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The Recurrent Iterations of (I)Liberal Capitalism in United States-Brazil Relation

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Introduction: Echoes of a Not-So-Distant Past

The election of extreme right-wing candidate Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency of Brazil in October 2018 represented a major rupture in the country's recent path of constructing a democratic regime and an associated aggressive revival of the neoliberal agenda that had been rejected by the country's population in the preceding three electoral cycles. Beyond the domestic realm, the unexpected rise to power of such an extreme political figure also marked a turning- point event in the country's decades-long international trajectory.

In effect, to repeat a hackneyed element of Brazil's diplomatic history, Baron of Rio Branco's early-20th-century shift in orientation towards the United States did not seek to exclude economic and political allies in other parts of the world but rather expand possible economic partners and guarantee the country's diplomatic autonomy (Bradford Burns, 1966 and Cervo & Bueno, 2015). Conversely, Bolsonaro's scorched-earth approach to global affairs has reversed the country's much-praised diplomatic record. And the very appointment of Ernesto Araujo – an obscure and irrelevant diplomat who portrayed Donald Trump as the redeemer of a Western Civilization in decline (Araujo, 2017) –, as foreign minister of an administration seeking to implement an unprecedentedly subservient political and economic alignment with the United States under Trump was in itself a decision filled with revisionist symbolism (Ioris, 2019).

Much in the same way, the appointment of University of Chicago trained neoliberal economist Paulo Guedes to lead the all-powerful Ministry of the Economy and thus implement an ambitious course of market friendly economic reforms was also presented as a panacea to the economic challenges of the last several years (Boadle, 2019). This move aimed at pleasing domestic and international investors regardless of the social costs involved and not really taking in consideration whether a complex society such as the Brazilian one could withstand such a dramatic course of reforms, nor whether this was the right

path for Latin America's largest industrial economic and the world's 10th largest economy.

Though some of these policies were already under way during the illegitimate years of the Temer administrative interregnum (2016-2018), Bolsonaro's aggressive reversal of course, in terms of both diplomatic initiatives and economic agenda, echoes events unfolding Brazil almost 60 years ago. In effect, their several historical differences notwithstanding, it was in the first years of the 1960s that the liberal economic agenda and closer diplomatic relations with the United States in the context of the Cold War were more efficiently articulated in Brazil, mostly by privately funded think-tank like organizations (e.g. IPES). It was indeed then that, against an administration seeking to implement a more inclusive social agenda and more autonomous course of diplomacy, very powerful economic, political and military elites actively professed the creed that addressing the many upheavals the country faced required the implementation of US- like market friendly policies. The notions, and supporting social actors, eventually coalesced into a conservative yet liberal (free-market friendly) and US-oriented disjoint yet effective coalition behind the military coup of 1964. Once in power, this group helped design major policies of the first military administration of Brazil's 21-year long dictatorial regime (1964-1985).

Scholarship on Brazil's civilian-military dictatorship is extensive and evolve, but the notion that local elites coalesced around the goal of modernizing the country's capitalist structures, by authoritarian means, if needed, remains a constant and pervasive element therein (for more, see, among others: Dreifuss, 1981; Evans, 1979; Ferreira and Gomes, 2014 and Skidmore, 1988). Though, over time, the regime assumed more nationalist lines of development, and even strained diplomatic relations with the US, in the mid-1970s, US-associated notions of development helped shape different patterns of behavior in Brazil and throughout much of the Latin American region in the 1960s, very much like today.

Yet, it is self-evident that Brazil of today is not the same one of the early 1960s. For one, the Cold War global context is no more, and much of the economic agenda propounded by liberal US and Latin American elites in the 1960s has already been implemented in the region, especially during the neoliberal decade of the 1990s. In any case, the very fact that then, as now, powerful economic and political forces aligned themselves with conservative military leaders to implement a liberalizing economic agenda that curbed social programs and paved the way for further internationalizing the country's economy seems hardly a coincidence. In effect, the manifold parallels one could find between these unique historical periods seems clearly to warrant a new critical analysis along a historical perspective. This is exactly

what the following paper seeks to do.

