Espinosa e a idéia-quadro cartesiana

Marcos André Gleizer



Shifting the notion of 'idea' from the divine intellect to the content of human mind, Descartes deliberately inaugurated a new use for this notion, thereby raising, in the course of Modern Philosophy, an intense debate as for its precise meaning, its function and its origin. In this article, I intend to examine a moment of this debate, analysing the spinozistic critique to the Cartesian notion of ideas "as images of things", with the ultimate aim of evaluating its scope and, in particular, if this critique entails the complete denial of the relevance of the notion of 'representation' in the spinozistic system.

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ISSN 1414-3003, Qualis A2

Analytica. Revista de Filosofia é indexada pelo Philosopher's Index e pelo GeoDados.