Epistemic Virtue and Acceptance in Legal Fact-Finding

Autores/as

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21875/tjc.v1i1.3440

Palabras clave:

Epistemic Virtue, Belief and Acceptance, Responsibilism, Legal Fact-Finding, Virtude epistêmica, Crença e aceitação, Responsabilismo, Investigação dos fatos

Resumen

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to outline the way in which an epistemic virtue approach can be used to address epistemological issues in law. My claim is that responsibilism is the right kind of approach. First, I will briefly examine the difference between this conception and the reliabilist conception of intellectual virtues. Then, I will explore two major responsibilist projects that contain several features required for an appropriate virtue approach to legal fact-finding. Next I will discuss the belief/acceptance dichotomy and attempt to show that it is acceptance -- rather than belief -- the right type of propositional attitude to be held by legal fact-finders, and that it may be regulated by intellectual virtues. In the end, it will be argued that the conjunction of a responsibilist epistemology and a theory of acceptance constitutes a good theoretical framework for the analysis of legal reasoning about matters of fact. 

Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é delinear o modo como uma abordagem a partir da epistemologia da virtude pode ser usada para lidar com questões epistemológicas no direito. Minha alegação é que o responsabilismo é um tipo correto de abordagem. Primeiro, vou brevemente examinar a diferença entre esta concepção e a concepção confiabilista das virtudes intelectuais. Em seguida, vou explorar dois grandes projetos responsabilistas que contêm diversas caracteristicas requeridas para uma abordagem a partir da teoria das vitudes que seja apropriada para a investigação dos fatos no direito. Depois discutirei a dicotomia crença/aceitação e procurarei mostrar que é a aceitação -- e não a crenca -- o tipo certo de atitude proposicional a ser assumida pelo investigador dos fatos no direito, e que esta atitude pode ser regulada pelas virtudes intelectuais. No final, será argumentado que a conjunção entre uma epistemologia responsabilista e uma teoria da aceitação constitui um bom quadro teórico para a análise do raciocínio jurídico sobre questões de fato.

Biografía del autor/a

Pedro Humberto Haddad Bernat, Universitat de Girona

Investigador en la Cátedra de Cultura Jurídica de la Universitat de Girona, España.

Citas

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Publicado

2016-11-18

Número

Vol. 1 Núm. 1 (2016)

Sección

Seção Especial

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