Por gramáticas monstruosas

desacordos mais-que-profundos e formas-de-vida

Abstract

I propose a dialogue between Derrida’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophies through the concept of deep disagreements (Fogelin, 1985). I analyze disagreements that express the dichotomy between humanity and monstrosity, noting that the epistemology of disagreements has so far focused on locating and separating disagreements (Lavorerio, 2021), a movement that aligns with efforts to dry out knowledge (Haddock-Lobo, 2007). Unlike the animal, deprived of language, monstrosities lie at the limits of human language, being subject to epistemic injustices (Fricker, 2007) and linguistic silencing (Saul and Díaz-León, 2018). If, as Fogelin argues, deep disagreements arise from clashes between forms of life, I propose that we think of more-than-deep disagreements, derived from conflicts between human forms of life and monstrous forms-of-life (Tiqqun, 2019; Trächtler, 2023), which provide the ground upon which deep disagreements occur.