SQUIB: A NOTE ON THE ANALYSIS OF TOO AS A DISCOURSE MARKER

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ABSTRACT

Heim (1990), Kripke (2009) and van der Sandt & Geurts (2001) argued that the adverb too is an anaphoric presupposition trigger. Contrary to this view Zeevat (2003) proposed that too should rather be analyzed as a marker of additive discourse relations, which he argued offers a better explanation of its resistance to presupposition accommodation. This squib is a critical examination of Zeevat’s (2003) analysis. I argue that nothing is gained by reanalyzing too as a discourse marker.

KEY WORDS: presuppositions, discourse markers, too

1. INTRODUCTION

In a classical analysis (see Kripke 2009, Heim 1990), too triggers an anaphoric presupposition which is restricted by association with focus. Consider for instance (1) from Kripke (2009). Here, too triggers a presupposition that a particular individual, which is salient in the discourse context and is distinct from Sam, is having dinner in New York tonight. The position of pitch accent (indicated by capitalizing SAM) constrains the selection of the antecedent: it must be an individual that belongs to the set of alternatives to the focused expression. The background of the sentence further restricts the resolution of anaphora, by requiring that this individual had dinner in New York.

(1) SAM is having dinner in New York tonight, too.

Kripke and Heim argued that the anaphoric nature of the presupposition triggered by too explains its resistance to accommodation. This line of thought has been developed in subsequent works in dynamic semantics, notably Heim (1991b), and later van der Sandt & Geurts (2001). However, this analysis has been more recently criticized by Zeevat (2003). In short, Zeevat claims that the presupposition of too differs in several respects from the presupposition of bona fide anaphoric presupposition triggers, such as personal pronouns. From this, he concludes that too is not a presupposition trigger, but a marker of discourse relations that hold between the proposition denoted by the sentence marked by too and a previously uttered proposition. Both propositions are assumed to be partial answers to a
common question under discussion. In this note, I argue that Zeevat’s reanalysis of too as a discourse marker is unmotivated. In particular, I show that Zeevat’s description of the lack of accommodation of the presupposition triggered by too is misguided, and that the theory he offers as a substitute to the presuppositional analysis is too restrictive.

2. THE CLASSICAL ANALYSIS

2.1. Kripke on presupposition and anaphora

Some of the most influential analyses of too as a presupposition trigger were existential: in the sentence JOHN will have dinner in New York, the adverb too would presuppose that there is someone other than John who will have dinner in New York. This is the case in Karttunen & Peters’s (1979) analysis, who argue that many putative presuppositions are really conventional implicatures, and propose an existential analysis of the implicature conventionally attached to too:

(2) “JOHN drinks too”, where too focuses on John, conventionally implicates that there is someone else who drinks besides John. (Karttunen & Peters 1979)

This position was criticized in Kripke (2009), who argued that a number of presuppositions that were analyzed as involving existential quantification over entities are actually singular propositions involving anaphoric reference to discursively salient entities. According to Kripke, too in (3) is anaphoric to a salient individual, and triggers the presupposition that this individual is not Sam and is having dinner in New York. This contrasts with the existential presupposition that would be attributed to the sentence, which is that there is someone other than Sam who is having dinner in New York.

(3) SAM is having dinner in New York tonight, too.

One argument advanced by Kripke is that (3) is infelicitous when it is uttered ‘out of the blue’, when no context is given in which the interlocutors are concerned about someone having dinner in New York. This is unexpected if the presupposition triggered by too is that someone other than Sam is having dinner in New York, for surely it is common knowledge that millions of men and women do so every night. On the other hand, Kripke’s proposal predicts that an utterance of (3) out of the blue will lead to a presupposition failure, since too cannot find a proper antecedent in the absence of a previous context. A consequence of this analysis of the infelicity of (3) out of the blue is that we must say that the presupposition of too cannot be accommodated. In this respect, the presupposition of too contrasts with other presuppositions, such as the ones triggered by possessive pronouns. Kripke remarks for instance that if one utters (4), the hearer would naturally infer that the speaker has a sister, although this information is not asserted but is presupposed. Lewis (1979) dubbed this process presupposition accommodation.

