Reasoning with persuasive precedent: the role of persuasive authority in the law

Joaquín Reyes Barros

Resumo


ABSTRACT:

This paper attempts to draw the attention to the role of persuasive authority in the law, by providing a critical review of Frederick Schauer’s influential account of persuasive authorities as optional authorities. Although recognizing that Schauer highlights some important features of the notion, it is argued that, as long as his interpretation leaves no room for theoretical authority in the law, it fails to account properly for one of the main roles of persuasive authorities, namely, to provide future courts with reasons to distinguish their case from previous court’s decisions. It is also suggested that persuasive authorities are best understood as theoretical authorities providing practical reasons. The article concludes with some final remarks on the consequences of the adopted view for our understanding of the law in general.

RESUMO:

Este artigo tenta chamar a atenção sobre o papel da autoridade persuasiva na lei, fornecendo uma revisão crítica da influente explicação de Frederick Schauer de autoridades persuasivas como autoridades opcionais. Embora reconhecendo que Schauer destaca algumas características importantes da noção, argumenta-se que, enquanto sua interpretação não deixa espaço para a autoridade teórica na lei, ela não leva em conta adequadamente um dos papéis principais das autoridades persuasivas, a saber, fornecer aos futuros tribunais razões para distinguir o seu caso das decisões dos tribunais anteriores. Sugere-se também que as autoridades persuasivas sejam melhor entendidas como autoridades teóricas fornecendo razões práticas. O artigo conclui com algumas observações finais sobre as conseqüências da visão adotada para nossa compreensão da lei em geral.

 


Palavras-chave


Jurisprudence; Precedents; Persuasive Authority; Non-binding Precedents; Teoria do direito; Argumentação; Precedentes; Autoridade persuasiva; Precedentes não-vinculativos

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21875/tjc.v1i2.8653

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Direitos autorais 2017 Joaquín Reyes Barros

ISSN 2526-0464

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