Interview with Professor Elizabeth Closs Traugott

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A distinguished scholar, Professor Emerita of Linguistics and English at Stanford University, California, Elizabeth C. Traugott has been one of the most prominent researchers of the last decades, as she has explored historical syntax, semantics and pragmatics, grammaticalization and lexicalization, among other topics. Her many publications include important works such as “A History of English Syntax” (1972), “Approaches to Grammaticalization” (1991, co-edited with Bernd Heine, 2 volumes), “Grammaticalization” (1993, with Paul Hopper, and a much revised second edition in 2003), “Regularity in Semantic Change” (2002, with Richard B. Dasher), “Lexicalization and Language Change” (2005, with Laurel J. Brinton), “Gradience, Gradualness and Grammaticalization” (2010, co-edited with Graeme Trousdale), and “The Oxford Handbook of the History of English” (2012, with Terttu Nevalainen). Currently working on a book with professor Graeme Trousdale (University of Edinburgh) on constructionalization, her current research focuses on ways to bring the theories of construction grammar, grammaticalization and lexicalization together in a unified theory of constructional change. Through this electronic interview, her expertise on historical linguistics makes for a delightful insight into linguistic change, subject of the present issue of Revista Linguística. The prelude to the questions3 has been kindly and spontaneously written by her and it reads as follows:

Elizabeth Traugott: First of all, thank you for a set of excellent questions. Some deserve a whole article for an adequate response, but I will be relatively brief. Fuller answers should be available by the end of the year in Traugott and Trousdale (In Press).

Research leads to new insights, non-stop revision, and new attempts to solve old problems, so my ideas have been evolving. Most of my work has been coauthored, and this has provided a wonderful opportunity to explore, thrash out and articulate new ideas. Much that I wrote and published several years ago, or that owing to exigencies of delayed publication is still in press, may not represent my thinking, so I appreciate the opportunity to be able to lay out some of my current thinking.

One of my latest projects has been to ask how construction grammar might offer new ways to think about language change in general, including, but not limited to, grammaticalization and lexicalization. In the 90s I started thinking that grammaticalization cannot be only or mainly reduction—bleaching,
coalescence, fusion, obligatorification, etc., as had been suggested in e.g. Lehmann (1995). Such reductions logically lead to increases in distribution such as are discussed in Himmelmann (2004). For example, when *be going to* became an auxiliary, it came to be used in more and more host-class (collocational) contexts that are not obviously compatible or even incompatible with the earlier motion construction, (e.g. verbs like *leave, think*), and syntactic contexts (e.g. raising constructions like *There is going to be a storm*); eventually there was morphophonological reduction to *be gonna* due to increased frequency of use.

Once I had settled on this approach I realized that lexicalization too is not limited to reduction. In the lexical domain expansion is illustrated by the development of word formation patterns out of compounds. Some items that arise from word formation are reduced in ways associated with lexicalization. For example, in Old English N2 in several compounds came to be used as derivational morphemes, e.g. *dom* and *raeden*, both meaning ‘status’. *-Dom* has survived and is still productive (often with slightly pejorative pragmatics, cf. *Obamadom*).

But after a short period of productivity *-raeden* was lost as a derivational morpheme. It survives in two frozen relics: *hated* and *kindred*, both of which underwent morphophonological reduction similar to that of *be gonna*. Construction grammar provides an excellent framework for thinking about such intertwined sets of changes since it requires thinking in terms of a) form and meaning equally b) both individual substantive constructions and the largely abstract schemas into which they are recruited, and c) the larger network in which all constructions participate. Because no sharp distinction is made between lexicon and grammar (see your Q1), it is also an excellent framework within which to recognize the remarkable similarities in development between what used to be sharply distinguished: grammaticalization and lexicalization.

**EntreviSta:** In Brinton & Traugott (2005), you present concepts to both lexicalization and grammaticalization as part of a same continuum, in which lexicon and grammar are in opposite ends. There would be different degrees of grammaticalization and lexicalization. As for today, with your interest revolving towards a more constructional approach, how do you conceptualize lexicon and grammar?