(4) I am going to meet my sister.

In the terminology of Abusch (2002), too is therefore a hard trigger: it resists presupposition accommodation, as opposed to soft triggers like possessive pronouns, whose presuppositions can be accommodated. Kripke offers a second argument to support the anaphoric analysis of too, which builds on the projection of its presupposition from the consequence of conditionals. Consider the following sentence:
(5) If Herb comes to the party, the BOSS will come, too.

According to Karttunen & Peters (1979), the presupposition (or rather, conventional implicature) of the conditional is *if Herb comes, someone other than the Boss will come*. Nevertheless, Karttunen and Peters recognize that one infers from (3) that Herb is not the boss, and propose that this inference arises as a conversational implicature. The idea is that one might wonder on what grounds the speaker asserts that Herb’s coming to the party entails that someone other than the Boss will come. A reasonable explanation is that the speaker knows that Herb is not the boss. Whatever the plausibility of this argument, Kripke notes that it collapses in more complex cases such as (6)

(6) If Herb and his wife come to the party, the BOSS will come, too.

It is trivially true that situations in which at least two people come to the party are situations in which someone other than the boss comes to the party. The boss might be Herb, his wife, or even someone else. In all cases, the consequent of the conventional implicature will follow from its antecedent, and therefore the conversational implicature should not arise. However, as Kripke points out, we infer from (6) that neither Herb nor his wife is the boss. This is not explained in Karttunen & Peters’s (1979) account. Kripke proposes that it is possible to account for the inference that neither Herb nor his wife is the boss if we assume that *too* is anaphoric to a salient individual in the context. There are two complications however.

First, satisfaction theories of presuppositions generally predict that presuppositions triggered by lexical items that are embedded in the consequent of a conditional do not project to the highest level: a conditional *if p then q* (where p presupposes A and q presupposes B) globally presupposes A and *if p then B*. In that case, the presupposition of (5) is predicted to be *If Herb comes to the party, then Herb is not the boss*, rather than the expected *Herb is not the boss*. This issue was dubbed the proviso problem by Geurts (1996). Kripke is aware of this complication and proposes a Gricean explanation for the global inference that Herb is not the boss, following Karttunen & Peters (1979):

(7) “However, one could give a Gricean reply as proposed by Karttunen and Peters and argue that since there is already a unique boss (of the company or group), the only grounds for asserting the material conditional can be truth-functional knowledge of the consequent. There is no connection between Herb’s coming to the party and whether or not he is the boss.” (Kripke 2009)

Much progress has been made on the proviso problem since Karttunen & Peters (1979) and Kripke (2009) (which was initially circulated in 1990). Since this issue is orthogonal to the argument of this squib, I will not address it. For recent discussions of the problem, the reader is referred Geurts (1996), Singh (2007) and Schlenker (2011).

Second, independently of the solution that is given to the proviso problem, the inference observed in (6) cannot be accounted for only by assuming that *too* is anaphoric to a salient individual α and presupposes that α is not the boss. Since there are two possible antecedents for *too* in the antecedent of the conditional, there should be at least two possible interpretations of the presupposition triggered by *too*: that Herb is not the boss, and that Herb’s wife is not the boss. These two interpretations do not predict the inference that the boss is neither Herb nor his wife. Alternatively, *too* might be anaphoric to Herb and his wife, as a plural individual, and the presupposition would then correctly be interpreted as neither Herb nor his wife is the boss. Judging from the following excerpt, this seems to be what Kripke has in mind:
“The general idea is that the presupposition arises from the anaphoric requirement that when one says *too*, one refers to some parallel information that is either in another clause (that’s the interesting case for the projection problem) or in the context. (Actually, in what I will later call the “active context” rather than the “passive context.” One might wish to subsume the clause case under the context case in some form of theory, but I won’t commit myself either way here.) When the focused element is a singular term, it is presupposed to be noncoreferential with the other corresponding elements in the parallel clauses or other bits of information in the (active) context.” (Kripke 2009)