Namely, to provide a new reflection on how a similarly promoted modernizing liberal agenda, articulated in Brazil by means of hemispheric diplomatic efforts from US public and private agents, may illuminate our contemporary assessments of similar historical dynamics, their appeal, potential and shortcomings. These events were largely shaped by the Alliance for Progress (AFP), and given that much of the literature on the Alliance Progress has centered on the internal, political and bureaucratic maneuvers of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, this piece follows a regional analytical perspective. The investigation provides an overview of some of the policies pursued across the continent and, as a case study, a closer examination of specific projects implemented in Brazil, country seen as likely to influence broader regional course of events. All in all, the article advances the notion that even if falling short of their initial objectives, the promotion of market-oriented developmental notions exerted lasting influences, at times in dramatic historic iterations.

Revisiting the Alliance: Foundational Narratives and Key Elements of Discord

From the Monroe Doctrine, in the first quarter of the 19th century, to the Good Neighbor Policy, in the 1930s, the United States has sought, in a continued, multifaceted, paternalistic, at best, and, often, violently interventionist fashion, to exert its economic preponderance, political leverage, and cultural sway in the Western hemisphere. In the second half of the twentieth century, hemispheric relations acquired a new and more concerted format as Cold War dynamics required an original set of policies to be more capable of dealing with the rising demands for economic prosperity and political democracy burgeoning across Latin American societies.

The Cuban Revolution proved to be the main catalyst for the many new initiatives US-based private and public actors sought to promote. In response to such a dramatic event, a long list of actions was placed under the suggestive label of an Alliance for Progress – a hastily devised initiative launched by the Kennedy administration in 1961, which still represents the most comprehensive diplomatic overture from the United States towards Latin America. In addition to supporting a broad list of material developmental goals (e.g. economic growth, expansion of literacy, land and fiscal reforms), this ambitious new multilateral diplomatic initiative also set out to establish unparalleled cooperative patterns of interaction in the continent (Perloff, 1969 and Roger, 1967).

Their lofty objectives and associated eloquent rhetoric notwithstanding, the implementation of the Alliance was marred from the start by bureaucratic stalemate and a lack of genuine commitment for reform both in the United States and in regional countries. Moreover, if Cuban events of the turn of decade expedited the response from the United States to regional events, already in the early and

mid-1950s, Latin American societies witnessed both a remarkable path of socio-economic, political and ideological transformations, particularly in the largest countries. Aligned with broader postwar political development unfolding on a global hemispheric scale, namely new Cold War security concerns and policies pursued by the United States, regional reformist leaders sought to convince US decision-makers to change course in terms of its engagement with nations on the south of the border (Ioris, 2014, p. 68).

Embedded in this sense of urgency about global and regional events, the bold New Frontier administration promoted a variety of political, economic, cultural, and military tools to reshape regimes throughout the Western Hemisphere. Their professed the goals of economic development and political democracy notwithstanding nonetheless required that Latin American societies professed an "unflagging allegiance to its Cold War policies and despite its public commitments to democracy and reform, (…) [which favored] anti-Communist authoritarians over left-leaning leaders who respected constitutional process" (Rabe, 1999, p. 56). It was therefore not surprising that, contrary to most promises and expectations, the policies pursued deepened political antagonism and enhanced a polarized view of US objectives and initiatives. Nor was it unexpected that, in the end, the historical record of the program is one better defined not by an effective change in the historical course or top-down engagements and its replacement by more constructive patterns of interaction with Latin American societies, but rather by dashed expectations, mutual resentment, and missed opportunities between the nations of the hemisphere.

