A Interpretação Epistêmica da Semântica Bidimensional

Júlia Telles Menezes

Resumo


O presente artigo pretende apresentar e avaliar criticamente o projeto racionalista de David Chalmers e Frank Jackson na interpretação epistêmica da chamada semântica bidimensional. Diferentes versões do aparato formal da semântica bidimensional são lançadas para resolver certos problemas no âmbito da filosofia da linguagem, a saber, dar conta do conteúdo semântico de termos indexicais, produzir uma explicação para os híbridos modais como instâncias do necessário a posteriori e contribuir para o debate acerca da determinação do conteúdo mental. De um modo geral, a semântica bidimensional estipula uma dupla dependência de expressões linguísticas frente a possibilidades ou cenários. Uma das noções centrais para a construção das possibilidades relevantes é a noção de “cenário”. O presente trabalho procura responder a duas objeções aa noção de cenário empregada por David Chalmers em sua interpretação do aparato bidimensional.

 

Abstract

This paper aims at presenting and critically assessing the epistemic interpretation advanced by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson of the two-dimensional semantic framework. Different versions of the formal apparatus of the two-dimensional framework are used to account for philosophical phenomena such as the content of indexical terms, modal hybrids, such as posteriori necessities and the individuation of mental content. Generally, two-dimensional framework stipulates a double dependence of linguistic terms on possibilities or scenarios. One of the central notions for the construction of the relevant kind of possibility is the notion of “scenario”. The aim of the paper is to defend the two- dimensional framework from two objections regarding the notion of scenario.


Palavras-chave


semântica bidimensional; David Chalmers; Frank Jackson

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Referências


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22i2.114-143



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