A percepção como uma relação: Uma análise do conceito comum de percepção
Keywords:
percepção, padrão de eventos, capacidade cognitiva, experiência perceptiva, teoria causal da percepção, perception, pattern of events, perceptual experience, causal theory of perception, cognitive capacityAbstract
O artigo pretende analisar o conceito comum de percepção. A concepção comum seria uma concepção relacional da percepção. A percepção seria, não somente um estado mental, mas um padrão de eventos, no qual estariam envolvidos os seguintes elementos: uma causa ou ocasião; uma sensação ou experiência; efeitos, manifestações ou reações. Em seguida, analisam-se esses elementos, dando destaque para a percepção como uma atividade cognitiva, para o papel da linguagem na experiência perceptiva e para o papel causal do objeto.
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to describe the common concept of perception. According to the common view, perception is intrinsically relational. Perception is not merely a mental state, but it is composed of a pattern of events, involving: causes and occasions; sensations and experiences; effects, manifestations and reactions. All these elements are analysed, and special attention is given to the notion of cognitive activity, to the role played by language in relation to perceptual experience, and to the causal role played by objects.
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