**Elizabeth Traugott:** There are no distinct modules in construction grammar, therefore there is no categorical distinction between lexicon and grammar. Lexical constructions can be thought of as contentful, grammatical constructions as procedural. The architecture of construction grammar puts lexicon and grammar on a “cline” (Goldberg and Jackendoff 2004: 532) or “gradation” (Langacker 2011: 96) with contentful, referential, and truth-conditional constructions at one pole and procedural, non-referential, and non-truth-conditional ones at the other pole. They are gathered together in the “constructicon”.

Perhaps I should mention, since this is not always agreed on, that in my view a construction can be of any size, from inflectional morpheme to complex sentence (Goldberg 2006).

**EntreviSta:** According to this concept of grammar, what would be the relationship between it and constructional pattern trajectories proposed by you in Traugott (2008)?

**Elizabeth Traugott:** From correspondence I understand that by “constructional pattern trajectories” you mean the steps I proposed for the change of partitive binominals to quantitative binominals. I think the steps from a) NP1 of NP2 in which NP1 is the head and the meaning is partitive (more properly pseudo-partitive because both NPs are indefinite) to 2) NP1 of NP2 in which NP2 is head
and the meaning of NP1 is quantificational, and to 3) degree modifiers are more or less correct. But this is a very early attempt on my part to think about language change in construction grammar terms and I would now make some modifications.

First, because the focus is on constructions, i.e. form-meaning pairings, the notation should not be so syntactic: every construction should appear in a notation that involves [Form] Õ [Meaning]. Here the Double-headed arrow ‘Õ’ indicates the symbolic correspondence link between form and meaning. Second, there is no reason to start the history of a sort/lot/shred of with NP of NP. We had to do that in the framework of grammaticalization because form was kept reasonably constant. With construction grammar, however, we can show a longer history, starting with inflected examples, e.g. hlot landes ‘piece land GEN’. The shift from inflectional case to preposition is then treated as an independent change (along with other system replacements of case by prepositions). Third, we need to look beyond the particular examples to see whether there were any exemplars which might have served as models. We find one in OE dael ‘piece’ + N GEN; but unsurprisingly, its development is not quite the same (each construction has its own history, within the larger set of changes ongoing in the language). By ME a deal of came to be associated in almost all quantifying uses with a quantifying modifier like great. Deal is still found as a quantifier with such a modifier (16thC examples of bare quantifier uses seem distinctly odd to the PDE ear, e.g. What a deal of brine/Hath washed thy sallow cheeks for Rosaline, Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet). In other words, one needs to look for the set of changes as well as the individual change (see Brems 2011).

As to the formalism in Figure 2 in the 2008 paper, I do not use boxes any more, since boxes tend to block flexible thinking; but they were useful in an initial attempt to show how Croft’s (2001) three form dimensions and three meaning dimensions change independently. What we need, I think, is a feature system such as is used in head-driven-phrase-structure-grammar such as is used in Fried and Östman (2004), or sign-based-construction-grammar (Boas and Sag 2012), but without some of the attendant theoretical assumptions about universality and innateness (though these assumptions have themselves been undergoing modification) and adapted to a usage-based approach to construction grammar.

In rethinking language change in terms of construction grammar, I (and also Graeme Trousdale) distinguish between constructional changes and constructionalization (see my In Press paper). Constructional changes are changes to individual components/features of a construction, constructionalization is the development of a form new-meaning new pairing. The “steps” in my 2008 paper can be correlated with constructionalizations. One needs also to be able to show the micro-steps (constructional changes) that precede constructionalization (see your Q4 on gradualness).

Entrevista: In your research, you correlate linguistic change with both subjectification and intersubjectification. What kind of changes could be associated with these concepts? How does metonym interlock with them?