Assessing the multiple, at times contradictory, facets of such as complex and multidimensional program always demanded creative approaches on the part of its analysts. Initially, early accounts of the Kennedy's administration policymaking tended to accept the official representation of U.S. development initiatives as altruistic, visionary attempts to create societies in which everyone would benefit. To be sure, even if at times pessimistic in assessing long-term results, favorable interpretations reiterated government explanations of the program's goals. In fact, and especially relevant, canonic works, such as A Thousand Days, by the presidential advisor and acclaimed historian, Arthur Schlessinger Jr., and Twilight Struggle, by the renowned diplomat William D. Rogers, proved foundational in establishing an optimistic view of the central objectives and guiding ideals pursued by the Kennedy administration in Latin America. In these influential works, along heroic and personalist lines of interpretation, overt contradictions committed along the way (e.g. the eventual acceptance of the military

coup in Argentina in 1962, among others) were quickly dismissed on the questionable basis of political expediency or pragmatism. In effect, these events were consistently portrayed as minor detours that did tarnish the noble goals of the new, self-acclaimed well intended, uniquely bright administration (Schlessinger, Jr., 2002 and Rogers, 1967).

Interpretative lines centered on key political actors continued to be the hegemonic narrative until the early 70s, when the AFP underwent a series of organizational modifications aimed at addressing the more authoritarian scenario in the region. Particularly important in furthering an analytical reframing of the narrative about the program, the book The Alliance that Lost its Way advanced an even more critical assessment that helped solidify the view that the Alliance was a well-devised initiative, which was nonetheless tragically betrayed by political and economic forces (Levinson & Onis, 1970). **[1]** Building upon Schlessinger Jr's early account, this book argues that the erosion of the Alliance had started in the aftermath of Kennedy's assassination along a process deepened after 1965, when Lyndon Johnson started his own presidential term. This foundational work paved the way for new evaluations centered on inter-agency bureaucratic strives, a trend later complemented by less personalist accounts that increasingly recognized the internal divisions in the formulation and implementation of the Alliance programs (Kunz, 1994; Paterson, 1989; Taffet, 2007; Tulchin, 1988; and Wiarda, 1987).

Particularly influential was the critique centered on the influence exerted by elements of what came to be known as Theories of Modernization in providing the very underpinnings of the program itself has helped redefined our understandings about these transformative historical events. To be sure, the very modernizing agenda implemented by different US actors in Latin America in the 1960s assumed that the developmental path of Western societies, especially that of the United States, could be easily replicated elsewhere. Much in the same way, what was now seen as short-sighted reading of things has been portrayed as behind not only the inadequacy of the modernizing agenda, but of the very frustration growing among US decision-makers who expected quick solutions to Latin America's historical challenges. In effect, a central guiding notion of these Theories was that by getting involved in the region, by means of well-designed socio-economic, and associated political reforms, the United States, through public and private political and economic actors could accelerate, on controllable bases, the path of evolution of Latin American societies (Latham, 2000 and Lorenzini, 2019).

The Alliance for Progress's grandiose rhetoric and promised disbursement of public funds notwithstanding, traditional security concerns and business interests helped shape the course of the program from the start. In fact, development promotion and national and hemispheric security walked

hand-in-hand and quickly the notion that the two could be more effectively achieved by resorting a 'modernizing military' became a central feature of the Kennedy administration's approach to Latin America. To be sure, as early as in November 1961, when the Joint Chiefs explained to President Kennedy "how the United States could use military assistance to achieve the objectives of the Alliance for Progress [by] shifting the military focus away from hemispheric defense to counter-insurgency, anti-subversion, and psychological warfare operations." (Rabe, 1999, p. 129).

Additional contradictory dynamics, at least at face value, of several Alliance for Progress programs can be found in the growing role business interests played in formulating and implementing many of its programs as, over the years, the original emphasis on public funds was replaced by the favoring of private sources of funds and partnerships with business corporations became more prevalent. Both Kennedy's and especially Johnson's administration included corporate executives in the formulation of the Alliance projects, especially as initial more optimistic views of public disbursements were dashes with poor results on the field (Pearce, 2001, p. 109). The most active private sector organization was the Business Group for Latin America, formed by David Rockefeller in the early 1960s. The role of the Rockefeller family in Latin America is well known and brothers David and Nelson played major roles in advising both private business and governmental activities in Latin America building upon the latter early involvement in the region since the early 1940s, when he worked for the FDR's administration as Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (Tota, 2014).

