Transcendental Idealism, Noumenal Metaphysical Monism and Epistemological Phenomenalism

Autores

  • Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira UERJ

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22i1.81-104

Palavras-chave:

Idealismo Transcendental, Idealismo Metafísico, Idealismo Epistemológico, Fenomenismo Epistemológico, Fenomenismo Ontológico, Kant

Resumo


Neste artigo, apresento uma nova interpretação do idealismo transcendental. Segundo tal leitura, endosso a rejeição de Allison da leitura tradicional conhecida como visão dos dois mundos e, portanto, o fenomenismo ontológico defendido recentemente por Guyer e Van Cleve. Mas seguindo Allais, eu também rejeito o deflacionismo metafísico de Allison: o idealismo transcendental está metafisicamente comprometido com a existência das coisas em si, noumena no sentido negativo. No entanto, em oposição a Allais, tomo seriamente a afirmação de Kant de que as aparências são “meras representações” em nossa mente seriamente. Com efeito, no sentido empírico, as “aparências” são o objeto indeterminado de nossa intuição sensível. No entanto, no sentido transcendental, as aparências nada mais são que o modo dependente da mente segundo o qual os noumena se manifestam dentro das nossas mentes e, portanto, nossa maneira mental de conhecer a realidade independente da mente em si (fenomenismo epistemológico).

 

Abstract

In this paper, I present a new reading of transcendental idealism. For a start, I endorse Allison’s rejection of the traditional so-called two-world view and hence of Guyer and Van Cleve’s ontological phenomenalism. But following Allais, I also reject Allison’s metaphysical deflacionism: transcendental idealism is metaphysically committed to the existence of things in themselves, noumena in the negative sense. Nevertheless, in opposition to Allais, I take Kant’s claim that appearances are “mere representations” inside our mind seriously. On the empirical sense, appearances are the undetermined object of our sensible intuition. Yet, on the transcendental sense, appearances are nothing but the mind-dependent way that noumena manifest inside our minds and, hence, our mind-dependent way of knowing the mind-independent reality in itself (epistemological phenomenalism).

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Publicado

16-04-2019