Realismo Científico e Incomensurabilidade Metodológica: Autonomia Epistêmica Como Parte da Racionalidade Científica
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35920/1414-3004.2021v25n1p99-124Keywords:
Argumento do Milagre, Incomensurabilidade Metodológica, Realismo Científico, Thomas KuhnAbstract
Resumo
O argumento do milagre afirma que o realismo científico é a melhor explicação para o sucesso da ciência:
teorias científicas são bem-sucedidas porque são verdadeiras, e cientistas são bem-sucedidos em encontrar
teorias verdadeiras porque se baseiam em normas metodológicas confiáveis. A tese da incomensurabilidade
metodológica afirma que teorias científicas não são escolhidas através de um algoritmo neutro de normas epistêmicas. Isso revela uma lacuna na explicação realista: normas epistêmicas confiáveis não são suficientes para conduzir a escolhas de teorias verdadeiras, pois tais escolhas também são determinadas por outros fatores além de normas epistêmicas. A introdução de fatores adicionais como subdeterminando a escolha de teorias engendrou argumentos relativistas e antirrealistas contra o realismo. A explicação realista pode ser reabilitada se postular que os cientistas possuem autoridade epistêmica para aprimorar as normas metodológicas da ciência, sendo aptos a tomar decisões autônomas em vez de regidas por regras.
Abstract
The no miracles argument claims that scientific realism is the best explanation to science’s success: scientific
theories are empirically successful because they are truthlike, and scientists are successful in theory-choices because they rely on reliable methodological norms. The methodological incommensurability thesis claims that there is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice. It reveals a gap in the realist explanation: reliable epistemic norms are not sufficient to guarantee successful theory-choices, because theory- choices are also determined by other factors besides epistemic norms. The introduction of additional factors as underdetermining theory-choices motivates relativist and antirealist positions. But the realist explanation can be rehabilitated if it postulates that scientists have epistemic authority to develop methodological norms, being apt to take decisions which are autonomous rather than rule-driven.
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