What is more, chiefly after President Johnson assumed the presidency, both bothers would enhance their advisory role within the US government, particularly insofar as findings creative ways to promote American business's interests and activities in Latin America. In addition to investing themselves, directly or through local joint-venture operations, the Rockefellers played a very active role in supporting other US-based companies to find economic opportunities in the region. The Business Group for Latin America was later renamed the Council of the Americas (COA) and held regular meetings with officials from the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress, Inter-American Development Bank, State Department, USAID, and World Bank. What is more, the American Association of Chambers of Commerce of Latin America (AACCLA) regularly lobbied U.S. and Latin American officials toward the end of the decade, typically campaigning for open trade and investment policies and greater attention to private- sector interests (Leacock, 1990 and Kofas, 2000).

The preeminent role of the business realm was equally relevant in

the activities conducted by the US Agency for International Development, USAID, whose mission coincided with and supported the goals of the Alliance for Progress, established in 1961, just as Kennedy was launching the Alliance for Progress. The Agency has a major responsibility for the administration of the foreign assistance program under the Alliance but it would soon become a constant source of some dissatisfaction and controversy. As a general standard procedure, United States contributions to the Alliance for Progress were paid directly to American firms, a practice which increased over time. USAID originally tied half of all loans and grants to the procurement of domestic goods and services. This figure rose to over 90 percent by the end of the decade and the United States Department of Commerce later claimed that three dollars were gained for every dollar invested in the Alliance for Progress (Adams, 2000, p. 36). It was thus not surprising that "in the absence of countervailing pressures from other organized domestic interest groups, business pressure predisposed the [United States] policy makers automatically to favor individual companies or interest of the community as a whole" (Levinson & Onis, 1970, p. 160). And as concerns from Latin American leaders, who complained that the Alliance could not be a cooperative effort if most decision-making approving authority largely rested in the hands of US- led funding agencies, became more vocal by the third year of the program, in January 1964, the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress was introduced to expand Latin American representation. The new committee had seven permanent members, six elected by Latin American countries, and one elected by the United States, and was responsible for examining the national development plans of member countries and estimating the additional financial resources needed. Though the Committee did increase Latin American representation in the Alliance, the United States retained effective control over the most significant decisions (Adams, 2000, p. 37).

Another element of controversy in Inter-American relations in the early 1960s relates to the level of commitment of US officials to the actual transformative changes in the region. To be sure, many agencies of the U.S. government never fully supported the Alliance's social agenda, something especially evident with respect to the highly controversial topic, in the US and in Latin America, of land reform. Often the United States Congress "refused to fund the purchase and distribution of agricultural lands and discouraged the Inter-American Development Bank from advancing the cause," emphasizing instead that US development agencies concentrated their efforts on "improving the productivity of the existing land systems via credit, information, and technical inputs, measures which actually benefited large-scale, capital-intensive exporters" (Adams, 2000, p. 41).

In fact, the very agency with the leading role in disbursing funds to regional initiatives, the United States Agency for

International Development (USAID), created in November 1961, to spearhead US involvement in developmental programs, played a central important role in advising business interested in investing in Latin America. What is more, USAID sponsored the Private Enterprise Promotion Program to assist private-sector actors in obtaining low-interest and technical assistance. Furthermore, in 1967, the Office of Private Resources was set up in order to improve USAID's relations with the business community and Private Investment Center was set up to aid American investors in the region. Additional government agencies assumed prominent roles in promoting the developmental agenda of the United States in the Cold War. In the public diplomacy realm, the main office in charge of US values, notions, plans, interests, and programs was the US Information Agency, USIA, put in place by Eisenhower as a way to intensify US efforts to explain why the United States was a nation "worthy of defense, emulation, and victory in the Cold War" (Belmonte, 2008, p. 49).

Revamped, redesigned, reassigned, and further empowered by the Kennedy administration, through publications, radio broadcastings, films cultural exhibitions, and other methods, US propagandists sought to elaborate comparisons between democratic and communist governments and thus enunciate a powerful vision of the freedom upon which the entire U.S. ideological offensive against communism rested, especially in Latin America. To assess how these ideological historical dynamics played out on the ground, I examine in the remaining pages some of the most impactful cooperative efforts taking place in Brazil under the guise of developmental models promoted by US-actors in Latin American in the 1960s. Even though many of these complex historical dynamics need to more comprehensively scrutinized, they clearly served as an important case study for assessing such transformative. As such, in tandem with recent work along similar lines, I try to indicate below how these historical dynamics taking place within the regional context at the height of the Hemispheric or Inter-American Cold War may have exerted lasting degrees of influence in Latin America (Harmer, 2011 and Pettina, 2017).

