Testando Teorias da Referência

Michael Devitt


Abstract: How should we test theories of reference? The accepted practice is to test them against the referential intuitions of philosophers. Machery et al (2004) wonder why it is appropriate to rely on the intuitions of philosophers rather than those of the folk. I wonder why it is appropriate to rely on referential intuitions at all. We should not go along with the common philosophical view that these intuitions are a priori. Philosophers might follow linguists in thinking that linguistic intuitions are “the voice” of our linguistic competence. But this view is false. Rather than relying solely on the indirect evidence of intuitions, theories of reference need direct evidence from linguistic usage. The paper considers the problems of doing this.

Resumo:Como devemos testar teorias de referência? A prática aceita é testá-las diante das intuições de referência dos filósofos. Machery e colegas (2004) se perguntam por que é apropriado confiar nas intuições dos filósofos em vez de naquelas das pessoas comuns. Eu me pergunto por que é apropriado confiar em intuições de referência em absoluto. Não devemos seguir a posição filosófica comum de que essas intuições são a priori. Os filósofos poderiam seguir os linguistas em pensar que as intuições linguísticas são “a voz” da nossa competência linguística. Mas essa posição é falsa. Em vez de confiar exclusivamente na evidência indireta das intuições, as teorias da referência precisam de evidências diretas advindas do uso linguístico. Este trabalho considera os problemas em se fazer isso.


referência, intuições, a priori, uso linguístico, produção eliciada

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