There are at least two important ideas in this excerpt. The first one is that in order to resolve the anaphora triggered by *too* one must find in the context some information that parallels the information conveyed by the clause that contains *too*. In the case of examples (5) and (6), this information is the property of coming to the party, which has been mentioned in the antecedent. The second idea is that the denotation of the focused expression is noncoreferential with “other corresponding elements” in the context. These corresponding elements are presumably entities that are known to be coming to the party, namely Herb and his wife. Importantly, Kripke assumes that the denotation of the focused expression that associates with too must be distinct from all these individuals. Only then can we account for the inference that neither Herb nor his wife is the boss, in example (6).

Kripke’s paper is programmatic in many respects, and in particular no formal theory of association with focus or anaphora resolution is proposed.

2.2. Heim’s analysis

Like Kripke (2009), Heim (1990) is concerned with the problem of presupposition projection. She discusses two views of what presuppositions are and their relation to theories of presupposition projection. According to the first view, defended most notably by Karttunen & Peters (1979), presuppositions are special inferences triggered by some lexical items. Since Karttunen & Peters (1979) analyze them as Conventional Implicatures, Heim calls this position the CI-view of presuppositions. According to the second view (see e.g. Stalnaker 1972), presuppositions are propositions that must be entailed by the common ground for a sentence with the appropriate trigger to be felicitous in the context. The common ground of a context is defined as the set of propositions that the interlocutors take for granted in that context. Heims dubs the second view the ‘Acceptance Condition view’, or AC-view for short. One of Heim’s objectives is to show that the AC-view of presuppositions fares better than the CI-view with respect to the projection problem.

The crucial difference between these two approaches is that in the CI-view presuppositions are inferred from sentences that contain the relevant triggers, while in the AC view presuppositions are (required to be) entailed by the context. This difference manifests itself when the context does not contain the information that is conveyed by the presupposition. This is the case for instance when example (9) is uttered out of the blue, when the interlocutors ignore the fact that the speaker owns a car:

(9) Sorry to be late, my car broke down.

According to the CI-view, nothing particular happens in this case: the presupposition merely adds to the common ground the information that the speaker owns a car, and the conversation proceeds normally. According to the AC-view on the other hand, the fact that the presupposition is not entailed by the context makes the utterance infelicitous, unless the interlocutors rescue the discourse by accommodating the missing information.
However, it appears that presuppositions cannot always be accommodated. This is the case with presuppositions triggered by *too* and a number of other anaphoric expressions. Heim argues that the CI-view fails to account for a number of properties of these presuppositions. Consider (10). This sentence is infelicitous when it is uttered out of the blue. As Kripke argued using a similar example, this is unexpected if *too* triggers an existential presupposition, given that it is well known that there are many students in Harvard. An anaphoric analysis of *too* can account for this fact. In (10), *too* is anaphoric to a contextually salient individual α, and triggers the presupposition that α is not John and α went to Harvard. This is a singular proposition, and in the absence of a salient antecedent, the interlocutors do not know which of the many possible singular propositions of this form is intended as a presupposition, and therefore accommodation cannot take place.

(10) JOHN went to Harvard too.