Suspicious Allies: US-Brazilian Relations amidst Growing Efforts in Public Diplomacy

In the early 1960s, the administration of center-left politician João Goulart in Brazil represented, in many ways, the ideal partner for much of what the Alliance for Progress professed to support; a center-left, reformist aimed at attending the needs of a fast-transforming underdeveloped society. Its eloquent rhetoric in favor of cooperation notwithstanding, US decision-makers perceived Brazil early in the 1960s through interpretive lenses that effectively marred any

possibility for constructive forms of engagement even though "there [was] little reason to believe that he is dedicated to a radical transformation of Brazilian society or to a radical reorientation of Brazil's independent foreign policy." (National Intelligence Estimate, 1963, p. 490). As such, in a tragic sense, the experiences tied to the Alliance for Progress in Brazil quickly became a "flagrant cases in which the United States bolstered the development of a political system and societal basis that contrasted with the ideal model depicted in the Alliance for Progress" (Towsend, 1982, p. 5 and Loureiro, 2020).

Before things unraveled, though, given Brazil's perceived potential for shaping regional dynamics, either to the benefit or to the detriment of the United States, US official continued to engage with Brazilian counterparts. In effect, in the first two years when both Goulart and Kennedy were in power (1961-1962), representative of both countries engaged in multiple conversations about Alliance-related projects, and Brazil received the greatest portion (in absolute numbers) of all US commitments in the region. The one area that would in fact grab the attention from United States observers and policy-makers was the huge Brazilian Northeast that seen as "in imminent danger of a takeover by Castro-Communist-inspired peasant leagues" (Hirschman, 1963, p. 11). In concrete terms, quickly after taking power, the Kennedy administration pledged to underwrite a concerted effort to develop the Brazilian Northeast, in large part motivated by emotional reports published in the New York Times warning readers that the conditions of poverty and social injustices in the Northeast had sparked a rising political consciousness in the masses. These pieces helped generate considerable American interest among the New Frontier men involved in the transition team of the new president, and, upon taking office, George McGovern, Director of Food for Peace, was one of the several officials that responded to this journalistic exposes by visiting the Northeast in October 1961 (Szulc, 1960. 1960a).

The continued attempts to strengthen ties between the two nations notwithstanding, cooperation between the United States and Brazil quickly broke down, and the administration, acting on direct orders from Kennedy, decided to fund projects that would have immediate effects to undercut the appeal of agrarian radicals rather than long-term economic growth, as espoused by SUDENE's Superintendent, Celso Furtado. In effect, as described in the influential words of Riordan Roett, the U.S. administration "chose a policy in the Northeast of cooperation with regional elites, and justified the policy in term of a communistic threat' (...) [thus] contributing to the retention of power by the traditional oligarchy and destroyed a Brazilian program to modernize the political structure of the Northeast." (Roett, 1972, p. 132). Additionally, by the end of the second year of intense bilateral negotiations, mistrust had become the norm, and in December 1962, JFK would send his own bother, Robert Kennedy,

who served as Attorney General of the United States, to lecture Goulart for his misguided association with subversives groups (DeWitt, 2009, p. 65).

The Kennedy administration also actively worked to destabilize the fluid domestic political scene in Brazil. In the Congressional elections in the same year, the CIA contributed illegally with about $5 million to support campaigns of opposition candidates to the Federal administration running in multiples races, namely 15 Senate seats, 8 state governorships, 250 federal deputy seats, and some 600 seats for state legislatures. Likewise, the US made a special effort to control the Brazilian labor movement, especially with a new Cold War weapon, the American Institute of Free Labor Development (AIFLD). Founded by the American Federation of Labor in late 1961, the AIFLD's mission was to counter the threat of Castroite infiltration and eventual control of major labor movements within Latin America. Much in the same way, Goulart's difficulties in implementing the economic stabilization agreement concluded between Brazil's finance minister, Santiago Dantas and David Bell, USAID Director, in 1963, further complicated relations as it motivated the United States to suspend virtually all economic assistance to the Brazilian federal government (Loureiro, 2014, p. 344).

