Entimemas e inferência de princípios jurídicos

Juliano Souza de Albuquerque Maranhão, Jorge Alberto A. de Araújo

Resumo


RESUMO:

O artigo propõe um modelo de inferência de princípios jurídicos a partir de normas jurídicas, por meio da reconstrução de entimemas presentes em decisões judiciais. A ideia básica é que o principio inferido é a premissa normativa faltante de um entimema empregado em decisão judicial que aplica determinada norma. A decisão seria, assim, uma forma de endosso autoritativo do conteúdo do princípio. O modelo é aplicado sobre a inferência do princípio de presunção de inocência na decisão do Supremo Tribunal Federal acerca da possibilidade de execução de sentença penal condenatória antes de seu trânsito em julgado.  O artigo discute implicações desse modelo de inferência para o debate entre positivismo e anti-positivismo. 

 

ABSTRACT:

The paper proposes a model to infer legal principles from norms, consisting in the reconstruction of enthymemes in judicial decisions. The basic idea is that the inferred principle is the missing normative premise of an enthymeme employed by a judicial decision, which applies the legal norm at stake. The decision would then be a form of endorsement of the content of the legal principle. The model is illustrated by the inference of the content of the principle of presumption of innocence in the Brazilian Supreme Court Decision on the possibility of execution of a criminal sentence before its final revision by the superior courts. The paper discusses the implications of the model within the positivism/antipositivism debate.


Palavras-chave


Entimemas; Princípios Jurídicos; Presunção de Inocência; Positivismo; Anti-positivismo

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Referências


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21875/tjc.v3i2.23095

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Direitos autorais 2019 Juliano Souza de Albuquerque Maranhão



ISSN 2526-0464

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