Frege and Wittgenstein's Debate Regarding the Notion of "Fact"in the Tractatus: Is it a Set-Theorist or a Mereological Notion?

Araceli Velloso

Autores

Araceli Velloso UFG https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0294-0229

Palavras-chave:

Wittgenstein, Frege, Set theory, Fact, Teoria dos Conjuntos, Merealogia, Mereology

Resumo

A preencher

Referências

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Frege and Wittgenstein's Debate Regarding the Notion of "Fact"in the Tractatus

Is it a Set-Theorist or a Mereological Notion?

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