Verificacionismo e “Mito do Dado” no Contexto das Observações Filosóficas


  • Mauro Luiz Engelmann UFMG


Wittgenstein, Russell, Moore, Observações Filosóficas, verificacionismo, princípio do contexto, princípio de verificação, mito do dado, Philosophical Remarks, verificationism, context principle, principle of verification, myth of the given


Primeiro, procuro esclarecer que uma das ideias que guiam Wittgenstein nas Observações FilosoÌficas eÌ o princiÌpio (criteÌrio) de verificação aplicado ao princiÌpio do contexto. o verificacionismo “amplia” o princiÌpio do contexto. sua função não eÌ meramente eliminar “pseudoproblemas”, pois seu propoÌsito eÌ tornar expliÌcito o sentido das sentenças e o significado das palavras. A partir disso, argumento que, apesar de aceitar que palavras precisam se referir aos fenoÌ‚menos, Wittgenstein usa o princiÌpio para evitar a versão de russell e moore do “mito do dado” (dados sensoriais são o significado de palavras e ‘particulares' não podem ser completamente conceitualizados).



First, I aim at making clear that in the Philosophical Remarks one of Wittgenstein's guiding ideas is the verification principle (criterion) applied to the context principle (verificationism “broadens” the context principle). its function is not merely to eliminate “pseudo-problems”, for it is meant to make explicit the sense of sentences and the meaning of words. With this on hand, i argue that Wittgenstein, in spite of accepting the view according to which words ultimately must refer to phenomena, uses the principle in order to avoid russell's and moore's version of the “myth of the given” (sense-data are the meaning of empirical words and ‘particulars' cannot be completely conceptualized).


Enviado em: agosto de 2015
Aprovado em: junho de 2015



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