Elizabeth Traugott: “Correlate” is a bit strong. In my view only some changes are associated with (inter)subjectification. To me -ation is very important – it denotes development and change. So although there is (inter)subjectivity in all language use because of dyadic interaction between speaker and addressee (see Benveniste 1958[1971]), there is change toward more subjective (speaker-oriented) or more intersubjective (addressee-oriented) meaning only in some cases. My current view of the changes is as in (1) (based on Traugott 2010a: 35):
a. In subjectification meanings are recruited by the speaker to encode and index speaker attitude or viewpoint.

b. In intersubjectification meanings are recruited by the speaker to encode and index the speaker’s relation and attention to the addressee.

Subjectification occurs in both the content domain, e.g. the development of *churl*, and in the procedural domain, e.g. the development of epistemic *must*, of binominal quantifiers like a *lot of*, or of metatextual markers like *as far as*, or *since*. It tends to occur more frequently in the development of procedural constructions because procedurals provide cues concerning the speaker’s construal of relationships such as the argument structure (case), veridicality (modality), temporal relations (tense, aspect), textual and metatextual connectivity (connectives, pragmatic markers), etc. Intersubjectification tends to be more closely associated with changes in the contentful than the procedural domain, in my view. However, some modal and pragmatic marker meanings may become intersubjectified when they are used to elicit response, rapport, etc., as is discussed below in connection with question tags. Both subjectification and intersubjectification involve metonymy to the speech act in that they are associated with speaker and addressee (“external” metonymy) as well as to the content (“internal” metonymy).

An example of subjectification in the content domain is the development of *churl*. In Old English *ceorl* meant ‘man’. There are several references in Beowulf to *snotere ceorlas* ‘wise men’. How did *ceorl* then come to mean ‘boor, rude person? (*boor* itself underwent very similar changes from the meaning ‘farmer’). In part there was a cultural factor—with the importation of feudalism from France into England in the Middle English period former free men became bondsmen. But even if the reference to social status changed, this in itself doesn’t explain the pejoration. We find examples like (2) in ME texts:

(2) Wiltu ben ərl? Go hom swipe,  
    fule drit, *cherl*!  
    foul turd, *churl*!  
    ‘Do you want to be an earl? Get gone fast, foul sh*t, churl!’  
    (c1300 Havelok 682 [MED *cherl* 2, OED *churl* 5])

In (2) we find both social class meaning and pragmatic implicature. The addressee is a bondsman (*ceorl*) hired to murder Havelock. He has asked to be made a free man as a reward for the deed (which he did not actually perform but the speaker does not know this). So *cherl* is an address term in (2) referring to social status. But the speaker’s rhetorical purpose and evaluation of the situation extends to the rank term itself (metonymic implicature across the apposition *fule drit, cherl*). By the late 14thC part of codified this pragmatic meaning might appear to have become codified (semanticized):

(3) Metellius, the foule *cherl*, the swyn.  
    ‘Metellius, the foul fellow, the swine’.  
    (c1386 Chaucer Wife of Bath’s Prol. 460 [OED *churl* 5])

However, collocation with *foule* projects pejorative evaluation, so codification may in fact not yet have taken place. In (3) we have an example of “unobtrusive”, “sneaky” micro-step actuation (Vandewinkel & Davidse 2008, De Smet 2012) via metonymic pejoration from the modifier to
the head. It is only when we find examples without modifiers that we can say semanticization has clearly occurred:

(4) Fie! thou’rt a churl; ye’ve got a humour there
     Does not become a man; ‘tis much to blame.
     ‘Fie, you are a churl; you have a temperament that is not suitable for a man; it is to be blamed greatly.’ (c. 1605 Shakespeare, Timon of Athens I.ii.26)

We find the same sort of thing with procedural change, which, as has been said for a long time, always occurs in context (one point of the churl example is that lexical change occurs in context too!). The changes are metonymic to meanings in that context. In the case of modals and other auxiliaries, the context is usually the clause (control or no-control syntax, type of associated verb, etc.) and the invited inferences arising within it. In the case of the binominal quantifiers, the relevant context is the nominal phrase, especially ambiguities arising when NP2 is plural, as in (5):