This example creates at least two problems for the CI-view of presuppositions. The first one is that if presuppositions are inferences derived from the sentences that contain the appropriate trigger, there should be no such thing as presupposition failure: the presupposed information should just be added to the common ground without any trouble. The second is that it appears to be impossible to formulate the presupposition of *too* and similar items without reference to the context of utterance. Indeed, there is a non-propositional element of meaning in the presupposition triggered by *too*, which in (10) is an injunction to find an antecedent among the salient individuals in the context of utterance. In Heim’s own words:

(11) “The admittance condition for *Bill was at the party too* did not seem to be that the context entail that somebody besides Bill was at the party; but rather that it provide some salient individual (or group) x and entail about this x that x ≠ Bill and x was at the party.” (Heim 1990)

One might try to formulate the presupposition triggered by *too* as a meta-linguistic proposition, thereby rescuing the CI-view from the danger of anaphora. Here is a possible candidate for the presupposition of Bill went to the party, *too*:

(12) “the proposition that there is some salient individual which is presupposed to be different from Bill and to have been at the party.” (Heim 1990)

Heim points out, however, that whatever the presupposition of this sentence is, it disappears in the conjoined sentence (13):

(13) John was at the party, and Bill was at the party too.

This is presumably because the first conjunct entails the presupposition of the second one, thereby satisfying it (in the AC view), or making it redundant (in the CI view). The issue for the ‘metalinguistic’ proposal is that John was at the party does not entail the proposition in (12), or anything like it.

In sum, Heim (1990) argues in favor of the AC-view of presupposition from the impossibility to accommodate the presupposition triggered by *too*, and she proposes that this impossibility is due to the anaphoric nature of this presupposition.
3. ZEEVAT’S REANALYSIS OF TOO AS A DISCOURSE MARKER

3.1. Objections to the anaphoric analysis of too

Zeevat (2003) argues that the anaphoric analysis of *too* faces a number of issues. Zeevat discusses van der Sandt & Geurts’s (2001) analysis of *too*, but I believe that his remarks apply directly to Kripke and Heim’s analysis, which already contained the gist of van der Sandt and Geurts’s. The main objective of van der Sandt & Geurts (2001) is to explain the lack of accommodation of the presuppositions triggered by *too*. They argue that these presuppositions consist of a pronominal part and of a descriptive part. In order to resolve them, one must find an antecedent for the pronominal component of *too*. The content of the presupposition can then be resolved by predicating the descriptive content of the antecedent. In the following example, Harry is the antecedent of *too*. The descriptive part is predicated of Harry, yielding the proposition that Harry is not John and will have dinner in New York.

\[(14)\quad \text{(A):} \text{Harry is having dinner in New York.} \\
\text{(B):} \text{JOHN is having dinner in New York, too.}\]

Van der Sandt and Geurts argue that presuppositions triggered by *too* cannot be accommodated precisely because they are partly pronominal: they observe that pronouns do not ‘accommodate’, in the sense that the utterance of a sentence that contains a pronoun whose reference cannot be resolved is infelicitous. That much is fairly similar to Kripke and Heim’s views. The specificity of van der Sandt & Geurts (2001) are not really relevant for our purposes. Zeevat’s main objection to the anaphoric analysis is that it predicts that the interlocutors should be able to accommodate the descriptive part of the presupposition triggered by *too*, provided there is a contextually salient antecedent for the anaphoric part. The following example (credited to Nicholas Asher) supposedly shows that this is not the case:

\[(15)\quad \text{A man is walking in the park. JOHN will have dinner in New York (#too).}\]

In (15), the indefinite *a man* provides a suitable antecedent for *too*. Therefore, we might expect that the descriptive content of the presupposition (i.e. that the antecedent is not John and that (s)he will have dinner in New York) can be accommodated. If this were the case, an utterance of (15) would result in the accommodation of the presupposition that the man who walked in the park is not John and will have dinner in New York, contrary to the facts: (15) is a clear case of presupposition failure. Zeevat points out that this contrasts with the possibility of partial accommodation in (16):

\[(16)\quad \text{A man is walking in the park. Some children were playing with his dog.}\]

In (16), the antecedent of the possessive pronoun *his* is identified as the man who is walking in the park, and the presupposition triggered by the possessive pronoun, namely that the referent of the pronoun has a dog, is easily accommodated.

