Hume as an Error Theorist

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22i2.84-113

Palavras-chave:

Hume, Sentimentalismo Moral, Convicções Morais, Projetivismo, Teoria do Erro.

Resumo

Neste artigo considero e rejeito uma leitura não-cognitivista do sentimentalismo moral de Hume (segundo a qual ele identifica convicções morais com impressões de um tipo particular) bem como uma leitura disposicionalista (segundo a qual Hume concebe convicções morais como crenças causais a respeito do poder de traços de caráter de produzir certos sentimentos em espectadores apropriados). Sustento que as falhas dessas leituras mostram que Hume é mais bem compreendido como um teórico do erro, de acordo com quem embora convicções morais sejam crenças elas jamais são verdadeiras. Em contraste com teorias do erro contemporâneas, contudo, a tese de Hume não se baseia em uma alegação metafísica para efeito de que não há propriedades morais. Antes, ele sustenta que ideias morais não são ideias de qualidades que possam ser corretamente predicadas de ações ou traços de caráter, mas ideias de sentimentos e que, portanto, crenças morais incorporam sistematicamente um erro categorial.

 

Abstract

In this paper I consider and reject a noncognitivist reading of Hume’ s moral sentimentalism (according to which he identifies moral convictions with impressions of particular kind) as well as a dispositional reading (according to which Hume takes moral convictions to be causal beliefs about the power of character traits to produce certain feelings in suitable spectators). I argue that the shortcomings of these views show that Hume is best understood as an error theorist, according to whom although moral  convictions are beliefs they are never true. In contrast with contemporary error theories, however, Hume’s view is not grounded on a metaphysical claim to the effect that there are no moral properties. He holds instead that moral ideas are not at all ideas of qualities that could be truthfully predicated of actions or character traits but rather ideas of feelings and, therefore, that moral beliefs systematically incorporate a category error.

Referências

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Publicado

05-08-2020