(5) Mrs. Furnish at St. James’s has ordered Lots of Fans, and China, and India Pictures to be set by for her, ‘till she can borrow Mony to pay for ‘em. (1708 Baker, Fine Lady Airs [LION: English Prose Drama; Traugott 2008: 231])

Lots of fans could mean ‘units of fans for sale’ or ‘many fans’ (if one buys several lots of anything, one buys a largish quantity of them) (see Langacker (2009) on a lot of sheep is for sale vs. a lot of sheep are for sale; the agreement differences here show the head shift that has occurred with the quantifiers).

I’d like to take the opportunity to comment on a couple of alternative positions. De Smet and Verstraete (2006) have argued that words like churl, boor, villain, etc. are ideationally and semantically subjective, and part of the propositional content. On the other hand causal connectors like since and because are not part of the propositional content (they cannot be negated or interrogated); because they enact speaker position with respect to content and also involve “interaction with the interlocutor, because the clause introduced by the conjunction represent a separate speech act in discourse”, they are interpersonal (intersubjective) (p. 387). De Smet’s and Verstraete’s approach is primarily synchronic, and from a synchronic point of view, I agree that the meaning of churl is functionally different from that of since and because, but I would attribute this difference to the fact that churl is contentful while since and because are procedural. Because I distinguish –ation (a change perspective) from –ity (a synchronic perspective), the fact that churl is synchronically functionally different from the conjunctions does not deny that it has been historically subjectified in ways very similar to those found in procedural cases. Indeed, examples (2) and (3) suggest it arose metonymically to enactment of speaker position with respect to the referential content of churl.

Others(e.g. Ghesquière, Brems, andVan der Velde2012)argue that I have downplayed intersubjectification in procedural development too much. I certainly do not deny that intersubjectification is evidenced in procedural developments (see my paper (Traugott 2012a) on the modal adverbs and pragmatic markers no doubt (subjectified) and surely (intersubjectified)) but I do not find extensive evidence of increase in coded intersubjective meaning among procedurals. If a preposition like since comes to be used as a connective (in this case temporal or causal), or a complex preposition like as far as comes to be used as a resumptive topic marker, these new uses obviously cue the addressee to a relationship between clauses (“creation of joint attention”, Ghesquière, Brems, and Van der Velde 2012: 134), but I regard this as ambient intersubjectivity. After all, as Benveniste observed, almost
everything we say is intersubjective in the sense that it is addressed to someone and therefore creates joint attention. But neither since nor as far as in my view code more intersubjectivity than they did in earlier uses; the intersubjectivity derives from the use of complex clause relationships rather than from the new uses. A helpful example is provided by the development of tag questions. Tottie and Hoffmann (2009) show how they arise from yes-no questions in the English of the sixteenth century. Yes-no questions are unquestionably intersubjective—they serve as directives to the address to act (respond and provide information). As yes-no questions come to be used clause-finally as question tags (pragmatic markers) they are subjectified. As pragmatic markers they may be used as attitudinal markers or to elicit confirmation (as in the teacher or parent’s Two and two make four don’t they?). Those that express speaker attitude have lost their intersubjectivity. Those that elicit agreement are intersubjective, but in a different way from yes-no questions: they elicit rapport, not information responses. It is not clear to me that eliciting rapport is more intersubjective than eliciting a response, so I would argue that there has been no intersubjectification. In (6), an example from some fifty years after question tags appear with any frequency, must I is attitudinal (subjectified and subjective) and an answer is not expected, but have you appears to be an information question which is answered (intersubjective):

(6) Slender: How now, Simple! Where have you been? I must wait on myself, must I? You have not the Book of Riddles about you, have you? Simple: Book of Riddles! Why, did you not lend it to Alice Shortcake? (1602 Shakespeare, Merry Wives of Windsor I. i. 200)

These issues raise really interesting questions about what to foreground or background in any analysis, and how to find evidence for the analysis, but would take us too far afield, so I won’t pursue them further here.