Zeevat concludes from these observations that the anaphoric theory of presupposition triggers such as *too* is not viable. He then sets out to offer an alternative explanation of the impossibility to accommodate the presuppositions triggered by these particles. His proposal is that interlocutors fail to accommodate these inferences because they are not presuppositions in the first place.
3.2. Too as a discourse marker

Zeevat identifies *too* as a member of a set of discourse particles traditionally analyzed as presupposition triggers, which share a number of unexpected properties. First, these particles have no semantic content of their own: Zeevat cites Stalnaker (1973), who observes that these particles (*too, even, also, etc*) can make the utterance in which they appear infelicitous, although they can never make it false. In that sense, it seems that particles such as *too* never contribute to the truth conditions of the sentences in which they appear. This is different from other presupposition triggers, such as *stop*: *Martha stopped beating her husband* is true if and only if Martha no longer beats her husband, and these truth-conditions are very much a function of the meaning of the presupposition trigger *stop*.

Secondly, the presuppositions that these particles trigger resist accommodation. Third, these particles are obligatory whenever they can be used, as illustrated in (17):

(17)  A: Bill will come tonight.
      B: John will come #(too).

Finally, Zeevat points out that some of these particles, such as indeed, can have antecedents that are not normally accessible to presupposition triggers (see (18)), where accessibility of antecedents is defined as in (19). It seems that Zeevat wants to contrast examples such as his (18) with examples like (20), where the presupposition triggered by regrets cannot be satisfied by the complement of dreamt.

(18)  Mary dreamt that she failed the exam and indeed she did.

(19)  “A subordinate context is inaccessible at a position x iff the information that it contains is not entailed at x. A subordinate antecedent for a pronoun occurring at x is inaccessible if the existence of the antecedent is not entailed at x.” (Zeevat 2003)

(20)  ?Mary dreamt that she failed the exam and she regrets that she did.

Zeevat argues that these properties do not follow from theories of presuppositions and their triggers, and that as a consequence we might be better off not analyzing discourse particles such as *too* and *indeed* as presupposition triggers:

(21)  “It is clear that if we want to analyze particles as presupposition triggers, we must be able to modify our presupposition theories to make it possible that the particles come out as a special case with special properties: no semantic content of their own, no accommodation, the possibility of inaccessible antecedents and the obligatory character of their use.” (Zeevat 2003)

Zeevat proposes that these particles belong to an altogether different category of expressions, that of discourse markers:

(22)  “they are markers of a relation of the content of the current sentence to the context (or to another parameter of the utterance context) and can be there because of either a functional necessity (if the relation in question is unmarked, wrong interpretations) or of a universal principle that requires the marking of the relationship.” (Zeevat 2003)

Let us see what this proposal consists in, taking the analysis of *too* as an example. Discourse markers are particles that signal relations between the utterance they mark, and the context of the utterance. *Too* is an additive discourse marker. Zeevat defines these markers informally as follows:
“Additive marking finds an old topic and the way it was addressed before. Without the additive marking, a different topic may be assumed. Without additive marking, the two occasions of addressing the same topic remain unintegrated and can lead to wrong information due to exhaustivity effects.” (Zeevat 2003)

What Zeevat calls a topic corresponds to what Roberts (1996) would call a question under discussion. In the following example, too signals that the sentence John will come is an answer to the topic Who will come tonight? previously addressed by A’s assertion that Bill will come tonight.

(24) A: Bill will come tonight.
    B: JOHN will come, too.

Zeevat spells out these intuitions by defining additive marking as a relation between a common ground CG and a proposition ψ. The relation holds if and only if (i) there is a topic T such that ψ addresses T, (ii) there is a proposition φ that is the strongest proposition entailed by CG that addresses T and (iii) the conjunction φ ∧ ψ addresses T and is stronger than each of φ and ψ. Consider (24) again. Principles of question-answer congruence (see Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984, Roberts 1996) tell us that focus marking signals that B’s utterance addresses the topic Who will come tonight?. At this point, CG entails the proposition that Bill will come tonight, which addresses the same topic. The conjunction of the two propositions, i.e. the proposition that Bill and John will come tonight, is stronger than each of them. Therefore, additive marking is respected. (24) should be compared to (25) and (26):

(25) A: Bill and John will come tonight.
    B: #JOHN will come, too.

