El derecho como punto de partida al concepto filosófico de "presunción": la contribución de Ullmann-Margalit
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.21875/tjc.v1i1.3256Keywords:
Presunciones, Razonamiento práctico, Ullmann-Margalit, Presumptions, Practical ReasoningAbstract
Resumen: El presente paper analiza la contribución de Edna Ullmann-Margalit al desarrollo del concepto filosófico de presunción (asumir desde la ocurrencia de un hecho conocido la ocurrencia de un hecho no conocido a modo de actuar sobre él). Ullman-Margalit toma el contexto jurídico como punto de partida de su teoría porque, según ella, el lenguaje técnico del derecho dispone de más precisión que el lenguaje ordinario en lo que respeta a la “presunción” y sus parientes terminológicos. Dado que su paper de 1983 se haya convertido en una referencia a todos los que se dedican a qué significa “presumir”, aquí se ofrecerán dos objeciones a la contribución de Ullmann-Margalit.
Abstract: The present paper analyzes Edna Ullman-Margalit's contribution for the development of a philosophical concept of presumption (assume from the occurrence of a known fact the occurrence of an unknown fact in order to act on its basis). Ullman-Margalit takes the legal context as a departure point for her theory because she believes that technical legal language is more precise than ordinary language in relation to the concept of "presumption" and its terminological cousins. Given that her 1983 paper has been a reference to those who attempt to understand what it means to "presume", this paper will offer two objections to Ullman-Margalit's contribution.
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