EntreviSta: What would be the difference between gradience and gradualness? How does gradience intersect with grammaticalization?

Elizabeth Traugott: This has been answered in detail in Traugott and Trousdale (2010), so I will outline some main points only. As the volume you refer to is on grammaticalization, I will expand to make some reference to constructionalization. “Gradualness” has to do with change, the tiny micro-steps (constructional changes) leading to and following the new construction (constructionalization) (see Q2 above), whether contentful or procedural (see also De Smet, 2012 and Vandewinkel and Davide, 2008 on micro-steps). “Micro-” is key here – not all micro-steps are or could be conceptualized to be of the same size; the point is that they are discrete and small for each individual construction. As type-changes occur, the accumulation of changes may lead to substantial shifts (analogous to the cascades following the accumulation of parameter resettings such as Biberauer and Roberts 2008 discuss). These large-scale shifts occur at the level of the schema, not of the individual “substantive” construction.

By contrast to gradualness, in Trousdale’s and my view “gradience” has to do with synchrony, especially the variation that is the output out of change. We argue against Aarts’s (2007) distinction between subsective and intersective gradience (a distinction between minimal convergence between categories and more complete convergence), and advocate the position that there is only intersective gradience. In my current view this is because constructions occur in networks which overlap and because constructional unification inevitably involves a certain degree of “bleeding” from one category to another.
The gradualness of change does not always intersect in obvious ways with synchrony and variation, especially when historical connections have been lost. For example, I doubt that any ordinary contemporary speaker of English thinks that *be going to* in the motion sense and in the auxiliary sense are polysemous. When loss of polysemy and divergence (Hopper 1991) happened we don’t know. Presumably it happened at different times for different individuals and communities, but collectively it must have occurred by the time that *gonna* came into be recorded (c1900). What is at one time a variable polysemous relationship can become severed. However, one must always be cautious not to conclude that old structures have been lost just because they are used in a specific niche or because linguists have focused only on the new structure. A case in point is the clitic –s genitive in complex possessive constructions. As argued by Denison, Scott, and Börjars (2010) the clitic –s genitive (6a) is not the only or even the normal way to form ”group genitives” in PDE conversation, although it has been the topic of extensive discussion, especially in the degrammaticalization literature (e.g. Norde 2009). What can be construed as a relic of the old inflectional genitive is preferred (6b):

(6) a. The student *we were talking about*’s assignment is now late. (2010 Endley, *Linguistic Perspectives on English Grammar* [Google; accessed Feb. 2nd 2012])

b. We don’t know the gentleman’s name with the tape recorder (BNC FM7 8 [Denison, Scott, and Börjars 2010: 548])

What I said above about gradualness and gradience pertains to lexicalization as well as grammaticalization because it pertains to constructions in general (see the example of *churl*). There’s nothing privileged about the relationship between gradience and grammaticalization although grammaticalization was the context in which gradualness was first discussed in great depth in historical work. It became a matter of considerable debate in the late 1990s when parameters were large – reanalysis was associated with parameter shift, therefore with big abrupt changes often known as ”saltations”. Resisting Lightfoot and his interest (from 1979 on) in large-scale “catastrophic” change, some claims were made that grammaticalization was gradual (small-step) and therefore did not involve reanalysis understood as saltation (e.g. Haspelmath 1998). As time went on, however, parameters became smaller (they are now features) and large-scale saltation is not an issue in work in Minimalism any more than it is in work on grammaticalization, so there has been quite a bit of convergence in thinking about this (Roberts 2010).

Because in the 90s abruptness was often associated with reanalysis/saltation, there was a tendency to deny “abruptness” in grammaticalization. I think almost everyone would now agree that “tiny steps” imply abruptness, but of a minimal sort.

**EntreviSta:** In Traugott (2008) and Traugott and Trousdale (2010) you suggest that Construction Grammar and work on grammaticalization complement each other. How exactly do these approaches link up and what is the importance of analogy and reanalysis mechanisms in developing constructions?

