Argumentation Schemes for the Interpretation of Statutes
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21875/tjc.v3i2.22710Keywords:
Interpretation, Argumentation, Argumentation Schemes, Argument a contrario, Legal Reasoning, PragmaticsAbstract
RESUMO:
Neste artigo demonstra-se como os esquemas argumentativos (esquemas que representam argumentos refutáveis, combinados com perguntas críticas correspondentes), podem ser usados para representar a estrutura lógica dos vários tipos de argumentos reconhecidos como fundamentais na interpretação da lei por Tarello (1980). Defende-se que o processo de interpretação da lei tem uma estrutura argumentativa distinta na qual a conclusão, nomeadamente o significado disputável ou questionado atribuído a uma fonte jurídica, é uma afirmação que necessita ser respaldada por argumentos refutáveis a favor ou contra. Esta transformação de argumentos de interpretação numa estrutura de esquemas argumentativos é analisada em detalhe em dois argumentos, o argumento psicológico e o argumento a contrario. A natureza refutável de cada esquema é demonstrada por meio de questões críticas que identificam as condições padrão para a aceitação de argumentos interpretativos e fornecem um método para avaliar a força ou a fraqueza de um determinado argumento.
ABSTRACT:
In this paper, the logical structures of the interpretative arguments summarizing the various interpretative canons considered fundamental by Tarello (1980) are represented by argumentation schemes, namely patterns of defeasible arguments combined with their corresponding critical questions. The process of statutory interpretation is shown to have a specific argumentative structure where the conclusion corresponds to the disputed or questionable meaning attributed to a legal source and needs to be supported and attacked through defeasible arguments. This translation of interpretative arguments into argumentation schemes is illustrated in detail considering two specific arguments, the psychological and the a contrario arguments. The defeasibility conditions of each scheme are summarized in a set of critical questions, which identify the default conditions for accepting interpretative arguments and provide a method for evaluating a given argument as weak or strong.
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