Filosofia analítica tradicional vs. filosofia naturalista/experimental, intuição conceitual vs. conceptômetro: quem vence a disputa?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.v20i2.13938Keywords:
intuição conceitual, epistemologia analítica, epistemologia naturalista, epistemologia experimental.Abstract
Abstract: In the present paper, I argue against a naturalistic conception of epistemology. I do this by showing, among other things, that conceptual intuition, which constitutes the proper method of the analytic conception of epistemology, is methodologically superior to the best method available to naturalistic epistemology.
Resumo: Nós argumentamos aqui contra uma concepção naturalista de epistemologia. Nós o fazemos mostrando, entre outras coisas, que a intuição conceitual, que é o método próprio da concepção analítica de epistemologia, é superior metodologicamente ao melhor método disponível à epistemologia naturalista.
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References
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