Incompetent Knowledge: Virtues and Virtualities

Hilan Bensusan

doi:10.35920/arf.v19i1.3329

Incompetent Knowledge: Virtues and Virtualities

Authors

Hilan Bensusan UnB

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.35920/arf.v19i1.3329

Keywords:

Epistemology, Sosa, Virtue Epistemology

Abstract

The paper reflects on some elements of Sosa's recently proposed SSS scheme. It considers the dispositional elements involved in some virtue-based epistemological approaches and their underlying counterfactual structure. These considerations ground a contrast between the virtue-based approach and a proposed virtuality-based approach where the underlying counterfactual is associated with no talk of abilities, capacities or competences.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Downloads

PDF (Português (Brasil))

Published

2016-06-16

How to Cite

BENSUSAN, Hilan. Incompetent Knowledge: Virtues and Virtualities. Analytica - Revista de Filosofia, [S. l.], v. 19, n. 1, p. 161–171, 2016. DOI: 10.35920/arf.v19i1.3329. Disponível em: https://revistas.ufrj.br/index.php/analytica/article/view/3329. Acesso em: 6 dec. 2025.

Issue

Vol. 19 No. 1 (2015): Metafísica e Epistemologia

Section

Artigos

License

Analytica. Journal of Philosophy is an open-access scientific journal licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-ND 4.0) license. This means that its content can be copied and redistributed in any medium or format for any purpose provided the following requirements are met: proper credit is given, a link to the license is provided, and it is indicated if any changes were made. Legal terms or technological measures that restrict others from exercising rights granted by the license shall not be applied. In the case of any transformation or adaptation of the content, the new material cannot be distributed.

This statement aligns with the Budapest Open Access Initiative (BOAI) definition of open access.