Epistemic Virtues and their Limits

Autores

  • Carlos Sartori UFSM

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.v19i1.3330

Palavras-chave:

Epistemology, Sosa, Virtue Epistemology

Resumo

The perspectivist virtue theory developed by Sosa requires two elements for a belief to be correct. First, the belief must be formed from a reliable ability or competence; second, the believer must have a higher order belief according to which he forms his beliefs from reliable abilities or competences. This conception faces Jason Boehr's accusation of negligence for not allowing character traits to have a place in the justification project. I will show Sosa's reply to this accusation and I propose to follow Audi and show that character traits, though interesting and desirable, play only an auxiliary role in the justification of beliefs and are inessential for knowledge.

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Publicado

16-06-2016