**Elizabeth Traugott:** As I see it now, changes associated with grammaticalization are a non-discrete subset of procedural constructionalizations—but “grammaticalization” as it is often understood isn’t the same as the development of procedural constructionalization. Much depends of course on what is meant by grammaticalization. If by grammaticalization one means something along the lines of Lehmann’s (1995: 164) reduction parameters, they are incorporated (except for scope reduction which is not empirically supported), but they are conceptualized very differently because they are intertwined with expansion. For example, bleaching (Lehmann’s integrity parameter) involves loss
of content meaning, but gain of procedural meaning. It leads to host-class/collocational expansion, and eventually in many cases to morphophonological reduction (the segmental loss that is included in the integrity parameter). If by grammaticalization one means “The creation of grammatical categories” (Lehmann 2004: 183), this begs the question what grammatical categories are; if they are procedural constructions, then that fits well, but construction grammar demands thinking not only about type categories but about schemas, and so the idea is not equivalent. If one means Himmelmann’s context expansion, that is also included, but context expansion is not limited to the development of procedural constructions as word formation patterns expand host-class contexts too. If one means “lexical > grammatical” that is only part of the story, and indeed was only part of it for Meillet (1912[1958]), who discussed syntactization (fixing) in French of “free” word order in Latin. In other words, aspects of most of the factors that have been studied in the last forty years in morphosyntactic change and that have been included under the rubric of “grammaticalization” have been redistributed and reconceptualized.

Perhaps I should mention that the unidirectionality debate was largely a function of definitions of grammaticalization as reduction. Unidirectionality does not fall out from the definition of constructionalization (the development of a form-meaning pairing). This is at it should be, since there can be no argument about circularity (see Campbell 2001). Of course, we still have to account for the tendency for constructions to be shifted from the contentful to the procedural pole, not vice versa, and this account has to include such factors as interactive communication, frequency, replication, etc. (see Bybee 2010).

With respect to reanalysis and analogy, my view is that every tiny step change is a reanalysis (a feature of a construction has been changed), whether the change is a constructional one or a constructionalization. Reanalysis is motivated (in part) by parsing. A problem in much earlier work on analogy has been that the term has been used for both the mechanism of analogy and for analogical thinking (a motivation for change). While Fischer (2007, 2011) combines the two, I think it is important to separate them, and I prefer to call the mechanism “analogization”. Cognitively we are, as Anttila (2003: 438) said, “analogical animals”. We match things and categorize, which involves analogical thinking, but that does not necessarily lead to linguistic analogical change. Likewise, we parse and differentiate, but that does not necessarily lead to linguistic reanalysis. From a constructional perspective, since we need to think not only of individual changes undergone by specific substantive constructions but also of changes in the potential context of sets and schemas (see mention of a deal of as a potential model for a lot of in my response to Q2) we can readily account for the fact that there is a lot of analogization in language change. But every analogization is a tiny step change, and a reanalysis. I should note that, approaching change from an optimality framework, and suggesting that analogy is optimization, Kiparsky (2012: 49) came to a similar conclusion: both analogy and grammaticalization are “instances of reanalysis” (for further discussion with respect to grammaticalization, see Traugott 2011, and for the suggestions that the processing motivating reanalysis is analogy, Fischer 2011).

While Fischer and I disagree on the topic of reanalysis and analogy, one point of agreement is that change is the outcome of various processes and mechanisms. This is true of grammaticalization and constructionalization.