(26) A: Who will come tonight?
    B: #JOHN will come, too.

(25) is infelicitous because the conjunction of the propositions expressed by A’s and B’s assertions is not stronger than each of them (to wit, A & B is not stronger than A, it is equivalent to it). (26) is infelicitous because CG does not entail a proposition that addresses the topic Who will come tonight? at the point when B answers A’s question. In each case, a constraint on the use of additive discourse markers is violated.

So far we have discussed the discourse relations that are marked by the additive discourse marker too. Zeevat (2003) argues that discourse markers are additionally governed by the two optimality-theoretic constraints max(R) and *PARTICLE. The first constraint max(R) requires that a particle that marks a relation R be added to an utterance ψ if R obtains between ψ and the common ground; max(R) is ranked over the constraint *PARTICLE, which is violated whenever a particle is used. Together, these two constraints ensure that particles are obligatory whenever the relation that they mark obtains, and ungrammatical otherwise.
4. DISCUSSION OF ZEEVAT’S PROPOSAL

4.1. Is partial accommodation actually impossible?

Remember that Zeevat’s criticism of the anaphoric analysis of *too* is based on the observation that *too* does not seem to license partial accommodation to the same extent as bona fide anaphoric presupposition triggers, such as possessive pronouns:

(27) A man is walking in the park. JOHN will have dinner in New York (#too).

(28) A man is walking in the park. Some children were playing with his dog.

The anaphoric analysis goes like this. The presupposition triggered by *too* has an anaphoric part and a non-anaphoric part. The anaphoric part consists in an injunction to find a contextually salient antecedent that has the same type as the associate of *too* (i.e. John in (27)). The non-anaphoric part of the presupposition ascribes two properties to this antecedent: the property of being distinct from the denotation of the associate, and the property that is obtained by abstracting over the associate in the prejacent (i.e. the property denoted by *will have dinner in New York* in (27)). The proponents of the anaphoric analysis (Kripke 2009, Heim 1990, van der Sandt & Geurts 2001) argue that the anaphoric component of the presupposition is as hard to accommodate as the reference of anaphoric pronouns, which are infelicitous in contexts that do not provide a salient antecedent. The non-anaphoric part of the presupposition on the other hand should be easier to accommodate.

According to Zeevat, the pair of sentences in (27) and (28) are supposed to show that this analysis is wrong, because partial accommodation is possible with an anaphoric pronoun as in (28), while it is impossible with *too* in (27). I would like to argue that this objection is misguided. First of all, note that it is only valid if there is no independent explanation of the contrast between (27) and (28). But as a matter of fact, there is: the discourse in (27) is incoherent independently of the presupposition triggered by *too*, as illustrated in (29):

(29) A man is walking in the park. ?John will have dinner in New York.

The issue in (29) is that it is hard to figure what is the relation between the situations that are described by each sentence, and as a result, putting these sentences together doesn’t result in a coherent discourse. This is enough to reject Zeevat’s argument: since (27) is degraded for independent reasons, which do not affect (28), the comparison between these two sentences is irrelevant.

But there is more: the lack of coherence of (27) makes the partial accommodation of the presupposition triggered by *too* especially difficult, while the coherence of (28) facilitates the accommodation of the presupposition triggered by the possessive pronoun. Indeed, in (27) one needs to accommodate the presupposition that the man who is walking in the park will have dinner in New York. But why would the addressee accommodate this information? There is no relation between walking in a park and having dinner in New York. In (28) on the other hand, the presupposition that needs to be accommodated is that the man has a dog. The situation described in the first sentence facilitates the accommodation of this presupposition, since it is common for people who own dogs to walk them in parks. This makes the comparison between (27) and (28) even less relevant.

