the existing state of affairs also changes the range of possible solutions, and the alternative states of affairs and action to achieve them that can be imagined and advocated, potentially including radical change. It is also to do with dialectical relations between discourse and other social elements. Explanation of how aspects of the existing state of affairs lead to normatively problematic discourse and how the latter affects the former identifies such dialectic relations.

Debate (a form of deliberation) needs to be analysed as part of the sequence deliberation-decision-action-change associated with activity types such as political problem-solving, as I argued earlier. Action and change are steps in the sequence, but they are also imagined in debate, and how they are imagined affects the range of actions and changes that are possible. In terms of dialectical relations, imagined
actions may be realized (‘operationalized’) in real actions, and thereby imagined change may be realized in real change. Changing the discourses means changing the possibilities for imagined action and change, which means also changing the possibilities for real action and change. I also suggested how the ‘epistemological’ dialectic of debate connects with a ‘relational’ dialectic (dialectical relations between discourse and other social elements) and thereby ‘ontological’ and ‘practical’ dialectics. In this perspective, debate is seen as a necessary part of action to bring about change, the terms of debate as affecting (constraining/enabling) the possibilities for action and change, and changing the terms of debate as changing those possibilities, either further constraining them, or enabling them to be opened up and extended. But what can these CDA ideas contribute to the political aims of KM? They can perhaps help people grasp how existing discourse can block social change, how changing the ‘terms of debate’ can open it up, and so how important it is to critique and challenge the terms of debate.

The ‘educative’ function of politics

Hall & O’Shea (KM Chapter 3; 22) formulate a strategy for left politics and a view of its ‘educative’ character:

The left and the Labour Party must take the struggle over common sense seriously. Politics, as Gramsci insisted, is always “educative”. We must acknowledge the insecurities which underlie common sense’s confusions and contradictions, and harness the intensity and anger ... Labour must use every policy issue as an opportunity, not only to examine the pragmatics, but to highlight the underlying principle, slowly building an alternative consensus of “popular philosophy”. It must harness to this the already strongly existing sense of unfairness and injustice. In other words, it must engage in a two-way learning process, leading to what Gramsci called “an organic cohesion in which feeling-passion becomes understanding”.

Let us rework this in terms of CDA as dialectical reasoning. The fourth sentence (‘Labour must ...’) advocates a way of arguing and deliberating in political debate: in its argumentation over policies, the left should argue about goals and values (‘highlight the underlying principle’) as well as means to achieve goals (‘examine the pragmatics’). It should debate not only with other political positions and arguments but also with ‘common sense’ argumentation. It should ‘engage in a two-way learning process’ which both transforms the ‘confusions and contradictions’ of common sense and ‘harnesses’ its ‘feeling-passion’, seeking to convert it into ‘understanding’ and to achieve an ‘organic cohesion’
between the two, thereby taking ‘struggle over common sense seriously’ and seeking to shift common sense towards a new consensus. Although they do not formulate it in this way, what Hall & O’Shea are advocating is a shift in the terms of debate, which is at the same time a shift in common sense. The left needs to draw upon common sense to do it: to draw upon the ‘passion’ and ‘sense of unfairness and injustice’ to shift values, but also to convert them into ‘understanding’ by formulating goals and actions which resonate with them. In so doing, the left is also seeking to form political constituencies and political subjects, which do not exist ‘ready-made ... they have to actively be constructed’ (Chapter 11, 197), as well as political agents to bring about change.

This takes us in the direction of an issue which I do not have space to properly address here: how rhetoric and deliberation are combined in political deliberation. It suggests that while rhetoric is, as generally recognized, to do with persuading people, it is not just a matter of accommodating to or playing upon what they already feel, believe and take for granted. In politics it is, or ought to be, engaging critically and constructively with people’s common sense feelings and beliefs in working up practical arguments and policies which they can become the subjects of and agents for. Rhetoric can have a positive and constructive role in political deliberation.

Drawing upon the ‘feeling-passion’ of common sense, e.g. people not just believing and claiming that something is unfair but feeling and being moved by the unfairness, is drawing upon values (in Value premises) and how people evaluate things on the basis of them. But ‘values’ as we note in Fairclough & Fairclough (2012) is too narrow, ‘concerns’ would be more comprehensive. People argue from motives which animate and drive them, including their passions (which may include greed and gross self-interest), they argue from their emotions and feelings, not just from values arrived at through reasoning; an agent needs to ‘care’ about the realization of a value to turn it into a motive for action. There is a difference between acting on the basis of reasons and arguments (and analysis and evidence) and acting on the basis of feelings and passions, but they are not simply alternatives: people argue and deliberate (i.e. evaluate and respond to others’ arguments) on the basis of affective concerns, motives, which shape their interpretation of circumstances (and how they ‘problematicize’ them) and the goals and actions which they advocate. This dialectical view of argument as merging reasons and motives, as well as causes, resonates with the Gramscian perspective which informs KM.