Turning to the ideological-cultural dimension of bilateral relations established between Brazil and the United States, propaganda-related activities were conducted by USIA-affiliated agencies across the world (the United States Information Service, USIS), in efforts ranging from publications, radio, filmic and TV programs to artistic and academic tours and cultural exchanges. Frequently, USIS offices were located in US diplomatic agencies, such as embassies and consulates. In Brazil, key cities such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Belém, Salvador, Recife, Curitiba e Porto Alegre all had units of USIS services, including libraries and the ever more popular in the late 1950s, and the so-called Binational Centers, where English courses were ministered and events celebrating US cultural accomplishments were held. In the early 1960s, Brazil was the country in the world with the largest number of Binational Centers in various parts of the country. USIA/USIS offices recurrently conducted opinion polls among different segments of the population about different issues, mostly related to the image of the United States, many times vis-à-vis that of the Communist Bloc. Surveys were frequently conducted on internal political matters, such as support for different political figures and controversial topics such as land reform foreign investors. These assessments became more prevalent as time went by both due to the heightened domestic political climate and the Kennedy administration's growing assertiveness in the region as a whole, in Brazil in particular.

Approval rates of key Latin American leaders were regularly surveyed in order have a sense of the rapidly evolving political climate in the early 60s, and key experts in the field of public opinion surveys were more consistently employed in order to fine tune USIA activities in the country (Santomauro, 2015).

Indicative of the logic behind the policies pursued, private interests were often prioritized in USIS posts, which consistently provided strategic information to large US corporations based in the region. Also relevant in bringing private actors of different portions of the hemisphere to interact on behalf of the Alliance under official auspices and support from government agencies, local cooperatives, as well as educational and health initiatives, were set up, especially in the countryside, many times by third-party actors (such as the Rockefeller Foundation). But even if framed under the label of not-for-profit initiatives, these efforts proved particularly useful in fostering a US-like forms of public-private partnership helping United States business interests locally while also seeking to disseminate a US-like entrepreneurial mindset (Ioris, 2017, p. 12).

Equally revealing of broader underpinnings embedded in the Alliance for Progress rationale, private interests were often prioritized in USIS posts. These offices consistently provided strategic information, such as political conditions for local activities, to large US corporations, particularly to more than 400 multinational American firms based in the region. What is more, over the course of the 1960s, AFP-affiliated programs donated millions of books to Latin American countries, mostly of translations of US literary and scientific publications. Embedded in this series of efforts, a rich dialogue between USIA officials and regional labor attaches ensued and various new propaganda efforts were put in place in the works of the public affairs advisers who were sent to work closely with local partners of several projects of the Alliance. A key instrument utilized to communicate its message broadly, USIA resorted repeatedly to cartoons magazines dealing with a multiple ranges of topic, most of which portrayed a not-very- subtle message of anticommunism. Pamphlets, most of which were produced in the late 1950s to other parts of the works, and then translated to Spanish and Portuguese in the early 60s, consistently presented a very rosy pictures on US capitalism where workers are treated generously and business and labor work cooperatively. By the same token, many publications promoted the notions of community development by means of self-help (thus in a reasoning that erased politics and power relations from the general picture), which was said to be best way to enhance one's life since it is up to us to work together. Altogether, this concerted publishing front bought into play multiple agencies of the US government but directed by the USAID and USIA led to the publication of over 2500 different titles, with a circulation of over 20 million copies throughout Latin America (Ioris & Mozer, 2019, p. 533)