To be fair, a comparison of partial accommodation with *too* and with possessive pronouns should control for such confounds. Once we do, we observe that partial accommodation is also possible with *too*, as illustrated in the following discourses:
(30) John is in Italy. I ought to go on vacation too.

(31) John is in Italy. His Italian uncle owns a villa in Tuscani.

Both discourses are coherent. (30) contrasts the situation described in the first sentence (John is on vacation in Italy) with the situation described in the second (the speaker is not on vacation) and comments on the contrast (the speaker should go on vacation). In (31), the first sentence describes a situation that the second sentence elaborates on. Therefore, discourse coherence is not a factor of infelicity in these discourses. In both examples, the noun phrase John provides an antecedent for the anaphoric expression in the second sentence. In (30), one must accommodate that the reason why John is in Italy is that he is on vacation there, while in (31), one must accommodate that John has an uncle from Italy. Neither of these accommodations are particularly difficult in the context that is setup by the first sentence.

Finally, note that complete accommodation is sometimes possible with too. The following example was suggested to me by Yasutada Sudo (p.c.)

(32) Context: A and B both applied to the SALT conference. On the day following the result of the abstract selection, A meets B in the corridor and asks her:

Did you get in SALT too?

This sentence is felicitous, and its interpretation requires a complete accommodation of the presupposition triggered by too: one must accommodate that the anaphoric part of the presupposition is resolved to the speaker, and one must accommodate that the speaker’s abstract was accepted at SALT. This is as it should be according to the anaphoric analysis of the presupposition triggered by too: if an individual is sufficiently salient in the context of utterance to serve as an antecedent, it should be possible to resolve the anaphoric part of the presupposition to this individual, even though this individual has not been mentioned in the preceding discourse.

In sum, partial accommodation is possible with too, just as it is possible with possessive pronouns. Complete accommodation is possible as well, but it is more difficult. We must therefore conclude that Zeevat’s argument against the anaphoric analysis of too is misguided. What is more, a proper analysis of the meaning of too should not rule out accommodation entirely, contrary to the discourse marking analysis that Zeevat proposes.

4.2. Other properties of Discourse Markers

Aside from its purported lack of accommodation, there are three properties that are supposed to set too aside from regular presupposition triggers and that motivate its reanalysis as a discourse marker. Let us have a look at each of them, check whether they are indeed properties of too, and ask whether they really motivate its reanalysis as a discourse marker.

Lack of assertive content This is clearly a property of too. However, it is not clear to me why this should be a problem for its analysis as a presupposition trigger. In particular, in the AC-view (Stalnaker 1972) presuppositions are constraints on the common ground, and their content does not have to be asserted. While it is true that some presuppositions, like that of stop, are both asserted and presupposed, the AC-view also accounts for presuppositions that have no asserted content.
**Obligatory character** This is again a property of *too*. However, it is also a property of a number of presupposition triggers that Zeevat would not analyze as discourse markers. Indeed, various presupposition triggers that have assertive content and allow for accommodation (e.g. *the* or *both*) are known to be obligatory, in the sense that the use of alternative expressions (e.g. *a* or *all*, respectively) are blocked when their presupposition is satisfied. (Heim 1991b) analyzed this phenomenon using a principle of ‘maximize presuppositions’:

(33) Make your contributions presuppose as much as possible. (Heim 1991a)

There have been several attempts to analyze the obligatory use of *too* in these terms (see Singh (2008): and references therein). In addition, Krifka (1999) offered an analysis of the obligatory nature of additive particles like *too* that does not rely on maximize presupposition, but which nonetheless treats them as presupposition triggers.

In sum, the obligatory character of *too* does not in and of itself motivate its reanalysis as a discourse marker.