But shouldn’t the left’s attempt to shift the terms of debate also include a shift towards dialectical reasoning? Dialectical reasoning is a powerful political as
well as analytic tool which can be of service to would-be political agents (anyone seeking to change reality for the better – politicians, party members, political activists, active citizens), as well as to critical social analysts as I suggested earlier. It starts from critique of discourse, i.e. from things which are largely discernible though not always discerned –problematic features of discourse and arguments. It then seeks to explain such features in terms of less discernible (partly ‘underlying’) features of existing reality, thereby extending critique beyond discourse to the wider social reality, and identifying what aspects of reality need changing, what change is possible, and how it might be achieved, as a basis for a practical conclusion about what action to take. Critique of discourse (debate) is an effective wedge to open up the wider social reality to analysis/ critique and thereby action/ change because the discourse is a part of the wider reality, a step towards action and change which imagines and prefigures them as well as representing and explaining the existing reality. This is not a novel view. As I said earlier, Marx’s critical method, drawing upon Aristotle, takes critique of discourse as its point of departure. Moreover, seeing and critiquing argumentation not in isolation but as the beginning of action is the basis for interpreting its dialectical character in a materialist rather than idealist way.

Politicians and political activists are used to deliberating and debating, and identifying and engaging with the arguments of others, but what Hall & O’Shea are proposing is an art of political debate which is not easy to achieve and requires learning, in formal education or practical politics or ideally a combination of the two. So too does dialectical reasoning. Part of what is involved here is changes in schooling (language education) similar to the ‘critical language awareness’ advocated within CDA as a part of ‘education for democracy’ in the 1990s (Fairclough 2010), as part of the educational conditions for making radical social change an option.

Gramsci (1995: 297-303) argues that dialectic is a ‘new way of thinking, a new philosophy’, but also ‘a new technique’ which he calls ‘the technique of thought’, which will ‘provide people with criteria’ to ‘carry out checks and make judgements’ and ‘correct distortions in common sense ways of thinking’. It is ‘as important to teach this technique as it is to teach reading and writing’. Dialectical reasoning provides a technique of thought and a way of arguing and deliberating which can identify, explain, critique and open the way to changing the terms of debate, itself as part of a way of acting to change existing reality. It is I think consistent with the Gramscian perspective of KM and it can be learnt and taught and transmitted through left politics in a form
which meshes with Hall & O’Shea’s view of the struggle over common sense. It is perhaps a way for CDA to contribute to political action to change existing reality for the better.

What would people need to know about dialectical reasoning? These are essential elements.

1. How to recognize an argument. Arguments are often partly implicit, and need to be reconstructed from texts, i.e. formulated in an explicit way.
2. How to identify what type of argument it is.
3. How to identify the premises and conclusion of an argument, including which discourses are drawn upon and what reasons are given.
4. How to evaluate (critically question) a practical argument: its Claim, in terms of its likely consequences; its premises, including values, goals and the representation/problematization of circumstances; and the inference from premises to conclusion.
5. How to identify an explanation and its constituent parts (explanans and explanandum), and how to evaluate it.
6. How to identify reasons, motives and causes, and the connections between them.
7. How to evaluate and critique argumentation as the first step in the sequence: deliberation-decision-action-change.
8. How to develop counter-arguments.
9. How to identify the ‘terms of debate’ and their limitations, how to approach changing the terms of debate.

Conclusion

I have envisaged people in CDA opening a dialogue with those involved in political action. Often the same person does both, so the dialogue might be in part between different sides of oneself. Working in a transdisciplinary way with colleagues in Sociology or Politics departments can also be seen as opening a dialogue, but the dialogue with politics seems less transient and more a matter of what we do anyway. The perspective of political action should be consistently brought into what we do, and we need more reflection on the connections and the differences between analytical (critical-explanatory) concerns and political concerns. CDA and politics are different but connected, and it is important to insist upon both the connection and the difference to avoid confusion. In terms of the Aristotelian sequence, CDA contributes to deliberation (as does politics), but decision and action are not part of CDA but of political action. However, CDA as dialectical reasoning shows how
deliberation enables and constrains decision, action and change, and how they can be opened up by changing the terms of debate.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the late Doreen Massey for her comments on a draft of this chapter, and Isabela Fairclough for discussion of ideas in the chapter and comments on several drafts.

References


