Em defesa do Direito Probatório fundado em regras - e da Epistemologia também

Frederick Schauer

Resumo


RESUMO:

Desde que Jeremy Bentham escreveu a sua severa crítca ao Direito Probatório, filósofos e juristas têm critcado as regras probatórias excludentes argumentando que as regras formais que excluem classes inteiras de provas em razão da sua alegada infabilidade violam máximas epistemológicas fundamentais que exigem que toda prova pertinente seja levada em consideração. Embora algumas partes da prova possam ser excluídas por falta de fabilidade – argumentam eles – seria um erro fazer tais juízos em relação a categorias inteiras, em oposição a fazê-los somente em relação à provas específcas apresentadas para propósitos específicos. Este artgo põe em causa essas alegações, argumentando que exclusões fundadas em regras servem a propósitos similares àqueles desempenhados pelas regras nas teorias morais consequencialistas de regras, e que, de maneira ainda mais importante, elas são totalmente consistentes com a natureza excludente das regras jurídicas em geral. Na verdade, uma vez visto o papel que as regras excludentes podem desempenhar na Epistemologia Jurídica, se torna possível ver que elas poderiam ter um papel a desempenhar na avaliação epistêmica em geral.

ABSTRACT: 

Ever since Jeremy Bentham wrote his scathing critique of the law of evidence, both philosophers and legal scholars have criticized the exclusionary rules of evidence, arguing that formal rules excluding entre classes of evidence for alleged unreliability violate basic epistemological maxims mandating that all relevant evidence be considered. Although particular pieces of evidence might be excluded as unreliable, they argue, it is a mistake to make such judgments for entire categories, as opposed to making only in the context of particular pieces of evidence offered for specifc purposes. This paper challenges these claims, arguing that rule-based exclusions serve similar purposes to those served by rules in rule-consequentalist moral theories, and that, even more importantly, they are entirely consistent with the exclusionary nature of legal rules in general. Indeed, once we see the role that exclusionary rules might serve in legal epistemology, we can see that they might have a role to play in epistemic appraisal more generally.


Palavras-chave


Direito probatório; Epistemologia; Regras excludentes; Evidence Law; Epistemology; Exclusionary Rules

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Referências


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21875/tjc.v1i2.11727

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Direitos autorais 2017 Frederick Schauer

ISSN 2526-0464

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