**Availability of otherwise inaccessible antecedents** Here, it appears that the facts are more complex than what Zeevat makes them to be. Firstly, not all discourse particles accept inaccessible antecedents to the same extent, hence it is dubious that this should be a characterizing property of the whole class. In particular, *too* itself does not always take inaccessible antecedents, as illustrated by the following example:

(34) Mary dreamt that she would fail the exam. #BILL will fail the exam too.

Contrary to indeed in (18), *too* cannot take its antecedent from inside the complement of *dream*. As a matter of fact, the infelicity of *too* in this example is very similar to that of regrets in (20). In both cases, the offending item (*too* or *regret*) triggers a presupposition that Mary actually failed the exam (or maybe in the case of regret, that she believes that she actually failed it). Since *dream* is not a veridical operator (it does not entail the truth of its complement), the common ground does not satisfy this presupposition, which explains the infelicity of these sentences. On the contrary, the sentence with *indeed* in (18) does not presuppose that Mary actually failed the exam: it asserts it. In other words, the infelicity of (20)/(34) is unrelated to the status of *too* and *regret* as discourse markers or as presupposition triggers. It is due to the incompatibility of the common ground with the constraint that *too* and *regret* put on it.

Secondly, it appears that some ‘regular’ presupposition triggers sometimes allow exceptional antecedents as well. Consider for instance the discourse particle *indeed* and the ‘regular’ presupposition trigger *regret*. The following pair of examples shows that *indeed* is more liberal than *regrets* in the selection of its ‘antecedents’: the proposition that Mary failed the exam cannot be used to resolve the presupposition triggered by *regrets*, because it is embedded under the attitude verb *dreamed*, and is therefore not entailed by the common ground at the time of utterance of the second conjunct.

(35) Mary dreamt that she failed the exam, and indeed she did.

(36) ?Mary dreamed that she failed the exam, and she regrets that she did.

However, the contrast in acceptability disappears in the following pair of sentences:

(37) Mary believes that she failed the exam, and indeed she did.
(38) Mary believes that she failed the exam, and she regrets that she did.

Here again, we can make sense of these facts even if we assume that both indeed and regret are presupposition triggers. Assume that regret triggers the presupposition that its subject believes that its complement is true. This presupposition is not satisfied in (36), since dream does not entail that its subject believes that its complement is true (actually, it might even implicate that the subject believes that its complement is false). It is however satisfied in (38). Indeed does not presuppose that its prejacent is true, therefore it is fine in both contexts.

In sum, it seems that the putative ‘discourse markers’ do not form a natural class with respect to the ability to have inaccessible antecedents, a class that would exclude regular presupposition triggers. This casts doubts on the relevance of this criterion for the definition of the class of discourse markers.

More to the point, too itself does not always take inaccessible antecedents, therefore this is no reason to reanalyze it as a discourse marker.

5. CONCLUSION
I examined the properties of discourse markers that are supposed to set them apart from regular presupposition triggers, and I asked whether too qualifies as a discourse marker according to these criteria. I showed that the absolute lack of accommodation is not a property of too, and that the availability of inaccessible antecedents does not reliably discriminate between discourse markers and regular presupposition triggers. We are left with its lack of assertive content and its obligatory use, which I argued are not problematic for its analysis as a presupposition trigger. In conclusion, it appears that Zeevat’s reanalysis of too as a discourse marker is not sufficiently motivated.

OBSERVAÇÕES SOBRE A ANALISE DE TOO COMO MARCADOR DISCURSIVO

RESUMO
Heim (1990) e Kripke (2009) argumentam que a partícula too desencadeia pressuposições que resistem a acomodação por causa da sua natureza anafórica. Ao contrário, Zeevat (2003) argumenta que too deve ser analisado como um marcador de relações discursivas aditivas, o que explicaria sua resistência ao processo de acomodação. Este squib é principalmente uma resposta a Zeevat (2003). Eu argumento que não há vantagem teórica em reanalizar “too” como um marcador discursivo.

PALAVRAS-CHAVES: presuposição, marcador discursivo, too

REFERENCES