In tandem with what was being carried out elsewhere in the region, these efforts involved working with dozens of local publishing houses, editors, educators, journalists, teachers and universities, resulting in the publications of close to 900 different titles with close to 8 million circulating copies (USIA, 1963 and Iber, 2015). In fact, starting in 1964, the work on translation and local publication of USAID approved titles included the partnership with the Franklin Book Program, which thus functioned as an intermediary between the US government and local Brazilian publishing houses.**[2]** Titles aimed specially to academic audiences, many for teaching purposes in the field of economic development, absorbed close to 1.5 million dollars in 1964 when over 300 titles were translated, with over 3.5 million copies printed across Latin America.**[3]**In Brazil, close to 900 titles were published throughout the 1960s, with almost 80 million copies distributed. Written by renowned authors, mostly from the United States, these books were often commission by USIA advisers in order to foment specific views on the Cold War. Upon publication, publishing houses, universities, research centers, academics and journalists were brought in to provide the intellectual and cultural support to the ideological activities sponsored by the agency. Book reviews, book talks by local experts on the topic at hand, and, perhaps more importantly, headmasters of public schools and chairs of academic departments were approached in order to have them adopt the titles of the USIA catalogue.**[4]**

Anti-communism and the associated need for creating more harmonious relationship between labor unions and management within Capitalism were recurrent themes portrayed in the pages of magazines, pamphlets and cartoon, increasingly translated into Portuguese in the early 1960s. Similarly, the virtues of the capitalism system, how countries should seek to promote a welcoming environment for business to flourish, and the promotion of economics prosperity on the basis of private property were equally highlighted in the many publications of the time. **[5]** Likewise, a romanticized view of community-based development, defined by the notion of self- help, was also recurrent along with the actual promotion of rural cooperative initiatives. These efforts gained ground in the late 1960s and early 1970s in said-to-be a-political means to improve the lives of the poor wherein private philanthropic actors played a major role under the auspices of an increasingly dictatorial, technocratic regime.**[6]** And, as the decade unfolded, matters related to challenges of development promotion, how to best deal with topics such as poverty and the different stages of development gain more presence, and works of prominent authors such as W.W. Rostow and Albert Hirschman can all be found.**[7]** These efforts were

also complemented by technical cooperation established with local universities aimed at closing ranks in the defense of its capitalist economic model in Latin America, including the provision of funds for infrastructure investments (buildings, labs, etc.), faculty exchanges, curriculum changes, and pedagogical materials (Motta, 2014).

Beyond the formal editorial and academic realms, one of the main collaborations sponsored by US agencies in charge of disseminating the liberal economies views underpinning the Alliance for Progress through pamphlets and filmic materials was with the IPES (Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais, Institute of Research and Social Studies). This was a business-funded, think- tank-like domestic propaganda-producing organization espousing a liberal capitalist reformist agenda to modernize Brazil, which quickly became one of the main voices in support of business friendly policies being proclaimed in the ideological cacophony that defined much of the early 1960s Latin America's largest country (Dreifuss, 1981; Ramirez, 2009 and Spohr, 2012).

IPES members tended to look to the US as a model and, as Spohr suggestively proposes, the Institute became a central element in the efforts to reproduce and disseminate the "American way of doing business" (Spohr, 2016). And the very agency proved instrumental in connecting Brazilian businessmen with American officials and Brazilian business and military elites interested in mobilizing people in favor of the free market economic ideology, thus functioning fulfilling the attributes of contemporary think-tanks in the US (Barros & Taylor, 2020 and Parmar, 2015). IPES also relied on the sympathy of the Brazilian corporate media, a feature that, once again, highlights how private interests were prioritized in the public diplomacy efforts conducted in Brazil by US actors (Weis, 2001).

What is more, resorting to more or less overt lines of action, different US-based official and un- official actors engaged in what was seen as a decisive battle for cultural hegemony in the most dangerous area of the world. These maneuvers involved both the disbursement of large sums of funds and sophisticated, manifold sorts of collaboration with a vast array of local public and, increasingly, private partners. What is more, in many ways, they combined various sorts of initiatives deployed by agencies of the US government in combination with private actors, particularly in areas such as cultural and public diplomacy, which echoes courses of actions of earlier periods in the history of US-Brazil and Latin American relations (Moura, 1988 and Valim, 2017).

