The knight of fire: self-esteem, strategic culture and nuclear arms control under George W. Bush

Abstract

The aim is to examine, from the psychological constructivist perspective developed by Richard Ned Lebow, the position of President George W. Bush on nuclear arms control. The hypothesis indicates that Bush aimed at preserving U.S. prestige as a great power and thereby strengthening his own self-esteem as a neoconservative leader and U.S. collective self-esteem as a pillar of democracy and freedom in the world. He adopted, from the institutionalized collective identity of defense of liberal values and the aggressiveness of the “American way of war”, a policy that put the U.S. power in the center of the strategy, in a combination of unparalleled military strength and defense of freedom and democracy. Bush thus sought to avoid strict controls on delivery vehicles, missile defense and stored nuclear warheads in legally binding agreements on nuclear arms control to strengthen the flexibility to combat new threats classified as "enemies of freedom", such as rogue states.