Elucidação, Ostensão, Acquaintance: como Ler o Aforismo 3.263 do Tractatus
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35920/1414-3004.2021v25n2-2p164-178Keywords:
Wittgenstein, Tractatus, elucidação, ostensão, acquaintance, nomes.Abstract
O aforismo 3.263 do Tractatus de Wittgenstein parece enunciar um paradoxo: para elucidar o significado de um nome, pode-se recorrer a uma proposição que inclua este nome; mas uma tal proposição só será compreendida se já for conhecido o significado daquele nome. Neste artigo, pretendemos cumprir duas tarefas: (1) avaliar criticamente duas interpretações daquele aforismo (as de Hacker e Ishiguro), levando em consideração os eventuais papéis cumpridos na elucidação de um nome pela ostensão e pelo conhecimento sensível (acquaintance) do objeto nomeado; e (2) propor os requisitos mínimos de uma leitura mais bem-sucedida de 3.263, dentre os quais estarão a interpretação da elucidação como uma proposição tractariana genuína e o reconhecimento de uma habilidade fundamental do destinatário da elucidação em apreender a proposição elucidativa, o fato afigurado pela proposição e a forma lógica comum entre a proposição e o fato.
Abstract
Aphorism 3.263 of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus seems to state a paradox: to elucidate the meaning of a name, one can resort to a proposition that includes this name; but such a proposition can only be understood if the meaning of that name is already known. In this paper, we intend to fulfill two tasks: (1) critically evaluate two interpretations of that aphorism (by Hacker and Ishiguro), taking into account the possible roles played in the elucidation of a name by ostension and by acquaintance with the object named; and (2) propose the minimum requirements for a more successful reading of 3.263, among which are the interpretation of the elucidation as a genuine Tractarian proposition and the acknowledgement of a fundamental ability by the recipient of the elucidation to grasp the elucidatory proposition, the fact pictured by the proposition and the common logical form between the proposition and the fact.
References
ANSCOMBE, E. 1959. An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Nova Iorque: Harper & Row. BLACK, M. 1964. A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
DIAMOND, C. 2000. Ethics, Imagination and the Tractatus. In CRARY, A. & READ, R. (ed.) The New Wit- tgenstein. Londres: Routledge.
HACKER, P. 1975. Frege and Wittgenstein on Elucidations. Mind 84 (336): 601-609.
HACKER, P. 1986. Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
HELME, M. 1979. An Elucidation of Tractatus 3.263. Southern Journal of Philosophy 17 (3): 323-334.
ISHIGURO, H. 1969. Use and Reference of Names. In WINCH, P. (ed.) Studies in the Philosophy of Witt- genstein. Londres: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
ISHIGURO, H. 1990. Can the World Impose Logical Structure on Language? In HALLER, R. & BRANDL, J. (ed.) Wittgenstein – Towards a Re-Evaluation: Proceedings of the 14th International Wittgenstein Sympo- sium.Viena: Springer.
KENNY, A. 1973. The Ghost of the Tractatus. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 7: 1-13. KRIPKE, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
NAKANO, A. 2021. Haecceitism in the Tractatus: A refutation of Ishiguro’s view on Tractarian names. Analysis 81(2): 232-240.
RUSSELL, B. 1986. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. In SLATER, J. (ed.) The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and Other Essays: 1914–19 (The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 8). Londres: George Allen & Unwin.
WAISMANN, F. 1979. Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle. Oxford: Blackwell.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. 1961. Notebooks 1914-1916. Trad. G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. 1975. Philosophical Remarks. Trad. R. Hargreaves and R. White. Oxford: Blackwell.
WITTGENSTEIN, L. 2017. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trad. Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos. São Paulo: EDUSP.
ZALABARDO, J. 2015. Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
Analytica. Journal of Philosophy is an open-access scientific journal licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-ND 4.0) license. This means that its content can be copied and redistributed in any medium or format for any purpose provided the following requirements are met: proper credit is given, a link to the license is provided, and it is indicated if any changes were made. Legal terms or technological measures that restrict others from exercising rights granted by the license shall not be applied. In the case of any transformation or adaptation of the content, the new material cannot be distributed.
This statement aligns with the Budapest Open Access Initiative (BOAI) definition of open access.