Five Challenges for Theories of Law
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21875/tjc.v3i2.19655Keywords:
Grounding, Supervenience, Law as factAbstract
RESUMO:
Neste artigo, enuncio cinco desafios intuitivos a serem enfrentados por uma teoria do direito. Na sequência, argumento que a ideia tipicamente positivista de que as atribuições jurídicas possam estar assentadas exclusivamente em fatos descritivos parece conflitar com três deles. Concluo, assim, que a despeito de tanto o interpretativismo quanto o descritivismo serem nalguma medida teorias contraintuitivas, é sobre o segundo que recai um maior ônus argumentativo.
ABSTRACT:
In this paper, I introduce five intuitive challenges that should be dealt with by theories of law. Then, I argue that the typically positivist idea that the legal ascriptions of a given legal system may be grounded exclusively on descriptive facts seems to conflict with three of those challenges. I conclude that in spite of the fact that both interpretivism and descriptivism are counterintuitive theories about law, it is the latter that has a greater argumentative burden.
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