Entrevista: Investigating the co-text, or larger discourse context, conveys methodological repercussions on dealing with data. To what point is it possible to work through a quantitative method in this respect? How does one manage the co-text, the diversity of critical contexts and effectively controlling frequency of use, in a kind of analysis that has increasingly become more holistic and contingent?
Elizabeth Traugott: I assume you are thinking here of my paper on onset contexts (Traugott, 2012b). Since I don’t do serious quantitative work, I can’t really answer this and would defer to Martin Hilpert or Stefan Gries. In principle I think one will always have to do what one does in narrower contexts, e.g. work on modals: use corpus mining and searching as a first step, to identify possible candidates, and then check each example individually and exclude non-instances manually (Nesselhauf, 2010, provides a good account of the method in her study of future time expressions). The things that I look for include: a) replication of and persistence of implicatures across contexts, both prior and following constructionalization, e.g. does the context sustain a future reading of be going to (this requires detailed pragmatic coding which has not yet been achieved), b) argumentative purpose, e.g. is the speaker/writer’s purpose to contrast clauses, as in contexts in which IT-cleft arose (Patten 2012) (see also Detges and Waltereit 2009). A problem for quantification is that most corpus coding gives only one reading and the whole point about contexts prior to and after change is that they provide two (or more!) readings.

Entrevista: In the stage of untypical contexts or bridging contexts, in which the focus is on pragmatic and semantic scopes, is it possible to look for/identify issues of structural nature within the strong link involving form/meaning, taking into account the constructional approach?

Elizabeth Traugott: “Bridging” as used by Heine (2002), citing Evans and Wilkins (2000), refers to pragmatic ambiguity, as does “atypical context” as used in Diewald (2002, 2006). Although Diewald’s examples, being modal, involve scope, I don’t think focus has to be on scope except in domains where it is relevant, like modals, negation, pragmatic markers, etc. Given a distinction between constructional changes and constructionalization, there should in principle be no problem distinguishing pragmatic and structural changes and linking them where relevant. A pragmatic change is a change in what Croft (2001) called DF (discourse function) (I’d call it pragmatics). A structural change is a change in some aspect of form. That said, no formalism is ever going to be able to account for all modulations and slight changes, nor should it. We are linguists, and our job is to show when some feature has changed (when mismatch of some sort has occurred). This requires some idealization, as we are not dealing with individual innovations. An innovation is not a change, only an innovation that has spread counts as a change (Weinreich, Labov, and Herzog 1968 and many references since then), therefore I require at least two examples to appear in texts before I accept that a change has occurred.

Perhaps I should mention that not all instances of constructionalization (or even grammaticalization) are preceded by pragmatic ambiguity. Sometimes what may be at issue is conventionalizing of discourse and argumentative strategies. This seems to be particularly true when information-structuring implicatures become conventionalized in contrastive focus contexts (see Patten 2011 on the development of IT-clefts and Traugott 2010b on the development of pseudo-clefts; also Lehmann 2008).

Entrevista: The grammatical constructionalization model (Traugott In Press:16) has a much larger range than grammaticalization model, namely, it involves changes that haven’t been considered in work of grammaticalization yet. What is the scope of the new concept?

Elizabeth Traugott: As I hope I’ve indicated above, the scope is language change in general. That said, I am not clear how segmental phonological change will be included. Constructional approaches to date have not been very adequate. A basic problem is that a construction is a form-meaning pairing and segmental phonology is often not meaningful or correlated with meaning; prosody is a different matter, since it typically interfaces with information structure and other meaningful
phenomena (see e.g. Hinterhölz and Petrova 2009). Prosody can potentially be included in the form component of a construction.

The important thing in my view is that we continue to explore theoretical questions about how to best account for change. Construction grammar is a good framework for rethinking grammaticalization and lexicalization because of the insistence on form and meaning pairings. These have in fact always been at the heart of both areas of research. Earlier frameworks typically led us to focus on form or on meaning, but not both together, although the one could never be easily discussed without the other. There is still a lot to work out, but the endeavor has proved fruitful not only in revisiting old examples, but in exploring new ones such as the gradual proceduralization of the way-construction (it has become increasingly aspectual over time), and others that have both contentful and procedural developments, such as those of the originally derivational construction -ish (Kuzmak 2007, Trousdale 2011, Traugott and Trousdale In Press: Chapter 6).

REFERENCES


