The unreasonable character in Plato’s Republic

Abstract

In this paper, I start from EN discussion on pathe’s configuration and its intrinsic relationship with human actions to discuss how the character Thrasymachus of the Republic’s Dialogue can be considered a paradigmatic example of a disposition whose reason is inoperative. Indeed, since this sophist is deeply rooted in his world’s conceptions, without admitting the hypothesis that his positions and answers about many subjects are shown incorrect for they fall into contradiction, beforehand all possibility of dialogue fails with such a man. Thus, in Republic, on the one hand, dialogic action shows the power it exercises in the souls of those who are willing to suffer its effects, but on the other hand, it points to the limits to which it is subjected. The deviation from the rational order, i.e., unreason, is an insurmountable obstacle to Socratic philosopher insofar as it signals to the end of discourse and the bestial ferocity’s prevalence. Certainly, Thrasymachus is the beast with whom it is not possible to dialogue.