Sosa on Animal Knowledge and Emotions

Autores

  • Eros Carvalho UFRGS
  • Flávio Williges UFSM

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.v19i1.3328

Palavras-chave:

Epistemology, Sosa, Virtue Epistemology

Resumo

Our goal in this paper is to discuss the notion of animal knowledge in Judgment and Agency. Our approach has two stages. First, we offer a positive contribution, attempting to show that there is room for the introduction of emotions into an animal knowledge approach and into Sosa's theory of competence. If we follow Sosa and conceive knowledge as a kind of action or successful performance, then emotions can contribute functionally for enhancing performance and are essential for the sharing of knowledge among social agents. Second, we offer criticism of Sosa's integrative project. It's not clear that reflective knowledge always improves animal knowledge; rather, in order to avoid regress, Sosa should recognize that we can have perfectly safe animal knowledge. Finally, we argue that reflective knowledge has a more marginal role than Sosa seems at first sight to suggest.mm

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Publicado

2016-06-16