Illness and Generality
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.2018.v22i2.174-191Palavras-chave:
Fenomenologia, enfermidade, dúvida corporal, pluralismo ontológico, generalidadeResumo
A fenomenologia aplicada à enfermidade promoveu a elaboração do paradigma do corpo vivido, que tem sido frutífero na análise de estruturas da experiência da doença. Um resultado central da análise é a elucidação do conceito de enfermidade em termos de uma sintonia (Stimmung) do estranhamento (Unheimlichkeit) que é correspondente à ruptura na unidade do corpo vivido. A pessoa enferma situa-se numa atmosfera de estranhamento em relação ao corpo próprio, que aparece de forma análoga a um utensílio quebrado. Neste artigo problematizo a analogia com o utensílio quebrado, concentrando-me no exame do fenômeno da dúvida corporal. Minha sugestão é que a explicitação da teoria de categorias implicada na fenomenologia da dúvida corporal conduz a um pluralismo de modos de ser em que o tipo correspondente de generalidade impede a interpretação da experiência da enfermidade como a manifestação de um utensílio quebrado. Como conclusão, a presente análise é consistente com a interpretação da enfermidade como sendo a atmosfera do estranhamento, que é interpretado aqui como a disrupção na unidade de dois modos de ser: existência e vida.
Abstract
Applied phenomenology of illness elaborated the paradigm of living body, which has been successful in the analysis of the structures of the experience of disease. One of the main results of this analysis is the elucidation of the concept of illness in terms of an attunement (Stimmung) of the uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) that is relative to a disruption in the unity of the living body. The ill person finds herself in an atmosphere of uncanniness in relation to her own body, which appears analogously to a broken tool. In this paper, I question the analogy with the broken tool, focusing in the examination of the phenomenon of bodily doubt. My suggestion is that the explicitation of the theory of categories implied in the phenomenology of bodily doubt leads to a pluralism of modes of being in which the corresponding type of generality precludes the interpretation of the experience of illness as the salience of a broken tool. As a result, this analysis remains consistent with the interpretation of illness as the atmosphere of uncanniness, which is presented here as the disruption in the unity of two ways of being: existence and life.
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