O Conceito de Consequência Lógica e os Problemas do Pluralismo e do Anti-Excepcionalismo

Autores

  • Alberto Leopoldo Batista Neto UFRN

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35920/1414-3004.2021v25n1p125-139

Palavras-chave:

Consequência Lógica, Pluralismo Lógico, Anti-excepcionalismo Lógico.

Resumo

Resumo
Apresentam-se alguns conceitos fundamentais e posições representativas referentes a três debates correntes
na filosofia da lógica, a saber aquele acerca da natureza da relação de consequência, o que versa
sobre o problema do pluralismo lógico (e sua alternativa fundamental, o monismo) e o que gira em torno
da chamada proposta anti-excepcionalista, que nega o caráter excepcional da lógica e a põe numa relação
de continuidade essencial com as demais ciências, de modo a evidenciar pontos de conexão entre as três
discussões mencionadas. Levanta-se, por fim, a questão da plausibilidade da posição, presentemente
minoritária, de um anti-excepcionalismo pluralista, vinculando-a, por sua vez, à aceitação de alguma
variedade de pluralismo científico.
Palavras-chave: consequência lógica; pluralismo lógico; anti-excepcionalismo lógico.
Abstract
Some fundamental concepts are presented, along with the theses relative to three current debates in the
philosophy of logic, namely the one concerning the nature of the relation of logical consequence, the one
over the problem of logical pluralism (and its fundemental alternative, monism), and the one around the
so-called anti-exceptionalist proposal, which denies logic’s exceptional character and puts it in a relation
of essential continuity with the remaining sciences, so as to highlight the points of connection between
the three aforementioned discussions. The question is raised, finally, of the plausibility of the position,
presently of small currency, of a pluralist anti-exceptionalism, which is associated, in its turn, to the acceptance
of some variety of scientific pluralism.

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Publicado

23-05-2023