Concluding Remarks: Brazil in the Context of Latin America's Cultural Cold War

Brazil was an initial cornerstone of US activities in Latin America in the Cold War, particularly in the 1960s, when the hemispheric hegemonic power sought

intently to assure that its positions and interests were protected in the turbulent context of the time. This work unfolded in different fronts, including a broad range of cultural, artistic, academic, and ideological (propaganda-like) groundwork deployed through multiple types of bilateral exchanges and collaborations in areas that went beyond high-level diplomatic and official channels, encompassing a range of different public and private actors, acting in different realms and levels of both societies. Likewise, while the official diplomatic initiatives conducted under the label of the Alliance for Progress helped shape the initial lines of these actions, over time, these activities gained new grounds and courses of action. So much so, in fact, that when bilateral formal and diplomatic relations between the United States and Brazil experienced a downturn in the mid-1970s, the US agenda of development structured along market-based frames but pursued along public-private partnerships continued to the influential in Latin America's largest economy.

In effect, though multiple accounts of the new US efforts to modernize Latin America and promote US-like views of capitalism claim that little was achieved in the short-term, in the long- run, and at times in unanticipated ways, the Alliance for Progress did laid the groundwork for multiple, multi-leveled, and multi-dimensional forms of promoting US-based economic models and ideas. To be sure, the manifold and multifaceted efforts pursued in Brazil in the transformative years of the 1960s helped disseminate a technocratic, a-political and monochromatic view of development which managed to deepen the alignment of Brazil and Latin America with the US-based economic and political actors. What is more, despite the fact that these efforts hardly met the needs of significant segments of Brazilian (and Latin American) populations, they certainly did conform to the United States' public and private actor's interests and views of development.

Finally, beyond helping reshaping the regional experiences of the Cold War, some of these transformative historical dynamics perhaps could even be said to be echoing in Latin America, especially in Brazil, in more recent years, though, of course, in new ways and through new courses of actions and political configurations. In this sense, though Bolsonaro is ideologically closer to the repressive experiences of the dictatorial regime of the early 1970s, the economic agenda and foreign policy he pursued echoes more closely the market-led policies and diplomatic orientation proposed – also as panacea-like solutions to structural challenges faced by the Brazilian society – by proponents of the coup of 1964 and early operators of the ensuing military regime.

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Notes

(1) The title of this book was inspired on a homonymous and equally critical essay by former Chilean president Eduardo Frei, published on Foreign Affairs. See Frei Montalva, 1967.

(2) Created in 1952 with funds from USIA, the Franklin Book Programs was an essential instrument for publishing and distributing books abroad as a means of the goals of public diplomacy of the Cold War by the USA. The Program functioned for 26 years, publishing works in 28 languages, throughout the world, including in Brazil (for more, see: http://findingaids.princeton.edu/collections/MC057/#description).

(3) Summary of Second Status Report on the Latin American Book Program – FY 1963 (NARA, 1961- 1963. BOX 15). Further details can be found in Mozer, 2020.

(4) Franklin Book Program, Books Published Abroad National Archives and Records Administration/NARA, RG 306, Declassified NN3-306-02-003, General Records of the United States Information Agency, Office of Administration; Historical Collection, Murray Lawson History Card Files Series, (NARA, 1966-1999, BOX 2).

(5) Dean Rusk, Directive on Books for Latin America. (NARA, 1961-1963. BOX 6).

(6) Books on US Economic System Published in Brazil (NARA, 1961-1963. Box 15).

(7) USIA Latin American Book Program (NARA, 1954-1968, BOX 8).

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Abstract

Beyond being a conflict centered on arms race between two global superpowers, the Cold War was also a dispute for hearts and minds of populations around the world. In Latin America, during the turbulent year following the Cuban Revolution, as the hemispheric hegemonic power, the United States sought to promote an idealized image of Capitalism so that alternative developmental ideas could be at bay. Thus, by means of economic disbursements, diplomatic overture and overt propaganda efforts, US public and private actors worked to convince Latin American populations of the virtues of liberal development. Latin America's largest economy, Brazil was the forefront of these efforts, especially in its early years, and even though not much was achieved in the short-term, free-market capitalist lines by means of a close alignment with the US have once again been said to be the fix-all solution to Brazil's persistent socio-economic and political challenges.