Reassessing the Clash Between Isaiah Berlin’s Value Pluralism and Ronald Dworkin’s Monism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35920/1414-3004.2021v25n1p140-156Palavras-chave:
Value Pluralism, Unity of Value, Isaiah Berlin, Ronald Dworkin, Liberty, Moral SkepticismResumo
Resumo
Este artigo reexamina o debate entre o pluralismo de valores de Isaiah Berlin (PV) e o monismo de Ronald
Dworkin, sua “unidade do valor” (UV). Em primeiro lugar, o debate entre ambos é reconstruído por meio
de duas proposições: de acordo com a proposição descritiva p, “é possível integrar nossos valores em um
todo coerente”; de acordo com a proposição normativa Pn, “a melhor interpretação de nossos valores
mostra que eles estão integrados em um todo coerente”. Enquanto PV nega ambas, UV as afirma. Feito
isso, apresentam-se os argumentos de Dworkin em defesa de sua tese (assim como as críticas que faz ao
pluralismo de Berlin), seguidos de uma resposta pluralista. Por fim, examina-se a tentativa de Dworkin de
recolocar o debate no plano meta-ético, julgando-a inadequada: o pluralismo berliniano não se encaixa
nos rótulos de “ceticismo interno” e “externo” que Dworkin tenta lhe imputar.
Abstract
This article revisits and reassess the debate between Isaiah Berlin’s value pluralism (VP) and Ronald Dworkin’s monism, his “unity of value” (UV). First of all, the debate is reconstructed around two claims: according to the descriptive claim p, “it is possible to integrate our values in a coherent whole”; according to the normative claim Pn, “the best interpretation of our values shows them to be integrated in a coherent whole”. While VP denies both, UV asserts them. After that, Dworkin’s arguments in defense of his thesis (as well as his criticisms of Berlin’s pluralism) are presented, along with a pluralist response to them. Finally, Dworkin’s attempt to recast the debate in the meta-ethical level is assessed and deemed to be inadequate: Berlin’s value pluralism does not fit the labels of “internal” and “external skepticism” that Dworkin wants to associate with it.
Referências
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