Vantagens Competitivas Institucionais de Bancos Públicos

Autori

  • Kurt Mettenheim Professor da Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas.

Parole chiave:

Vantagens Comparativas, Bancos Públicos, Bancos Privados

Abstract

Este artigo utiliza conceitos e teorias sobre instituições, falhas de mercado, e bancos para explicar como bancos públicos tendem a superar bancos privados em funções essenciais como o custo de operações, o balanceamento de ativos e passivos, a criação de reservas, a gestão de liquidez, a manutenção da confiança de depositantes e do público em geral, a gestão de problemas relacionados à assimetria de informações, aos custos de agência, ao racionamento de crédito, à drenagem de capital, e outras falhas de mercado e fenômenos importantes de economia política.

Biografia autore

Kurt Mettenheim, Professor da Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas.

Professor da Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo, Fundação Getulio Vargas.

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2020-02-09

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