Epistemic Virtues and their Limits
Resumo
The perspectivist virtue theory developed by Sosa requires two elements for a belief to be correct. First, the belief must be formed from a reliable ability or competence; second, the believer must have a higher order belief according to which he forms his beliefs from reliable abilities or competences. This conception faces Jason Boehr's accusation of negligence for not allowing character traits to have a place in the justification project. I will show Sosa's reply to this accusation and I propose to follow Audi and show that character traits, though interesting and desirable, play only an auxiliary role in the justification of beliefs and are inessential for knowledge.
Palavras-chave
Epistemology; Sosa; Virtue Epistemology
Texto completo:
PDFDOI: https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.v19i1.3330
Direitos autorais 2016 Analytica. Revista de Filosofia

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ISSN 1414-3003, Qualis A2
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