Russell and Wittgenstein on time and memory: two different uses of the cinematographic metaphor

Guilherme Ghisoni da Silva

Resumo


O objetivo deste artigo é explorar os usos de Wittgenstein e de Russell da metáfora cinematográfica. Wittgenstein utilizou a metáfora frequentemente durante o período intermediário (1929-1933). Russell a usou em um artigo de 1915. Situarei o uso de Russell em relação a sua filosofia de 1912-1919 (em especial, durante o período construtivista (1914-1919)) e o de Wittgenstein em relação a sua filosofia do período intermediário. Como será visto ao longo do artigo, o aspecto temporal é o elemento central da metáfora. Buscarei reconstruir os conceitos de tempo por eles mobilizados e explorarei os diferentes estatutos concedidos à memória, como condição de possibilidade do tempo da experiência imediata. Embora seja possível localizar várias semelhanças entre esses autores, veremos também algumas diferenças cruciais. O principal elemento que buscarei expor através dessa análise é a maneira como Russell e Wittgenstein concebem de forma inversa o estatuto ontológico da metáfora.

 

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore Wittgenstein's and Russell's use of the cinematographic metaphor. Wittgenstein used the metaphor frequently during his middle period (1929--1933). Russell used it in a paper from 1915. I place their uses of this metaphor against the background of Russell's philosophy from 1912 to 1919 (especially his constructivist period from 1914 to 1919) and Wittgenstein's middle period. As demonstrated throughout this paper, time is the key element of both uses. I reconstruct their concepts of time and deal with the important roles attributed to memory in relation to time. Although many similarities can be found, with careful examination some remarkable differences can be seen. The cinematographic metaphor can be used as a starting point to articulate those differences. My final objective is to show how Russell and Wittgenstein used the metaphor inverting its ontological status.

Recebido em novembro de 2014
Aprovado em abril de 2015

Palavras-chave


tempo da memória; tempo mental; tempo físico; memória remota e imediata; fenomenologia;Wittgenstein; Russel;mental-time; memory-time; physical-time; remote and immediate memory; phenomenology

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Referências


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