A percepção como uma relação: Uma análise do conceito comum de percepção

Plínio Junqueira Smith

Resumo


O artigo pretende analisar o conceito comum de percepção. A concepção comum seria uma concepção relacional da percepção. A percepção seria, não somente um estado mental, mas um padrão de eventos, no qual estariam envolvidos os seguintes elementos: uma causa ou ocasião; uma sensação ou experiência; efeitos, manifestações ou reações. Em seguida, analisam-se esses elementos, dando destaque para a percepção como uma atividade cognitiva, para o papel da linguagem na experiência perceptiva e para o papel causal do objeto.

 

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to describe the common concept of perception. According to the common view, perception is intrinsically relational. Perception is not merely a mental state, but it is composed of a pattern of events, involving: causes and occasions; sensations and experiences; effects, manifestations and reactions. All these elements are analysed, and special attention is given to the notion of cognitive activity, to the role played by language in relation to perceptual experience, and to the causal role played by objects. 


Palavras-chave


percepção; padrão de eventos; capacidade cognitiva; experiência perceptiva; teoria causal da percepção; perception; pattern of events; perceptual experience; causal theory of perception; cognitive capacity

Texto completo:

PDF

Referências


Austin, J. (1962). Sense and Sensibilia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Austin, J. (1979). Other Minds. Philosophical Papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ayer, A. J. (1973). The Central Questions of Philosophy. London: Penguin Books.

Chakrabarti, A. (1998). Experience, Concept-Possession, and Knowledge of a Language. In: Hahn, E. (ed.). The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson. Chicago and Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court.

Child, W. (1992). Vision and Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168): 297-316. doi:10.2307/2219682

Child, W. (1994). Vision and Causation: Reply to Hyman. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(176), 361-369. doi:10.2307/2219615

Descartes, R. (1996). Meditations. In: Oeuvres Complètes. Ed. Adam et Tannery, Paris: Vrin, Vol. IX.

Dretske, F. (2000). Conscious Experience. Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.113-137. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511625312.008

Grice, P. (1989). The Causal Theory of Perception. Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: Harvard University Press.

Hacker, P. M. S.; Bennett, M. R. (2003). Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hinton, J. M. (2008). Visual Experiences. Byrne, A.; Heather, L. (eds.). Contemporary Readings, xxx--11. doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.003.0002

Hume, D. (1986). An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Ed. P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hume, D. (2004). A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hyman, J. (1992). The Causal Theory of Perception. Philosophical Quarterly 42(168), p. 277-296. doi:10.2307/2219681

Hyman, J. (1993). Vision, Causation and Occlusion. Philosophical Quarterly 43(171) , p. 210-214. doi: 10.2307/2220370

Hyman, J. (1994a). Reply to Vision. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176), p. 369-376. doi: 10.2307/2219616

Hyman, J. (1994b). Vision and Power. The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 91(5), p. 236-252.

Mackie, J. L. (1976). Problems from Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McDowell, J. (1998), Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge. In: Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: Harvard University Press.

McDowell, J. (2012). Perception as a Capacity to Knowledge. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press.

Millar, A. (2009). The Idea of Experience. In: Byrne, A.; Heather, L. (eds.). Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: MIT Press. doi: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.001.0001

Millar, A. (2011). “Disjunctivism and Skepticism”. In: Greco, J. (ed.). 2011. The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.003.0027

Pritchard, D. (2012). Epistemological Disjunctivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557912.001.0001

Robinson, H. (2009). Selections from Perception. In: Byrne, A.; Heather, L. (eds.). Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: MIT Press. doi: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.001.0001

Ryle, G. (1969). Dilemmas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Snowdon, P. (1998). Strawson on the Concept of Perception. In: Hahn, E. (ed.) (1998) The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson. Chicago and Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court.

Snowdon, P. (2009a). Perception, Vision, and Causation. In: Byrne, A.; Heather, L. (eds.). Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: MIT Press. doi: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.003.0004

Snowdon, P. (2009b). The Objects of Perceptual Experience. In: Byrne, A.; Heather, L. (eds.). Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, England: MIT Press. doi: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.001.0001

Strawson, P. F. (1974). Causation in Perception. In: Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays, London and New York: Routledge.




DOI: https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.2014.v18i1.109-132



Direitos autorais 2015 Analytica. Revista de Filosofia

Licença Creative Commons
Esta obra está licenciada sob uma licença Creative Commons Atribuição - Compartilhar igual 4.0 Internacional.

ISSN 1414-3003, Qualis A2

Analytica. Revista de Filosofia é indexada pelo Philosopher's Index e pelo GeoDados.